https://www.site/2014-01-31/predsedatel_prezidium_rossiyskogo_soveta_po_vneshney_i_oboronnoy_politike_fedor_lukyanov_o_vozmozhn

"I don't want to predict a civil war, but..."

Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, on a possible civil war in Ukraine and a war between Russia and NATO

In Ukraine, the hottest stage of confrontation between the authorities and the opposition has ended at this moment. The government has changed, a law on amnesty has been adopted. However, this is not enough for the protesters. The calls for early parliamentary and presidential elections are getting louder. Meanwhile, Viktor Yanukovych went on sick leave. The smoke from the barricades cleared. It's time to take stock and make predictions. Our interlocutor is Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine.

"Yanukovych is a lesser evil than any other alternative"

Fedor Alexandrovich, the formal reason for the intensification of anti-state protests throughout Ukraine is the “laws of January 16” on toughening responsibility for riots, the seizure of institutions, and the like. However, the Ukrainian government comments that these laws are in line with European standards. How true is this?

Firstly, both the Russian and, in this case, the Ukrainian sides are a little cunning in such matters. Indeed, those measures that are legally fixed exist in Western countries. But usually we take all the most stringent measures and put them together. Formally, each of these measures corresponds to the political practice of a particular country. But in fact, the spirit of these legislative measures is much harsher than any of those referred to. It turns out some manipulation.

Secondly, in Western countries these laws have existed for a long time. They are accepted by society. Therefore, there is some agreement about them. In Ukraine, these laws were adopted on the go, during the political crisis. Most importantly, a large part of the population questions the legitimacy of this government. And this power on the go adopts laws that are openly aimed at protecting it from any attacks from society. Therefore, it is impossible to compare the situation in Western countries and in Ukraine. If such laws had been adopted long ago, and if Yanukovych himself had enjoyed undeniable authority, then one could say that the laws of January 16 correspond to Western norms.

"For Putin, interfering in the affairs of Ukraine is an absolutely pointless exercise. There will be no shame, but no result"

- Then from whom does the Ukrainian government take an example?

From Russian, this is obvious. But it seems to me that she somewhat underestimates the difference that exists between political culture and the situation in Ukraine and Russia.

Is this shortsightedness? Or intent: to provoke a harsh reaction, and then play a forceful option, crush the protest?

I believe that in today's Ukrainian politics there is a great element of spontaneous action. This can be traced throughout the crisis. Therefore, most likely, they did not take into account that events could go according to a completely different scenario.

At the recent Russia-EU summit in Brussels, Putin once again stated that the Russian Federation would not interfere in the affairs of Ukraine. Do Putin's statements correspond to reality, is the Russian side really neutral in the Ukrainian conflict?

I think that Putin is disingenuous in this statement. But there really won't be any open intervention. For one simple reason. Russia once, and Putin personally, has already interfered in the affairs of Ukraine. This was in 2004. Putin traveled to Kyiv and then actually participated in the election campaign of Yanukovych. We know the result: he lost. For Putin, this was the most painful defeat. Therefore, he has a clear idea that trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine and influence them is an absolutely pointless exercise. You will not end up with shame, but there will be no result. Therefore, I think that Russia really will not participate in this conflict openly. We have leverage in the form of promised money, which has begun to be allocated, but this can be suspended.

Can we say that Putin and his entourage are clinging to Yanukovych? After all, it is clear that he, as a politician, has already been written off, his rating is low. It is unlikely that he will be voted for in the popular elections. Maybe even today go to someone else, someone from the opposition?

Yanukovych is the legitimate president. There is no other legitimately elected president in Ukraine. As for the elections, it is pointless to predict them in Ukraine. I would not say that Yanukovych has no more chances. And Putin, as I think, does not cling to Yanukovych, but in the current scenario, Yanukovych is a lesser evil than any other alternative. It may be anti-Russian forces that may try to do what Yushchenko did. Or maybe there will be a leadership that will not be able to control anything at all, that is, there will be political chaos in the country. I think that Russia is not satisfied with either option.

Is civil disobedience in Ukraine an example and a call to action for the Russian opposition? Is the scenario of "exporting the revolution" being played out? Are there prerequisites for this in Russia?

I think exporting revolutions is a scarecrow. The situations in Ukraine and Russia are different. I believe that there is no direct correlation in this regard.

“People are just fed up with this system”

You spoke about a special Ukrainian political culture. Surely its epicenter is the western regions: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnitsky, Rivne, Lutsk, etc. And it is clear why they are protesting - because of the historical heritage. But why did the same actions take place in Dnepropetrovsk, Chernihiv, in the Poltava region, that is, in the eastern lands?

In Russia, the geopolitical factor, which certainly exists, is greatly exaggerated. But the situation is by no means exhausted by them. Ukraine today is experiencing a crisis of the political system. Yanukovych did not create this regime, but he is its most striking personification. This is a deeply corrupt and ineffective regime. He is incapable of formulating any guidelines for national development. And it's getting worse. It was from the very beginning, but at different times more skillful politicians found ways to maneuver in this system. Since the 2000s, the situation has gradually worsened. And under Yanukovych, it reached a certain limit. Residents of the western regions are not satisfied with this situation for cultural and historical reasons, while residents of the eastern regions are simply tired of it. Instead of doing something for the people, the authorities are engaged exclusively in intrigues, stealing and trying to shift their responsibility to someone else. Therefore, there is nothing to be surprised that people of the most different views, strata living in different regions, are simply fed up with this system, which serves itself, and not the population.

"This is a deeply corrupt and ineffective regime, unable to formulate guidelines for national development. Under Yanukovych, it has reached its limit"

How do you generally assess the ongoing civil disobedience in Ukraine for years? How effective is it in terms of improving political and social relations? What is it - forward movement, walking in a circle or stepping back?

