Scientists have long differed in their interpretation of the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on the history of Ancient Rus'. Some scientists sincerely believe that there was actually no invasion, and the Russian princes simply turned to the nomads for protection. At that time, the country was weak and not ready for serious wars with Lithuania or Sweden. The Tatar-Mongol yoke protected and protected Russian lands, preventing invasions of other nomads and the development of wars.

One way or another, in 1480 the Tatar-Mongol rule in Rus' came to an end. It is necessary to characterize in the most detailed way the role of the yoke in the history of the state, paying attention to both positive and negative aspects.

Positive and negative influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke

Sphere of life of society and state	Positive influence of the yoke	Negative aspects of the influence of the Mongol yoke
Cultural sphere of life	expanded lexicon, because Russian people began to use foreign words from the Tatar language in everyday use. The Mongols also changed the perception of the culture itself, introducing traditional aspects into it. During the reign of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Ancient Rus', the number of monasteries and Orthodox churches increased.	culture developed much more slowly than before, and literacy fell to the lowest levels in the history of Ancient Rus'. the architectural and urban development of the state was hampered. Literacy problems became increasingly common, and chronicles were kept unstable.
The political sphere of state life.	the Mongol yoke protected the territories of Ancient Rus', preventing wars with other states. Despite the labeling systems used, the Mongols allowed the Russian princes to maintain the hereditary nature of the transfer of power.	The veche traditions that existed in Novgorod and testified to the development of democracy were destroyed. The country chose to follow the Mongolian way of organizing power, leaning towards its centralization. During the control of the Tatar-Mongol yoke over the territory of Ancient Rus', it was never possible to achieve the identification of a single ruling dynasty. the Mongols artificially maintained fragmentation, and Ancient Rus' stalled in political development, lagging behind other states by several decades.
Economic sphere of state life	There are no positive aspects of the impact of the yoke on the economy.	The hardest hit to the country's economy was the need to pay regular tribute. After the invasion and the establishment of the power of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, 49 cities were devastated, and 14 of them could not be restored. The development of many crafts stalled, as did the development of international trade.
Influence on public consciousness	Scientists are divided into two camps on this issue. Klyuchevsky and Soloviev believe that the Mongols did not have a significant impact on public consciousness. All economic and political processes, in their opinion, followed from the trends of previous periods	Karamzin, on the contrary, believed that the Mongol yoke had a huge impact on Ancient Rus', achieving complete economic and social inhibition in the development of the state.

Conclusions on the topic

Of course, it was impossible to deny the impact of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. The Mongols were feared and hated by the people, largely due to the fact that representatives of the Tatar-Mongol yoke tried to change the state according to their own image. At that time, the Mongols even dreamed of imposing their religious system on the inhabitants of Ancient Rus', but they actively resisted this, giving preference only to Orthodoxy.

In addition, the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke also affected the establishment of the future system of power. Gradually, power in the country became centralized, and the beginnings of democracy were completely destroyed. Thus, the despotic, eastern model of government flourished on the territory of Rus'.

After liberation from the yoke in 1480, the country found itself in a deep economic crisis, from which it emerged only decades later. Ahead of the state lay Troubles, imposture, a change of the ruling dynasty and the rise of autocracy.

Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde) yoke on the development and fate of Russia

In science, controversy is commonplace. In fact, without them there would be no science. In historical science, disputes are often endless. Such is the discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde) yoke on the development of Russia for more than two centuries. At one time in the 19th century it was common not to even notice this impact.

On the contrary, in historical science, as well as journalism of recent decades, it is believed that the yoke became a turning point in all spheres of public life, most of all in political life, since the movement towards a single state modeled on the Western one was stopped. European countries, as well as in the public consciousness, which, as a result of the yoke, formed the soul of the Russian person as the soul of a slave.

Supporters of the traditional point of view, and these are historians of pre-revolutionary Russia, historians of the Soviet period and many modern historians, writers and publicists, i.e. the actual significant majority assesses the impact of the yoke on the most diverse aspects of life in Rus' extremely negatively. There was a massive movement of the population, and with it the agricultural culture, to the west and northwest, to less convenient territories with a less favorable climate. The political and social role of cities has sharply decreased. The power of the princes over the population increased. There was also a certain reorientation of the policy of the Russian princes to the east. Today it is not fashionable, and often considered inappropriate, to quote the classics of Marxism, but, in my opinion, sometimes it is worth it. According to Karl Marx, “the Mongol yoke not only suppressed, but insulted and withered the very soul of the people who became its victims.”

But there is another, directly opposite point of view on the problem under consideration. She views the Mongol invasion not as a conquest, but as a “great cavalry raid” (only those cities that stood in the way of the army were destroyed; the Mongols did not leave garrisons; they did not establish permanent power; with the end of the campaign, Batu went to the Volga).

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, a new cultural-historiosophical (historiosophy - philosophy of history) and geopolitical theory - Eurasianism - appeared in Russia. Among many other provisions, the interpretation of ancient Russian history and the so-called “Tatar” period by the theorists of Eurasianism (G.V. Vernadsky, P.N. Savitsky, N.S. Trubetskoy) was completely new, extremely unusual, and often shocking. national history. To understand the essence of their statements, you need to delve into the essence of the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

The “Eurasian idea” is based on the principle of the unity of the “soil” (territory) and asserts the originality and self-sufficiency of the Slavic-Turkic civilization, which developed within the framework of first the Golden Horde, then the Russian Empire, and subsequently the USSR. And today, the current leadership of Russia, experiencing enormous difficulties in governing a country in which Orthodox Christians and Muslims are side by side, and who have their own state entities(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, and finally, Chechnya (Ichkeria)) are objectively interested in spreading the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

According to theorists of Eurasianism, contrary to the tradition of Russian historical science to see in the Mongol yoke only “the oppression of the Russian people by the filthy Baskaks,” Eurasians saw in this fact of Russian history a largely positive outcome.

“Without “Tatarism” there would be no Russia,” wrote P.N. Savitsky in his work "Steppe and Settlement". In the eleventh and first half of the thirteenth centuries, cultural and political fragmentation Kievan Rus could not lead to anything other than a foreign yoke. Great is the happiness of Russia that it fell to the Tatars. The Tatars did not change the spiritual essence of Russia, but in their excellent capacity in this era as the creators of states, a militarized organizing force, they undoubtedly influenced Rus'."

Another Eurasian S.G. Pushkarev wrote: “the Tatars not only did not reveal systematic aspirations to destroy the Russian faith and nationality, but on the contrary, showing complete religious tolerance, the Mongol khans issued labels to Russian metropolitans to protect the rights and advantages of the Russian church.”

Developing this idea of ​​his, S.G. Pushkarev contrasted the “Tatar neutral environment” with the Romano-Germanic “Drang nach Osten”, as a result of which “the Baltic and Polabian Slavs disappeared from the face of the earth.”

This advantage of the East over the West was appreciated by many Russian statesmen of that time. As a striking example of the “Old Russian Eurasian” G.V. Vernadsky brought Alexander Nevsky (who, by the way, was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church). In contrast to Daniil Galitsky, who associated himself with the West, Alexander Nevsky, “with much less historical data, achieved much more lasting political results. Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich identified in the Mongols a culturally friendly force that could help him preserve and establish Russian identity from the Latin West” - This is how G.V. assessed it. Vernadsky's "Eastern" orientation of Alexander Nevsky and his focus on the Horde.

Thought G.V. Vernadsky was deepened by another Eurasian historian, Boris Shiryaev. In one of his articles, he comes to the conclusion “that the Mongol yoke called the Russian people out of the provincialism of the historical existence of small scattered tribal and urban principalities of the so-called appanage period onto the broad road of statehood.” “The genesis of Russian statehood lies in this intermediate era,” he stated.

The famous emigrant historian and ethnographer of Kalmyk origin E.D. Khara-Davan believed that it was during these years that the foundations of Russian political culture were laid, that the Mongols gave the conquered Russian lands “the main elements of the future Moscow statehood: autocracy (khanate), centralism, serfdom.” In addition, “under the influence of Mongol rule, the Russian principalities and tribes were merged together, forming first the Muscovite kingdom, and subsequently Russian Empire".

The personification of supreme power, traditional for Russia, also disappears in this era. consequence of the Horde Tatar yoke

Mongol rule made the Moscow sovereign an absolute autocrat, and his subjects serfs. And if Genghis Khan and his successors ruled in the name of the Eternal Blue Sky, then the Russian Tsar, the autocrat, ruled those under him as the Anointed One of God. As a result, the Mongol conquest contributed to the transformation of urban and veche Russia into rural and princely Russia / from the author: from a modern perspective, all this looks sad, but...

Thus, according to Eurasianists, “the Mongols gave Russia the ability to organize itself militarily, create a state-coercive center, achieve stability... become a powerful “horde.”

According to Eurasianists, Russian religious consciousness received significant “feeding” from the East. So, E.D. Khara-Davan wrote that “Russian God-seeking”; “sectarianism”, pilgrimage to holy places with a willingness to make sacrifices and torment for the sake of spiritual burning could only come from the East, because in the West religion does not influence life and does not touch the hearts and souls of its followers, for they are completely and without a trace absorbed only by their own material culture."

But the Eurasians saw the merit of the Mongols not only in strengthening the spirit. In their opinion, Rus' also borrowed from the East the features of the military valor of the Mongol conquerors: “bravery, endurance in overcoming obstacles in war, love of discipline.” All this “gave the Russians the opportunity to create the Great Russian Empire after the Mongolian school.”

The further development of Russian history was seen by Eurasians as follows.

The gradual decomposition and then the fall of the Golden Horde lead to the fact that its traditions are picked up by the strengthened Russian lands, and the empire of Genghis Khan is reborn in the new guise of the Muscovite kingdom. After the relatively easy conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia, the empire was practically restored to its former borders.

At the same time, there is a peaceful penetration of the Russian element into the eastern environment and the eastern one into the Russian one, thus cementing the integration processes. As B. Shiryaev noted: “The Russian state, without compromising its main principle - Orthodox everyday religiosity, begins to apply the Genghis Khan method of religious tolerance, which it tested on itself, to the conquered Tatar khanates. This technique united both peoples.”

