Mongols and Russ discuss the consequences of Mongol rule. Examination: Russia and the Golden Horde in the XIII-XV centuries

Unlike the countries of Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Northern Black Sea region conquered by the Mongols, which had favorable natural conditions for extensive nomadic cattle breeding, which became the territory of the Mongolian states, Russia retained its statehood. The dependence of Russia on the khans of the Golden Irda was expressed primarily in the heavy tribute that the Russian people were forced to pay to the conquerors.
Having received an idea of the military capabilities of Russia and the readiness of the Russian people to defend their national statehood, the Mongol-Tatars refused to directly include Russia in the Golden Horde and create their own administration in the Russian lands.
In 1243, the brother of the Grand Duke of Vladimir, Yuri Vsevolodich, Yaroslav, who was killed in the City, was summoned to Batu’s headquarters, to whom, after officially recognizing his vassal dependence on the Horde, the Khan handed a label (deed) to the great reign of Vladimir with recognition as the “oldest” prince of North-Eastern Russia . Other princes also received labels for their reigns, who arrived after Yaroslav in the Horde and agreed to perform a series of humiliating procedures emphasizing their vassal "submission to the Khan".
Having retained power in the hands of the princes in their principalities, the khans limited themselves to controlling their vassal loyalty and activity by sending their special representatives, the Baskaks. The latest research does not confirm the previously accepted view of the Basques as a military-administrative form of organizing the rule of the Mongols in Russia. The functions of the Basques were to actively control the actions of the princes. According to the denunciations of the Baskaks, the princes who were “guilty” of anything before the khan were summoned to the Horde or sent to the Russian lands a punitive army.
The Batyev pogrom did not break the will of the Russian people to resist the invaders. It took the khans of the Golden Horde more than ten years to consolidate their dominance over Russia. The western and northwestern Russian lands, which were almost unaffected by the invasion, refused to recognize dependence on the Horde. Southwestern Russia quickly recovered from the pogrom. Daniil Galitsky defiantly refused to come to the Horde for a label and prepared to continue the fight against it. In the early 1950s, the Grand Duke of Vladimir Andrei Yaroslavich (1249-1252) tried to unite all forces hostile to the Horde by concluding an anti-Horde alliance with Daniil-Galitsky and the Prince of Tver. In the proud words put into his mouth by the chronicler: “It is better for me to flee to a foreign land, than to be friends and serve as Tatars,” reflected the intransigence of the people towards the conquerors. Batu warned the upcoming joint action of the princes by sending punitive troops against them. Near Pereyaslavl, the Horde army of the “Prince” Nevryuy defeated the hastily assembled regiments of Andrei Yaroslavich and the Prince of Tver. Daniil of Galicia managed to repel the punitive army of the “prince” Kuremsa, but in 1259 Southwestern Russia was subjected to a new invasion of the Horde hordes and Daniil Romanovich was forced to admit his dependence on the khan. Ruined and fragmented Russia did not yet have sufficient strength to resist the Horde. The economic and political conditions necessary for the success of the liberation struggle have not yet taken shape.
After the flight of Prince Andrei Yaroslavich abroad, Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky (1252-1263) became the Grand Duke of Vladimir, who, in relations with the khans, strove to proceed from the real balance of forces of Russia and the Horde at that time. Alexander Nevsky considered the main task of Russia to be the fight against the aggression of the crusaders from the west, actively supported by the Roman curia. Despite the severity of the Horde yoke, Russia retained its statehood, the Russian people were not threatened by assimilation by the conquerors. The Mongols, who stood at a lower level of general development, could not impose their language and culture on the Russian people. The aggression of the crusaders threatened not only the state, but also the national existence and cultural development of the Russian people.
Concentrating the forces of Russia to repel aggression from the west, Alexander sought to maintain peaceful relations with the khans, not to give rise to new invasions and raids, and, restoring the undermined productive forces and economy of the country, gradually accumulate strength for the future liberation struggle. This course of Nevsky in relations with the Horde for a long time became decisive for the Vladimir, and then Moscow princes. It also met the interests of the bulk of the Russian feudal lords, who preferred to enter into an agreement with the conquerors, to give up part of their income in their favor, but to retain their reigns and estates, power over the people. The church also called for an agreement with the Horde, which received from the khans letters of protection for church property and exemption from tribute.
The liberation struggle against the invaders was hampered by the strengthening of feudal decentralization and the weakening of the grand ducal power. The temporary strengthening of the grand duke's power under Alexander Nevsky, who extended his power to many cities of the Smolensk, Chernigov and Novgorod-Pskov lands, was supported by the khans, who at first needed its strength and authority to assert the Horde's dominance in the lands that were not affected by the invasion, and for assistance in conducting a census and taxing the people with tribute.
