Arithmetic of history. Moncada military barracks

STORM OF MONCADA BARRACKS As a result of the military coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, the American protege, General Batista, came to power in Cuba. To carry out the coup, Batista used the Cuban army, which was created, trained and equipped by the United States and, since its inception, has invariably acted as an armed gendarme defending the interests of American imperialism and the bourgeois-landlord oligarchy. “The coup further undermined the independence and sovereignty of Cuba,” notes the materials of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba. “After it, the country’s doors opened even wider for American monopolies; he promoted the interests of Cuban and foreign landowners; caused increased exploitation of workers, small and middle peasants, ordinary employees, small traders, etc.; it caused an aggravation of the problem of chronic unemployment and contributed to the growth of profits of large bourgeois-landowner enterprises due to a decrease in the standard of living of the masses; has depleted our country's currency reserves; trampled the few democratic freedoms that existed before March 10; contributed to the preservation of corruption and vices inherent in previous governments, bandit robbery of the state treasury, waste of funds intended for pension provision workers, political and other corruption; unleashed the most cruel and bloody terror that has never happened in the history of Cuba. This coup led to the extreme aggravation of all the contradictions inherent in the neocolonial regime from which our country suffered, and to the emergence revolutionary situation" The need to fight against the dictatorship required the immediate mobilization of the popular masses. However, the bourgeois opposition parties were deeply confused, counted on US help, and preached anti-communism. The party of Cuban communists, the People's Socialist Party, took a decisive position in the struggle against the dictatorship. However, under the conditions of the Cold War and the widespread preaching of anti-communism by the media, she was politically isolated and subjected to severe persecution. The labor movement was split. All power was in the hands of the army under the command of General Batista. In this difficult situation, a group of progressive-minded youth began to create an underground political organization with the aim of preparing a popular armed uprising against tyranny. It included young people - workers, office workers, students, peasants. The organization was headed by the young politician Fidel Castro Ruz. Fidel Castro's plan was to seize the Moncada military barracks in the city of Santiago de Cuba in order to arm the people and create a center of revolutionary struggle. With great difficulty, making personal material sacrifices, the revolutionaries managed to raise funds to purchase 165 small arms (mostly small-caliber rifles and hunting rifles). Under conditions of the strictest secrecy, combat training of future participants in the uprising was carried out; People and weapons were transported from Havana to Santiago de Cuba. At dawn July 26, 1953 one and a half hundred rebels set out to storm Moncada. They were opposed by the regular part of Batista's army, who used modern weapons. The battle lasted more than two hours. Despite the unparalleled heroism shown by the revolutionaries, they were defeated - the forces were too unequal. Most of the attackers were captured by soldiers, many of them were subjected to severe torture, were brutally killed, and the rest were put on trial. Fidel Castro was sentenced to 15 years in prison. On trial Fidel Castro gave a powerful speech in which he exposed the crimes of the dictatorial regime and outlined the program of the rebels. It put forward such goals as the overthrow of the dictatorship, the destruction of the latifundia and the transfer of land to the peasants, the elimination of semi-colonial dependence on foreign monopolies, the eradication of unemployment, and the expansion of real democratic rights of the people. Fidel Castro's speech, illegally distributed under the title "History will vindicate me", played important role in mobilizing the masses for further struggle against the dictatorship. “In order for people to sincerely and wholeheartedly believe in some idea, one must do what no one does: tell people everything with utmost clarity and fearlessness,” Fidel Castro emphasized, speaking in court. - Demagogues and professional politicians want to create a miracle by preserving everything and with everyone a good relationship, while inevitably deceiving everyone and everything. Revolutionaries must boldly proclaim their ideas, define their principles and express their intentions so that no one is deceived in them - neither friends nor enemies. When it comes to struggle, we call the people those 600 thousand Cubans who do not have jobs and want to earn an honest living, and not be forced to emigrate from the country in search of a livelihood; 500 thousand agricultural workers, living in miserable huts and working only four months a year, and the rest of the time starving, sharing poverty with their children, not having a single piece of land for crops, people whose existence should evoke compassion if there were not so many hearts of stone; 400 thousand industrial workers and unskilled workers whose pension funds have been completely plundered, they are deprived of the rights they have won, and they live in appalling housing, and their earnings from the hands of the owner go straight into the hands of moneylenders, people who will face demotion in the future and dismissal, whose life is constant work, and rest is only the grave; we are also talking about 100 thousand, the site reports. small farmers who live and die working land that does not belong to them, looking at it with sadness, like Moses at the promised land, but die without receiving it, obliged to pay for their plots of land, like feudal serfs, part of their harvest ; They cannot cherish this land, improve it, decorate it, plant a cedar or an orange tree on it, because they themselves do not know when the Alguasil will come with the village guard and drive them away from this piece of land. We are also talking about 30 thousand selfless teachers and teachers, sacrificed, people so necessary for the better destinies of future generations, but who are treated so poorly, they are paid so little for their work; we are also talking about 20 thousand small traders, burdened with debts, ruined by the crisis and finally finished off by a multitude of robber officials and bribe-takers; about 10 thousand young professionals - doctors, engineers, lawyers, veterinarians, teachers, dentists, pharmacists, journalists, artists, sculptors, etc. - who leave classrooms with diplomas, with the desire to fight, full of hope, but end up at a dead end, bumping into everywhere closed doors, indifference to their requests and demands. This is the people - those who experience all the misfortunes and therefore are ready to fight with all their courage! To this people, whose sad paths are paved with false promises and lies, we will not say to this people: “We will give you everything.” We will tell him: “Give all your strength to the struggle, so that freedom and happiness become your property!” The assault on Moncada marked the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. The situation in the country began to change qualitatively. A new progressive force appeared on the political arena, and Fidel Castro emerged as the undisputed leader of the nascent revolutionary process. While in prison, Fidel Castro and his associates lay the foundations of a new political organization. In honor of the heroic events at the walls of Moncada, it was called the “26 July Movement”. Under public pressure, the tyranny was forced to grant amnesty to the rebels who had served almost two years in prison. After leaving prison and making sure that a legal struggle is impossible, they go to Mexico, where, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, they begin to prepare a new armed uprising...