Thus, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. is considered by Eurasians as the era of the best expression of Eurasian statehood.

The Eurasian theory of relations between Russians and Mongols (Turks) caused heated controversy among Russian emigrant historians. Most of them, brought up on the classical works of Russian historical school, did not accept this interpretation and, above all, the concept of Mongol influence on Russian history. And there was no unity among the Eurasians. For example, the prominent Eurasianist Ya.D. Sadovsky in his letter to P.N. Savitsky sharply criticized the book “The Legacy of Genghis Khan in the Russian Empire,” published in 1925 for “praising the most vile and vile slavery among the Tatars.” Another prominent Eurasian theorist M. adhered to a similar position. Shakhmatov.

"What can we say about opponents of Eurasianism in general." So P.N. Miliukov contrasted the argumentation of the Eurasians with his theses about “the absence of a Eurasian culture common to the Russians and the Mongols” and “the absence of any significant kinship between the eastern steppe life and the sedentary Russian.” The “Apotheosis of Tatarism” was seen in the Eurasian theory by the prominent liberal historian A.A. Kiesewetter. “Dmitry Donskoy and Sergius of Radonezh, from the point of view of a true Eurasian, should be recognized as traitors to the national calling of Russia,” he sneered.

One way or another, despite a certain radicalism and subjectivism, Eurasianism is valuable because it provides a new, essentially, interpretation of Russia’s relations with both the West and the East. And this, in turn, enriched the theoretical basis of historical science.

The ideas of the Eurasians in the second half of the twentieth century were developed by the famous scientist Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov and his other followers. This is how L.N. Gumilyov wrote on this issue:

"...Moreover, the purpose of this raid was not the conquest of Rus', but the war with the Polovtsians. Since the Polovtsians firmly held the line between the Don and the Volga, the Mongols used the well-known tactical method of long-distance bypass: they carried out a “cavalry raid” through the Ryazan and Vladimir principalities. And subsequently the great Prince of Vladimir (1252-1263) Alexander Nevsky concluded a mutually beneficial alliance with Batu: Alexander found an ally to resist German aggression, and Batu - to emerge victorious in the fight against the Great Khan Guyuk (Alexander Nevsky placed an army consisting of Russians and Alans at Batu’s disposal) .

The union existed as long as it was beneficial and necessary for both parties (L.N. Gumilyov). A. Golovatenko also writes about this: “...Russian princes themselves often turned to the Horde for help and did not even see anything wrong with using Mongol-Tatar troops in the fight against competitors. So...Alexander Nevsky, with the support of the Horde cavalry, expelled his brother Andrey from the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (1252). Eight years later, Alexander again took advantage of the help of the Tatars, rendering them a return service. The authoritative prince contributed to the census in Novgorod (similar censuses in all Horde possessions served as the basis for the imposition of taxes); the Horde helped Alexander Nevsky to make his son (Dmitry Alexandrovich) the Prince of Novgorod.

Cooperation with the Mongols seemed to the princes of North-Eastern Rus' just as natural a means of achieving or strengthening power as alliances with the Polovtsy-South Russian princes of the 12th century." It seems worth listening in this discussion to the calm and balanced opinion of the famous Soviet historian N.Ya Eidelman:

“It is impossible, of course, to agree with the paradoxical opinion of L.N. Gumilyov (and other Eurasianists!), that the Mongol yoke was the best destiny for Rus', because, firstly, it saved it from the German yoke, and secondly, it could not have been so painful affect the identity of the people, as would have happened under the more cultured German invaders. I don’t believe that such an erudite as Gumilyov does not know the facts with which he can easily be challenged; carried away by his theory, he goes to extremes and does not notice, for example, that the forces "dog knights" were incomparably weaker than the Mongol ones; Alexander Nevsky stopped them with the army of one principality. Far from praising any foreign dominion in general, let me remind you that the Mongol yoke was terrible; that, first of all and most of all, it hit the ancient Russian cities, the magnificent centers of crafts, culture...

But it was the cities that were the bearers of the commercial principle, marketability, and future bourgeoisism - the example of Europe is obvious!

There is no need, we believe, to look for positive sides such a yoke, first of all, because the result of Batu’s arrival is simple and terrible; the population has decreased several times; ruin, oppression, humiliation; the decline of both princely power and the sprouts of freedom.

Study in domestic historiography of the problem of Russian-Mongolian relations of the 13th-15th centuries. has repeatedly become the subject of consideration by many scientists, mainly during the Soviet period, when a sufficient number of opinions and points of view had accumulated both on individual periods and problems, and on generalizing conclusions of a conceptual plan. Historiographical reviews with different goals and objectives are contained in the works of B.D. Grekova and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, A.N. Nasonova, M.G. Safargalieva, L.V. Cherepnina, V.V. Kargalova, N.S. Borisova, G.A. Fedorova-Davydova, I.B. Grekova, D.Yu. Arapova, A.A. Arslanova, P.P. Tolochko, A.A. Gorsky, V.A. Chukaeva. A distinctive feature of these historiographical excursions is that they are mostly devoted to the historiography of the 19th - early 20th centuries, and speak very sparingly about later works. In addition, this historiographic series does not include recent works. Thus, the author sees one of his tasks in supplementing the historiography of the “Mongolian question” with an analysis of the latest literature.

At the same time, we do not pursue the goal of listing all the works of past and present years that mention certain conflicts in Russian-Mongolian relations and/or evaluate them. Historiographical discrepancies on certain specific issues will, if necessary, be presented in the appropriate chapters. We consider our main task to be the following: to trace the most important directions of Russian historical thought on this - one of the most significant and defining problems of Russian history, which, in turn, allows (together with source observations and analysis) to develop the basis for the author’s study of the topic “Rus and the Mongols "

1

In Russian historiography there are a number of rather highly politicized subjects. So, in the field of early Russian history, this is the “Norman problem”. This also includes the question of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and yoke. The overwhelming majority of Russian historians have considered and are considering them primarily from the point of view of political content, for example, the subordination of the institution of princely power to the Mongols, as well as the “fall” for the same reason of other ancient Russian power structures. Such a one-sided approach entails a certain modernization of the relationships between the ethno-state structures of the Middle Ages, the interpolation of interstate relations of modern and modern times onto them, and ultimately, as we see it, a certain discrepancy in the understanding of the situation as a whole.

The origins of this kind of perception can already be seen in the reports of chroniclers, who also added a strong emotional overtones. The latter is, of course, understandable, since the initial recordings were made either by eyewitnesses who survived the tragedy of the invasion, or from their words.

Actually, in domestic historiography, the identification of the problem of “Tatars and Rus'” dates back to the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries. Its understanding and interpretation must be associated with “the process of self-affirmation of the Russian mentality”, “an expression of the intensive growth of national self-awareness” and “an unprecedentedly high patriotic upsurge.” These socio-psychological foundations for the formation of Russian national culture of modern times directly influenced the formation of Russian national historiography, its initial “romantic” period. Hence the highly emotional and dramatic, even tragic perception of the events of ancient Russian history, especially such as the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke.

N.M. succumbed to the charm of Russian chronicles, which tragically vividly depict Batu’s invasion and its consequences. Karamzin. His perception of the events of distant times is no less emotional than that of his contemporaries or eyewitnesses of the events themselves. Russia is “a vast corpse after Batyev’s invasion,” - this is how he defines the immediate results of the Mongol campaigns. But the state of the country and people under the yoke: it, “having exhausted the State, absorbing its civil well-being, humiliated humanity itself in our ancestors, and for several hundred centuries left deep, indelible traces, watered with the blood and tears of many generations.” The stamp of sentimentality is present even when N.M. Karamzin turns to sociological generalizations and conclusions. “The shadow of barbarism,” he writes, “has darkened the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from us...”, “Russia, tormented by the Mughals, strained its strength solely in order not to disappear: we had no time for enlightenment!” The Horde yoke as the reason for Rus'’s lag behind the “European states” - this is the first main conclusion of N.M. Karamzin. The historiographer’s second conclusion relates to the internal development of Rus' in the “Mongol centuries.” It does not correspond to what was said before, does not follow from it and, moreover, contradicts, for, it turns out, the Mongols brought to Rus' not only “blood and tears,” but also good: thanks to them, civil strife was eliminated and “autocracy was restored,” Moscow itself was “owing its greatness to the khans.” “Karamzin was the first historian to single out the influence of the Mongol invasion on the development of Rus' into a large independent problem of Russian science.”

Views of N.M. Karamzin became widespread among his contemporaries, as will be discussed below. For now, we are interested in their ideological origins. We have already pointed out one: this is the elevated socio-psychological and ideological atmosphere in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. But there was another.

When analyzing the literature used by N.M. Karamzin in volumes III and IV of “History of the Russian State”, a fairly frequent mention of the work of the French orientalist historian of the 18th century is striking. J. De Guigne “General history of the Huns, Turks, Mongols and other Western Tatars in ancient times and from Jesus Christ to the present time,” published in 4 volumes in 1756-1758. (Volume 5 appeared in 1824). J. De Guigne defines the Mongols and their place in world history as follows: “The people who caused a great revolution and who then formed an empire, the most extensive of all that we know, were not at all a civilized people, nor did they strive to spread the wisdom of their laws . They were a barbarous people who went to the most distant countries only to seize all the wealth, reduce the peoples into slavery, return them to a barbaric state and make their name fearsome.”

The work of J. De Guigne was the most significant and popular study of Mongolian history in Europe in the 18th century. As we see, N.M. Karamzin, no stranger to European enlightenment, fully accepted the latest Western European scientific developments in ancient history East.

