Sokolov boris innokentyevich hero. Sokolov Boris Innokentevich - military counterintelligence officer, hero of the Soviet Union

Business card

Grigory Maksimovich Kazimir was born in 1934. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Kyiv University, studied at the Novosibirsk School of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He went through all stages of operational work - from an operational officer to deputy head of a special department of the Trans-Baikal Military District. In January 1986, he was appointed head of the special department of the Turkestan military district. Major General.

Before leaving for Afghanistan, I was received by the head of the 3rd Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Nikolai Alekseevich Dushin, and the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov. Dushin, in particular, said that if until that time we had led the 40th Army in Afghanistan directly from Moscow, now you, the head of the special department of the TurkVO, are taking all the reins of government into your own hands. Therefore, your main workplace not in Tashkent, but in Kabul.
- Why is it so?
- When success was expected at the beginning of the campaign, it was good to manage from Moscow. And by that time it became clear that it was necessary to somehow get out of Afghanistan ... Therefore, the former interest, so to speak, was no longer there.
- What impression did the conversations with the management make on you, what was the main emphasis on?
- I saw that Nikolai Alekseevich was monitoring the situation in Afghanistan, he was aware of all the cases. He told me very carefully: “We need to see how long we will fight there ... We have been fighting for six years already - but there is no end in sight and there is no positive, only the situation is getting worse. In general, look what is there, but only very carefully!
The leaders of the 3rd Main Directorate, Dushin, and then Sergeev, monitored the situation in the 40th Army on a daily basis, controlled the situation, knew where they were, what was happening, what measures were being taken ...
Chebrikov ended the conversation with the following phrase: “As a specialist, you probably know all the technical aspects as well as I do, so I give you “political guidelines”. I won't say that he was specifically in charge of counterintelligence work in this direction, but in general, of course, he was in control of the situation - there was a large representation of the KGB in Afghanistan.
- What role did this representation play?
- I will say this: the real power was in the hands of the KGB representative office, through it the influence of the Soviet Union on the Afghan administration was exercised. In second place in importance, so to speak, was the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - all the five years that I was in Afghanistan, General of the Army Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, held this position. At one time - the commander of the Carpathian military district, since then we have known each other. Well, the commander of the 40th Army was a very significant figure - when I arrived in Kabul, it was Lieutenant General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, later Minister of Defense. However, not for very long, four army commanders were replaced in five years.
- How did your relationship with the military leadership develop?
- I introduced myself to Valentin Ivanovich on the very first day; he treated the employees of special departments very carefully. "Where did you come from, Grigory Maksimovich?" - "From Transbaikalia." - "Yes? My son works there!” - “I know,” I say, “in Dosatui, the commander of a motorized rifle regiment on an infantry fighting vehicle ...”
I will clarify that about a year later, the son of General Varennikov came to Afghanistan to the post of deputy commander of the 201st motorized rifle division. Soon a real hunt began for him: the enemy knew that this was the son of a high boss. I reported this situation to Valentin Ivanovich and, although he was categorically against it, raised the question of the need for his son to leave Afghanistan before the leadership. This was done, he was sent to study at the Academy of the General Staff.
My relations with Varennikov were not just businesslike, but, I would say, warm. If necessary, I called him at any time and always found understanding. I can say that Varennikov always assumed full responsibility, "covered" the army command with himself. If there were any miscalculations, he said: “I am in charge here, and I will answer to the General Staff, the Politburo ...”
- The commander of the army, as you said, was Rodionov ...
- Yes, and I knew him as the commander of the 24th Iron Division, where I was the head of a special department - this was in the early 1970s - and then we were friends with families. I also met with Igor Nikolayevich on the first day. In the evening we went to him, and immediately the question surfaced: how much and how will we fight? He says: “I can give you my assessments, but only if I show up as an opponent of the continuation of the war, they will attribute defeatist moods to me, and ...” Rodionov gave a deep analysis of the prospects for the development of events. The conclusion was clear: there is no military solution to the Afghan problem. Even if, as suggested, to increase the army.
- Who suggested it?
- In particular, the command staff of the 40th Army. There were not enough people: the garrison service absorbed everything. Our 120,000-strong group was scattered throughout Afghanistan, in dozens of garrisons, large and small, which guarded and provided for themselves. And combat operations begin - the division, at best, recruits three combat battalions. Maximum - consolidated regiment. But if there are more troops, there will be more garrisons. In general, a vicious circle! Rodionov is a very competent general, very well trained militarily. He gave me all the calculations... I'll add that Igor Nikolaevich was very worried about people - he would calculate ten times whether this operation should be carried out or not, what we would get from it... He did not scatter soldiers.
- Did the mood of the general correspond to the mood of his army? Or was it some kind of tragic understanding of a military leader?
- No, we studied the mood of all categories of servicemen very well, from soldiers and sergeants to generals - everyone unequivocally believed that the war was futile, it was not clear why, and it was not clear who needed all this ... However, I can’t say that in The 40th Army had some kind of defeatist mood, a desire to give up everything and leave - no, the army was absolutely combat-ready, with a good fighting spirit ... But deep down everyone believed that they were fighting for no one knew what.
- Grigory Maksimovich, you, like all employees of military counterintelligence, communicated a lot with the personnel of the 40th Army. But how did the troops treat special officers?
- Military counterintelligence officers enjoyed great prestige, good disposition of officers and soldiers, because they were in combat formations with them.
Here is the Hero of the Soviet Union Boris Innokentyevich Sokolov - he promptly provided the reconnaissance battalion of the Bagram division, visited more than eighty combat operations. He even had a machine gun that was scuffed up to whiteness in the mountains! Dushin calls me: “How many Heroes of the Soviet Union do we have?” - “Four,” I say, “posthumously for the Great Patriotic War and one alive ...” - “Let's take him out so that there is no fifth.” I called: “Boris Innokentevich, get ready!” - “No, I have three more months! I got a Hero - how can I leave now?
Although in general, I believe, military counterintelligence was deprived of awards. After all, our officers did no less than any commander of a platoon or company, but, unfortunately, many were not marked by anything ...
The military counterintelligence officers in Afghanistan behaved very worthily - there was no case that anyone, under some pretext, refused to participate in a military operation. Moreover, in the last year and a half, I categorically forbade the operational staff to go on combat operations without my consent, and I myself determined the expediency. It hurts me a lot, but seven of the eighteen military counterintelligence officers who died were in my period ...