More than a hundred years ago, the Queen Mercedes fortress was built in the city of Santiago de Cuba. At that time, the struggle against Spanish rule was flaring up in Cuba, especially in the east of the country, in the province of Oriente. The fortress housed a Spanish garrison; Cellars were intended for captured rebels.

In the early nineties, the fight against Spain was led by General Guillermo Moncada. In 1893, Moncada was betrayed, captured and thrown into the Reina Mercedes fortress. Two years of torture and solitary confinement in a damp cell destroyed Mon-ada.

After his death, the uprising continued and escalated into the Cuban-Spanish War. In 1898, United States troops landed on the island, ostensibly to help the Cubans. American troops occupied the eastern part of the island. Instead of the Spanish flag, an American flag soared over the “Queen Mercedes” fortress. And even when the war with Spain ended, United States troops continued to remain in Cuba "for the purpose of protecting the business and personal interests of US citizens."

The Cubans, not reconciled to the new foreign domination, again took up arms. Unrest began in the province of Oriente. To reassure the people, the government raised the Cuban flag over the fortress and named it after the revolutionary General Moncada.

From now on the fortress was called: Moncada barracks. Soldiers of the Cuban army marched in the fortress, whose main goal was to protect the dictatorial regime from its own people.

One can compile a long chronicle of uprisings and strikes: 1906, 1912, 1917 and 1920. If a rebellion threatened North American interests, US Marines would arrive in Cuba. The uprising was suppressed by fire and sword, and the prison of the fortress, named after the revolutionary general, was filled with prisoners, as before - during the time of Spanish rule.

Many generations of Cubans dreamed of storming Moncada, of destroying this hated fortress in which thousands of the best people in the country were tortured. But the walls of the fortress were too strong, there were too many soldiers in it. And yet the time has come...

At the end of May 1953, a young lawyer from Havana arrived in the provincial capital of Oriente. The lawyer's name was Fidel Castro Ruz. He did not have any court cases in Santiago; apparently, he came to relax - he often walked with two friends in the outskirts of the city. They also visited the beach about twenty kilometers from Santiago. The road to the sea went through a sparsely populated area; Only sometimes we came across Finnish farms.

About one of the fincas - a small house, almost invisible from the road - the visitors began to make inquiries, asking people living nearby and the owner of the posada - a roadside tavern. The house stood ten meters from the road, but the large, wide leaves of a large banana covered it right up to the roof. And the whole garden around was a dense thicket of intertwined plants with shiny leaves. The house seemed uninhabited.

And so it was. The house - Finnish Siboney - belonged to a certain Señor Vasquez, a very rich man. Vasquez had other estates, but his heart ached at the thought that the Finn Siboney was not bringing in income. He tried to rent it out as a dacha, but the summer residents, having been there once, brought the Finnish woman into such a state that Vasquez vowed to ever let them on the doorstep.

So, Vasquez was tormented by the thought of the worthless Finn, but, being a suspicious person, he warily met a stranger who came with a request to rent his house. The memories of the barbarian summer residents were too fresh!

The young man was persistent. His appearance inspired confidence: tall, phlegmatic, fair-haired - he looked more like a North American than a Cuban, and this, you see, could not but speak in his favor: you won’t find a better business partner than a gringo! However, the blonde's last name was Alvarez. He said that he wanted to use the finca as a transit point for trading chickens: he would buy them from surrounding peasants and transport them to Havana. The plan, it seemed to Vasquez, promised money, but first of all it was necessary to make inquiries about the payment and Alvarez’s characteristics. That's where we parted.

If Señor Vázquez had been with the Finnish woman Siboney on that May day when Fidel Castro and his friends were examining her, he would have immediately recognized Alvarez as one of them. Alvarez's real name was Ernesto Tisol.

Meeting with Fidel in Santiago, Tisol recounted his conversation with Vázquez. They decided that Tisol would tell Vasquez his real name, explaining that he owned a poultry farm near Havana. This was true, and Señor Vasquez could easily verify it. He wants to help Alvarez also get into poultry farming, and Vazquez, under the name Alvarez, will be introduced to Abel Santamaria, also blond, like Tisol. And so it was done.

Vasquez demanded immediate payment of two hundred pesos for two months in advance. For June and July. And when they left him, Tisol, grinning, said:

- Well, at least we won’t owe him anything on the morning of July twenty-sixth...

Of course, there were plenty of barracks in Cuba. The big ones are cuartelos and the small ones are cuartelitos. Every dictator - from Machado to Batista - left behind several barracks. The barracks housed the soldiers of Ejercito (the name of the Cuban army), and there was also a branch of SIM - the military intelligence service, which actually dealt with internal security issues. And Ejercito, by the way, was by no means intended to fight an external enemy. Soldiers were used as a means of protecting the regime from possible internal opponents. There was no conscription in Cuba; lumpen people were hired to serve in the army - sometimes urban, but most of all rural, dark, illiterate, only in the army for the first time in their lives had they eaten their fill and put on boots. During punitive expeditions, soldiers were not forbidden to confiscate whatever they wanted from the civilian population. The barracks contained a lot of weapons necessary for the Movement, Fidel Castro’s organization, to begin an armed struggle against the Batista regime.