But Europe influenced the study of Russian history not only from the outside, but also from the inside. We are referring to activities in the first decades of the 19th century. Russian Academy of Sciences. “Historical science in the first quarter of the 19th century. was in obvious decline at the Academy.” Scientists of German origin who were part of the department of history were mainly engaged in auxiliary historical disciplines (numismatics, genealogy, chronology), and their works on Russian history were published in German. Elected in 1817 academician Kh.D. Fran was also a numismatist, a specialist in oriental (Juchid) coins. But he caught, so to speak, the spirit of the times. The fact is that “it was in the first decades of the 19th century. in France, England, Germany, the first oriental scientific societies arise, special oriental journals begin to be published, etc.” H.D. Frehn was able to take a broader look at the problems facing Russian historical science than his predecessors. He becomes the founder of the Russian school of Oriental studies, and his previous studies on Mongolian issues determined the top priorities of Russian Orientalism. "X. Frehn was aware of all the orientalist literature of his time and, as the largest historian of the Golden Horde, had strong views on the role of the Mongol conquest in the history of Russia,” noted A.Yu. Yakubovsky. In 1826, the Academy of Sciences announced a competition on the topic “What were the consequences of the Mongol rule in Russia and what impact did it have on the political relations of the state, on the way of government and on its internal governance, as well as on the enlightenment and education of the people?” The statement of the problem was followed by recommendations. “For a proper answer to this question, it is required that it be preceded by Full description external relations and the internal situation of Russia before the first invasion of the Mongols into it and so that it would subsequently be shown what exactly changes were brought about by the domination of the Mongols in the state of the people, and it would be desirable that, in addition to the scattered evidence contained in the Russian chronicles, a comparison of everything that can be gleaned from eastern and western sources regarding the then state of the Mongols and their treatment of the conquered peoples.”

A grandiose prospect certainly opened up before the researchers. Actually, the very formulation of the problem and its explanations remain relevant to this day, practically unchanged. Their scientific literacy is undeniable. But already in this initial task there was a certain predetermination: the orientation towards the “dominance” of the Mongols in Rus' was determined in advance, although it was precisely the proof or refutation of this that should have become the main task of the stimulated research.

This trend became more obvious later. The competition of 1826, as is known, did not lead to the desired result and was resumed at the suggestion of H.D. Frena in 1832, the Academy of Sciences again presented the work written by H.D. Fren "Program of the task", more extensive than in the first case. The introduction was also more extensive. “The dominion of the Mongol dynasty, known among us under the name of the Golden Horde, among the Mohammedans under the name of the Ulus of Jochi, or the Chingiz Khanate of Deshtkipchak, and among the Mongols themselves under the name of Togmak, which was once for almost two and a half centuries the horror and scourge of Russia, which kept it in bonds of unconditional enslavement and capriciously disposed of the crown and life of its Princes, this dominion should have had more or less influence on the fate, structure, regulations, education, morals and language of our fatherland. The history of this dynasty forms a necessary link Russian history, and it is self-evident that the closest knowledge of the former not only serves to more accurately understand the latter, in this memorable and ill-fated period, but also greatly contributes to the clarification of our concepts about the influence that Mongol rule had on the regulations and national life of Russia.”

Comparing the “tasks” of 1826 and 1832, one can note some shift in emphasis. Firstly, much more attention is now given to the need to study the actual history of the Golden Horde; secondly, only the previously outlined focus on the “rule” of the Mongols in Rus' is now developing into a whole concept. It is said (in the spirit of the “Norman problem”) about the “Mongol dynasty” that forms “a necessary link in Russian history.” The "horror and scourge" of Russia - the Mongol khans - kept it "in the bonds of unconditional enslavement", and they disposed of the "crown and life" of the princes "willfully." In addition, attention is drawn to the transition, so to speak, to Karamzin’s style of presentation (what are the same “horror and scourge” and so on).

Thus, the foundation was laid for the future - not only the 19th, but also the 20th centuries. - research on Russian-Horde issues. Views of N.M. Karamzin, presented by him in volumes IV and V of the “History of the Russian State,” and the academic competitions of 1826 and 1832 gave a strong impetus to the study of the topic “Rus and the Mongols.” Already in the 20-40s, many works appeared that directly or indirectly developed certain judgments of scientific authorities. In 1822, the first book on this topic was published. Taking N.M.’s thought to the point of absurdity. Karamzin about the slowdown in the historical development of Rus' as a result of the Mongol yoke, the author writes that the influence of the Mongols affected all levels of public life and contributed to the transformation of Russians into “an Asian people.” The same topic becomes relevant on the pages of periodicals (and the most popular magazines), establishing itself, therefore, as socially significant.

However, in a number of works of the same time, a different direction is visible than that of N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Frena. Thus, denying any benefit from “Tatar rule,” M. Gastev further writes: “The autocracy itself, recognized by many as the fruit of their rule, is not the fruit of their rule, if back in the 15th century the princes divided their possessions. We can rather call it the fruit of the appanage system, and most likely the fruit of the duration of civil existence.” Thus, M. Gastev was one of the first to question Karamzin’s “concept of slowing down” the natural course social development Rus', due to the intervention of the Mongols. Objections and one’s own vision of the Mongol period in Rus' can also be seen in the works of N.A. Polevoy and N.G. Ustryalov.

Similar considerations were put forward by S.M. Solovyov as the basis for his understanding of the time of the Russian Middle Ages. It is difficult to say how much the historiographical situation influenced him. It is obvious that he proceeded primarily from his own concept of the historical development of Russia. “Since for us the subject of first importance was the replacement of the old order of things with a new one, the transition of clan princely relations into state ones, on which the unity, power of Rus' and a change in the internal order depended, and since we notice the beginning of a new order of things in the north first of the Tatars, then Mongolian relations should be important to us to the extent that they contributed to or hindered the establishment of this new order of things. We notice,” he continued, “that the influence of the Tatars was not the main and decisive one here. The Tatars remained to live far away, caring only about collecting tribute, without interfering in the least with internal relations, leaving everything as it was, therefore, leaving in complete freedom to operate those new relations that began in the north before them.” His position as a scientist on the “Mongolian question” was formulated even more clearly in the following words: “... the historian has no right from the second half of the 13th century to interrupt the natural thread of events - namely the gradual transition of clan princely relations into state ones - and insert the Tatar period, to highlight the Tatars, Tatar relations, as a result of which the main phenomena, the main reasons for these phenomena, must be covered up.” In his “History of Russia since Ancient Times,” the great historian concretizes and details these general provisions.

Regarding S.M. Solovyov is attracted to Russian-Mongolian themes by his balanced and conceptual approach. This was expressed respectively in the absence of emotional assessments, which, as we have seen, filled the previous historiography, and in an attentive attitude to the development of precisely internal “original” (as his Slavophile contemporaries would say) processes. Look at historical development Mongolian Rus' CM. Solovyov, thus, was a new scientific concept of this period and became an alternative to the previously prevailing point of view of Karamzin-Fren. Nevertheless, this line did not die. This is due to the extremely successful development of Russian Oriental studies. Moreover, Russia becomes the only country where Mongolism is emerging as an independent scientific discipline. In the middle - second half of the 19th century. it was represented by such names as N.Ya. Bichurin, V.V. Grigoriev, V.P. Vasiliev, I.N. Berezin, P.I. Kafarov, V.G. Tiesenhausen.

V.G. Tiesenhausen noted in 1884 that “the study of the Mongol-Tatar period since then (since the time of academic competitions. - Yu.K.) has managed to move forward in many ways...” But at the same time, “the absence of a thorough, possibly complete and critically processed history of the Golden Horde, or the Juchid ulus... constitutes one of the most important and sensitive gaps in our everyday life, depriving us of the opportunity not only to become familiar with the course of affairs and the entire structure of this vast and a kind of semi-steppe power that controlled the destinies of Russia for more than 2 centuries, but also to correctly assess the degree of its influence on Russia, determining with certainty what exactly this Mongol-Tatar rule affected in our country and how much it actually slowed down the natural development of the Russian people."

How to comment on the presentation by V.G. Tiesenhausen's historiographical situation? Of course, firstly, despite the “advancement” of the problem, the awareness of the unsatisfactory scientific level of previous studies (primarily due to the lack of use of the entire known fund of sources), and, secondly, the author clearly has “old prejudices”, because the “ideological platform "remains basically the same - at the level of Karamzin and Frehn.

Actually, the “Karamzin” line found its most prominent representative in the person of N.I. Kostomarova. Exploring the “Mongol problem”, he approaches it, as was typical for him, on a large scale - against the backdrop of the history of the entire Slavs. “Wherever the Slavs were left to their own devices, there they remained with their primitive qualities and did not develop any lasting social system suitable for internal order and external defense. Only a strong conquest or the influence of foreign elements could lead them to this,” he wrote in one of his fundamental works. These provisions even A.N. Nasonov called it a “fantastic theory.” But, based on them, N.I. Kostomarov, inheriting N.M. Karamzin, explained the origin of autocratic power in Rus' with the Tatar conquest. Inheritance of N.M. Karamzin is also felt in another passage: under the Mongols, “the feeling of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; servility before the higher, despotism over the lower became the qualities of the Russian soul,” there was a “fall of the free spirit and dullness of the people.” In general, for N.I. Kostomarov, with the conquest of the Mongols, “the great revolution in Russian history began.”

So, with mid-19th V. The “Mongolian question” becomes one of the most important topics in Orientalist and Russian medievalist studies. In the second half of the century, two main ways of studying it were formed. The first, going back to the traditions laid down by N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren, and presented by a number of major Mongol scholars of that time, proceeds from the significant, and at times decisive and all-encompassing role of the Mongols in medieval Russian history. The second is associated with the name primarily of S.M. Solovyov, as well as his successors, among whom stand out the names of V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov, and in the first third of the 20th century. M.N. Pokrovsky and A.E. Presnyakova. For these scientists, the main thing remains the natural course of the internal life of medieval Rus', which was not subject, at least radically, to changes. So S.F. Platonov considered the Mongol yoke only “an accident in our history”; therefore, he wrote, “we can consider the internal life of Russian society in the 13th century. not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke."

In a word, there was no certainty in the Mongolian question either in general or in specific subjects. This gave rise to one of the orientalists of the early 20th century. to summarize: “It is hardly possible to point to any other issue in Russian history that has been so little developed as the question of the Tatars.”