I think that the most correct description is walking in circles. There are a number of elements in the Ukrainian protest that inspire respect: for a long time there was no violence in it. However, now we see that it no longer works. But experience shows that this model of political behavior as a whole does not change anything. She makes the country stagnate. Therefore, the main purpose of the events, first of all, is to try to change this political system.

- What about the economy? Standard&Poor""s downgraded Ukraine's credit rating. What will happen in the long run?

Any investor loves predictability. Ukraine demonstrates the opposite. This is another sign that the Ukrainian model is not working. The fact that Ukraine is degrading economically is obvious. As for possible changes, it is difficult for me to say whether they will happen or not. As you can see, for all the post-Soviet years, it was not possible to do this.

"Ukraine is a periphery"

Are there elements of provocation in the escalation of the conflict? If so, who is their "customer"? Who could be behind the killing of protesters and police officers?

There is a provocation, of course. But don't confuse cause and effect. There is an objective crisis of the state model, from which it is not clear how to get out. It is clear that both inside the country and outside, there are forces that are trying to use this crisis. Who is the customer, I can not say. These are senseless attempts to speculate on this topic. But the reason for everything is an unsuccessful model that the Ukrainian authorities are trying to implement.

Then how to regard the visits to the Maidan by representatives of the State Department, the demands from the American administration to Yanukovych to remove the special forces from the streets of Kyiv, to appoint a pro-European government? Is this not an attempt at foreign interference in the affairs of a sovereign state?

This is, of course, interference in internal affairs. But from an American point of view, this is normal. They have such a political culture. But, as far as I remember, it was only one case, when Mrs. Nuland, Deputy Secretary of State, came to the Maidan. I don't remember any other representatives of the State Department. Victoria Nuland is a specific lady, she belongs to the group that controlled US foreign policy under Bush. Now she, perhaps, does not represent the mainstream of American politics. Although she occupies a high position, therefore, any of her appearance is a certain signal. But, as I said, the United States does not consider it something extraordinary that they can tell all the countries of the world how to live. They have always had such a political culture, especially in the 20th century, when they became the world hegemon. But if we compare the US intervention in the affairs of Ukraine 10 years ago, during the Orange Revolution, and what we have today, then, of course, this is incomparable. Then there was a frank attempt to intervene and coordinate the political management of Ukraine, but now it is a kind of reflex behavior. Yes, they have a certain pattern: here, people are fighting for democracy, but the corrupt regime is hindering them. But today Ukraine is not a priority of US foreign policy. They have enough problems without it.

"This is interference in internal affairs. But from the point of view of America, this is normal. They have such a political culture."

Is it possible to say that what is happening in Ukraine is the implementation of a long-standing US geostrategy, which was once published by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his famous "Grand Chessboard"? Russian statist patriots are now clearly sitting and rubbing their hands: we said that the United States is getting close to the heart of Eurasia - and here, please, the result is obvious! Today - Syria, tomorrow - Ukraine, the day after tomorrow - Russia.

Brzezinski is indeed considered a demon in Russia. Therefore, if some kind of political struggle suddenly intensifies in Ukraine, Brzezinski is immediately remembered. He really believes that Ukraine is the key to the Russian imperial consciousness: if Russia can no longer influence Ukraine, then the imperial consciousness will gradually disappear. And in principle he is right. But if in the 90s, when he wrote this book, Ukraine was an important geopolitical issue for both the United States and Russia, then now the paradox of what is happening is that the passions that boil there, except for the participants directly involved in the conflict , no one else in the world really cares. Because today Ukraine is a periphery. World events today do not develop in Eastern Europe, they have shifted to completely different regions of the world - to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific and Indian oceans. And this is the difference between the current situation and the mid-90s, when Brzezinski wrote his book.

“Most Ukrainians have no idea what association with the European Union is”

The Ukrainian opposition explains its actions by aspiration to Europe. But is Europe so attractive today, taking into account its “diseases”, primarily of an interethnic, interreligious, civilizational nature? And also taking into account the fate of such "small" countries in the EU as Portugal, Greece, Cyprus? Taking into account the huge expenses that Ukraine faces during its integration into the EU.

The European choice that is being talked about in Ukraine today is an image, not a reality. And I think that it is not connected with the fact that Ukrainians believe that, having made this choice, they will immediately leave the system that exists there now. Most Ukrainians have no idea what association with the European Union is. They have a pretty rough idea of ​​what is happening in Europe. That is, it is not a real choice, but a choice of consciousness.

Of course, the image of Europe is attractive. And in order to strive there, one does not have to be any “corrupt oppositionist”. It is a natural desire to be part of what is successful and progressive. And what does Russia offer on the other side of the scale? If you leave, we'll take it away from you, and if you don't leave, we'll give you that much money. But for Ukrainians, such primitive logic does not work. I cannot understand why the aspirations of Ukrainians are perceived as a betrayal. Another issue is that this is not very realistic. Europe is not going to give anything, and the association agreement is an attempt to tie Ukraine to the European Union for an indefinite future with not very clear goals. So that it was. Europe has never said a word about Ukraine's chances of joining the European Union.

But, by the way, Yanukovych and his government spent many months convincing citizens that the European course was the right choice for Ukraine. At the same time, without explaining why we really need it. And then they suddenly made a 180-degree turn: stop, we don’t need this anymore, we need relations with Russia. But that's not how it's done. Therefore, why be surprised that the citizens on the Maidan now behave like this. At first, one thing was hammered into the head, and the propaganda just came from the "Party of Regions", and then the same party set in motion back. And now Ukrainians have such a mess in their heads. One thing is clear - that now they want another, they want change. But there is a vicious circle here. They cannot make changes in themselves, but they hope that some external force will arrange these changes for them.