Moncada was chosen for the first assault for many reasons. Cuba is a very elongated island; the capital is located on the edge of the state, and not in its center. The remote province of Oriente is connected to the capital only by a nine-hundred-kilometer-long mountain road. And the population of Oriente preserved revolutionary traditions and were hostile to Batista. In the southwestern part of Oriente stretches the Sierra Maestra range - wild mountains covered with impenetrable forests. And if you have to retreat, the Sierra Maestra could become an ideal base for guerrilla forces.

July 26 was also not chosen by chance. For three days - July 25, 26 and 27 - carnival is raging in Santiago. Carnival in Cuba will not amaze anyone, but in Santiago, where the black population predominates, it is not just a holiday. Even during the years of slavery, local custom allowed black slaves to have fun and relax three days a year. These three days turned into a frenzied hurricane of passions, when the driven deep vital energy of the eternally hungry, overworked people burst out. Under the Batista regime, when all movement of citizens around the country was strictly controlled, the carnival became the best cover for one hundred and fifty people - members of Fidel Castro's "Movement" - to sneak into Santiago. There was one more consideration. The soldiers of the local garrison - from the Moncada barracks - cannot resist taking part in the general fun. Discipline is falling, and there is no need to talk about vigilance.

Old people named Nunez, who lived not far from the Finnish woman Siboney, could not praise enough their new neighbor - an amazingly modest and hardworking young man. From morning to night he was busy in the poultry house, receiving some people, obviously poultry traders; Trucks carrying chicken feed and farm equipment often drove into the Finnish yard. (So, at least, it seemed to the Nunezes.) Apparently, Alvarez found it difficult to cope with the household alone, and after some time a woman came to him from Havana. Alvarez introduced her to the Nunezes as his wife, Aydes. And she also turned out to be very hardworking. The light was on in the Finnish windows until late at night. Sometimes the trucks arrived late, and the poor Alvarez couple had to get up in the middle of the night to unload them. And in the morning, Aides, as if nothing had happened, fresh and combed, was busy in the yard.

“I can envy you, Señor Alvarez,” old Nunez used to say, “you have such a wife... Oh, if only I were thirty years younger!”

Aides was as much the wife of Abel Alvarez as he was Alvarez himself. They both had the same last name, Santamaria, because Aides and Abel were brother and sister.

And there really was enough work at the Finnish: one hundred and fifty people who should arrive by July 26th must be provided with military uniforms and weapons. In principle, almost everything could be bought from the soldiers of Batista’s army. But, firstly, you cannot immediately purchase a large amount of uniforms - this will immediately arouse suspicion. Secondly, it was expensive to pay.

The Movement had money, not much, but enough to buy uniforms and some weapons. Every participant in the Movement donated money as much as they could. Abel Santamaria sold the car. Oscar Alcalde founded his pharmaceutical laboratory. Waiter Elpidio Coca gave away his savings - a whopping 300 pesos! Jesus Montana also had some savings. And Pedro Marrero, a worker at the Polar beer factory, sold his position. The latter needs to be explained. In those days there was so little work in Cuba and so many unemployed that a position in a reputable enterprise (no matter what: courier, fireman, loader, janitor) was bought and sold. Marrero had once bought his position, and now, when money was needed, he sold it for a thousand pesos. (Few unemployed people had that kind of money, and people borrowed from the moneylender at merciless interest rates.) One way or another, they got the necessary uniforms. It was worse with weapons: it was easiest to buy revolvers - it was more convenient for soldiers to take them out of the barracks, hiding them under their clothes. Machine guns and machine guns - alas! - didn't sell. I had to get hunting rifles.

And all this was taken to the “chicken farm”, all this had to be checked, lubricated and hidden. The weapons arrived in feed boxes, in baskets of flowers, in bags of cement. So two months passed.

We traveled to Santiago in small groups of five or six people. Some traveled by train, some on a regular bus, called “uaua” in Cuba, and some in cars. One could only talk among one another about the carnival; one had to look cheerful and riotous.

On July 25, Fidel Castro went to the detective department of the police: as a lawyer, he had the right to make inquiries about prisoners. He talked with the heads of the department, trying to understand from their behavior whether they suspected anything. No. The police looked calm.

Fidel drove to Santiago in a rented car. It was a late-production blue Buick. Such a car was supposed to inspire respect from the police during the entire twelve-hour drive! - ways. At the wheel was a member of the “Movement,” a black man named Teodulio Mitchell. Fidel sat nearby - important and unapproachable, as befits a white lord driving around in a Buick. And when they were stopped by the police - Teodulio was speeding or it seemed to the policeman - the guard, who showered curses on this idiot black man, immediately lowered his tone, looking at his arrogant owner.

But before leaving Havana, Fidel asked to come to his home.

- I want to kiss my son. Who knows when I'll be able to do this again...

At Finnish Siboney they handed out weapons: Spanish and German pistols, an army rifle, one machine gun. Most of all there were hunting rifles with 12-gauge cartridges and long-barreled carbines of the 1922 model. In a surprise attack, this weapon could be effective.

“Compañeros, listen to me,” said Castro. “Today we will attack the Moncada barracks.” This will be a surprise attack. It should last no more than ten minutes.”

The minute of departure was approaching. Fidel announced that he would have the last word.

- Compañeros! We give everything and receive nothing in return. Today we will find out how our battle will end: victory or defeat. If we win, we will fulfill the aspirations of José Martí. If we are defeated, our fight will serve as an example to the people of Cuba and will be continued by others. But in any case, the “Movement” will triumph!