2

Soviet historiography, thus, found the “Mongolian question” unresolved and, moreover, resolved in a diametrically opposite way. For some time, the Mongolian period did not attract much attention from Soviet historians, and the works published in the late 20s and early 30s were mainly based on the widespread (and not yet debunked) theory of “merchant capital” by M.N. Pokrovsky. The situation began to change by the end of the 30s, after the most important discussions had taken place on a number of problems in the history of Russia, the class-harmful bourgeois concepts of Russian history were thrown off the “steamboat of modernity”, and Marxist teachings were strengthened. After the concept was approved by B.D. Grekov about the class feudal nature of ancient Russian society, the turn has come for the next - medieval - period of the history of Rus'. That’s when the first Marxist works appeared, devoted to the period of the 13th and subsequent centuries. In 1937, a thematically specialized, but popular scientific work by B.D. Grekova and A.Yu. Yakubovsky “Golden Horde”, consisting of two parts: “Golden Horde” and “Golden Horde and Rus'”.

The book was destined to answer the question - how should the problem of “Rus and the Mongols” be understood, studied and presented in Soviet historical science. In this regard, the authors followed the path that has already become traditional for Marxist historiography. They turned to the classics of Marxist thought, specifically to the statements of K. Marx, as well as I.V. Stalin. “We have had the opportunity to be convinced more than once,” writes B.D. Grekov, - how Marx assessed the influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of the Russian people. In his remarks we do not see even a hint of the progressiveness of this phenomenon. On the contrary, Marx sharply emphasizes the deeply negative influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of Russia.” Marx’s quotation is also given that the yoke “lasted from 1257 to 1462, that is, more than 2 centuries; this yoke not only crushed, it insulted and dried up the very soul of the people who became its victim.” I.V. spoke even more clearly and definitely. Stalin (this was done regarding the Austro-German invasion of Ukraine in 1918): “The imperialists of Austria and Germany... bear on their bayonets a new, shameful yoke, which is no better than the old, Tatar yoke...”.

This approach and the assessment of medieval Russian-Mongolian relations by the classics of Marxism-Leninism had a direct impact on all subsequent Soviet historiography. But was there anything fundamentally new in the judgments of ideologists and politicians of the 19th and 20th centuries? on the problem we are considering? Apparently not. In fact, with the exception of the “Karamzin” thesis about some positive features of the development of Russian statehood, in general, in the perception of the “Mongolian question” by the classics, the provisions of Karamzin and Kostomarov were repeated. It also talks about the negative influence of the yoke on the social and spiritual life of medieval Rus', and quite emotionally.

So, an already tested path was “offered” to Soviet historical science. However, unlike the previous historiographical period, there was no alternative to this path. The rigid framework of possible interpretations of Russian-Horde relations should not have allowed for any radically different understanding of them.

However, returning to the work of B.D. Grekova and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, it should be said that they themselves are not inclined to exaggerate the influence of the Mongols on either the economic, political, or cultural development of Rus'. So, A.Yu. Yakubovsky, criticizing Kh.D. Fren for his interpretation of the impact of the Golden Horde period on the course of Russian history, writes the following: “With all the merits that Fren has to science, one cannot miss that for his historical consciousness the question was not posed differently... For Fren, the Golden Horde remains only “ill-fated period," and only from this side is it of scientific interest." “No matter how heavy the power of the Golden Horde Mongol khans in feudal Rus' was,” the scientist continues, “it is now impossible to study the history of the Golden Horde only from the point of view of the extent to which it was a “horror and scourge” for the history of Russia.” At the same time, B.D. Grekov writes: “In the process of the difficult struggle of the Russian people against the Golden Horde oppression, the Moscow state was created. It was not the Golden Horde that created it, but it was born against the will of the Tatar Khan, contrary to the interests of his power.” These two theses about the struggle of the Russian people and the creation of a unified Russian state against the will of the Mongols actually contained a specific program for upcoming scientific research.

A portion of criticism of “Mongolian views” by M.N. Pokrovsky was also in the article by A.N. Nasonov “The Tatar yoke in the light of M.N. Pokrovsky" in the famous collection "Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky". True, the author largely used this “tribune” to present his own concept of Russian-Horde relations. This was emphasized by A.N. himself. Nasonov. “Moving on to criticism of the views of M.N. Pokrovsky,” he wrote, “we note that our task will be not so much to evaluate Pokrovsky’s works to determine the place he occupies in our historiography, but to test his views on specific historical material.”

A little later, the concept of A.N. Nasonova will be published in the form of a book “Mongols and Rus'”. Work by A.N. Nasonova will become a milestone for Soviet historiography of the “Mongolian question”.

Anticipating his own formulation of the question, he not only criticizes, but, based on the socio-political conditions of his time, explains the reasons for the “general assessment of the significance of the Tatar yoke in Rus'” of his predecessors. “Apparently,” he believes, “in the pre-revolutionary situation, the idea of ​​​​the active policy of the Russian princes in the Horde was more easily perceived than the idea of ​​​​the active policy of the Tatars in Rus', even by those historians who attributed the Tatar yoke great importance. Contemporary to historians of the 19th - early 20th centuries. Russia was a state with the class of the Great Russian center dominating over the other nationalities of the East European Plain. They unwittingly transferred their idea of ​​contemporary Russia to a certain extent to the past. They willingly discussed the results of the policies of the Russian princes in the Horde, but did not study the issue of the Tatars in Rus' or touched upon it in passing. In most cases, they were of the opinion that the passive behavior of the Mongols contributed to the process of state unification of Rus'.”

His reasoning about the influence of social conditions on the formation of “pre-revolutionary” concepts of Russian-Horde relations can be fully applied to the ideological origin of his own concept. Firstly, despite the fact that “the problem of studying the history of Tatar politics in Rus' is posed” by him “for the first time,” “the formulation of such a problem follows from the indications of the “traditional politics of the Tatars”” given by K. Marx in the book “The Secret History of Diplomacy XVIII centuries." This is the first impetus for subsequent constructions. Secondly, the ideological essence of A.N.’s approach. Nasonov is explained by the social conditions of the time of which he was a contemporary. “We prove,” he says, “that the Mongols pursued an active policy and the main line of this policy was expressed not in the desire to create a single state from a politically fragmented society, but in the desire to in every possible way prevent consolidation, to support the mutual discord of individual political groups and principalities. This conclusion assumes that the unified “Great Russian” state, as we see it in the 17th century, was formed in the process of fighting the Tatars, i.e. in the 15th-16th centuries, partly in the second half of the 16th century, when the fight was possible according to the state of the Golden Horde itself." Consequently, “the formation of a centralized state was thus not at all a result of the peaceful activities of the conquering Mongols, but as a result of the struggle against the Mongols, when the struggle became possible, when the Golden Horde began to weaken and decay, and a popular movement arose in the Russian North-East for the unification of Rus' and for the overthrow of Tatar rule."

Having analyzed a large number of Russian (mainly chronicles) and Eastern (translated) sources, A.N. Nasonov came to the following specific conclusions: 1) the internal political life of Rus' in the second half of the 13th - early 15th centuries. depended decisively on the state of affairs in the Horde; the changes taking place in the Horde certainly entailed a new situation in Rus'; 2) the Mongol khans constantly manipulated the Russian princes; 3) there were popular uprisings against the Mongols, but they were suppressed.

Book by A.N. Nasonova became the first monograph in Russian historiography entirely devoted to the topic “Rus and the Mongols,” and most of her conclusions became the basis for the subsequent development of the problem. Moreover, we can say that it still remains in this “role”: many (if not most) of its provisions are accepted as axioms in modern historiography. Consequently, thanks to the work of B.D. Grekova and A.Yu. Yakubovsky and monographs by A.N. Nasonova, first of all, “Soviet historiography of the 30s - early 40s developed... a unified scientifically based view of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion as a terrible disaster for the Russian people, which delayed the economic, political and cultural development of Rus' for a long time” ; This was also due to the fact that a regime of “systematic terror” was established in Rus' for many decades, wrote A.A. Zimin, fully accepting A.N.’s scheme. Nasonova. Thus, as proclaimed by A.A. Zimin, “the study of the struggle of the Russian people against the Tatar-Mongol enslavers is one of the important tasks of Soviet historical science.”

An example of solving this problem is the fundamental work of L.V. Cherepnin "Education of the Russian centralized state." In the chapters on the socio-political history of medieval Rus', its history is closely intertwined with Horde themes. Peru L.V. Cherepnin also wrote an article about the initial period (XIII century) of Mongolian dependence in Rus'.

“Having suppressed the courageous and stubborn resistance of the peoples, the Mongol-Tatar invaders established their dominance over the Russian land, which had a detrimental effect on its future destinies.” IN general view The researcher formulates the question about this “perniciousness” as follows: “the Mongol invasion of Rus' is not an isolated fact, but a continuous long process that led the country to exhaustion, causing it to lag behind a number of other European countries that developed in more favorable conditions.” Already in the 13th century. the “Russian” policy of the Mongol khans is revealed, “aimed at inciting inter-princely strife, strife, and internal wars.” Although the Horde did not break (“could not break”) the “political orders” that existed in Rus', it sought to put them “at its service, using in its interests the Russian princes who seemed reliable to them, exterminating the unreliable and all the time pitting the princes against each other , to prevent anyone from strengthening and to keep everyone in fear.”

However, “the Horde khans acted not only through intimidation. They tried to rely on certain social forces; with gifts, benefits, privileges to attract part of the princes, boyars, and clergy.” This, according to L.V. Cherepnin, played a certain role: “some representatives of the ruling class went into the service of the conquerors, helping to strengthen their rule. But not everyone did this. And among the feudal elite - princes, boyars, clergy - there were enough people who resisted the foreign yoke." But they did not determine the “modus” of fighting the enemy. “The active force in the fight against Mongol-Tatar oppression was the masses. Throughout the XIII century. there was a people's liberation movement, anti-Tatar uprisings broke out,” which, however, did not represent “organized armed resistance” (which would only happen by the end of the 14th century), but “individual spontaneous isolated uprisings.”

This is how an authoritative researcher sees the 13th century. Did much change in the 14th century? The events of the century in relation to Russian-Mongolian relations are presented (and rightly!) by L.V. Cherepnin is ambiguous. A picture of that complex and dramatic era unfolds before us in detail.