- From your words, we can conclude that the troops were brought into Afghanistan completely in vain ...
- Did I say so? There are different points of view on why the USSR sent troops to Afghanistan - and that they wanted to help the revolutionary movement, although the revolution took place there without our “blessing”, and to help the people ...
- International help, as they often say...
- No, everything is simpler: we had great geopolitical interests there. In particular, we built five major air bases: Kandahar, Bagram, Kabul... The runway of each airfield is 3,200, strategic bombers could land on them, refuel and fly further to strike at the communications of a potential enemy on pacific ocean. I really did not want to lose this most important position - however, I think that here it was necessary not to send in troops, but to solve everything in other ways.
- For example?
- Continue to arm the Afghan army - they are, if necessary, combat-ready and can fight well, especially if they pay well. But someone did not think it through: there was a point of view that we would put things in order there in six months. However, one could argue like that only without knowing either Afghanistan, or its history, or its people ... So do not reduce everything to the notorious international assistance! When I instructed our employees, I said: “You are going to defend the strategic, political interests of your own country! In order not to start wars from our mound, as in 1941.”
- And what is it - a special department of the 40th army, where did they go?
- A very serious, influential body! By the way, even during the Great Patriotic War, no coordination of operational documents with military counterintelligence was provided. And here, on the map of the combat operation approved by the commander of the corresponding rank, the bottom always stood: “Agreed. Special department, such and such. This was not envisaged by any regulatory documents, but such a practice was developed.
- And what is the point, what is it for?
- On the one hand, military counterintelligence, feeling its responsibility, tried to get as much information as possible about the possible danger to the troops. On the other hand, it disciplined the command, contributed to the success of operations, and reduced personnel losses. This practice took shape in 1983, when we suffered the biggest losses here.
- Still, what was a special department of the army?
- It was an unusual structure: although there was a full-scale war, the special department of the 40th Army was not deployed in wartime states. It consisted of the army apparatus, special departments of divisions and brigades. The military counterintelligence of the army was equipped with literally all the units that existed then in the KGB, up to the operational and technical service, the surveillance service ...
- The question of an amateur: what is the point of all this?
- Let me explain with a concrete example. When analyzing and studying the situation, I noticed that information about operations, especially aviation ones, is leaking. Let's say our planes take off for the area near the Pakistani border, and Pakistani F-15s with American pilots immediately rise to meet them. It was clear that the Americans knew about the flights of our aviation. Since there was no continuous radar field in Pakistan, it became clear that there was a leak from some kind of headquarters - we had a lot of contact with the headquarters of the Afghan army.
- You are definitely talking about the Afghan headquarters - couldn't there be an enemy agent somewhere in our headquarters?
- I officially report to you: during the entire war, military counterintelligence did not reveal a single agent of foreign special services or bandit formations among generals, officers, warrant officers, sergeants, soldiers or employees of the Soviet Army! We really didn’t even have serious developments in suspecting our people of involvement in enemy agents. That's why I realized that the leak comes from our "friends" - as we called the Afghans. Together with Rodionov, we conducted several experiments: we will think of a small operation that we don’t tell our “friends” about - there is no “leakage”. Once shared - there is!
- That is, it was necessary to find out who exactly was transmitting information to the enemy?
- It was not easy at all! By that time, the Americans began to use satellite communications to communicate with agents. Transmissions were carried out in ultra-high speed mode. Speed is if a printed sheet of text is broadcast within a minute, and ultra-speed is half a second. If you take a bearing on an oscilloscope - it's just like that, a flash begins - and that's it! It was an expensive pleasure, but the costs, apparently, were justified: the information was dropped to the satellite, then to Langley and went in the opposite direction ...
With the assistance of the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Georgy Karpovich Tsinev, a radio counterintelligence service was created in a special department of the 40th Army. It was very difficult to deliver the appropriate mobile equipment there, the direction finders were made in 1950, but the teams were staffed very good specialists. They improved this technique so much that they carried out radio interception of satellite systems! After all, it is necessary to take direction from three points in order to make a triangle; then even closer - another triangle; even closer - still ... First, we managed to determine the area - this is the fourth district of Kabul, the so-called Shuravi - Soviet, which was rebuilt by our specialists since the 1930s, then we found a quarter, then - a house, after which the equipment led to the doors and one , and another agent - let's call them "Said" and "Ahmed".
- Have your assumptions been confirmed? Headquarters workers?
- Lieutenant Colonel "Said" for a long time headed the air traffic control service of the Afghan army. The control tower in Kabul was the same: air traffic controllers sat in the same room, who controlled both small Afghan aircraft and the huge aircraft of the 40th Army, and therefore everyone there knew about the sorties of Soviet aircraft, and about where helicopters were flying, where they were striking . Then "Said" became the deputy commander of aviation and Najibullah's personal pilot. It's hard to imagine a better position!
How did he become an agent?
- At one time he underwent flight training in the United States, where he was recruited and actively worked for his "masters".
The second agent, 'Ahmed', is their top physician, who was said in the old days to serve the families of President Najibullah, the Prime Minister, and the leaders of the army and police. It is known that the Afghan has no secrets both from his wife and children, and from the doctor. The agent was getting a lot of political information!
- In general, these agents were exposed ...
- I consider this operation the greatest success of the military counterintelligence of the 40th army: both were arrested during communication sessions. We hoped to organize an operational game, but they immediately pressed the buttons of the device showing that they were detained ... Nine sets of radio communication equipment disguised as household radios and bags were confiscated from each. The seized was sent to the center - our intelligence service did not have such means of communication then.
We interrogated them: both worked for a very high monetary reward. The money went into their accounts, printouts of which were given to them in banks in America quarterly, and here, on the spot, they were paid very small amounts in afghanis or dollars. The Americans did the right thing, because the Afghans could spend this money smartly and light up. The Afghan soldiers were poor: their salaries were about six times lower than ours.
- What did they do with these agents?
- I do not know. All exposed and arrested agents and suspicious persons were handed over by us to the special services of Afghanistan. If you are told that our special agencies had some kind of prisons or concentration camps there, this is not true! Only when the operation was going on, a temporary camp was created, where they carried out filtration work, identifying suspicious persons, who, after a certain development, were transferred to "friends". The Soviet secret services did not take any repressive measures against the citizens of Afghanistan or foreigners who fought there. I tell you this for sure!