The day of the storming of the Moncada barracks was the first day of the Cuban revolution. It doesn’t matter that the assault itself ended in failure, and the rebels were brought to justice. The true meaning of July 26, 1953 was determined on January 1, 1959, when Fidel Castro's rebel army entered Havana: the defeat at Moncada was the beginning of a victorious struggle. On the long road to this victory there was a prison on the island of Pinos, and a landing from the Granma, and the mountain trails of the Sierra Maestra. And the fact that the whole island learned: there are people who seriously decided to end the Batista dictatorship is the main significance of the battle at the walls of the Moncada fortress.

But today everything is still ahead - the first defeat, the upcoming victories. Everything is ahead. Today, early in the morning of July 26, 1953...

(Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar), relying on the military who had great influence in the country, carried out a coup d'etat. He removed the incumbent president, Carlos Prío Socarrás, from power, declared himself “interim president” and canceled the presidential elections, which were to be held in three months and in which the Batista United Action Party was predicted to only come third, by a wide margin.
The most common accusations against the “second Batista regime” in Cuba (1952-59; before that, from 1933, after the military “revolt of the sergeants” he led, Batista played an important role in political life country, and in 1940-44. he held the presidential post legitimately) consist of lobbying the interests of American capital (US monopolies controlled over 70% of the national economy) and providing patronage to the American mafia, which turned Havana into a major center of the gambling business (“Latin American Las Vegas”), as well as rampant corruption. Batista's achievements include only some economic growth through direct investment from the United States and the development of tourism.
The standard of living of Cubans during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, against the backdrop of the rapid enrichment of circles close to the regime or collaborating with American official and/or shadow business in the country, generally showed a steady decline. The increase in unemployment amounted to 10% of the working population (from 30% to 40%), there was a massive ruin of peasant farms due to the increase in land ownership of litifundists, who, in turn, could not organize the cultivation of most of their lands. All this caused constant social tension in society and a rapid increase in dissatisfaction with the rule of an undoubtedly charismatic, but irresponsible leader in economic and social matters.

Fulgencio Batista Saldivar wearing the regalia of the President of Cuba and the general's uniform of the Cuban Army.

The Batista regime immediately faced widespread opposition from supporters of democratic and civil rule in Cuba, opponents of political and economic dependence on the United States, and advocates of social justice (in particular, the abolition of the large private ownership of land by the latifundists and the allocation of land to poor peasants). Many young radicals, including the quick rise of 26-year-old Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz, a law graduate from the University of Havana and a recent participant in left-wing insurgencies in the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, were banking on a revolutionary uprising against the dictatorship in arms.

Fidel Castro (standing in the middle) with his comrades shortly before the attack on the Moncada barracks.

According to the memoirs of Fidel Castro himself, in short time The revolutionaries managed to train up to 1,200 determined fighters, united in approximately 150 territorial cells. At the same time, as training grounds used the sports facilities of the University of Havana, where Fidel and his “chief gunsmith” Pedro Miret, an engineering student, had good connections, a shooting club in Cerro, as well as vacant lots on the outskirts of the Cuban capital, where the rebels practiced shooting posing as pigeon hunters .
The political coloring of supporters of the armed struggle was quite different, but leftist and socialist views dominated among them. Fidel recruited the largest number of comrades from the Orthodox Party of the Cuban People (Partido del Pueblo Cubano - Ortodoxo), an influential populist party that united a fairly diverse range of ideological movements - from veteran communists Civil War in Spain and socialist youth who dreamed of a social revolution, to nationalist-minded Catholic conservatives who wanted to “expel the damned gringos from the country.” Fidel Castro himself in the 1950s. adhered to left-wing socialist views, but was not yet a communist. His phrase is indicative in this regard: “The Cuban revolution is olive, not red.”
Also interesting is the assessment of the associates of the young Fidel and himself from the lips of Ernesto Che Guevara: “This movement is one of many inspired by the desire of the left bourgeoisie to get rid of the oppression of imperialism. I have always thought of Fidel as the true leader of the petty-bourgeois revolution, who, thanks to his outstanding personal qualities, managed to rise above his class."
However, Fidel Castro, who received an excellent humanitarian education, and many of his comrades were well acquainted with the ideas of Marxism, energetically using them in their social program to rouse the poorest sections of the Cuban people to fight. One of the most consistent adherents of communist beliefs among Fidel’s followers was his 22-year-old brother Raul Castro, a member of the communist youth organization of Cuba, who had recently returned from Komsomol studies from the Socialist Republic of Romania and had already been arrested for this.
The self-name of the organization of Cuban revolutionaries at that time was simple: “Movement.” It was this that Fidel Castro later took as a basis when creating his “26 July Movement” (Movimiento 26 de Julio; M-26-7), named after the day of the storming of the Moncada barracks.
The “movement” enjoyed sympathy in various strata of Cuban society, due to the fact that Batista’s corrupt mafia authoritarian regime “created trouble” for people of various incomes and social status. The Cuban Revolution was financed both by modest membership fees from the conspirators themselves, and by donations from wealthier people who planned to use it for their own purposes.

The main problem of Fidel Castro and his followers was the lack of weapons. Cuban historians of the revolution, who have thoroughly studied the circumstances of the storming of the Moncada barracks, estimate the underground arsenal of the rebels as:
- 40 hunting rifles of 12 and 16 gauge;
- 35 Mosberg and Remington rifles and carbines of various models chambered for 22LR cartridge;
- 8 Krag-Jørgensen M1898 rifles;
- 3 Winchester M1892 rifles;
- 1 Springfield M1903 rifle;
- 1 self-loading rifle M1 Garand;
- 1 submachine gun, “which stuck.”
In addition, there were up to 60 pistols and revolvers of various models and 11 “unidentified” long-barreled weapons.
The daring sabotage of July 26 against the Moncada barracks was aimed at main goal namely the seizure of army arsenals for the subsequent arming of the revolutionary masses. Three thousand small arms located in the barracks, incl. M1 self-loading rifles, Thompson submachine guns and machine guns of various models could provide the Cuban revolution with solid firepower.

