Battle of Kursk. Historical description

The Battle of Kursk is a turning point during the entire Second World War, when the Soviet Troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost the strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of fighting remained before the defeat of the enemy, after this battle, confidence in victory over the enemy appeared in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

The radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad, when a large enemy group was eliminated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk salient was the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, German troops were mainly on the defensive until the end of the war, while ours mainly conducted offensive operations, liberating Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly drained of blood, the USSR command carried out a counter-offensive against the troops of Army Groups “Center” and “South”. On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, marking the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

Background of the battle

After the victory at Stalingrad during the successful Operation Uranus, Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of German troops, a protrusion arose in the area of ​​Kursk and Orel, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.

From April to June, relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The most suitable place was considered to be the Kursk ledge, by striking at it in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kiev and Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

Back on April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he outlined his thoughts on Germany’s actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the enemy’s main attack. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan for countermeasures, which included wearing out the enemy in defensive battles, and then launching a counterattack and completely destroying him. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters unanimously spoke out for the impossibility and futility of launching a preventive strike in the spring and summer. After all, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groups preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of friendly troops. Also, the formation of forces to deliver the main attack was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attack of the Germans, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, a decision was made to conduct a defensive operation in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, where the main attack of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.

In the spring of 1943, the word “Citadel” appeared more and more often in intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named “Citadel” on Stalin’s desk, which was developed by the Wehrmacht General Staff, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the operation plan.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful group capable of withstanding the pressure of German units and carrying out counterattacks at the climax of the battle.

Army composition, commanders

It was planned to attract forces to strike Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk-Oryol bulge Army Group Center, which was commanded Field Marshal Kluge And Army Group South, which was commanded Field Marshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the considered elite SS tank divisions “Das Reich”, “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” were pulled up for a strike in the direction of Kursk.

Thus, the group consisted of 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft that were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.

One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand assault guns. It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to reach the front and were in the process of being finalized that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete Pz.Kpfw tanks. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.

The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th Armies, the 9th Tank Army of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as Task Force Kempf, the tank 4th Army and the 24th Corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command by General Hoth.

In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts: Voronezh, Stepnoy, and Central.

The Central Front was commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to Army General N.F. Vatutin, had to defend the southern front. Colonel General I.S. Konev was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the USSR reserve during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the Kursk salient area. Data may differ from some sources.

Weapons (tanks)

During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike forces before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.

Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification it was considered severe. For the first time he took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the battles in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, it began to be actively used by the Wehrmacht in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, even despite a number of shortcomings.

"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long combat distances it was invulnerable to fire from Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks on the creation of one combat unit.

Panzerkampfwagen III until 1943 it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. Captured combat units were used by Soviet troops, and self-propelled guns were created on their basis.

Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar types of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.

The light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of Krupp and Daimler Benz, discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1,574 units.

In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War had to withstand the onslaught of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which, the T-34-85, is in service with some countries to this day.

Progress of the battle

There was a calm on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the accuracy of the calculations of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. However, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of two Soviet fronts launched a massive attack on the supposed enemy positions. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the area of ​​​​Kharkov and Belgorod. However, this did not bring much results. According to German reports, only communication lines were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery barrage, significant Wehrmacht forces went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers and minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communications, the Germans were unable to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without tank support. On the northern front, the attack was aimed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to break into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.

* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and said with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk will not go anywhere.

The 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which were part of the 4th Army, were tasked with defeating the Russians in the South. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Tank Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkassk, without moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassy is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on an advantageous terrain in a tactical battle, he would give battle to the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy Tigers, the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions managed to quickly make a hole in the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tank crews received orders to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of court martial and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Having struck Das Reich head-on, the 5th Stk failed and was driven back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to encircle the corps forces. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units who found themselves outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of Soviet troops in a single day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery barrage and massive airstrikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the 2nd SS Tank Corps collided in a counter battle. The battle lasted all day. The initiative passed from hand to hand. The opponents suffered colossal losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, victory remained with us; the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, on the Northern front, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Oryol. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called “Kutuzov” in the plans of the General Staff.

Operation Rumyantsev was supposed to defeat German forces in the area of ​​​​Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev and with it the Battle of Kursk.

* On August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire War was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.

Losses of the parties

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not precisely known. To date, the data differ radically. In 1943, the Germans lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded in the battle of the Kursk salient. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1,696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned and out of action due to technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the skies over Kursk and Orel.