"This is an attempt to tie Ukraine to the European Union for an indefinite future with not very clear goals"

In Brussels, Putin mentioned a free trade zone between the European Union and the Customs Union. Could Ukraine become a buffer zone, and not be a peripheral country?

No, it is assumed that such a zone will cover everything: both the European Union and the Customs Union. Therefore, hypothetically, this may be a way out for Ukraine. Stop trying to share it. But in practice, this is still pure utopia. No one is really going to build this zone. Europeans do not yet take the Customs Union seriously at all. And the Russian government is not able to explain to them that this is serious.

“I don’t see how Ukraine can be divided peacefully”

How do you see a political way out of the crisis in Ukraine? The main question is: will it survive as a single state? Some experts argue that federalization is the best option for Ukraine. And someone does not exclude its division into several states ...

We need to cut off the extremes and try to find something that unites all Ukrainians. The most important obstacle to this is that today Ukraine is an oligarchic state. There is a constant bargaining between different groups of influence. This prevents Ukraine from finding a development strategy. How to get rid of this oligarchic regime is not a matter of my competence. As for the federation. Theoretically, this might be some way out. But, firstly, I'm afraid that the moment for such a scenario has already been lost. Secondly, to be honest, it is not very clear, but how geographically will this happen? Just as it is not very clear how disintegration can happen. I doubt that this can happen through agreements and painlessly.

- That is, the chosen path may well lead to a civil war?

I don't want to predict a civil war. But the degree of uncertainty is high. In a word, I don't see how Ukraine can be divided peacefully. I am afraid that the costs of such a scenario may exceed all hypothetical benefits.

"Ukraine is an oligarchic state. This prevents it from finding a development strategy"

- In this case, can the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine aggravate relations between NATO and Russia?

I don't think that protecting Ukraine from its eastern neighbor is an important issue for NATO today. And Russia, I think, understands that in the current situation it is pointless to drag Ukraine into the Customs Union. Such countries cannot be accepted into associations that are created for a serious integration perspective. On the contrary, Ukraine will destroy the Customs Union from the inside.

But what about the statements of patriotic geopoliticians that without Ukraine the Customs Union will not become a full-fledged organization?

They just believe that the Customs Union is the revival of the Soviet Union. But I think that it is high time to move away from such logic. This is irrelevant. By the way, this is the logic of Brzezinski, and our patriots reproduce it precisely without realizing it. Only with a plus sign. I repeat, today Ukraine is a global strategic periphery.

In response to US actions

The development and implementation of the presented systems was provoked by unilateral US actions: the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the practical deployment of this system both on the territory and outside the United States, as well as the adoption of a new nuclear doctrine, Putin explained.

The treaty was concluded by the USSR and the US in 1972, and in 2002, under President George W. Bush, the United States withdrew from it. The document prohibited the deployment of new types of anti-missile defense (ABM) systems, countries could have only one such system - either around the capital, or in the area of ​​​​intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (for the USSR - with a center in the capital, for the USA - at the Grand Forks base in North Dakota).

The US withdrew from the ABM treaty at the start of Putin's presidency. He repeatedly criticized this decision, especially after it became known that the American side intended to deploy some missile defense facilities in Europe. Russia, when Dmitry Medvedev was president, offered NATO to share responsibility for security in Europe and create a sectoral missile defense system. However, NATO refused, explaining that it could not transfer responsibility for ensuring its own security to countries outside the alliance.

Numerous attempts to negotiate with Washington failed, because they considered Russia weak, unable to revive the economy and the armed forces, Putin stated. “All of our proposals, namely all of our proposals, were rejected,” the president said.

As a result, two missile defense areas appeared - in Romania, as well as in Poland, where the deployment of the system is being completed, it is planned to deploy anti-missile systems in Japan and South Korea. The US global missile defense system also includes a naval grouping of five cruisers and 30 destroyers deployed in areas in close proximity to Russian territory, Putin said.

Anti-missile complex THAAD (Photo: Leah Garton/Reuters)

The United States and NATO, commenting in recent years on the deployment of missile defense, pointed out that it was not directed against Russia, but should respond to threats from the "southern direction." Experts then explained that the main threats to the West came from Iran and North Korea.

Of concern, according to Putin, is the new review of US nuclear strategy, published on February 2. Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are listed in it as an increased external threat. The document says that the United States will modernize the nuclear triad and develop low-yield nuclear bombs, and a nuclear strike can follow not only a nuclear attack, but also a conventional strike.

Impossible Conversation

Experts interviewed by RBC note that the president's current message is tougher than all previous ones on international issues, and surpasses the famous Munich speech of 2007 in intensity. Then Putin also spoke about the danger of the US decision on missile defense and warned about retaliatory measures. This is not the second "Munich", this is "super-Munich", not a declaration of the Cold War, but a statement that it is coming, says Fyodor Lukyanov. Putin's message is very tough. While in Europe the reaction to it is restrained, however, these tough words and videos will be heard and seen not only by politicians, but also by citizens, which can have a serious impact on moods, including sobering those who have recently only criticized Russia, says the scientific Director of the German-Russian Forum Alexander Rahr.

Despite the harshness, Putin's message is an invitation to negotiations, said Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the international committee of the Federation Council. Putin also spoke about the same: “No, no one really wanted to talk to us, no one listened to us. Listen now." Laying cards on the table in order to let the interlocutor understand that it is necessary to play is a completely normal tactic, relying on the fact that the other side will sober up and go to negotiations, Lukyanov believes.

However, the chances that the United States will be ready to negotiate with Russia after such a message are small, experts say. Putin's speech will worry European countries that are between the two centers of confrontation, Lukyanov predicts.

Second arms race

This "absolutely exceptional speech" will be presented in the West as further evidence of the growing Russian military threat, said Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The Pentagon on the evening of March 1 said that Putin's statement in the department did not surprise anyone and all Russia's plans had already been taken into account in military planning.