However, the first decades of the 14th century. not much different from the last of the 13th century. The scientist writes: “In the first quarter of the 14th century. The Tatar-Mongol yoke weighed heavily on Russia. Fighting for political primacy in Rus', individual Russian princes did not oppose the Golden Horde, but acted as executors of the khan’s will. As soon as they stopped doing this, the Horde dealt with them. The fight against the Horde was carried out by the people themselves in the form of spontaneous uprisings that arose mainly in the cities. The princes have not yet tried to lead the liberation movement of the townspeople. For this they did not yet have the proper material prerequisites and strength. But the support of the cities largely determined the successes of certain princes in the political struggle with each other.”

These same processes remained dominant during the time of Ivan Kalita. Thus, the uprising in Tver in 1327 was raised “by the people themselves, contrary to the instructions of the Tver prince...”. In general, “under Kalita, the Russian feudal lords not only made no attempt to overthrow the Tatar-Mongol yoke (the time for this had not yet come), but this prince cruelly suppressed those spontaneous popular movements that undermined the foundations of the Horde’s dominance over Russia.”

Some changes are observed in subsequent decades. In the 40-50s, still recognizing the supreme power and regularly paying the “exit”, the princes sought “non-interference of the Horde Khan in the internal affairs of their domains.” Thanks to this, these years become a time of “a certain strengthening of the independence of a number of Russian lands.” This, as well as the internal struggle in the Golden Horde itself, lead to the fact that in the 60-70s of the 14th century. there is a “gradual weakening of the power of the Golden Horde over Russia.” At the same time, from the turn of the 60-70s of the 14th century. In connection with the intensified Tatar raids, “the resistance of the Russian people to the Horde invaders also intensified,” and the “Nizhny Novgorod Principality” became the “center of the people’s liberation struggle.” Ultimately, this “rise” led “to a decisive battle” on the Kulikovo field. Assessing the reign of Dmitry Donskoy L.V. Cherepnin writes about the “significant activation foreign policy Rus'": if earlier the Russian princes ensured the security of their possessions by paying tribute to the khans, then "now they are already organizing a military resistance to the Horde force." Dmitry Donskoy “tried to achieve “silence” for Rus' not only with the people’s ruble, but also with the sword.” Having “raised” this prince in this way, L.V. Cherepnin hastens to make a reservation: “However, before Dm. Donskoy raised this sword, the Russian people have already risen to fight the Tatar yoke.” And yet, “Prince Dmitry more consistently than his predecessors supported an alliance with the townspeople,” which was due to the growth of their importance, primarily in socio-economic development. Dmitry Donskoy “objectively” thus contributed to the rise of the people’s liberation movement.

In the studies of L.V. Tcherepnin, dedicated to the period of Horde dependence, a number of thoughts are clearly visible that develop the views of his predecessors. The first is princely-khan relations, mainly dependent on the khan’s will and, in general, on the events taking place in the Horde. The second is emphasizing in relation to the Mongols the deep class gap between the princes (and other feudal lords) and the people. At the same time, certain successes in the inter-princely struggle depended on the latter, mainly on the townspeople. Of course, specific situations one way or another changed the arrangement of the noted parties, but always, in the opinion of L.V. Cherepnin, their original opposition was preserved: prince - khans, feudal lords - people (citizens) and, of course, Rus' - Horde. At the same time, it is necessary to note a certain research flexibility, which allows a scientist in his conceptual scheme of events to take into account data that at first glance contradicts the main trend of research (which, however, remains unchanged).

This distinguishes the works of L.V. Tcherepnin from the somewhat straightforward conclusions of other Russian historians, whose works were contemporary with them or saw the light of day in subsequent years. So, I.U. Budovnits very emotionally wrote the following: “...In the most terrible decades of the Tatar yoke, which came after the bloody Batyev pogrom, the preaching of servanthood, servility and groveling before the bearers of foreign oppression, emanating from the clergy and the ruling feudal class, the people were able to oppose their fighting ideology, based on intransigence towards invaders, on contempt for death, on readiness to sacrifice one’s life just to free the country from foreign yoke.”

Having examined the historiographical situation in the “Mongolian question” that had developed by the mid-60s, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion about the need to create “ special research"specifically about the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. These are the chapters that are thematically and chronologically more general of his work.

The main goal of V.V. Kargalov’s goal is to maximally expand the “field” of the problem within the 13th century: chronologically, territorially, and finally, socially. As for the first task, “the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' are considered not as the result of Batu’s campaign alone, but as a consequence of a whole series of Tatar invasions that lasted several decades (starting with Batu’s pogrom).” In general, I think it is true and justified: Mongolian troops appear in Rus' more than once. But V.V. Kargalov is a priori interested in only one aspect: “This formulation of the question makes it possible to more fully imagine the destructive consequences of the Mongol-Tatar conquest.”

Expanding the “territorial field”, V.V. Kargalov also makes his contribution. If “the question of the consequences of the invasion for the Russian city,” he believes, “is well developed by Soviet historians,” then “the situation is somewhat worse with the study of the consequences of the invasion for rural areas feudal Rus'. Having studied written and archaeological data, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that the Mongol invasion “dealt a terrible blow” to both the cities and the “productive forces of the Russian feudal village.”

How did the population of the Russian lands: the nobility and the people react to these disasters? V.V. Kargalov continues the practice of “bifurcating” them, outlined in previous works. The “policy of agreement” of the Tatars with the “local feudal lords”, “cooperation of the Tatar feudal lords”, their “alliance” among themselves, at best “a certain compromise” - this is how the researcher sees the picture of Russian-Mongolian relations in the second half of the 13th century. at the level of “feudalism” of two ethnic groups.

But unlike his predecessors V.V. Kargalov proposes to consider this “compromise policy” of the Russian princes not locally (both in relation to individual princes and other “feudal lords” of certain Russian lands), but extends such conclusions to “Russian spiritual and secular feudal lords” as a whole. “Russian feudal lords,” he concludes, “quickly came to an agreement with the Horde khans and, recognizing the supreme power of the khan, retained their “tables” and power over the oppressed classes.”

The people's attitude towards the Horde was different. “The policy of cooperation with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors, which was pursued by a significant part of the Russian feudal lords, was opposed by the masses with an irreconcilable attitude towards the rapists. Despite the terrible consequences of the “Batu pogrom” and the policies of their own feudal lords, who colluded with the Horde khans, the Russian people continued to fight against the foreign yoke.”

This arrangement of social forces led to at least two consequences. The first was that “anti-Tatar and anti-feudal motives were closely intertwined in the speeches of the lower classes.” The second is that it is precisely “to the struggle of the Russian people against the foreign yoke... North-Eastern Rus' owes its special position in relation to the Horde khan. It was not the “wise policy” of the Russian princes, but the struggle of the popular masses against the Mongol conquerors that led to the elimination of “besermanism” and “Baskaism”, to the expulsion of numerous “tsar’s ambassadors” from Russian cities, to the fact that Rus' did not turn into a simple “ulus” of the Golden Hordes. Under the painful foreign yoke, the Russian people managed to preserve the conditions for their independent national development.” This is one main conclusion of V.V.’s work. Kargalova. Another sums up the invasion. “The study of the history of Rus' after the Mongol-Tatar invasion inevitably leads to the conclusion about the negative, deeply regressive impact of foreign conquest on the economic, political and cultural development of the country. The consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were felt for several centuries. It was precisely this that was the main reason for Rus'’s lag behind developed European countries, the elimination of which required titanic efforts of the hardworking and talented Russian people.”

Work by V.V. Kargalov is a new milestone in the development of domestic historiography of the “Mongolian question”. She very clearly pointed out the main themes of Russian-Horde relations in the 13th century. and their perspective. There was a tough armed confrontation between Russia and the Horde, and irreconcilable class contradictions between the princes (and other “feudal lords”) and the people. At the same time, another aspect of the problem is the preservation of a certain (within the framework of feudal development) political independence of the Russian lands.

We see the development of this kind of research trends in the monograph by V.L. Egorova. Its main task is to study the historical geography of the Golden Horde in the XIII-XIV centuries. - is closely linked, in particular, to the military-political relations between Rus' and the Horde. Along with the confirmation of a number of provisions already established in Russian historiography, for example, about “the undivided power of the Mongols and the absence of active resistance of the Russian princes” in the period before 1312 or that the period 1359-1380. “characterized by a steady increase in the military and economic power of the Russian lands,” the author poses some questions in a new way or more emphasizes the known ones.

Firstly, we see a clear division of the “main stages of Mongolian policy in Rus'.” Secondly, it seems important to us that this policy “was not associated with the seizure and alienation of new land territories.” The Russian lands, thus, in the reasonable opinion of the researcher, were not actually included in the territory of the Golden Horde. And in this same connection stands the concept of “buffer zones” that he introduced into scientific circulation, “limiting the Russian borders from the south.” Finally, thirdly, emphasizing that the main goal of the Horde policy “was to obtain the greatest possible tribute,” and the Russian lands were “in the position of semi-dependent territories subject to tribute.” At the same time, this status not only did not interfere, but, on the contrary, stimulated the military dictatorship of the Mongol khans over Russia. Therefore, “throughout the entire existence of the Golden Horde, the Russian principalities were forcibly drawn into the orbit of the political and economic interests of the Mongols.”

The results of consideration of the “Mongolian question” in the latest domestic historiography were summed up in the article by A.L. Khoroshkevich and A.I. Pliguzov, prefacing J. Fennell’s book about Rus' 1200-1304. “The question of the impact of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russian society is one of the most difficult in the history of Rus'. The extreme lack of sources makes it difficult to answer, so it is quite possible that works will appear that deny any impact of the invasion on the development of Rus'. Most historians, however, are of the opinion that the foreign yoke delayed the economic, social and political development of Rus', the completion of the formation of feudalism, and revived archaic forms of exploitation.”