Results, significance

Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted major losses on the Germans, who lost their strategic advantage forever. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its previous scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory at the Kursk Bulge became an excellent help for raising the morale of soldiers on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Russian Military Glory Day

The day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is a day of remembrance of all those who, in July-August 1943, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations of “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Arc of Fire.

Video about the Kursk Bulge, key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend watching:

The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5, 1943 to August 23, 1943, is a turning point in the central event of the Great Patriotic War and a gigantic historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.

Hitler had great hopes for this major offensive battle called “Citadel”; he needed a victory to raise the morale of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 became fatal for Hitler, as the countdown in the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched towards victory.

Intelligence service

Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the Citadel. Anastas Mikoyan (member of the CPSU Politburo) claims that Stalin received information about the Citadel project as early as April 12.

Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted messages from the 3rd Reich. As a result, the summer offensive project was intercepted, as was information about the overall Citadel plan, location and force structure. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.

Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the Soviet command became aware of the deployment of German troops along the Eastern Front, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other directions of the fronts.

Confrontation

The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparations were carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.

The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - Central direction, I. Konev - Steppe direction of the front, responded to the German offensive with dignity.

The Kursk Bulge was supervised by talented generals from the enemy - General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having received a repulse at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyry with the help of the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they were unable to break through the defensive power of the Red Army.

From July 11, a fierce battle raged near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that a turning point in the war occurred, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.

One of the global tank battles took place. Hitler's army brought 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1,200 tanks on both sides. The Germans were defeated by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned defensive.

During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 people and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Operation Citadel lasted only 6 days, in which the Germans tried to advance.

Equipment used

Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery units, nicknamed "St. John's wort" by soldiers - SU-152, as well as SU-76 and SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tiger, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by self-propelled guns "Elephant" (we have "Ferdinand").

Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of the Ferdinands; they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.

Also the Germans' assault guns were the StuG III and JagdPz IV tank destroyers. Hitler relied heavily on new equipment in the battle, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.

During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German Panthers and Tigers, abandoned by the crew or broken. After the breakdowns were repaired, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet army.

List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):

• 3444 tanks;
• 2172 aircraft;
• 1.3 million people;
• 19,100 mortars and guns.

As a reserve force there was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.

List of enemy forces:

• 2733 tanks;
• 2500 aircraft;
• 900 thousand people;
• 10,000 mortars and guns.

The Red Army had numerical superiority at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in quantity, but in the technical level of military equipment.

Offensive

On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack with the aim of defeating the Kharkov-Belgorod German group. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions occupied before the offensive.

By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18:00 Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, the battle for the city of Oryol was fought, and on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway road during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, weakening the tempo of fighting on both fronts.

Heavy fighting lasted until August 14. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intense assault on Kharkov began.

This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until August 30.

Losses

According to different historical reports, losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. states that losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and prisoners, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.

Losses in the difficult battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army were:

• Killed, disappeared, captured - 254,470 people,
• Injured - 608,833 people.

Those. In total, human losses amounted to 863,303 people, with an average daily loss of 32,843 people.

Losses of military equipment:

• Tanks – 6064 pcs.;
• Aircraft – 1626 pcs.,
• Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.

The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were 130,429 killed. The losses of military equipment were: tanks - 1500 units; airplanes – 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were killed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.

Bottom line

Irritated, Hitler laid the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, later major offensives “Watch on the Rhine” in 1944 and the Balaton operation in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, the intensity, the results and the military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5 - 12); offensive - Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation “Citadel”. About 2.2 million people, approximately 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft.

During the winter of 1942-1943. the offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge. The "Kursk Bulge", a protrusion facing west, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. Throughout April - June 1943, there was an operational pause on the Eastern Front, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensively preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts were located on the Kursk salient, threatening the flanks and rear of the German Army Groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could deliver strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk area, encircle them and destroy them.

Plans and strengths of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy forces were exhausted and mud had set in, negating the possibility of a rapid offensive, the time had come to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous opponent who thirsted for revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of the Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS and Air Force troops, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht at the start of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of units, the Wehrmacht of 1943 was superior to the German armed forces of 1941.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet one, a wait-and-see strategy and pure defense were unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time was on its side - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to operate at full capacity (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), and partisan warfare in the German rear expanded. The likelihood of Allied armies landing in Western Europe and the opening of a second front grew. In addition, it was not possible to create a strong defense on the Eastern Front, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, Army Group South was forced to defend a front stretching up to 760 km with 32 divisions - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy limited himself only to defense, to conduct offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not stick to defense alone; this was the path to defeat. Only a war of maneuver, with breakthroughs in the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, made it possible to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. Major success on the Eastern Front allowed us to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political solution.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preventing the advance of the Soviet army and “imposing his will on at least one sector of the front.” In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the Wehrmacht strategy was chosen back in March 1943. All that remained was to determine where to strike. The Kursk ledge arose at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler, in order No. 5, demanded the delivery of converging attacks on the Kursk ledge, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops located on it. However, in March 1943, German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to attack the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.