- Grigory Maksimovich, but what did you personally do in Afghanistan?
- Please note that I only came to Afghanistan and spent about a third of the time there - I also had the entire Turkestan district on me, and I managed to visit the Special Departments of all its divisions and brigades. And then, the replacement of leadership is not good ... Speaking of Afghanistan, I will not portray a hero: at night I didn’t go to any “secret operations”, I didn’t take part in hostilities - so that with a gun - I didn’t take part either, but came under fire. By this time, the bandit groups had received portable anti-aircraft systems, and if before that, having climbed by helicopter to a height of 3,000, it was already possible not to be afraid of their DShK, now helicopters have become the most dangerous transport. And I had to fly a lot - to all points. Once I rode through the mountains: in order to smuggle the head of the Special Department of the district, two or three tanks, two or three infantry fighting vehicles, armored vehicles were given - in general, about a dozen pieces of equipment, which attracted attention very much, and I had to sit on the armor, on demolition case. Therefore - only by helicopters!
I had to visit the most "hot", let's say, points. For example, Kandahar - I was there three times. If we take the whole of Afghanistan, then in terms of the intensity of hostilities it was like Stalingrad. In whatever tent they invite you to drink tea - there are stacks on the table covered with bread ... Jalalabad is also a very harsh place. In addition, the heat is unbearable: on the first visit, I accidentally put my hand on the car radiator - the skin peeled off!
- Why did you need all these trips?
- To be honest, I have always loved working directly with people. It's one thing to listen to reports, and it's quite another when I come to an operational worker and say: "Everything that is on the table!" He posts, I work with him. Three hours of work with the opera is like two weeks of jostling with the leaders.
- You somehow separate the operatives from the leaders ...
- In no case! There were, of course, different operatives and different leaders. The vast majority are honest, principled people. But, you yourself know, in combat, special conditions, their temptations arise ... At first, some leaders presented me with the following ciphers: "Within fifteen days, 15 agents of enemy bandit formations and special services were exposed." Who, what, where?! No names, nothing! Then I said: “Include in the telegram what you have exposed, - it’s on my desk!” And, to tell you honestly, there were no more “lindens” ...
We didn't falsify anything, didn't intensify anything - everything was considered one to one, priority was given to the issues of prevention, suppression, non-admission, and only where a crime had already been committed, criminal liability was imposed.
- As far as we know, a powerful investigative unit was created in the Special Department of the 40th Army?
- Indeed, if in the usual Special Department there were two or three investigators, then in the 40th Army there were ten and thirty investigators in the Special Department of the Turkestan District. Already a lot! In addition, from one hundred to two hundred investigators were constantly seconded from all over the Soviet Union, from all territorial bodies. They came for a period of three to six months, and some of them several times.
- Well, what kind of cases did they work on? What was the level of crime there?
- First of all, the cases are smuggling and the crimes accompanying it - abuse of official position, theft of socialist property, and so on. The next type of crime is a violation of the rules of financial transactions, that is, currency smuggling, etc. For example, there were several courier-postal officers who tried to use their abilities for the uncontrolled transportation of currency. But it is difficult to hide secrets from military counterintelligence - where there are "sharp areas", we are always present there.
- Still, why, to put it mildly, did the investigators in Afghanistan have so much work to do?
- How can I explain... Let's say goods that are in demand are exported to the territory of Afghanistan from the Union. There they are sold for afghani, and this money is used to buy goods that are in great demand in the USSR. This turnover gave tenfold welding! If we bought for 100 thousand - it turned out a million. Food products were usually imported: food was bad in Afghanistan, but money was running low... I can say that we literally completely renovated the customs service several times, sending many customs officers to "places not so remote." However, such large bribes were given that although they knew that the predecessor was there, they took it. The mind bounced when they give 100,000 rubles! However, an ordinary customs officer, as a rule, was offered 10,000 rubles for a single shipment. And this is a car that you can buy right here!
- As far as I know, economic crimes were not “profile” for military counterintelligence at that time ...
- Yes, weapons and drugs were the most important for us from smuggling, we did a lot to prevent their import into the territory of the Soviet Union. In particular, they seized large consignments of drugs, investigated cases of “ownerless” consignments!
- What does it mean - "ownerless" parties?
- Let's say, the column was unloaded - eighty long trucks. In one of the cars they find a kilogram of heroin: the dog ran up, yap-yap - reported. The driver really has nothing to do with it. I say: “Well, guys, hang out!” Arkady Levashov - he was then a lieutenant colonel, and now he is a general, replies: “Well, Grigory Maksimovich, let's spin it!” They unleashed it - and who laid it on the other side, and who they are taking ... They took the whole group, about 15 people. And there was just a kilo of ownerless!