After the death of Alexander Nevsky, the title of Grand Duke of Vladimir became an object of struggle between the specific princes, for whom the possession of it was associated primarily with receiving income from the administration of the territory that constituted the "Vladimir inheritance", and suzerainty over the richest cities of North-Western Russia - Novgorod and Pskov.
The weakening of the grand ducal power also occurred in the Galicia-Volyn land, which was divided after the death of Daniel Romanovich of Galicia (1264) into a number of specific principalities. His son Lev Danilovich managed to temporarily unite Southwestern Russia, but cut off from other Russian lands, weakened by internal strife and frequent invasions of the Horde, it became in the XIV century. object of aggression from the Polish, Lithuanian and Hungarian feudal lords.
The khans of the Golden Horde, who sought to prevent the strengthening of individual princes, contributed in every possible way to the feudal fragmentation of Russian lands and the incitement of strife between the princes. The khans confronted princes obedient to them with dangerous and objectionable princes to the Horde, eliminated the latter by murder at the khan's headquarters or by sending punitive armies against them. Having turned the issuance of labels into an object of rivalry and bargaining between the princes, into an instrument of political pressure on them, the khans deliberately violated the order of inheritance of “tables” that had developed in Russia and intervened in princely strife, using them as pretexts for predatory invasions of Russia. Often, the Tatar rati "led" to Russia in the fight against their rivals and the princes themselves, as they had previously "led" the Polovtsians.
In 1257, the Mongolian scribes (“numerals”), relying on the help of the grand ducal administration and the assistance of secular and spiritual feudal lords, carried out a census (recording in the “number”) of the population of Russian lands for the imposition of tribute and duties. By assisting the Horde "numerals" in conducting the census, the Russian feudal lords sought to shift the entire burden of the "imminent tribute" onto the shoulders of the working masses. The tribute sent annually to the Horde (“exit”, “tithe”) was the greatest burden of the Horde yoke. At first, it was collected in kind, but then it was transferred to money (“silver”). The unit of taxation was each urban and agricultural sector. The severity of the constant tribute was exacerbated by the frequent demands of the khans to send them additional large sums (the so-called “requests”. Deductions from trade duties were also in favor of the khan. Yamskaya and underwater duties fell heavily on the peasants, the duty to give “feed” to the passing Horde ranks and their retinue The collection of tribute was given by the khans at the mercy of Muslim merchants (“besermens”), who imposed additional arbitrary taxes on the population, enslaved peasants and townspeople with usurious fetters, and sold insolvent debtors into slavery in the eastern slave markets.
The struggle of the Russian people against the Golden Horde yoke in the second half of the XIII century.
In the forced recognition by the Mongols of the special position of Russia in relation to the Golden Horde, in the refusal of the conquerors to create their own administration in the Russian lands, a huge role was played not only by the heroic resistance of the Russian people during the years of the Batu invasion, but also by its unceasing struggle against the Horde scribes, tribute collectors, arbitrariness and the atrocities of the Baskaks, Khan's ambassadors, who came from the Horde. The liberation struggle of the working people was closely intertwined with the struggle against the Russian feudal lords, who entered into an agreement with the Horde. This was most clearly manifested during the census in 1257, which caused a series of anti-Tatar unrest, during which the townspeople and peasants also cracked down on the feudal lords who assisted the “numerous”. The "numerals" who arrived in Novgorod were forced to seek protection from the Grand Duke from the rebellious urban poor. During these unrest, the posadnik Mikhalka was killed, who, together with the boyars, sought to shift the entire burden of tribute to the "lesser people" ("It is easy for the boyars to create for themselves, but evil for the lesser"). Alexander Nevsky, with the help of other princes, brutally suppressed the uprising. When in 1259 the “numerals” again arrived in the city for the census, the prince again had to take them under his protection and force the Novgorodians to “appear according to the number”. In 1262, the inhabitants of Vladimir, Suzdal, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, Ustyug and other cities of North-Eastern Russia revolted. The rebels dealt with the hated "besermen" and local feudal lords who collaborated with the Tatars. Unrest against the Basques and tribute collectors continued in the 70s - 90s of the XIII century. In the course of urban uprisings, veche meetings were revived, which in the hands of the urban people became an instrument of national liberation and anti-feudal struggle.
The khans failed to suppress the liberation struggle of the Russian people with some frightening punitive armies, and they had to make separate concessions. At the end of the XIII century. the collection of tribute was transferred to the Russian princes, and then the Baskaks were also recalled from the Russian cities, which deprived the Horde of the opportunity to directly interfere in the internal political life of the Russian lands. These concessions, wrested in the hard struggle of the people, were of great importance in creating more favorable conditions for eliminating the grave consequences of the Tatar invasions in the country's economy, for starting the struggle for the state-political unity of Russia.