On April 15, Hitler signed Operation Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was planned to begin as soon as weather conditions permitted. Army Group “South” was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, and connect at Kursk and east of it with formations of the Army Group “Center”. Army Group Center launched a strike from the Trosna line, an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were supposed to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo sector, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with Army Group South in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the shock groups, on the western front of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were supposed to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their forces. The plan was quite simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging attacks from the north and south - on the 4th day it was planned to encircle and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Fronts). This made it possible to create a wide gap in the Soviet front and seize the strategic initiative. In the Orel area, the main striking force was represented by the 9th Army, in the Belgorod area - by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf operational group. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a strike to the rear of the Southwestern Front, an offensive in the northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, forestalling the Soviet offensive in the Donbass. He was also supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had enormous authority in the eyes of the Fuhrer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data about the defensive potential of the Central Front opposing the 9th Army. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense and strengthened its artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were withdrawn from forward positions, taking them out of a possible enemy attack.

A discussion of this report took place on May 3-4 in Munich. According to Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German Army. Model's 15 infantry divisions had half the regular infantry strength; in some divisions, 3 of the 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and some batteries had 1-2 guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average “combat strength” (the number of soldiers directly participating in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, the 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army experienced serious problems with transport. Army Group South, after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations that were reorganized in the rear in 1942. Model had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and were in urgent need of replenishment.

Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other military leaders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, they decided to delay the start of the operation by a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized by German generals, who blamed their mistakes on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).

It must be said that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of forces between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943, the Central Front numbered 538.4 thousand people, 920 tanks, 7.8 thousand guns and 660 aircraft; at the beginning of July - 711.5 thousand people, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1,050 aircraft. Model's 9th Army in mid-May had 324.9 thousand people, about 800 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns. At the beginning of July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with equipment faster than German industry.

The plan for the offensive of the 9th Army troops from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical method for the German school - Model was going to break through the enemy’s defenses with infantry, and then introduce tank units into battle. The infantry would attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile formations that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately brought into battle - the 20th Tank Division. The 47th Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Lemelsen was to advance in the main attack zone of the 9th Army. His offensive line lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction between two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. The 6th Infantry and 20th Tank Divisions advanced in the first echelon of the 47th Corps and struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th tank divisions. They should have been brought into the breakthrough after the Soviet defense line had been breached. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Tank Corps was advancing under the command of General Joseph Harpe. The first echelon included the 86th and 292nd infantry divisions, and the 18th tank division in reserve. To the left of the 41st Panzer Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under the command of General Friesner. He was supposed to deliver a diversionary strike with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions on Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn was advancing. In its first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tankgrenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Von Kluge was supposed to hand them over to Model after the strike forces had broken through into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. There is an opinion that Model initially did not want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, and even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon so that, if necessary, they could be transferred to an area that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of Army Group South was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army of Colonel General Hermann Hoth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). Task Force Kempf, under the command of Werner Kempf, was to advance in the north-east direction. The group stood facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the attack of the 4th Tank Army on Kursk had to be secured from the eastern direction from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group "Kempf" was supposed to hold the line of defense on the Donets with one 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenklot. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of Panzer General Hermann Breit (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of Panzer General Erhard Routh, before the start of the operation and until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the Main Special Purpose Command of Routh (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), and were supposed to actively support the offensive of the 4th Tank Army. It was planned to subordinate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, to the Kempff group after it had captured a sufficient area and ensured freedom of action in the north-east direction.

Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).

The command of Army Group South did not limit itself to this innovation. According to the recollections of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly enter the battle by moving into the corridor between the Donets and Psel rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Tank Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Hoth believed that it was necessary to introduce the most powerful formation that he had into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser, consisting of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Death's Head") should no longer advance directly north along the Psel River, but should turn northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would definitely be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of Army Group South tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the attack of the Kempff group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary attacks in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - Walter Nehring's 24th Panzer Corps. But it was a reserve for the army group in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the point of attack on the southern front of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He did not have serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle.