- How did your employees manage to create such miracles?
- The investigators were amazingly qualified, and besides, they were exceptionally honest people! Therefore, not a single case was protested, no one was acquitted on complaint. It was the law: any doubt in the evidence was interpreted by us in favor of the suspect, the accused. The slightest doubt that this is not "iron" evidence, that it will falter somewhere in court - and this fact was deduced from the prosecution, and only that which could not be refuted went to court. When in doubt, even the suspects were released - God forbid, if at least one person is illegally arrested and imprisoned! It would be better if the guilty walk free - after all, these are not murderers, not traitors ... And in just ten years, 204 criminal cases were investigated against more than 2,000 people.
- By the way, you talked about ordinary crimes, but there were also military crimes ...
- Yes, there were cases of treason - in the form of going over to the side of the enemy and assisting the enemy. For example, they put a fighter in a secret - he kills his partner, takes his weapon and goes to the gang. There were also such cases. The Mujahideen used such traitors as instructors, militants, and so on.
- What happened often?
- If I said that these were isolated cases, it would not be true. There were about a dozen such cases.
- Not so few of our soldiers were captured by the militants ...
- During the period of hostilities, about three hundred of our servicemen turned out to be in the hands of the bandits. We had a file cabinet for everyone: what data, under what circumstances... About eighty percent were captured in a helpless state, the wounded or ammunition ran out... They were kept in gangs in the most terrible conditions. We had created a detective department, which was engaged in the withdrawal of those captured. Desperate guys were there - for each of them I would not regret even the highest state awards! We brought out 70 people - out of three hundred ...
- How did you manage to find them?
- Through agents from among the Afghans, through the advisory apparatus and through the GRU, who had agents in bandit groups ... If an honest man, a patriot, if an officer, they spared nothing! For one of ours, they, as a rule, asked for five or six of their prisoners - they were in camps, the Afghans held them tightly, especially if someone with some kind of family ties ... We gave.
Let me tell you how the operation went. They chose a place so that they could see five or six kilometers. They came there armed to the teeth, approximately up to a platoon or a reinforced squad, they led the prisoners ... They demanded from ours that no escort, no more than two people, in tight tracksuits and no weapons - indeed, they didn’t even take knives. Of course, there were helicopters somewhere, but until the helicopter took off... Usually, if it was a soldier, the commander of a platoon, or a company, or a colleague, was walking to identify them. If he was beaten or emaciated, then they asked - he called some names, by which they were convinced that it was him. Then they took him away and left, and they stood with weapons at the ready, watched ...
- You said that you had to redeem?
- Yes, they bought them out - sometimes for a lot of money. Including ransomed and those whom we later held accountable.
- Can you understand that not everyone wanted to return?
- Yes, many refused. Some, as I said, went there with treacherous intentions; they gave women to others there, they accepted Islam ... It was different. So, already before the withdrawal of troops, the American human rights group ransomed and took 13 of our prisoners of war to America for a lot of money. And there were also heroic deeds in captivity - like an uprising in a camp in Pakistan, about which, unfortunately, very little is known.
And in general, not everything was so simple. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners were people who were in combat formations. Although there is one “but” here - if at least one of their spooks died, then they no longer took prisoners, they shot all the rest. If the combat clash went so that all of them remained “dry”, and ours hit, then there was a chance that they would be brought to this pit ...
In the pictures: G.M. KAZIMIR with Hero of the Soviet Union B.I. SOKOLOV, Bagram, 1986; military counterintelligence officers at the headquarters of the 40th army, Kabul, 1988