Along with this conclusion, which, however, does not contain any innovations, the authors propose the formulation of some of the ideas they see as current problems. Without a doubt, they are such both for solving private and general issues Russian-Horde relations. But at the same time, we note that the “Mongolian question” as a whole is far from being resolved in principle. Concepts that previously, having been criticized, could, simply put, be brushed aside citing their scientific inconsistency do not at all seem frivolous and unscientific. In our historiography, the concept of L.N. has long played such an unenviable role. Gumilyov.

The relationship between Rus' and the Mongols is considered by L.N. Gumilyov against a broad background of foreign policy, largely emanating from ethnic and religious relations of that time. For the scientist, the invasion of Batu’s troops is not some kind of turning point in the history of Rus'. It was a "Mongol raid", or "a large raid, and not a systematic conquest, for which the entire Mongol Empire would not have enough people"; “in terms of the scale of the destruction caused, it is comparable to the internecine war that was common in that turbulent time.” “The Grand Duchy of Vladimir, which allowed the Tatar army to pass through its lands, retained its military potential,” and “the destruction caused by the war” was “exaggerated.”

Subsequently, “in Great Russia they agreed that the Russian land became the land of “Kanovi and Batyev,” that is, they recognized the suzerainty of the Mongol khan.” This situation suited both the Mongols and the Russians, since “it was justified by the foreign policy situation.” What was “suzerainty” for Rus'? “...The Mongols did not leave garrisons in Rus', Poland, or Hungary, did not impose constant taxes on the population, and did not conclude unequal treaties with the princes. Therefore, the expression “a conquered but not conquered country” is completely incorrect. The conquest did not take place because it was not planned”; “Rus was neither subjugated nor conquered by the Mongols,” and “Russian land became part of the Dzhuchiev ulus without losing its autonomy...”. “This system of Russian-Tatar relations, which existed before 1312, should be called symbiosis. And then everything changed..." The changes occurred as a result of the adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde, which L.N. Gumilyov calls it “a victory for the neighboring Muslim superethnos, which took possession of the Volga and Black Sea regions in 1312.” “Great Russia, in order not to perish, was forced to become a military camp, and the former symbiosis with the Tatars turned into a military alliance with the Horde, which lasted more than half a century - from Uzbek to Mamai.” Its political essence was that the Russian princes “for the tribute they paid, demanded and received military assistance against the West (Lithuania and the Germans. - Yu.K.) and had a strong barrier that protected them from impending attacks from the East."

The subsequent confluence of circumstances (internal and external) made it possible to lay “the foundation of the future greatness of Russia.”

The concept of “Ancient Rus' and the Great Steppe” L.N. Gumilyov largely goes back to the idea of ​​“Eurasianism” and its concrete historical development, primarily in the works of G.V. Vernadsky. (L.N. Gumilyov, as is known, called himself “the last Eurasian.”) “Eurasianism” is now, unlike past decades, actively present in domestic social and scientific thought. It is “opposed” by the concept of Russian-Mongolian relations, formed by our historical science in the late 30s - 60-70s. How significant are the differences between these concepts? If you pay attention to the details, then, of course, there will be a lot of inconsistencies and disagreements. And if you look more broadly and volumetrically?

Both concepts recognize, to one degree or another, the dependence of Rus' on the Mongols, which is obvious. But the “Eurasian” view assumes the status of Russian lands as a “Russian ulus,” i.e., their inclusion in the main territory of the Golden Horde. However, this did not result in any “stagnation” in the internal life of Rus'. Moreover, it was enriched with many acquisitions in various spheres of social, political, cultural and even ethnic life.

Most domestic historians believed and still believe that Rus', as a territory and society, did not become the territory of the “Dzhuchiev ulus”. As noted by V.L. Egorov, between the “indigenous” lands of North-Eastern Rus' and the Golden Horde there were so-called “buffer zones”, essentially delimiting the Russian and Mongolian areas. But at the same time this did not ease the situation for Rus'. Rus' found itself under the heavy Horde “yoke,” which lasted for almost two and a half centuries. The “yoke” threw back the country, which was in the mainstream of European development, for several centuries, causing its backwardness and specificity in the future. These are the positions of the currently opposing historiographical parties in the “Mongolian question.”

It seems to us that, despite the external antagonism, there are no insurmountable obstacles between them. But for this it is necessary to somewhat soften their provisions concerning the internal state and development of Rus' “under the yoke.” There is no doubt that assessments of relationships as “friendly” or “benevolent” did not correspond to reality. There was a confrontation between two ethno-social systems (although, perhaps, similar ones at their core), and the confrontation was tough. On the other hand, we believe that the view of Russian-Horde relations as the “total” subordination of Rus' to the Horde, expressed in the form of constant “terror” in relation to the population and princes, is at least somewhat exaggerated.

This is not about defending the Mongol-Tatar policy in Rus'; we are not striving for any apologetics for the Mongol-Tatars. (It seems that the history of any ethnic group does not need protection and patronage, because in the history of all peoples there is positive and negative, “black” and “white,” if one can even pose the question that way.) We are talking about creating the most complete picture of Russian -Horde relations, complete and balanced, without ideological or other distortions in one direction or another. We are also talking about an attempt to explain some (all, apparently, it will not be possible) elements of relationships (their sources, causes), which do not always fit into the rationalistic schemes that are familiar to us. Religious ideas, norms of customary law, everyday life, rituals - all this (of course, along with “classical” economic and political relations) must be taken into account when studying Russian-Horde relations.

Not only economic, social and political systems, not only the nomadic and sedentary worlds, but also ideological systems: ideological and mental. Without taking into account the latter, our perception of the events and phenomena of that time becomes impoverished and becomes inadequate to medieval realities.

Raids, assaults, and violence clearly simplify Russian-Horde relations, as they generally simplify the internal development of Rus' itself, largely reducing it only to the imposed influence of the Mongol-Tatar order.

The essays offered below pursue the goal of showing what is common and different, what connected or separated the two major social systems of the Eurasian Middle Ages. Ultimately, an attempt to move from the interpretation of Russian-Horde relations as a continuous struggle to an interpretation that involves multilateral and multi-level interaction.

Notes

. Grekov B.D., Yakubovsky A.Yu. 1) The Golden Horde (Essay on the history of the Ulus of Ju-chi during the period of formation and prosperity in the XIII-XIV centuries). L., 1937. S. 3-10, 193-202; 2) The Golden Horde and its fall. M.; L., 1950. P. 5-12; Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke as covered by M.N. Pokrovsky // Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. Part 2. M.; L., 1940; Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols in Russia // Essays on the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1953. S. 31-95; Safargaliev M.G. Collapse of the Golden Horde. Saransk, 1960. P. 3-18; Cherepnin L.V. Formation of the Russian centralized state in the XIV-XV centuries. Essays on the socio-economic and political history of Rus'. M., 1960 (Chapter 1. Historiography of the issue of the formation of the Russian centralized state); Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors in the development of feudal Rus': Feudal Rus' and nomads. M., 1967. S. 218-255; Fedorov-Davydov G.A. Social system of the Golden Horde. M., 1973. S. 18-25; Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography on the influence of the Tatar-Mongol invasion on Russian culture // Problems of history of the USSR. Vol. V. M., 1976. S. 129-148; Grekov I.B. Place of the Battle of Kulikovo political life of Eastern Europe end of the 14th century // Battle of Kulikovo. M., 1980. S. 113-118; Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde // Battle of Kulikovo in the history and culture of our Motherland. M., 1983. S. 70-77; Arslanova A.A. From the history of the study of the Golden Horde according to Persian sources of the 13th - first half of the 15th centuries. in domestic historiography // Problems of socio-economic development of the village of the Middle Volga region during the period of feudalism. Kazan, 1986. P. 11-130; Tolochko P.P. Ancient Rus'. Essays on socio-political history. Kyiv, 1987. pp. 165-167; Gorsky A.A. Russian lands in the XIII-XV centuries. Paths of political development. M., 1996. S. 56-57, 107-108; Chukaeea V.A. Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. 1243-1350 Dnepropetrovsk, 1998. P. 4-19.

Cm.: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography... P. 140-143; Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors... P. 253-255.

Cm.: Rudakov V.N. Perception of the Mongol-Tatars in the chronicles about Batu’s invasion // Hermeneutics of Old Russian Literature. Sat. 10. M., 2000, etc. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the later editorial processing of the “scribes” ( Prokhorov G.M. 1) Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle // VID. L., 1972; 2) The story of Batu’s invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle // TODRL. T. 28. 1974).

. Stennik Yu.V. On the origins of Slavophilism in Russian XVIII literature century // Slavophilism and modernity. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 17, 19, 20; Poznansky V.V. Essay on the formation of Russian national culture: The first half of the 19th century. M., 1975. P. 8, etc.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. V. M., 1992. P. 205.

Right there. T. II-III. M., 1991. P. 462.

Right there. T.V.S. 201, 202, 208. See also: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography... P. 130-132.

Right there. P. 132.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. II-III. P. 751; T. IV. M., 1992. P. 423.

Quote By: Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia in the West (XIII - mid-XX centuries). M., 1988. P. 40.

Right there. - His successor was another prominent French orientalist of the early 19th century. D "Osson, who published “The History of the Mongols from Chinggis Khan to Timur Bek” in 4 volumes in 1824. M.I. Golman believes that he “managed to recreate a broad picture of the Mongol conquests and, what is especially important, to correctly evaluate them devastating consequences for the peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe"; like de Guigne's work for the 18th century, D'Osson's work was "the most significant in Western European historiography on the history of Mongolia in the 19th century. and did not lose its scientific significance in the 20th century.” (Ibid. pp. 42-43). “A look at the Mongols of the 13th century. as conquerors who caused enormous destruction in the countries they conquered, was accepted by bourgeois science when this science was on the rise" ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols... P. 33). Compare: “After D’Osson, historians, so to speak, vulgarized the negative attitude towards the Mongols and Genghisids” ( Kozmin N.N. Preface // D "Osson K. History of the Mongols. T. 1. Genghis Khan. Irkutsk, 1937. C.XXVII-XXVIII).

History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. T. 2. 1803-1917. M.; L., 1964. P. 189.

About H.D. Frenet see: Savelyev P. About the life and scientific works of Frehn. St. Petersburg, 1855.

. Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia... P. 143, approx. 57. - D.Yu. wrote about the “noticeable impact on Russian Oriental studies” of a number of ideas that “dominated in Western European Orientalism.” Arapov ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde. P. 70). See also: Gumilev L.N. Ancient Rus' and the Great Steppe. M., 1989. S. 602-604; Kozhinov V.V. Mysterious pages of the history of the 20th century. M., 1995. S. 229, 231-232.

. Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols... P. 39.

Collection of acts of the ceremonial meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which took place on the occasion of its 100th anniversary on December 29, 1826. St. Petersburg, 1827. P. 52-53. - For the background to the problem statement and the results of the competition, see: Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. St. Petersburg, 1884. T. 1. S. V-VI; Safargaliev M.G. Collapse of the Golden Horde. pp. 3-6.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. P. 555-563.

Right there. P. 555.

Right there. pp. 556-557.

. “The views of H. Frehn were then dominant in historical science” ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols... P. 39). - It is hardly appropriate to say that in the “Program” compiled by Kh.D. Fren, “the problem of classes and class struggle was not taken into account, primary importance was not given to the study of the socio-economic foundations of the Golden Horde state” ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies... P. 72).

. Richter A. Something about the influence of the Mongols and Tatars on Russia. St. Petersburg, 1822. See also: Naumov P. About the relations of Russian princes to the Mongol and Tatar khans from 1224 to 1480. St. Petersburg, 1823; Bernhof A. Russia under the yoke of the Tatars. Riga, 1830; Kartamyshev A. On the significance of the Mongolian period in Russian history. Odessa, 1847.

. A.R. Research on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1825, June; Prandunas G. The reasons for the fall of Russia under the yoke of the Tatars and the gradual restoration of autocracy in it // Bulletin of Europe. 1827. Part 155. No. 14; [N. U.] On the state of Russia before the Mongol invasion (excerpt) // Son of the Fatherland. 1831. T. 22. No. 33-34; [M.P.] Discourse on the reasons that slowed down civic education in the Russian state before Peter the Great, essay by M. Gastev. M., 1832 // Telescope. 1832. No. 12; Fischer A. Speech delivered at the ceremonial meeting of St. Petersburg University by ordinary professor of philosophy A. Fischer, September 20, 1834 // ZhMNP. 1835.4.5. No. 1.

. Gastev M. Discussion about the reasons that slowed down civic education in the Russian state. M., 1832. P. 131.

. Polevoy N.A. History of the Russian people. St. Petersburg, 1833. T. 4. P. 9; T. 5. P. 22-23, etc.; Ustryalov N.G. Russian history. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1855. P. 185, 187-193.

Although it is possible to assume that his view was “a reaction to the exaggeration of the role of the Tatar yoke in Russian history” (Russian history in essays and articles / Edited by M.V. Dovnar-Zapolsky. T. I. B. m., 6. g. P. 589).

. Soloviev S.M. Op. in 18 books. Book I. History of Russia since ancient times. T. 1-2.M., 1988. P. 53.

Right there. P. 54.

The concept of the “Mongolian question” by S.M. Solovyov was not accepted by Soviet historical science and was sharply criticized. So, N.S. Borisov wrote that in his works “the significance of the Tatar invasion is extremely downplayed, even the very term “Mongol period” is discarded.” In his multi-volume History of Russia, Batu’s invasion takes up only four pages, and about the same amount is a description of the customs of the Tatars” ( Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography... P. 135).

. Kononov A.N. Some issues in studying the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1960. P. 3; Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia... P. 54. - On the subsequent development of Mongolian studies in Russia, see p. 108-118.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials related to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. P. IX.

Right there. S. V. Cf.: “The merits of that generation of Orientalists to which Berezin belongs are determined not so much by the implementation as by the formulation of scientific tasks, and in this regard, the scientist who understood that “Russian Orientalists have the responsibility to explain” the Mongolian period of Russian history, and not only in word, but also in deed, who has proven awareness of this duty... has every right to the gratitude of posterity" ( Bartold V.V. Op. T. IX. M., 1977. P. 756).

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Rus' // Kostomarov N.I. Collection Op. Historical monographs and studies. Book 5. T. XII-XIV. St. Petersburg, 1905. P. 5.

. Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke as covered by M.N. Pokrovsky. P. 61.

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Rus'. P. 47.

Right there. P. 43.

. Platonov S.F. Op. in 2 volumes. T. 1. St. Petersburg, 1993. P. 135-139. - Brief description other points of view of domestic historiography of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. see: Russian history in essays and articles. pp. 589-590. - Reassessment of the “Mongol heritage” at the end of the 19th century. took place in Western historiography. “In bourgeois historical science, a revision of views on the past began at this time, including the question of the role of the Mongol conquest. Voices began to be heard more and more loudly that previous historians had incorrectly assessed the role of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest in the history of mankind, that it was high time to reassess previous views in this area, that the Mongols were not at all such destroyers as they had previously thought, and that, on the contrary, , they brought a lot of positive things into the life of the conquered peoples and countries. This change from progressive views in the field of assessing the Mongol conquests to reactionary ones captured even the most serious representatives of bourgeois historiography late XIX and XX centuries,” - this is how he described it from the position of the early 50s of the XX century. revolution in views on the “Mongolian problem” A.Yu. Yakubovsky ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols... P. 64. See also: Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia... P. 44, 52).

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Northeastern State University

"Discussions about the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on Russian history."

Completed by a student

Faculty of Philology

group YA-11

Vechtomova Tatyana

Checked by Associate Professor of the Department of VIiIR

Pustovoit G.A.

Magadan 2011

In the 13th century The peoples of our country had to endure a difficult struggle with foreign invaders. From the east, hordes of Mongol-Tatar conquerors fell upon Rus', the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. From the west, the Russian lands and the lands of the peoples of the Eastern Baltic were subjected to aggression by German, Swedish and Danish crusading knights, as well as Hungarian and Polish feudal lords.

The period of Mongol-Tatar rule in Rus' lasted about two and a half centuries, from 1238 to 1480. During this era, Ancient Rus' finally collapsed and the formation of the Moscow state began.

Before the invasion of the Tatar-Mongol hordes on Russian lands, the Russian state consisted of several large principalities, constantly competing with each other, but not possessing one large army capable of resisting the armada of nomads.

The problem of the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on the formation of Russian statehood in Russian historiography is expressed by two extreme positions:

1. The Mongol-Tatar yoke brought ruin, death of people, delayed development, but did not significantly affect the life and way of life of Russians and their statehood. This position was defended by S. Soloviev, V. Klyuchevsky, S. Platonov, M. Pokrovsky. It has also been traditional for Soviet historiography for 75 years. The main idea was that Russia developed during the Mongol-Tatar invasion along the European path, but began to lag behind due to large-scale destruction and human losses, and the need to pay tribute.

2. The Mongol-Tatars had a great influence on the public and social organization of Russians, on the formation and development of the Moscow state. This idea was first expressed by L.N. Gumilev, N.M. Karamzin, and then it was developed by N.I. Kostomarov, N.P. Zagoskin and others. In the 20th century, these ideas were developed by Eurasians who considered the Moscow state to be part of the Great Mongolian state. There are authors who claimed that serfdom was borrowed by Russia from the Mongols

Position of L.N. Gumlev.

A special feature of Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov’s concept is the assertion that Rus' and the Golden Horde before the 13th century. Not only were they not enemies, but they even had some allied relations. In his opinion, the prerequisites for such a union were the overly active expansionist actions of the Livonian Order in the Baltic states. Moreover, the alliance was for the most part military rather than political in nature. This alliance was expressed in the form of protection of Russian cities by Mongol troops for some payment: “...Alexander was interested in the prospect of receiving military assistance from the Mongols to resist the onslaught of the West and internal opposition. It was for this help that Alexander Yaroslavovich was ready to pay, and pay dearly” (Gumilev L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 132). Thus, according to Gumilev, with the help of the Mongols, cities such as Novgorod, Pskov in 1268, as well as Smolensk in 1274 avoided capture: “But then, according to the agreement with the Horde, a Tatar detachment of 500 horsemen came to Novgorod...Novgorod and Pskov survived” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 134). In addition, the Russian princes themselves helped the Tatars: “The Russians were the first to provide military assistance to the Tatars, taking part in the campaign against the Alans” (Gumilev L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 133). Lev Nikolaevich saw only positive aspects in such an alliance: “Thus, for the tax that Alexander Nevsky undertook to pay to Sarai, Rus' received a reliable strong army that defended not only Novgorod and Pskov... Moreover, the Russian principalities that accepted the alliance with the Horde completely retained their ideological independence and political independence... This alone shows that Rus' was not a province of the Mongol ulus, but a country allied with the Great Khan, which paid some tax for the maintenance of the troops that it itself needed” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia - M.: Progress. p. 134). He also believed that this union entailed an improvement in the internal situation of the country: “The union with the Tatars turned out to be a benefit for Rus' from the point of view of establishing internal order” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 133).

To support his idea, L.N. Gumilyov cites the following facts. Firstly, Tatar-Mongol detachments were not constantly present in Rus': “The Mongols did not leave garrisons, they did not think of establishing their permanent power” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 122). Secondly, it is known from many sources that Prince Alexander Nevsky often traveled to Khan Batu. Gumilyov connects this fact with the organization of the union: “In 1251, Alexander came to Batu’s Horde, became friends, and then fraternized with his son Sartak, as a result of which he became the adopted son of the khan. The union of the Horde and Rus' was realized…” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 127). Thirdly, as mentioned above, Gumilyov cites the fact that the Mongols defended Novgorod in 1268. Fourthly, in his books, Gumilyov mentions the opening of an Orthodox bishopric in the Golden Horde, which, in his opinion, would hardly be possible in the event of hostility between these countries: “In 1261, through the efforts of Alexander Nevsky, as well as the Mongol khans Berke and Mengu-Timur, it was The Orthodox bishop's courtyard was opened. He was not subjected to any persecution; it was believed that the Bishop of Sarsky was the representative of the interests of Rus' and all Russian people at the court of the Great Khan” (Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 133). Fifthly, after Berke came to power in the Horde, who established Islam as the state religion, religious persecution of the Orthodox Church did not begin in Russia: “...After the victory in the Horde of the Muslim party represented by Berke, no one demanded that the Russians convert to Islam” ( Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. - M.: Progress. p. 134). It seems to me that it is on the basis of these, and maybe some other facts, that he draws a conclusion about the existence of allied relations between Russia and the Horde.