The Moncada Barracks in the city of Santiago de Cuba (the capital of the province of Oriente) in 1953 was the second largest military facility of this type in Cuba. They were a building typical of the Spanish military tradition of the “cuartel” type (El cuartel), a fortress-type building designed to house military units with their equipment (or horses), weapons and support services “under one roof.”
The 1st Antonio Maceo Regiment (Regimiento Nº 1 Antonio Maceo), one of the oldest units of the Cuban Army, dating back to 1895, with the struggle for Cuban independence from Spain, and bearing the name of one of its heroes, was stationed there. . The regiment was officially called “cavalry”, but by the time period being described it had mainly switched to motor transport. In addition, the 18th squadron of the so-called Moncada barracks was located. Rural Guard (Guardia Rural), a special mounted police formation.
The garrison was commanded by Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano, who had a reputation as a brilliant cavalryman and a good unit commander. Otherwise, he was a typical high-ranking Batistian officer, personally brave, but dishonest and involved in political intrigue.
The total strength of the Moncada garrison exceeded 1,000 soldiers and officers, however, due to the traditional carnival in Santiago de Cuba that began on July 25, 1953, many military personnel and police went on vacation, and on the day of the attack, only about 400 active bayonets could resist the rebels (or sabers? - cavalrymen!). In addition, many soldiers had had a fair amount of fun at the carnival the day before and could be considered “active bayonets” purely formally. It was these factors that Fidel Castro took into account when determining the time for the assault on the Moncada barracks. In addition, the choice of the leader of the Cuban revolution settled on this military facility because it was almost 900 kilometers away from the main forces of the Cuban army, located in Camp Colombia near Havana. If the assault were successful, the Batista government would need considerable time to gather loyal troops to Santiago de Cuba.
The rebels' chances of success seemed all the more real since the fighting qualities of the Batistian army were low. Despite the fact that almost all of Fulgencio Batista’s life was connected with the army, his attitude towards it was traditional for many Latin American dictators of that time. Considering the armed forces as a tool for achieving his political goals, he did not systematically work to build them, securing support for himself in army circles primarily by indulging corruption and careerism among the officer corps.
In the absence of universal conscription in Cuba and the recruitment of armed forces by the method of recruiting volunteers, the small salaries of ordinary and junior commanders attracted military service predominantly impoverished poor peasants and urban declassed elements. The officers, mostly from wealthy backgrounds, treated recruits with the arrogance of a landowner lord before his farmhand, and their treatment of lower ranks was often cruel. In the Cuban army there was no mutual trust and spirit of military brotherhood between commanders and subordinates.
Periodic purchases of weapons and military equipment from the United States were not accompanied by adequate combat training for troops. Unit commanders were more concerned about the impression that their soldiers would make on the “senior president” than about the real combat capability of their units, therefore military exercises and parades were in the nature of outright window dressing. The revolutionary guerrilla struggle in Cuba, which unfolded shortly after the events described, showed the low level of tactical and technical literacy of officers of the Cuban government army, and an even more deplorable level of training of soldiers.

Panorama of the Moncada barracks:

Aerial view of the barracks and adjacent buildings:


In the foreground are the Moncada barracks. Adjoining them on the left are the buildings of a military hospital and the Palace of Justice ( Palacio de Justicia), behind the barracks are the buildings of a civil hospital, used by Fidel Castro's rebels when attacking the garrison.

Moncada barracks, early 1950s:

The ceremonial formation of the 1st Antonio Maceo Regiment at the Moncada barracks, early 1950s:

Group photo of soldiers and junior commanders 1st Regiment "Antonio Maceo" , early 1950s:

Fidel Castro's opponent in the battle for the Moncada barracks, Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano, at the military parade on May 20, 1952 in Havana...:


... and during field maneuvers at Camp Columbia in 1952:

Fidel Castro set the task of sabotage to capture the Moncada barracks and, first of all, the army arsenals located there. After this, under the guise of sending false radiograms from the Moncada radio station to other military units in order to disorganize the actions of the military (the Fidelists were determined to spread disinformation about a military mutiny against the Batista regime, a new “revolt of the sergeants”, similar to the one that first glorified the future dictator in 1933 ), it was planned to transport weapons and ammunition to several safe houses in Santiago de Cuba. If the operation was successful, the next step was to seize the city radio center and broadcast from there a recording of the last radio address of the authoritative opposition politician Eduardo René Chibás Ribas (died in 1951), who passionately called on the people of Cuba to fight dictatorship, corruption and American domination capital. In a word, the Moncada barracks were to become only the first link in the chain of ambitious plans of the young leader of the Cuban revolution... Due to a tragic combination of circumstances, they were not destined to come true this time. Or rather, it was destined, but much later.