- Grigory Maksimovich, let's go back to where we started: you were tasked with assessing the prospects for our Limited contingent in Afghanistan.
- Yes, and therefore at the beginning of 1987 I wrote with my own hand, since it was impossible even to connect a typist, a large letter addressed to the chairman of the KGB of the USSR. On all three positions: the military component, moods and prospects, and what needs to be done. There was only one conclusion: we must leave Afghanistan.
- Why didn't you send a letter on command?
- So we agreed with Nikolai Alekseevich Dushin. As a result, it was very soon reported to Gorbachev. He, as far as I know, imposed a resolution: “The proposals deserve attention. To the secretariat, for elaboration. Since that time, the preparation of the conclusion began.
- Not quite clear. Wrote, let's say so, just the head of the special department of the district - and right there it all started ...
- So everyone was waiting for this! Only no one wanted to take responsibility, they reasoned: what will “there” think, how will they understand it? And I was in TurkVO - they would not send further Kushka, as they said. Kushka is our Turkestan military district, I was constantly there. General received. What do I have to lose?! And here, after all, people are dying - without a prospect, and most importantly, the situation worsened every day ...
Why did it get worse?
- The reason is absolutely wrong domestic politics authorities of Afghanistan. For example, they took land from the rich and allegedly handed it over to dehkans. But if before the tenant gave the landowner one third of the crop, now the taxes on the land amounted to two thirds! Why does a farmer need such a land?! Besides the best lands, the best sources of water remained with the rich. For example, the prime minister of the "people's government" was the largest landowner in Afghanistan and did not give up his land. And that's just one moment...
It seems that my letter played the role of a catalyst - the need for withdrawal, as I said, has long been recognized by everyone.
- How has your activity changed during that period?
- In 1987, an order was issued by the KGB of the USSR, where I personally was entrusted with the duties of creating an intelligence service of the military counterintelligence of the 40th Army. So in the last year I literally sat on it, that's all I did.
- Following the example of "behind the front" work "Smersh"?
- Of course - the invaluable experience of the Great Patriotic War. If GRU intelligence came into contact with gangs, with the local population, collected information about the enemy, planned attacks, planned ambushes, penetrated gangs, then our task was to identify the aspirations of enemy intelligence units to our special services and penetrate to us. That is, intelligence for the purposes of counterintelligence.
- In the SVR, this is a unit of foreign counterintelligence.
- Yes, you can call it that. Although, of course, the bulk of the information received was in favor of the army, but we also drew something for ourselves: here, for example, a “setup” is being prepared - someone will come, he will say that he wants to cooperate with the KGB ... Knowing this, we worked with him accordingly - any "double" is useful if it is used wisely. And as an enemy agent, we neutralized him. Received information about the arrival of disinformation; infiltrated the enemy's special services not only in Afghanistan; recruited large local "authorities".
We know about this side of the activities of military counterintelligence, but we will not talk much ... But I will say that on the very eve of the withdrawal, I participated in a very important operation.
- Did you manage it?
- No, I told you - I participated. The head of the 3rd Glavka Sergeev, the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops, General of the Army Matrosov, the heads of special departments of the two border districts and I flew around in helicopters all 16 border detachments located on the border with Afghanistan. On the other side, at a depth of 25 to 50 kilometers, there were constantly mangroups - combat maneuver groups, from a reinforced company to a reinforced battalion. This was how it was ensured that there was no breakthrough of militants into our territory, although there was one case in the Moskovsky area ... We also visited large mangroups, on Afghan territory. Therefore, even Sergeyev had a machine gun and pouches - you never know where something is. We all flew around for a month, heard reports everywhere - after all, all these mangroups remained there even after it was officially announced that the last soldier had left. We had two helicopters and an escort. so, we lost two helicopters from escort!
- That is, the war went on to the last ... And where were you during the solemn withdrawal of troops, on February 15?
- From this side, I met here. We managed to agree with the customs service that the inspection was done on the territory of Afghanistan - before crossing the border, and they entered here without delay, in a solemn march. In addition, smuggling is when the border has been crossed, and if something is discovered before that, it is simply an administrative violation. Why pull people?
- Indeed, it was not worth spoiling someone's holiday ...
- Finishing our conversation, I will say that my special admiration is caused by the fact that the majority of "Afghans" showed themselves very well later. Many have advanced in their careers, reached high positions, distinguished themselves... For example, Grigory Konstantinovich Khoperskov, whom I have known since a major, became a Hero of Russia - a fighting man! Or here is Lieutenant General Viktor Petrovich Vasiliev, "Kandahar", head of the special department of the brigade, on whose account there were real interceptions of very serious gang agents and many other glorious deeds ... This is Anatoly Ivanovich Mikhalkin, Hero of Russia Alexander Ivanovich Shulyakov, and others comrades... We will not name their names, ranks and positions - it is impossible, because they are all at the forefront, protecting the security and state interests of our Motherland.
In the photo: Head of the 3rd Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant-General N.A. DUSHIN (second from right) in the special department for the 40th Army.