The consequences of the invasion and the establishment of the Horde yoke

The Batu pogrom and the foreign yoke that was then established for two centuries led to a long decline in the economic, political and cultural development of the Russian lands, marked the beginning of their development lagging behind the advanced Western European countries.
Huge damage was done to the basis of the country's economy - agriculture. The old landowning centers of Russia (Kyiv land, the central regions of North-Eastern Russia) were deserted and fell into decay, the inhabitants of which survived death and captivity, left cultivated places and fled to the remote forest thickets of the Upper Volga region, inaccessible to the Tatars, and further north - to the Trans-Volga region . The Mongol-Tatars pushed the borders of Russia to the north and west, including in the huge "Wild Field" stretching from the Northern Black Sea region to the Oka and Ugra, the steppe and forest-steppe lands mastered by the Russian people since ancient times (the Principality of Pereyaslavl in the south, the eastern regions of the Chernigov-Seversk land and the southern regions of North-Eastern Russia).
A severe consequence of the Mongol-Tatar conquest was the division of Russia into its separate parts, which led to a sharp weakening of the active economic and political ties between the northeastern and northwestern Russian lands with the population of the western and southwestern Russian lands, subsequently captured by Polish and Lithuanian feudal lords.
The massive ruin and destruction of Russian cities, the death and captivity of skilled craftsmen led to a decline in the role of cities in the political and economic life of the country, to the loss of many craft skills and technological methods, to the coarsening and simplification of crafts and handicrafts. Disappeared forever or revived only after 150 - 200 years complex types of crafts (filigree, niello, cloisonne enamel, polychrome glazed ceramics, stone carving, etc.). Stone construction in cities stopped, fine and applied arts fell into decay. The connection between urban handicraft and the market weakened, the development of commodity production slowed down, and the emerging trend towards the transformation of handicraft into small-scale production was interrupted. The tribute to "silver" led to its leakage to the Horde and the almost complete cessation of monetary circulation within the Russian lands, which led to the cessation of the development of commodity-money relations that had begun before the Batyev invasion.
A heavy blow was dealt to political and commercial relations with foreign countries. Only the cities of Western and Northwestern Russia (Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk) preserved trade relations with the West. North-Eastern Russia retained trade with the East along the Volga route, but it was hampered by the predatory raids of the Horde on Russian trade caravans.
The difficulties of restoring the national economy undermined by the invasion, restoring destroyed cities and villages were aggravated by the departure of a significant part of the national income to the Horde in the form of "tribute", "requests", "commemoration" (gifts) to the khans and the Horde nobility, as well as the incessant raids of the Mongol-Tatars on the Russians. lands that repeated on different scales the disasters of the Batu invasion. Only in the last quarter of the thirteenth century 14 major invasions of Russian lands were made, not counting the many smaller raids undertaken for the personal enrichment of the Horde nobility - “princes”, “temniki”, “ulans”, etc. The most devastating invasion, which Russian chroniclers compared with Batyev, was “ Dudenev's army" to North-Eastern Russia in 1293, when the Mongol-Tatars again "created the whole earth empty."
It took almost a century of hard work and heroic struggle of the people to restore the pre-Mongolian level of the national economy under these difficult conditions and ensure its further rise and development as a necessary basis for the elimination of feudal fragmentation and the creation of a Russian centralized state.