“His speech can be seen as a message to Washington that indicates a clear deterioration in relations,” The Washington Post responded. In the tone of the Cold War, the Russian president reduced everything to the fact that the country deserves a place among the world's superpowers, wrote The New York Times.

“Putin's message is the best gift to the American military-industrial complex. I'm sure headquarters from Boeing to SpaceX are opening champagne today. There is nothing better for the owners of shares in military-industrial complex enterprises than a serious arms race, and it has begun, ”Ariel Cohen, a leading expert of the American Atlantic Council, is sure. “It is more likely that the American leadership will interpret Putin's words as an invitation to military competition. The American military-industrial complex is clearly yearning for real work, and Trump and his team have always shown a benevolent attitude towards the defense complex, ”Lukyanov expects an increase in US military spending.

USA is getting ready

The modernization of the American nuclear triad, including nuclear submarine missile carriers, strategic aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles, is announced in all the latest military plans of the Donald Trump administration. Now the basis of the US ICBM arsenal is represented by Minuteman III missiles. The doctrine of the US nuclear policy, published in early February, which Putin spoke about in his message, proposed to begin replacing these missiles in 2029. In the same doctrine, Washington unveiled plans to invest in new weapons systems, including a low-yield nuclear warhead for the Trident D5 naval ballistic missiles. In addition, it was reported that the United States had already begun a program to create and deploy a new generation of B-21 Raider bombers. The draft military budget for 2018, which Donald Trump signed on December 12 last year, contains an article allowing the Pentagon to start developing a land-based non-nuclear cruise missile with a range of 500 to 5.5 thousand km. Since 2010, the US Navy has been developing laser weapons. In 2014, the US Navy reported on successful testing of the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) directed energy weapon. All these plans can be revised towards the acceleration of their execution, experts say.

“President Putin has staked on a powerful breakthrough in the military-industrial complex. We already went through this in the 1950s and 1980s, and this led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. I do not rule out that now Russia will step on the same rake. I doubt that with a GDP 12 times less than the US and 10 times less than the Chinese, Russia has a chance to get ahead of the US and China in this area, ”says Cohen.

In 2018, Russia will spend $46 billion on defense, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said late last year. The US military budget for fiscal year 2018 is $692 billion.

The collapse of the negotiation system

Another result of the demonstration of the latest Russian systems may be the abandonment of the deterrence system established during the previous Cold War. “All work to strengthen the defense capability of Russia has been carried out and is being carried out by us within the framework of existing agreements in the field of arms control, we are not violating anything,” Putin said. The weapons presented by him do not really violate existing international treaties, Alexei Arbatov, academician, head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, told RBC.

However, experts predict that the weapons presented and the rhetoric of President Putin will not contribute to the negotiation process. Between the United States and Russia, two fundamental documents in the field of arms control are now preserved - the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded in 2010 and valid until 2021, and the indefinite Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. “In three years, the INF and START treaties may become history,” says Trenin. The first will soon expire, and upon the execution of the second, the parties have long had claims to each other; given the current circumstances, they are unlikely to continue, says Lukyanov.

V. Ryzhkov: I― Vladimir Ryzhkov from the temporary studio of the Ekho Moskvy radio station. We are working today for the first day at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, there are quite a lot of foreigners and foreign topics here, and therefore I invited Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign Defense Policy and Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine, to my studio.

Well? International topics are of great interest, and the first question I would like to ask you. Putin has just visited Paris and met with the new President of France, Macron. We now have such visits in recent years, quite a rarity, when our leaders travel to the West and meet with Western leaders. What is this visit about? He says that the normalization of our relations with the West begins, probing, testing the water like that, with his foot, when a person, before entering the river, tries with his foot whether the water is cold or not? Luck, no luck? What does it say?

F. Lukyanov- Luck - I think you can say that, because the very fact of the visit and the fact that it took place so quickly is good. And for both sides. It was important for Putin, well, let's say, not to repeat the possible mistakes that were made with Trump. I don't know if it was a mistake or not, but one can hypothetically assume that if the meeting had taken place immediately after, for example, the inauguration, something might not have gone quite the way it is now going terribly. But this did not happen with Macron, despite the fact that, so to speak, the parties did not express any sympathy for each other, but rather the opposite. But the president is the president, he won, and the fact that Putin went there, so to speak, to get acquainted is good.

For Macron, this is also useful, because it is very important for him to show that he is a heavyweight.

V. Ryzhkov“Moreover, we now have parliamentary elections very soon, which are vitally important for him.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, he has parliamentary elections. Plus, well, let's be honest, one of his many tasks... He has a very big agenda, a difficult one, but one of the tasks is to show that France is a foreign policy player, because, frankly, under Hollande, well, France has become an accessory German politics. Now it is clearly an attempt to do something different.

As for the normalization of relations you are talking about, my question in this regard arises from the word itself: what is the norm in our relations?

V. Ryzhkov“The norm is the absence of sanctions, the norm is mutual investment, the norm is the growth of trade, the norm is the growth of mutual trust. Here's what I mean by normal.

F. Lukyanov- If this is the norm, then I think that we are extremely far from it. I'm afraid the norm is now somewhat more modest. The norm is probably the preservation of sanctions for an incomprehensible period. The norm is, yes, indeed, an increase in confidence, but only from a very low level. Very low. And the norm is the ability to solve individual issues without much propaganda chatter. I don’t know about any common project, I don’t know how there was a common space a couple of years ago, and so on. Alas, this is all in the past, this will not happen, I'm afraid, never, it's like the cycle has passed.