19.10.1953 -
The hero of the USSR

Additional photo:

Portrait of B.I. Sokolov by People's Artist of the USSR, Academician of the Russian Academy of Arts A.M. Shilov.

FROM okolov Boris Innokentyevich - detective of the Special Department of the KGB of the USSR for the 108th motorized rifle division of the 40th army of the Turkestan military district (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), captain.
Born on October 19, 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude in the family of an employee. Russian. Member of the CPSU since 1977. Graduated from 10 classes, Irkutsk Aviation College. He worked at a machine-building plant.
In the Soviet Army since May 1973 - drafted for military service to the Trans-Baikal Military District. From the troops he entered the military school. In 1979 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School. He served in the engineering units of the Leningrad Military District.
Since August 1981 - in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR. He graduated from the Higher Courses of Military Counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk in 1982. He served in the Special Departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District.
From December 1983, for two and a half years, Boris Sokolov served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as an operative of the Special Department of the KGB for the 108th motorized rifle division. He took part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days. In battles he was twice shell-shocked and received a shrapnel wound. He remained in Afghanistan until the end of the business trip even after being awarded the title of Hero, refusing the right to leave ahead of schedule for the Union.
At Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of December 10, 1985 for the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Captain Sokolov Boris Innokent'evich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the medal " Golden Star"(No. 11536).
In 1986-1991 he served in a special department of the USSR State Security Committee for the Moscow Military District. Since 1992, he served in the military counterintelligence bodies of the Ministry of Security and the Federal Grid Company of Russia, then in the Economic Counterintelligence Directorate - Department economic security Federal Service security Russian Federation. He headed the representative office of the FSB of Russia in one of the foreign countries.
Major General. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, medals.
Biography supplemented by Anton Bocharov
(village of Koltsovo, Novosibirsk region)

COMMUNIST, CHEKIST, HERO
Afghanistan left a tragic mark in the hearts of hundreds of thousands Soviet people. The time has come to tell about the fact that in this difficult war, along with soldiers and officers, army security officers participated in all military affairs. The harsh school of Afghanistan, shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers, went through the military counter-intelligence officers, who were fulfilling their duty to ensure the security of a limited contingent of Soviet troops.
One of them is Boris Sokolov. His Afghan everyday life was not much different from the everyday life of hundreds of other military counterintelligence officers who deserved the good memory of everyone with whom fate brought them together on the dangerous roads of Afghanistan. They exposed and suppressed many espionage and sabotage terrorist acts of the rebels and their Western patrons against the Soviet troops, and dozens of servicemen of the Soviet Army were released from captivity.
From the presentation of Captain Sokolov Boris Innokentevich to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union:
"He took part in 64 operations with a total duration of 269 days. During the operations, he showed courage, bravery and courage. He acted confidently in a difficult combat situation, made competent decisions, and more than once ensured the successful completion of combat missions by the unit."
In combat conditions, the business qualities of an officer are in full view, and even more so for him, a Chekist. So it was on that March day in 1984, when, during the landing of Soviet soldiers on helicopters, they came under heavy fire from the gang. Sokolov and the chief of staff, Major Yakushev, managed to organize an effective defense, ensuring the landing of soldiers in combat vehicles. And the last to leave the battle.
In war, it is difficult to separate the life of an Aramaic counterintelligence officer from the military everyday life of other Soviet officers. Only, perhaps, it is a little more difficult for a counterintelligence officer, because he also has his own, KGB tasks. However, the opponent does not discount this.
In January 1984, Sokolov and senior lieutenant A. Golovin seized important documents containing information about the involvement of Western intelligence services in major hostile actions against Afghanistan, lists of rebel agents. The price for this is a terrible battle, in which Boris also participated.
More than once, the communist Sokolov had to take command in critical combat situations. This happened in February 1984, when Boris, shell-shocked, still managed to lead the unit and withdraw it from the battle with minimal losses.
And one more, perhaps the most significant touch in the combat biography of Boris Sokolov. The Chekist unit in which he served was actively engaged in the release of Soviet soldiers who were captured. This work, always associated with mortal risk, required great personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice from military counterintelligence officers: one had to have great self-control and courage to go unarmed to the camps of dushmans and negotiate with them at gunpoint. Many Soviet servicemen were then helped to return to their mothers.
Until recently, Boris Sokolov was one of those heroes about whom it was impossible to write. Now, as you can see, they write about it, and even in posters.

Sokolov Boris Innokentevich - military counterintelligence officer, hero Soviet Union, major general. He served in the engineering units of the Leningrad Military District, from where he was sent in August 1981 to the Higher Courses of Military Counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk. Since 1982, he served in the Special Departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District.

In 1983-1985, he was the detective of the Special Department of the KGB of the USSR for the 108th motorized rifle division of the 40th army of the Turkestan military district, which is part of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the DRA, where for courage and heroism shown in the provision of international assistance, Captain Sokolov Boris Innokentevich was awarded title of Hero of the Soviet Union

Sokolov Boris Innokent'evich - military counterintelligence officer. In 1981-1983 he served in the Special Department for the Leningrad Military District, from where he was sent on a business trip to the DRA. The hero of the USSR.