By the evening of July 25, 1953, rebels led by Fidel Castro gathered at a previously rented farm in the village of Siboney on the outskirts of Santiago de Cuba. Most of them had to travel from different parts of the country, mainly from Havana. About 60 people arrived individually on trains or buses, the rest - in groups of 4-5 people in their own or rented cars, which were then planned to be used in the assault. The movement was carried out in conditions of strict secrecy; the senior groups received comprehensive instructions on this matter and small sums for travel expenses. The general “legend” in case of checks on the roads was as follows: young people come to a fun carnival in Santiago de Cuba.
Fidel himself, who left the Cuban capital in the brand new Buick of the black rebel Teodulio Mitchell, had to improvise when meeting with a mechanized police patrol in the Rancho Boyeros area. Dressed in an elegant summer suit and with an expensive cigar in his mouth, the leader of the conspirators gave the impression of a trustworthy young dandy. He told the police that he was going to the local airport “to meet a friend-general,” after which the law enforcement officers took up their visor and let the car through... noting in parting: “Sir, there are no flights at this hour!”
Some other groups also had unforeseen circumstances: several people deserted at the last moment, while others, in order to cope with nervous tension, managed to get drunk on the way, despite the commander’s ban on drinking alcohol.
However, by dawn on July 26, the detachment was assembled and ready to move. Fidel Castro addressed his comrades with a short but incendiary speech, the text of which is included in all textbooks on the history of the Cuban revolution and is very indicative of understanding the motivation of young revolutionaries: “Comrades! In a few hours you may find yourself victorious or defeated, but know this, comrades, no matter what, our movement will win! If we win tomorrow, Marty's aspirations will come true faster. If this does not happen, our speech will serve as a call for all the people of Cuba to pick up the banner and move forward. The people will support us in Oriente and throughout the island. Marty's Centennial Generation! As in the past, here in Oriente we are the first to proclaim: “Freedom or death!”
Historians of the revolution in Cuba currently know the names of 137 participants in the assault on the Moncada barracks. At the same time, the total number of the rebel detachment that Fidel Castro led into the attack on July 26, 1953 could have been somewhat larger - the leader of the Cuban revolution himself recalled 140 fighters.
At the same time, a smaller detachment (according to various sources from 24 to 40 people) was supposed to attack the barracks in the city of Bayamo, the relatively large army garrison closest to Santiago de Cuba, in order to prevent reinforcements from approaching the military.
The vast majority of Fidel Castro's fighters came from the working or middle classes of Cuba. There were a lot of young people studying, but only four had a completed university education, including Fidel himself. An unusual circumstance for revolutionary uprisings in Latin America was that among the Fidelists there was not a single professional military man. Average age The rebels were 26 years old - most of them were very young, only 27 of them were over thirty years old and five were over 40 years old. The racial composition of Fidel Castro's squad was unusually "white" for the multiracial society of Cuba - only two fighters were black and another 12 were mulattoes. This is explained by the fact that the “colored” population of Cuba generally supported the Batista regime, seeing in it “their man” - mixed blood also flowed in the dictator’s veins. There were two young women in the combat detachment - Haydee Santamaria, the sister of one of the commanders, and Melba Hernandez, who were assigned the role of doctor's assistants.

The tactical plan for the capture of the Moncada barracks was developed by Fidel Castro and his closest associates Abel Santamaría, Raul Castro, Pedro Miret, Lester Rodríguez and several others. As Fidel himself later admitted, he was overly calculated on using the factors of surprise and luck; the risk of failure was unreasonably high. However, the young revolutionaries were eager to fight, and their high morale and willingness to sacrifice gave the rebels an additional advantage over the poorly motivated soldiers of the Batista regime.
The main assault group led by Fidel Castro, consisting of approximately 90 fighters for 16 passenger cars was supposed to approach the entrance to the territory of the Moncada barracks from post No. 3 under the guise of a motorcade of a high-ranking officer from Havana, who had descended on the garrison with an unexpected inspection. All, or at least most of the people in this group were dressed in military uniform (however, with civilian shoes and without army belt equipment). Sets of soldiers' uniforms, which were mostly light blue color(military police), in order to distinguish themselves from the khaki uniform of the Moncada garrison, the rebels managed to “get by” with the help of a young resident of the military hospital, Florentino Fernandez Leon, a relative of one of the revolutionaries. A military medic who sympathized with the Movement bought them from the sergeant in charge of the hospital laundry for the modest sum of $200. In addition, the female conspirators sat down at sewing machines and sewed a number of more sets of clothes based on the army model from fabrics that matched the color. In total, up to 100 people could be equipped. Fidel Castro ordered sergeant stripes to be sewn onto all uniforms, knowing the respect and fear the stern junior commanders instilled in the rank and file of the Cuban Army, and also to give credibility to the “legend” of the “revolt of the sergeants.”
The assault group was entrusted with the main combat mission - to break into the territory of the Moncada barracks and capture the object.
It was to be supported by two more combat groups - twenty people under the command of Abel Santamaria and five people led by Raul Castro and Lester Rodriguez. The first of them was instructed to seize a civilian hospital and set up a detachment medical center there (for this, the group had a doctor, Dr. Muñoz, and both female nurses), and the second was to take possession of the Palace of Justice. Having established control over both objects, the groups were supposed to support the assault with sniper fire from their upper floors, from where a convenient field of fire opened onto the barracks.
The drivers were not part of the combat groups and had to remain with their vehicles, guarding them and keeping them ready with the engines running in case of the need to retreat or otherwise maneuver forces.

The implementation of this bold plan largely depended on a favorable combination of circumstances for the young Cuban revolutionaries, and this is precisely what did not happen on July 26, 1953. The assault on the Moncada barracks became for Fidel Castro and his comrades a chain of unpleasant surprises and accidents for which they were not prepared. At the same time, the reaction of the garrison, consisting of soldiers of a selected regiment and led by an intelligent officer (a kind of “best of the worst” against the backdrop of the general bad state of the Cuban army), turned out to be much more rapid and aggressive than the rebels expected.
It began with the fact that none of the drivers of the cars of the rebel convoy could navigate freely in the cramped, winding streets of Santiago de Cuba. We had to get there using tourist guides and road maps. Having left the Siboney farm in the dark (around 4:30-4:45), the cars lost each other on the way and arrived at the Moncada barracks at different time. Without having time to get their bearings in the situation, their crews entered the battle on the move and acted at their own peril and risk. Several cars, including the one containing a supply of ammunition and some of the rifles so necessary for Fidel’s detachment, got lost altogether and were unable to reach their destination.
However, around 6:00 a.m., the first few vehicles arrived in front of Moncada Barracks Post No. 3; Fidel Castro decided to act with available forces, counting on the imminent arrival of reinforcements.
Sources describe the further development of events in different ways.
According to the most common version, eight rebels in sergeant's uniforms managed to disarm the sentries without firing a single shot, scaring the sleepy, confused soldiers into fear with a menacing shout: “Open the passage, the general is coming! Immediately put your rifles on the ground, you bunglers, and march to the barracks!” However, then Fidel's Buick suddenly stalled as it entered the post, blocking the road inside the barracks for other vehicles. While the driver was desperately trying to start it, and the rest of the rebels were helplessly crowding around, an outer patrol appeared, consisting of Privates Luis Triay and Alfonso Silva (alert and experienced old soldiers) who became suspicious and called out to the suspicious "sergeants". One of the young rebels lost his nerve and fired. The patrolmen immediately took cover in a fortified guardhouse and returned fire.