And in this sense, France is a very good partner, because there is an understanding that a certain dead end of the absence of relations is conscious. But, so far, no one understands how to restore these relations, on what basis to restore them. Why do I say that France in this case can be better than Germany? Because Germany has a very heavy burden of European leadership now. Germany, even if we imagine that Chancellor Merkel would want to change her policy towards Russia (I'm not sure if this is the case, but if she would), she is forced, first of all, to focus on intra-European alignments.

France is freer in this sense. Plus, well, in France, after all, there is a century and a half tradition that Russia is important. Here, in Germany, by the way, oddly enough for us, now there is no feeling that Russia is important. And in this sense, Macron is indeed a very important partner.

V. Ryzhkov- Well, after all, there is a feeling, Fedor, do you have that in addition to the fact that they arrived there on time, Putin flew in, that this meeting with the new president is important in itself, was there a specific content? So, there is a feeling that there were just those small advances that you spoke about, there, in Syria, in Ukraine, in the Normandy format, in terms of sanctions? Or is it still not clear?

F. Lukyanov- I don't know, we don't know. We were not told anything. The statements that have been made are...

V. Ryzhkov- Well, there are common words.

F. Lukyanov- Common words, and absolutely in the spirit of what was expected. Although, I would say, here ... Well, it's purely, you know, atmospheric and subjective. It seems to me that the Russian tone has changed in recent months. That is, Russia clearly does not want an escalation.

V. Ryzhkov- But Putin (his last phrase at a press conference in Paris) - he said about this: "Let's fight together for the lifting of sanctions, because it harms us all." That is, it's just a different language, it's a language, well, I won't say "reconciliation", but it's the language of common sense, at least.

F. Lukyanov- Well, this is the language of common sense, and, most importantly, this is the completely incomprehensible and uncertain situation that has arisen in general, but, in particular, within the Western world. Because, well, after all, Putin flew to Macron literally the next day after Angela Merkel said something that the German leaders never said, that not all partners ...

V. Ryzhkov- That Europe itself will, yes, defend itself.

F.Lukyanov: Russia clearly does not want escalation

F. Lukyanov- Yes. That there are partners we can no longer rely on. Well, it's clear who she had in mind. Apparently, the meeting with Donald Trump at the "Seven" made a strong impression on the Europeans, that is, as it were, the lack of any progress.

And in this regard, it seems to me too early to expect any concrete shifts. Because, let's say, Syria. The task of France, frankly speaking, is, generally speaking, to return as a player. Because it turned out, after all, an amazing thing in recent years that Europe and, in particular, France, which has always been there, has disappeared. America exists, Russia exists, Turkey exists, but there is no France or Europe. This is the first.

In Ukraine - we'll see. Obviously, Macron intends to take over, so to speak, the baton from Hollande, but in a different capacity, because Hollande, well, was there ... Again, I don’t want to offend anyone.

V. Ryzhkov- Not as a passive player, but as a more active, apparently, player.

F. Lukyanov- Hollande was there because Merkel generously allowed him to be supposedly on an equal footing.

V. Ryzhkov- Yes. And Macron seems to have the ambition to be more active after all.

F. Lukyanov“Macron has ambition, and what’s more, he has no choice, because if he doesn’t prove… Why was he elected? Because France has been in a state of a certain political depression for quite a long time. France wants to feel important and influential. There are a lot of internal economic problems, but apart from that there is a role in Europe.

Therefore, in this sense, it seems to me that Putin correctly sensed that there was a request for a conversation. Indeed, for Macron, one must understand the role and reputation of Russia now in Europe. For Macron, this is not a plus in the sense that here he is again, as it were, moving closer to Russia. Many in Europe do not consider this necessary and important.

V. Ryzhkov- And in the sense that he is so cool that he can talk to Putin.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, even with such a difficult person as Putin, he is not afraid. Please. Well, in this sense, he achieved his goal.

V. Ryzhkov- Well, it's very interesting that ... Fedor, we are following and studying Europe very carefully (both you and me). How quickly not only the scenery changes, but how quickly the play itself changes, right? That is, even there, 3 months ago, it all gave the impression of decline and decadence, but, now, Macron won and, most likely, Merkel will win again, and Europe suddenly begins to play with some kind of steel highlights.

Here, I have a question: does this mean that Europe will start now, after all, that this tendency to decline will be replaced by a tendency to rebirth, and that this famous locomotive of two Franco-German locomotives will work at full capacity? Because Macron really gives the impression of a very ambitious, energetic person who wants to be a leader, including the leader of Europe.

F. Lukyanov- Well, I would...

V. Ryzhkov Or is it too early to tell?

F. Lukyanov- I would wait, because ... Here, you are right, Macron ... What does Macron produce? Macron makes an impression. The impression is good. Whether Macron will produce anything other than an impression, we don't know yet.

V. Ryzhkov- Because, after all, the impression is a big deal. Here, Trump makes a bad impression, and Macron makes a good impression.

F. Lukyanov- Trump not only makes an impression, Trump, if he wants, will take a shot at some country. No, I think that...

V. Ryzhkov So what will happen to Europe?

F. Lukyanov- I think that Europe is entering right now, indeed ... And, by the way, this statement by Merkel is an indirect confirmation. Europe is indeed entering a period of transformation. There was a lot of talk about this. At first they didn't say anything, they pretended not to. Then they started talking, but did not know how. Now the combination of factors - the British withdrawal, and this new situation with America, and the rise, and then, after all, the stopping of this so-called populist wave - creates a situation where it is no longer possible ... Well, here, it was possible It's time to keep the inertia of rest. Now it is destroyed. And Europe after the elections in Germany, apparently, will start some changes. But so far it is not at all clear to what. More and more often I hear from European interlocutors this mantra about Europe of many speeds. Well, to be honest, I… Maybe, of course, I’m not as qualified as they are, but I don’t believe in it, because, in my opinion, the European idea either works when there is at least the illusion of equality… And when they say to some countries “Excuse me, we respect you very much, but you are, after all, the second grade, and you are the third”, well, you yourself understand: this does not work. Therefore, I do not yet know how Europe will act, but the fact that it is entering a phase of action, not inaction ...