To carry out the offensive operation, the best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were recruited, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike forces were supported by the 4th Air Fleet under Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2,700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, 200 T-V Panther tanks) took part in Operation Citadel and 90 Ferdinand assault guns), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command placed great hopes on the use of new models of military equipment. The anticipation of the arrival of new equipment was one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers considered the Panther, which the Germans considered a medium tank, to be heavy) and self-propelled guns would become a battering ram for the Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI and Ferdinand assault guns that entered service with the Wehrmacht combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were approximately 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial velocity of the projectiles, German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers, the 105 mm Wespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150 mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”), which were part of the artillery regiments of the tank divisions, were also used. German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. New Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft entered service with the German Air Force. They were supposed to gain air superiority and provide assault support to the advancing troops.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march.

Henschel Hs 129 attack aircraft.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret and achieve surprise in the attack. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. We carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, transferred tanks, concentrated transportation means, conducted active radio conversations, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, to hide from the enemy. The measures were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicality, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.

German shielded tanks Pz.Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the start of Operation Citadel.

In order to protect their rear from the attack of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and carried out several large punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were deployed against approximately 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against the partisans in the Zhitomir region. grouping. However, the plan could not be fully realized; the partisans retained the ability to inflict strong blows on the invaders.

To be continued…

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report in August 1943, the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is provided by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the north-west and south-east of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and units of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front line of the tank, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the tank's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, the 18th Tank Tank met a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone over to the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and are not successful.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks cannot engage in tank combat with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V "Panther" tank, which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way qualities is significantly higher than the T-34 tank and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

Tank brand and control system	Nose armor in mm.	Turret front and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Gun caliber in mm.	Col. shells.	Speed ​​max.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1S	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
SU-152	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack, it was possible to achieve better results by observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “When the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our material part, burns and blows up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way to conduct combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing the wrong thing at all. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What are you offering?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "

A people who forgets their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, “fifteen sister republics” united by “Great Russia” inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of humanity - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be crushed on all fronts. The purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. From that time on, the fascists forgot what “forward to the East” meant.

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the original Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density on 1 km of front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from the North Caucasus, Don, and Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of spring 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of the fighting in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a protrusion stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought calm to the front: no one was attacking, both sides were rapidly accumulating forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation for Nazi Germany

After the defeat of Stalingrad, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer longed to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation “Citadel”. The plan involved delivering attacks converging on Kursk (from the north - from the Orel region; from the south - from the Belgorod region). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts fell into the “cauldron”.

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this section of the front, including. 16 tank and motorized troops, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the leadership talent of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. He, together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future site of the battle, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy group.

Along the front line, the fascists were opposed by the Voronezh Front (commander - General N. F. Vatutin) and the Central Front (commander - General K. K. Rokossovsky) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located behind the listed fronts. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group were carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the Moscow-Vladivostok distance. It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, deprive him of the initiative, making the task as easy as possible for the attackers. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Orel. Second: “Commander Rumyantsev” to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place on the Soviet side “from defense.” For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two to three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. The day before, German sappers began making passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the “tongues”: 03:00 07/05/1943.

The reaction was prompt and adequate: At 2-20 07/05/1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful artillery shelling by frontal artillery forces. This was an innovation in combat tactics. The occupiers were fired upon by hundreds of Katyusha rockets, 600 guns, and 460 mortars. For the Nazis this was a complete surprise; they suffered losses.

Only at 4:30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5:30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

Start of the battle

Of course, our commanders could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, towards the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commander - General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh Front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against Nikolai Fedorovich’s troops. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoe (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for 24 hours.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for its martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Following them were from fifty to a hundred medium Panther tanks, accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks resembled the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

We will follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tank battle tactics. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel General Hermann Hoth; he “jewelfully,” if one can say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of work The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I.M. Chistyakov) had a gun density per 1 km of 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, whose commander was the most gifted Wehrmacht strategist, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which, in fact, he was dismissed in 1944).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P. A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A. S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Leibstandarte” changed the direction of attack to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle on the German side, 850 on our side. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was so loud that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, which caused the towers to collapse. When approaching the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire at the tanks, causing the tanks to burst into flames. The tankers seemed to be in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat or hide.

Of course, it was unwise to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses of one in five, what would they have been like during the offensive?!). At the same time, Soviet soldiers showed real heroism on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the day of its end - August 23 - is celebrated annually by residents of the country like Russia.