In the Soviet Army since May 1973 - called up for military service in the Trans-Baikal Military District. From the troops he entered the military school. In 1979 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School. Served in rocket troops in the Leningrad Military District.

Since August 1981 - in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR. He graduated from the Higher Courses of Military Counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk in 1982. After that, he served in the Special Departments of the KGB of the USSR in the Leningrad Military District.

From December 1983, for two and a half years, Boris Sokolov served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as an operative of the Special Department of the KGB for the 108th motorized rifle division. He took part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days. In battles he was twice shell-shocked and received a shrapnel wound. He remained in Afghanistan until the end of the business trip even after being awarded the title of Hero, refusing the right to leave ahead of schedule for the Union.

Major General, Honored Officer of the State Security Bodies Sokolov B.I.
Painting by People's Artist of the USSR, Academician of the Russian Academy of Arts Shilov A.M.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of December 10, 1985, for the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Captain Sokolov Boris Innokent'evich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 11536).

In 1986-1991 he served in a special department of the USSR State Security Committee for the Moscow Military District. Since 1992, he served in the military counterintelligence bodies of the Ministry of Security and the Federal Grid Company of Russia, then in the Economic Counterintelligence Directorate - the Department of Economic Security of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. He headed the representative office of the FSB of Russia in one of the foreign countries.

Major General. He was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and medals.

Text and photo from the site “Heroes of the country”
Biography supplemented by Anton Bocharov
(village of Koltsovo, Novosibirsk region)

COMMUNIST, CHEKIST, HERO

Afghanistan left a tragic mark in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of Soviet people. The time has come to tell about the fact that in this difficult war, along with soldiers and officers, army security officers participated in all military affairs. The harsh school of Afghanistan, shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers, went through the military counter-intelligence officers, who were fulfilling their duty to ensure the security of a limited contingent of Soviet troops.

One of them is Boris Sokolov. His Afghan everyday life was not much different from the everyday life of hundreds of other military counterintelligence officers who deserved the good memory of everyone with whom fate brought them together on the dangerous roads of Afghanistan. They exposed and suppressed many espionage and sabotage terrorist acts of the rebels and their Western patrons against the Soviet troops, and dozens of servicemen of the Soviet Army were released from captivity.

From the presentation of Captain Sokolov Boris Innokentevich to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union:

“I took part in 64 operations with a total duration of 269 days. During operations, he showed courage, bravery and courage. In a difficult combat situation, he acted confidently, made competent decisions, and more than once ensured the successful completion of combat missions by the unit.

In combat conditions, the business qualities of an officer are in full view, and even more so for him, a Chekist. So it was on that March day in 1984, when, during the landing of Soviet soldiers on helicopters, they came under heavy fire from the gang. Sokolov and the chief of staff, Major Yakushev, managed to organize an effective defense, ensuring the landing of soldiers in combat vehicles. And the last to leave the battle.

In war, it is difficult to separate the life of an Aramaic counterintelligence officer from the military everyday life of other Soviet officers. Only, perhaps, it is a little more difficult for a counterintelligence officer, because he also has his own, KGB tasks. However, the opponent does not discount this.

In January 1984, Sokolov and senior lieutenant A. Golovin seized important documents containing information about the involvement of Western intelligence services in major hostile actions against Afghanistan, lists of rebel agents. The price for this is a terrible battle, in which Boris also participated.

More than once, the communist Sokolov had to take command in critical combat situations. This happened in February 1984, when Boris, shell-shocked, still managed to lead the unit and withdraw it from the battle with minimal losses.

And one more, perhaps the most significant touch in the combat biography of Boris Sokolov. The Chekist unit in which he served was actively engaged in the release of Soviet soldiers who were captured. This work, always associated with mortal risk, required great personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice from military counterintelligence officers: one had to have great self-control and courage to go unarmed to the camps of dushmans and negotiate with them at gunpoint.

Many Soviet servicemen were then helped to return to their mothers.

Until recently, Boris Sokolov was one of those heroes about whom it was impossible to write. Now, as you can see, they write about it, and even in posters.

V. Medvedev. - see "On Afghan Roads". A set of postcards. – M.: Ed. "Poster", 1989.

SERGEEV

EVGENIY GEORGIEVICH

At the time of submission to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union - deputy commander for combat training special purpose, major. Born in 1956 in the city of Polotsk (now the Vitebsk region, Republic of Belarus), in a military family. In the same place in 1973 he received a certificate of secondary school education.

In the Soviet Army - since August 1973. In 1977 he graduated from the Ryazan Airborne Command School. military service took place in the special forces of the Trans-Baikal Military District, including those stationed on the territory of Mongolia; commanded a platoon and a company of special forces.

Since 1984, Major E.G. Sergeev was part of a limited contingent of the grouping of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He distinguished himself in numerous combat operations, successfully solving military tasks with minimal human losses among his subordinates.

He showed courage and heroism in carrying out the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov about the urgent capture of the man-portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS) "Stinger" made in the USA.