V. Ryzhkov- And politicians have ambitions, which is also very important.

F. Lukyanov- There are ambitions, yes.

F. Lukyanov: France wants to feel important and influential

V. Ryzhkov- Because there are 2 types of ambition - when a politician simply keeps what he has, and the second type of ambition is when politicians want to change something. I have a feeling now that Merkel, the new Merkel, Merkel 3 ... Or what is she already in a row?

F. Lukyanov- Four.

V. Ryzhkov- Merkel 4 and Macron 1 - they are, after all, now ... They have an ambition - to change. And now the Italian leadership has the same rhetoric, the Spanish leadership and Juncker have the same rhetoric. All of them have now changed the rhetoric of retention to the rhetoric of change.

F. Lukyanov- Yes, it is, but at the same time, you are absolutely right that everything is changing very quickly. Just before we were in decline, now we are on the rise. It is not a fact that we will not be in decline again in 2 years.

V. Ryzhkov- Fedor, now, the question is about Russia then, especially since we are working with you at an economic forum. If the assumptions that we are now very carefully building about new trends in Europe suddenly turn out to be a reality, how should Russia behave with this new Europe, with Merkel's Europe with new legitimacy, Macron's new legitimacy, and so on?

F. Lukyanov- So, Russia needs to behave carefully. I think it's respectful. Stop convincing yourself that it's all gone ... How is it? The plaster is removed, the client leaves. But at the same time, understand clearly that Europe will not and should not be in the role in which it was, say, the previous one and a half to two decades, that is, a kind of starting point, or something. Not because there are our internal here these 150- or 200-year-old rituals “We are Europe, not Europe”. This is another matter. But it's just that the world has changed so much that Europe, even renewed, will no longer be the center of the world.

V. Ryzhkov- But it will be one of the centers.

F. Lukyanov- One... That's the point, one of. And accordingly, Russia should treat it as one of the important centers, as a source, of course, of cultural and civilizational identity, but this does not mean that we should count on some kind of joint political project - this will not be for sure.

I think that a lot will depend, of course, on how relations between Europe and the United States develop. Under Trump, after Trump, there will be Trump for a long time, not for long, we don't know. But the fact that very fundamental changes are taking place there is quite obvious to me.

Another thing is that we shouldn't be under illusions, as some of us do, that now Europe will rise from its knees, throw off the American oppression and turn to us. Will not turn. Because, excuse me, cynically speaking, here, just with all the Bolshevik frankness, Russia as an opponent is purely instrumentally more useful to Europe now than Russia as it is not clear what, some kind of partner is not a partner. Well, when you're dealing with a huge number of internal problems, it's good to have some kind of scarecrow, sorry, on the outside. Well, we are successfully fulfilling this role so far. Here, I think that it would be good for us, as it were, to carry it out less successfully (like this).

V. Ryzhkov- I think that we have time left for one question, Fedor, which I cannot but ask. The fact is that many have noticed that Trump managed to meet with all the key world leaders. Well, of course, he started with Theresa May, then he met, of course, with his Japanese allies. Then he met with Merkel, where there was this famous scene by the fireplace when he did not shake her hand. He met with Hollande and, apparently, will meet with Macron in the near future. He invited Xi Jinping to his ranch in Florida and fed him in every possible way.

The only top world leader he hasn't met yet is Vladimir Putin. And we are now expecting that the meeting will finally take place, apparently at the G20.

Here is the question, Fedor, for you. What should we expect from this meeting given what we already know about Donald Trump as president, right? And how should we behave in this situation, preparing for this meeting? What would be your recommendations as an international expert?

F. Lukyanov So my recommendation is very simple: you need to understand the context. Trump, whatever he wants… He wants something from Russia, he doesn’t… It’s hard to understand him at all, he has 7 Fridays a week quite often. But even if we assume that he wholeheartedly supports Putin and would like to merge with him in his arms, he cannot do this. It is enough to look at the effect of the visit, Lavrov's modest visit to the White House. The tsunami is just political, almost washed away Trump. What could happen after the meeting with Putin, I even find it difficult to say.

The problem, our problem, is that we have become due to various circumstances (objective and subjective), Russia has become a factor in the domestic political struggle of the United States. And this is the worst situation, because this is a situation that we cannot influence. This is their business. And the fact that Russia came out like this, became such a battering ram against Trump, it doesn’t add anything to us, it absolutely narrows the space for both him and us. Therefore, I would not expect anything from this meeting, or rather, God forbid, if after this meeting he would not be finally rolled out charges of impeachment. Because, again, looking at the consequences of Lavrov's visit to the White House, I no longer exclude anything.

V. Ryzhkov- Good. Thanks. In my studio... I remind you that I am Vladimir Ryzhkov, we work at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and we talked with Fyodor Alexandrovich Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign Defense Policy, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, one of the most interesting and profound Russian international affairs specialists.

F. Lukyanov- Thanks.

V. Ryzhkov- Thanks. And we will hear from you on the air.

ALTERNATIVE OPINIONS

The materials posted in this section reflect the private opinion of the authors, which may not coincide with the opinion of the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Embassy.

16.04.2014

Russia without the West? (F.A. Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine)

Historical moments often happen unexpectedly. And the turning points are events that in themselves do not at all claim to be of a large scale. The conflict in Ukraine, which began over Kyiv's refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union, a boring 400-page legal document, has escalated into an almost collapse of Ukrainian statehood and an international crisis of the first magnitude.