Fulgencio Batista (left) talks with soldier Alfonso Silva, one of the first to open fire on the rebels:

Fidel Castro, in turn, recalls that the guards noticed the approach of the convoy and blocked the entrance to the barracks, after which he had to drive his car “straight into a group of soldiers.” Then shots rang out and the car was stopped.
As a result, only three rebels managed to penetrate the territory of the barracks, and those who remained unidentified due to their military uniform were forced to get out without making their presence known in any way (except for misleading a platoon of recruits who, posing as sergeants , they ordered not to engage in battle). The rest, led by Fidel Castro, abandoned their vehicles and entered into an intense firefight with the guard personnel before entering the barracks. Subsequently, the leader of the Cuban revolution recalled that at this stage only 20 hand grenades in the hands of his people could have turned the tide of the battle, but the Fidelists did not have such an important assault weapon.
Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano immediately gave the order to declare a combat alert in the garrison, and the soldiers of the 1st Antonio Maceo Regiment, roused from their bunks by gunfire, began to dismantle their weapons and take up defensive positions along the perimeter. In the squadron of the Rural Guard, the alarm was announced later, when the officer on duty realized that there was an attack on the garrison, and not a “showdown” between the military.

A staged photo of the Cuban Army, which recreates the moment of the Moncada garrison rising to the gun:

Soldiers of the 1st Regiment "Antonio Maceo" are here in full combat gear, while eyewitnesses of the battle for Moncada testify that many soldiers were "half-dressed", and Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano generally led the battle in silk pajamas, having managed to put on " for recognition" only a cap and a belt with a holster.

While Fidel’s assault group, hiding behind cars and a low stone fence of a military hospital, where the rebels intuitively accumulated under the bullets of the defenders of the barracks (Fidel Castro recalled the “capture” of a military hospital by his people, however, Batistian sources claim that the hospital was closed for repairs and was not guarded), "stuck" in a fierce battle at post No. 3, two support groups managed to complete their tasks with surprising ease.
Abel Santamaria and his men occupied the civilian hospital and opened fire from its windows on the defenders of the barracks, while the squad doctor and the girls set up a medical station and prepared to receive the wounded. However, it was not possible to deliver any of the wounded rebels there during the battle. Medical staff and the hospital patients, accustomed to the armed “showdowns” that periodically occurred in the country between political or criminal groups, treated the situation with understanding and took cover from bullets during interior spaces. Moreover, seeing that they were dealing with opponents of the Batistian dictatorship, many expressed their support for the revolutionaries - the protest potential in Santiago de Cuba was assessed as one of the highest.
Raul Castro and his group captured the Palace of Justice, without resistance, disarming several soldiers and police officers who were there. The soldiers locked the prisoners in the basement, while they themselves positioned themselves on the roof of the building and began to fire at the Moncada barracks from above.
It is believed that most The defenders of the Moncada barracks suffered losses precisely from sniper fire from the civilian hospital and the Palace of Justice.
Fire support allowed Fidel Castro's assault group to hold out a little longer, but when the military introduced two Browning M1919 heavy machine guns into the battle, it became clear to the rebels that their cause was lost. Fidel gave the order to retreat. His men, having loaded their wounded into the surviving cars, began to leave the battle - on foot or in cars. The young commander himself was one of the last to leave, miraculously managing to jump into the departing car. The retreat was covered by seven riflemen under the leadership of the detachment's gunsmith Pedro Miret. This handful of brave men continued to fight several times longer than the main forces of the assault group.

Cuban Army machine gun nest near the Moncada barracks shortly after the end of the battle:

In the heat of battle, Fidel Castro did not have time to convey the order to retreat to the combat groups occupying the civilian hospital and the Palace of Justice. The rebel leader believed that, having seen the retreat of the main forces, the group commanders themselves would decide to withdraw. In the case of Raul Castro, this is what happened: he managed to withdraw his people from the battle without losses.
However, Abel Santamaria, who was in charge of the civilian hospital, either did not immediately notice Fidel’s retreat, or wanted to completely bind the enemy in battle, even sacrificing himself and his fighters. It is impossible to reliably determine what exactly guided this young revolutionary when he decided to continue fighting alone: ​​he himself and almost all his comrades died tragically. Firing heavily from the windows until they ran out of ammunition, Santamaria's group was able to hold out for about three hours - longer than any other rebel.
After repelling the assault on the Moncada barracks, their garrison began counter-offensive actions. Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano sent several platoons of soldiers under the command of the best officers to encircle Pedro Miret's fighters, who were still shooting on the outer perimeter of the barracks, and to capture the civilian hospital.
However, the Batistian military were obviously better able to defend than to attack. The officers were cautious, and the platoons moved forward hesitantly, sluggishly. Having lost several people killed and wounded, Pedro Miret's group of rebels managed to get into the hospital, and only when his defenders ran out of ammunition did the soldiers break into the building.
Doctors and hospital patients tried to hide the young revolutionaries by dressing them in hospital pajamas and placing them in wards. The doctors gave both girls a nursing uniform and tried to convince the Batistian officer that they were their colleagues. However, this noble and naive attempt was doomed to failure: the military quickly identified the participants in the recent battle by traces of soot on their faces and hands, bruises from rifle butts on their shoulders and similar signs, and Aidee Sntamariya and Melba Hernandez were given out as informants. Showering the captured revolutionaries with choice abuse and blows, the soldiers dragged them to the garrison headquarters, where Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano and the hastily arrived Santiago de Cuba police chief Jose Izquierdo Rodriguez subjected them to preliminary interrogation.
Pedro Miret, beaten half to death with rifle butts and bleeding, was left dead in the hospital by the soldiers. Miraculously, 18-year-old lyceum student Ramon Ferres managed to escape captivity, whom the elderly veteran of the War of Liberation against Spain, Thomas Sanchez, who was undergoing treatment, passed off as his grandson.