In 1986, the Americans handed over to the Afghan anti-government formations a huge batch of "Stingers" - over 500 units. The consequences were not long in coming: in the same year, 23 Soviet planes and helicopters were shot down in Afghanistan. There is a need to urgently capture a serviceable sample of weapons and develop protective measures. All special-purpose units in Afghanistan were focused on this task. But it turned out to be difficult: the dushmans observed the strictest security measures. The first soldier who captured MANPADS was promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

They became Major Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev. On January 5, 1987, the inspection team under his command flew in two helicopters into the depths of the territory controlled by the dushmans - into the Meltanai Gorge - in order to reconnoitre the area of the upcoming ambush operations. Working at extremely low altitude, the scouts found three motorcycles with several dushmans, and as it turned out, positions were equipped nearby, in which there were several more opponents. The enemy managed to launch a rocket at the helicopters, but missed in a hurry. Some of the dushmans were destroyed on the spot by return shelling from the air, another one was neutralized by the special forces later. When examining the dead, our fighters found a serviceable Stinger, a used container from a freshly fired rocket, as well as a briefcase with instructions for the combat use of MANPADS. The most valuable trophies were urgently delivered to the headquarters of the 40th Army in Kabul, and from there to Moscow.

Fulfilling the promise, the commander of the 40th Army instructed to introduce Major E.G. Sergeyev to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But this was categorically opposed by political workers, since by that time the major had been reprimanded by the party for a disciplinary violation. All other special forces who participated in the operation were also denied awards, although among the high officials at the headquarters there were many who were encouraged for the capture of the Stingers ...

Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Sergeev died on April 25, 2008 after a long-term serious illness (due to combat wounds and shell shock). He was buried at the New Cemetery in Ryazan.

Last years life of an officer, his comrades-in-arms tried to restore justice and achieve a well-deserved award; found a document on his submission to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The exhausting struggle with the bureaucratic system continued after the death of the officer, and in the end the truth triumphed. By the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 6, 2012, for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev Evgeny Georgievich was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).


SERGEEV E.G.		Sokolov B.I.

SOKOLOV

BORIS INNOKENTIEVICH

Detective officer of the KGB of the USSR, captain. Born in 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude, in the family of an employee. He graduated from the Irkutsk Aviation College, worked at a machine-building plant.

In 1973 he was called up for military service in the Soviet Army, after demobilization he entered the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School, after which he served in engineering units. Since 1981 - in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR. He studied at the Higher Courses of Military Counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR, served in the Special Departments of the KGB of the Leningrad Military District.

For two and a half years, Boris Sokolov served in the Republic of Afghanistan as an operative of the Special Department of the KGB. He took part in 64 military operations with a total duration of 269 days. In battles he was twice shell-shocked and received a shrapnel wound. He remained in Afghanistan until the end of the business trip even after being awarded the title of Hero, refusing the right to leave early for his homeland.

Afghanistan has left a tragic mark in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of Russian people. The time has come to tell about the fact that in this difficult war, along with soldiers and officers, army security officers participated in all military affairs. Military counterintelligence officers went through the harsh school of Afghanistan shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers, fulfilling their duty to ensure the security of a limited contingent of Soviet troops.

One of these heroes is Boris Sokolov. His Afghan everyday life was not much different from the everyday life of other military counterintelligence officers, who left good memories of themselves for everyone with whom fate brought them together on dangerous Afghan roads. Through their efforts, many espionage and sabotage terrorist acts of the rebels and their Western patrons against the Soviet troops were exposed and stopped, and dozens of servicemen of the Soviet Army were released from captivity.

In combat conditions professional quality an officer, and even more so a Chekist - at a glance. So it was on that March day in 1984, when, during the landing of Soviet troops on helicopters, the gang opened heavy fire on them. B.I. Sokolov and the chief of staff, Major Yakushev, managed to organize an effective defense, ensuring the entry of soldiers into combat vehicles, and were the last to leave the battle.

The Chekist unit, in which Boris Sokolov served, was actively involved in the release of captured Soviet soldiers. This work, always associated with mortal risk, required great personal courage and readiness for self-sacrifice from military counterintelligence officers: not everyone was able to go to the camp of dushmans unarmed in order to negotiate with bandits at gunpoint of enemy machine guns ...

Prepared
Evgeny FIELD

Sokolov Boris Innokent'evich- , detective of the Special Department of the KGB of the USSR for the 108th motorized rifle division of the 40th army of the Turkestan military district (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), captain.

Biography

Born on October 19, 1953 in the capital of Buryatia - the city of Ulan-Ude in the family of an employee. Russian. Member of the CPSU since 1977. Graduated from 10 classes, Irkutsk Aviation College. He worked at a machine-building plant. In the Soviet Army since May 1973 - called up for military service in the Trans-Baikal Military District. From the troops he entered the military school. In 1979 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Military Engineering School. He served in the engineering units of the Leningrad Military District.

Since August 1981 - in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR. He graduated from the Higher Courses of Military Counterintelligence of the KGB of the USSR in Novosibirsk in 1982. He served in the Special Departments of the KGB in parts of the Leningrad Military District.

By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of December 10, 1985 "For the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Captain Sokolov Boris Innokentevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 11536)."