Change of milestones and Russia

Russia became the main actor. Moscow has actually retreated from the model of behavior that it has been guided by for almost a quarter of a century, since the late 1980s. Since that time, since the period of beautiful dreams of peace and Europe without dividing lines, at all turns of our history, maintaining good relations with the West has remained the most important goal. Even when Russia took steps that were clearly contrary to the wishes of Europe and the United States, it left room for maneuver to minimize damage to ties with them. The Western direction of foreign policy and foreign economic contacts was seen as a guarantee of Russia's security, development and well-being.

In 2014, Moscow behaved differently. Ignoring all the requests, appeals, warnings, threats of Western countries, Moscow included Crimea and Sevastopol in the Russian Federation. Until the last moment, literally before Vladimir Putin's speech with an extraordinary message to the Federal Assembly on March 18, many politicians, diplomats, commentators in the West could not believe that this would happen. Even when a referendum was already in full swing on the peninsula, the result of which seemed inevitable, the version continued to circulate that, they say, the head of the Russian state simply raises the stakes, wants to use the will of the Crimean population as a trump card in some kind of geopolitical bargaining. Everyone is too accustomed to the fact that Russia never goes to the very end in defending interests, as she understands them. And when it did happen, the reaction of the United States and Europe was reduced to the desire to punish Russia first of all, regardless of how justified its wishes and reasoned position.

"Seven" against "eight"

Very symbolic in this context is the behavior of Moscow's partners in the G8, which many consider to be the most influential political forum in the world. So, what should such a structure do when a major political crisis breaks out in the world? That's right, to meet and discuss ways to resolve it. Where else to do this, if not in a meeting, the meaning of which has always, since its formation 40 years ago (then still in the format of the "five"), has been the opportunity to conduct a frank and direct conversation. Especially since Russia is currently chairing the G8. An excellent occasion to convene an emergency summit in order to sort things out face to face. And ideally, to agree on something - in an informal setting, it is always more convenient.

However, the opposite happens. The first (I emphasize - the first!) reaction of the seven countries to the aggravation of the situation around Crimea and to the position of Moscow was: we will not come. Even for a scheduled summit meeting in Sochi - in early June. And then the "seven" makes a series of statements condemning Russia and threatening it, and then begins to impose sanctions.

Let us leave aside the fact that the G8 chairman is threatened with sanctions of the same kind that were applied to dubious countries and leaders. More precisely, not aside, but on the conscience of those who are guided by a standard set of templates in a large and complex policy. Something else is more important.

The habit of resolving crisis situations through pressure rather than consultation is ineradicable. And this is a consequence of the development of events after the Cold War. With the end of the USSR, equilibrium disappeared in the world. The winning side believed that it could now establish a new order, which it considered the most correct and effective. However, experience shows that the result is increasingly the opposite. The pressure and attempts of the big countries to force the rest to do what they want, only give rise to great confusion, but not order. The vice of the modern world is a total imbalance of everything: opportunities, interests, ideas about each other. And it already affects every step.

Wide view of the world

The main lesson that Russia seems to be learning from what is happening is that the world is not limited to the West. Moreover, it has become truly heterogeneous and diverse; centralization and anyone's dominance are simply impossible. And since a lot of new influential players have appeared, each of which needs a special approach, it is inappropriate to approach the world system based on the indispensable priority of relations with the West. For Russia, this is a serious turn, because for centuries its view has remained Western-centric.

What does this mean in practice? Six years ago, three American researchers from the University of Berkeley published an article in the National Interest called "A World Without the West." Globalization and the emergence of new centers of economic growth and development are leading to the emergence of a much more dispersed world than before, the authors argued. Rapidly developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and a number of others are establishing links with each other. This is happening not against, but bypassing the United States and Europe. In the bowels of what used to be called the "third world", the beginnings of general ideas are being formed that do not coincide with Western ones. For example, about the inviolability of sovereignty or that human rights are not necessarily primary in relation to the law of society or the state. And this is not just a defense of not quite democratic regimes from the reproaches of the West, but a different political culture.

The scientists concluded that there are three scenarios in which the United States could respond to the emergence of a "world without the West." The first is a tough confrontation, attempts to force the rest to accept the same rules that have been established by the West. The second is the opposite: serious concessions to developing countries on economic issues in order to win their sympathy. However, they themselves recommend the “live and let live” model. In the language of the Cold War, "peaceful coexistence."

Modern America does not yet seem to be willing to follow this advice. True, Barack Obama took indecisive steps to reduce the ideological intensity of US policy, but it did not work, circumstances constantly return him to his usual course. Something else is interesting here.

Russia, which, with the light hand of Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O "Neill, was once recorded in BRIC (later becoming BRICS), has always clearly contrasted in its ideological baggage with the rest of the members of this group. India, China, Brazil, South Africa are united by anti-colonial (he but mostly anti-Western) pathos. Russia also has a relationship to the West, which is known to be very complex, but quite different. The Old World for Russia is its cradle, a source of cultural and religious identity, we are connected with Europe by common roots, which does not negate the rich history of conflicts and rivalry.In this, however, Russia is no different from other European states, most of which in the past fought each other, sometimes brutally, to annihilate.

Be that as it may, even at the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian outlook remained Euro- and West-centric, unlike the rest of the rising BRICS powers. The whole conversation, including the dispute about ideas and values, was conducted precisely with Western countries. Even the rejection of liberal currents that has been outlined in the last two years, the insistence that Russia is the bearer and custodian of traditional values ​​and approaches, was a game, albeit a counterattack, on the Western conceptual field. In other words, we could not imagine our “world without the West”. And it was hard to imagine that this would change. Now, however, events are taking place that can cause major shifts.

Unexpected effect of sanctions

The referendum in Crimea and the entry of the peninsula into the Russian Federation provoked a nervous reaction from the West, Europe and the United States began to impose sanctions against Russia. At the beginning, it was about political and symbolic measures, but since Moscow is not going to change its line of behavior in any way, and perhaps it will be more active in Ukraine, an economic confrontation cannot be ruled out. The effect may be unexpected.