Other approaches to the problem.

In addition to the concept of L.N. Gumilyov, there is another “original” concept of G.V. Nosovsky. and Fomenko A.T., which does not coincide at all with traditional history. Its essence is that, in their opinion, the Horde and Rus' are practically the same state. They believed that the Horde was not a foreign entity that captured Rus', but simply an eastern Russian regular army that was an integral part of the ancient Russian state. “The Tatar-Mongol yoke,” from the point of view of this concept, is simply a period of military government of the state, when the supreme ruler was the commander-khan, and in the cities there were civil princes who were obliged to collect tribute in favor of this army, for its maintenance: “Thus the ancient Russian state seems to be a single empire, within which there was a class of professional military men (Horde) and a civilian part that did not have its own regular troops, since such troops were already part of the Horde” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Publishing Department of the UC DO Moscow State University, 1996. p. 25). In the light of this concept, the frequent Tatar-Mongol raids were nothing more than the forced collection of tribute from those regions that did not want to pay: “The so-called “Tatar raids,” in our opinion, were simply punitive expeditions into those Russian regions that, for some reason, - for reasons they refused to pay tribute” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Publishing Department of the UC DO Moscow State University, 1996. p. 26). Nosovsky and Fomenko argue their version of events as follows. Firstly, they share the opinion of some historians that back in the 13th century Cossacks lived on the borders of Rus'. However, there is no mention of clashes between the Mongols and the Cossacks. From here they conclude that the Cossacks and the Horde are Russian troops: “The Horde, no matter where it came from,... would inevitably have to come into conflict with the Cossack states. However, this was not noted. The only hypothesis: the Horde did not fight with the Cossacks because the Cossacks were an integral part of the Horde. This is the version: the Cossack troops not only formed part of the Horde, they were also regular troops of the Russian state. In other words, the Horde was Russian from the very beginning” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Publishing Department of the UC DO Moscow State University, 1996. pp. 24-25 ). Secondly, they point out the absurdity of the Mongols using Russian troops in their campaigns; after all, they could rebel and go over to the side of the Mongol enemies: “Let us stop for a moment and imagine the absurdity of the situation: for some reason the victorious Mongols transfer weapons to the “Russian slaves” they conquered, and they calmly serve in the troops of the conquerors, making up the “main mass” there ”! .. Even in traditional history, Ancient Rome never armed newly conquered slaves” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Publishing Department of the UC DO MSU, 1996 . p.122). Karamzin wrote in his writings that most of the current churches were built during the period of the yoke. This fact also confirms the basis of the concept of Nosovsky and Fomenko: “Almost all Russian monasteries were founded under the “Tatar-Mongols.” And it’s clear why. Many of the Cossacks, leaving military service in the Horde, they went into monasteries” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Publishing Department of the UC DO Moscow State University, 1996. pp. 127-128). Thus, they write, “The Mongol conquerors turn into some kind of invisible people, whom for some reason no one sees” (Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus', England and Rome. M.: Published by Department of UC DO MSU, 1996. p.124).

Almost all other famous historians believe that the relationship of the Golden Horde to Rus' cannot be called allied. In their opinion, the reasons for the establishment of the yoke are:

1. Conquest campaigns of the Tatar-Mongols,

2. The superiority of the Mongols in the art of war, the presence of an experienced and large army;

3. Feudal fragmentation and strife between princes.

The Tatar-Mongol invasion is precisely an “invasion”, and not a “walk” across Rus', as L. Gumilyov claims and the establishment of the most severe yoke, i.e. the rule of the Tatar-Mongols with all the hardships of the dependent existence of Rus'.

The consequences of the Tatar-Mongol invasion are as follows: as a result of more than 2.5 centuries of yoke, Rus' was thrown back in its development by 500 years, and this is the reason why Russia is currently lagging behind Western civilizations. As a result of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, Russian lands and cities were devastated, entire principalities were destroyed, colossal damage was caused to the development of the economy and culture, but the struggle against the Tatar-Mongol yoke helped to unite the Russian people and form a centralized state.

Therefore, the Horde still had power over Russia, and this power is most accurately characterized by the word “yoke.” The Great Khans treated Rus' as a vassal state, the helplessness of which was supported by large tributes and conscription. They justify their position with the following facts. Firstly, for the great khans, the Russian princes were like a cross between vassals and slaves. So, every time after the change of khan, they went to bow to him and ask for a label to reign: “Back in 1242, the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav I went to Batu’s headquarters, where he was confirmed in office. His son Konstantin was sent to Mongolia to assure the regent of his and his father’s commitment” (Vernadsky V.G. History of Russia: Mongols and Rus'. - M.: Tver: Agraf: Lean, 2000. p. 149). This is also confirmed by the facts of the execution of Russian princes by the Mongol khans, for example, the execution of Mikhail of Chernigov: “... He was executed along with one of the boyars loyal to him, who accompanied him to the Khan’s Savka...” (Vernadsky V.G. History of Russia: Mongols and Rus'. – M.: Tver: Agraf: Lean, 2000. p. 151). Secondly, history knows that during the entire period of its rule, the Golden Horde sent many punitive detachments to Rus', which fought against non-payment of tribute, as well as uprisings of princes or ordinary people. The clearest example of this is the “Nevryuev’s army”, sent against the Grand Duke Andrei Yaroslavich, and which, according to the testimony of many historians, caused harm to Rus' greater than Batu’s campaign: “In 1252, Vladimir Rus' was attacked for the disobedience and obstinacy of the Grand Duke Andrei Yaroslavich Tatar tumens under the command of commander Nevryuy. The regiments of Andrei Yaroslavich and his brother Yaroslav were defeated in a fierce battle near Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, and the Grand Duke himself fled to Sweden, from where he returned only a few years later” (Encyclopedia for children. Vol. 5. History of Russia and its closest neighbors. - M .: Avanta+, 1998. p.229). It is also impossible not to take into account the frequent censuses of the population of Rus' conducted by the khans. Their results were used to collect taxes, as well as to recruit warriors. This version of events is also supported by the fact that there was a decline in culture in Rus': some crafts were lost, many books were burned.

Conclusion.

It is very difficult to draw an unambiguous conclusion on this issue. None of the above versions of events can be true.

List of used literature

1. Gumilyov L.N. From Rus' to Russia. – M.: Progress.
2. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State: Book. 2. – Rostov-on-Don, 1994.
3. Nosovsky G.V., Fomenko A.T. New chronology and concept of ancient Rus': T.1. – M: Publishing house. Department of the UC DO Moscow State University, 1996.

Key dates and events: 1237-1240 p. - Batu's campaigns on

Rus; 1380 - Battle of Kulikovo; 1480 - standing on the Ugra River, liquidation of Horde rule in Rus'.

Basic terms and concepts: yoke; label; Baskak.

Historical figures: Batu; Ivan Kalita; Dmitry Donskoy; Mamai; Tokhtamysh; Ivan IP.

Working with the map: show the territories of Russian lands that were part of the Golden Horde or paid tribute to it.

Response plan: 1). main points of view on the nature of the relationship between Russia and the Horde in the 11th-15th centuries; 2) features of the economic development of Russian lands under the rule of the Mongol-Tatars; 3) changes in the organization of power in Rus'; 4) Russian Orthodox Church under Horde rule; 5) the consequences of the rule of the Golden Horde on Russian lands.

Material for the answer: The problems of Horde rule have caused and continue to cause different assessments and points of view in Russian historical literature.

Even N.M. Karamzin noted that Mongol-Tatar domination in Russia had one important positive consequence -

vie - it accelerated the unification of the Russian principalities and the revival of a single Russian state. This gave rise to some later historians talking about the positive influence of the Mongols.

Another point of view is that Mongol-Tatar domination had extremely dire consequences for Russia, as it set its development back 250 years. This approach allows us to explain all subsequent problems in the history of Russia precisely by the long rule of the Horde.

The third point of view is presented in the works of some modern historians who believe that the Mongol-Tatar yoke did not exist at all. The interaction of the Russian principalities with the Golden Horde was more reminiscent of allied relations: Russia paid tribute (and its amount was not so large), and the Horde in return ensured the security of the borders of the weakened and scattered Russian principalities.

It seems that each of these points of view covers only part of the problem. It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of “invasion” and “yoke”:

In the first case we're talking about about Batu’s invasion, which devastated Rus', and about the measures that the Mongol khans took from time to time against the rebellious princes; in the second - about the very system of relationships between Russian and Horde authorities and territories.

The Russian lands were considered by the Horde as a part of its own territory that had a certain degree of independence. The principalities were obliged to pay quite a significant tribute to the Horde (even those lands that were not captured by the Horde paid it); in preparation for new campaigns, the khans demanded from the Russian princes not only money, but also soldiers; finally, “F!fVOY goods” from Russian lands were highly valued in the slave markets of the Horde.

Rus' was deprived of its former independence. The princes could rule only after receiving a label to reign. The Mongol khans encouraged numerous conflicts and strife between the princes. Therefore, in an effort to obtain labels, the princes were ready to take any steps, which gradually changed the very nature of princely power in the Russian lands.

At the same time, the khans did not encroach on the position of the Russian Orthodox Church- they, unlike the German knights in the Baltic states, did not prevent the population under their control from believing in their own God. This, despite the difficult conditions of foreign domination, made it possible to preserve national customs, traditions, and mentality.

The economy of the Russian principalities, after a period of complete ruin, was restored quite quickly, and from the beginning of the 14th century. began to develop rapidly. Since that time, stone construction has been revived in cities, and the restoration of temples and fortresses destroyed during the invasion began. The established and fixed tribute was soon no longer considered a heavy burden. And since the time of Ivan Kalita, a significant part of the funds collected has been directed to the internal NEEDS of the Russian lands themselves.