Colonel Alberto del Rio Chaviano in his office shortly after the end of the battle:

The officers of the Moncada garrison draw up a report on the repulse of the assault. Behind the typewriter is Lieutenant Teodoro Rico Boué, second from the right is Colonel Manuel Ugalde Carrillo, on the right is the garrison commander Colonel Alberto del Río Chaviano:

One of the captured rebels, José Luis Tasende, wounded in the leg, awaits his fate at garrison headquarters:

A few minutes later he will be mercilessly shot:


________________________________________ ________________________________Mikhail Kozhemyakin.

The clock hand was approaching five o'clock in the morning, when a motorcade of 26 vehicles in which the fighters were located headed for the target. The rebels were dressed in the uniform of soldiers of the Batista army, most had sergeant stripes. Fidel rode in the lead car. The assault was supposed to begin at 5:15 am.

Everything seemed to be going according to plan. However, already upon approaching the barracks itself, a completely unexpected obstacle was encountered, which significantly, if not decisively, influenced the outcome of the operation. When the vehicle with the group seizing the main gate had already broken away from the column and went ahead, a foot patrol appeared, making an outer round. The patrolmen did not pay much attention to the main column, but saw that something was wrong near the main gate (and there the guards were captured and disarmed). They prepared for battle, and Fidel, who saw from the lead car all the danger to the advanced group of the situation, stopped his car and jumped out of it to attract the attention of the patrol.

Further developments took an unplanned course. Some of the fighters decided that they were already at the goal, since Fidel got out of the car with a pistol in his hands. They rushed to the neighboring buildings (none of them knew the city, and they thought that the houses standing nearby were the Moncada barracks). The first shots were heard, as a result of which the most important element of the plan was lost - surprise. When they managed to neutralize the patrol and approach the barracks, the roar of shots had already awakened the barracks. The sentries serving inside the building managed to turn on the combat alarm, and the nerve-wracking sound of an electric bell was heard throughout the area.

The main part of the assault detachment was thus forced to take the fight in the most unfavorable conditions for themselves. Firstly, the battle broke out outside the barracks, and secondly, it took on a positional character, that is, conditions were created as a result of chance that Fidel carefully wanted to avoid when planning the operation.

The nature of the battle that unfolded around the barracks was extremely unfavorable for the attackers. He was setting them up for failure. After all, in the barracks there was an entire regiment of the regular army plus a cavalry squadron. It was enough for the enemy to come to his senses and begin to encircle the rebels from the rear with part of his forces, and things could immediately acquire a threatening character. One has to wonder how long (almost two hours) the battle lasted given the fantastic inequality of forces and weapons. The officers commanding the Moncada garrison were in a state of stupor for a very long time and could not take any active measures, only increasing fire from the windows and from the roof of the barracks.

Fidel, according to the unanimous testimony of all participants, was always in the very center of the battle. With a pistol in his hands, he directed the actions of the fighters, and he himself conducted aimed fire at the firing points in the barracks building. He had to figure out a plan for withdrawing the main forces of the detachment from the battle as it became clear that the chances of success had been exhausted.

It was already dawn when he gave the signal to retreat.

Moncada (Spanish Moncada), the name (until 1959) of the military barracks in the city of Santiago de Cuba on the island. Cuba, which was attacked on July 26, 1953 by a group of young revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro. They planned to take possession of the barracks with a warehouse of weapons and ammunition, then, with the help of the people, capture the bridges and railway, cut off the province of Oriente from other areas and carry out a number of social events in this territory, which, according to the rebels’ plan, was supposed to help raise the people to fight for achieving independence and sovereignty of the nation, destroying the latifundia and transferring the land to the peasants. The assault on the Moncada barracks ended in failure. This was due to the lack of weapons and lack of experience. But the courageous performance of the revolutionaries had a great influence on the political situation in the country and throughout Latin America, marking the beginning of the armed struggle against tyranny Batistas in Cuba. The reaction brutally dealt with the young revolutionaries. Over 80 people, including the wounded, were subjected to brutal torture and then shot, the rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (from 3 to 15 years). At the trial on October 16, 1953, designed to “legitimize” the massacre of the heroes of the assault on Moncada, F. Castro made an accusatory speech, which later became a manifesto of the struggle of the Cuban people. July 26 is celebrated annually in Cuba as National Uprising Day. In honor of this event, the anniversary medal “XX Anniversary” was established in 1973.

Materials from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes, vol. 5, were used.

Literature:

Castro F. Speeches and speeches. Per. sysp. M., 1960; Moncada - the alarm of the revolution. M., 1974;

Slezkin L. Yu. History of the Cuban Republic. M., 1966;

M e p l R. Moncada. Per. from French M., 1968.