Much has been said about Russia's turn to Asia, to the East, and Vladimir Putin recently called it the main Russian priority for the 21st century. If the West starts economic and political pressure on Russia, tries to impose restrictions in the spirit of the Cold War (investment, technology, financial markets, access to credit sources, curtailing contacts, closing markets, etc.), then for Moscow " a world without the West” can become just the same objective reality. And then the reorientation to other centers of economic influence will be a forced reaction to it.

There is no need to create illusions, this is a rather significant shock. First, it is worth honestly recognizing that Russia is not accustomed to interacting on an equal footing and fully with countries that until relatively recently were considered the world's political periphery, rather objects than subjects. In Soviet times, we acted as patrons, fought with the United States for influence on the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the post-Soviet years, at first they were, in fact, ignored, then they tried to restore the lost ties by touch.

Secondly, there is no doubt that the developing world, where the American position is strong enough, will be actively advised not to do business with Russia. It is difficult to ban now, the situation has changed a lot compared to what it was 25-30 years ago, but nevertheless one should not underestimate Western levers.

Thirdly, speaking, for example, about China, which in the current situation seems to be a natural alternative, one cannot ignore the other side. No matter how positive Russian-Chinese relations are, Russia is now significantly inferior to China economically and is increasingly tied to it politically. Beijing is willing to support Moscow (albeit informally) and provide financial and economic assistance, but the price of this will be the rapid growth of Russian dependence on China. At the same time, the interests of the two countries do not coincide in everything, but Russia will have to take into account the Chinese opinion more and more when making decisions.

Turn towards real multipolarity

Moreover, it is important for Russia to activate a wide variety of ties in addition to the traditional West in order to balance its new positions. In recent years, as Moscow gradually gained international prominence and emerged from increasingly independent positions, there was hope in many parts of the world that Russia would return as an independent player. Not necessarily opposed to America and Europe, but at least balancing them.

Most of the world's population is tired of the lack of an alternative. Russia will not wait for the official recognition of its actions in Crimea, but it can also firmly hope that in the event of further aggravation with the West, it will not be possible to organize any complete blockade. Developing states are now completely refusing to walk in formation, but are trying to use the discord of the giants to strengthen their own positions. Noteworthy is the statement of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner, who supported the Crimean referendum, of course, comparing the Russian integration of the peninsula with the desire of Buenos Aires to take the Falkland Islands into its jurisdiction. African countries are sympathetic to Moscow's steps.

Iran stands apart. He counts on the rapid growth of ties with Russia, which have so far been limited by the Kremlin's unwillingness to escalate with the West. The entire Middle East palette could be transformed if Russia begins to oppose the policies of the US and its allies to an even greater extent than before. In general, there is an opportunity to capitalize on the noticeably grown reputation that Moscow has gained during the Syrian conflict and due to its adherence to principles on this issue. Many Arab states probed whether Russia intended to act as a counterbalance to America in the region, which had lost part of its authority, but until recently they did not find decisive support. Now Russia's intentions may change.

It is clear that the West remains the most powerful and influential global player, it has a potential that no one can replace. First of all, in the scientific, technological, and educational spheres. And the cultural attractiveness of Europe for Russia and the whole world can hardly be overestimated. However, Russia has no intention to enter into a conflict with the West, to isolate itself from it. It's simple and childish that interaction should not be on any terms and at any cost.

Russia is and will be the powerhouse of European culture, at least as long as it is inhabited by Russians and other peoples who have lived here for centuries. And this will not change from the fact that the EU will try to put pressure on Russia. But in the world of the 21st century, without strong ties with the non-West, it is pointless to count on success. So, if sanctions are imposed, we should be thankful for them. They will help the reorientation that is long overdue. For the world, Russia's rejection of a narrow Western-centric view will mean the emergence of a full-fledged multipolarity that no one can ignore.

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Kommersant has learned that the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) will be replaced. Sergey Karaganov, who headed the SWOP for 20 years, will leave his post on November 30. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, will most likely become the new chairman of the SWOP.

Sergey Karaganov will leave the post of chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy at the general meeting of the council, which will be held on November 30. As Mr. Karaganov told Kommersant, immediately after this, the SWOP will hold a conference "Russia in the World of Power in the 21st Century" dedicated to its 20th anniversary. “I informed my colleagues about my decision to leave the post of chairman of the council last year,” said Mr. Karaganov. - 60". According to Mr. Karaganov, the election of a new chairman will be held at the general meeting of the council. At the same time, a rule will be introduced on the need for rotation of chairmen.

One of the most likely candidates for the post of chairman of the SWOP, according to Kommersant's information, is Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine. "There are such plans, I am a candidate, but the final decision will be made only at the general meeting," Lukyanov confirmed to Kommersant. According to him, he does not know if any of the experts intend to compete with him. The current chairman of the council also intends to support the candidacy of Mr. Lukyanov. "Lukyanov is one of the council's leaders, and I think he is one of the most worthy candidates," Sergey Karaganov told Kommersant.

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Kirill Kabanov, a member of the presidential council for human rights and chairman of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, suggested in a conversation with Kommersant that Mr. Karaganov's departure may be due to his desire to concentrate on the council's projects in the Far East. Indeed, in July, Mr. Karaganov, together with MGIMO professor Oleg Barabanov, presented the report "Toward the Great Ocean, or Russia's New Globalization", prepared for the APEC-2012 summit in Vladivostok. Another interlocutor of Kommersant suggested that Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin might want to revive the council's activities: "Except for the Congress of Russian Communities, nothing stands behind it, and perhaps Rogozin may be interested in reanimating this expert platform."