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1. Reasons for the success of the Mongols

The feudal fragmentation of Russia, Europe and the weak interstate relations of the countries of Asia and Europe, which did not allow, by combining their forces, to repulse the conquerors.

Numerical superiority of the conquerors. There were many disputes among historians about how much Batu brought to Russia. N.M. Karamzin indicated the number of 300 thousand soldiers. However, a serious analysis does not allow even close approach to this figure. Each Mongol horseman (and they were all horsemen) had at least 2, and most likely 3 horses. Where in the forest of Russia to feed 1 million horses in winter? Not a single chronicle even raises this topic. Therefore, modern historians call the figure a maximum of 150 thousand Moghuls who came to Russia, more cautious ones stop at the figure of 120-130 thousand. And all of Russia, even if united, could put up 50 thousand, although there are figures up to 100 thousand. So in reality, the Russians could put up 10-15 thousand soldiers for battle. Here the following circumstance should be taken into account. The strike force of the Russian squads, the princely ratis, were in no way inferior to the Mughals, but the bulk of the Russian squads were militia warriors, not professional warriors, but ordinary people who took up arms, not like professional Mongols. The tactics of the warring parties also differed. The Russians were forced to stick to defensive tactics designed to exhaust the enemy. Why? The fact is that in a direct military clash in the field, the Mongolian cavalry had clear advantages. Therefore, the Russians tried to sit out behind the fortress walls of their cities. However, wooden fortresses could not withstand the onslaught of the Mongol troops. In addition, the conquerors used the tactics of continuous assault, successfully used siege weapons and equipment perfect for their time, borrowed from the peoples of China, Central Asia and the Caucasus they conquered.

The Mongols conducted good reconnaissance before the start of hostilities. They had informants even among the Russians. In addition, the Mongol commanders did not personally participate in the battles, but led the battle from their headquarters, which, as a rule, was in a high place. The Russian princes, up to Vasily II the Dark (1425-1462), themselves directly participated in the battles. Therefore, very often, in the event of even the heroic death of a prince, his soldiers, deprived of professional leadership, found themselves in a very difficult situation.

It is important to note that Batu's attack on Russia in 1237 came as a complete surprise to the Russians. The Mongol hordes undertook it in the winter, attacking the Ryazan principality. The Ryazans, on the other hand, are accustomed only to the summer and autumn raids of enemies, mainly Polovtsy. Therefore, no one expected a winter blow. What did the steppe dwellers pursue with their winter attack? The fact is that the rivers, which were a natural barrier for enemy cavalry in the summer, were covered with ice in winter and lost their protective functions.

In addition, in Russia, stocks of food and fodder for livestock were prepared for the winter. Thus, the conquerors were already provided with fodder for their cavalry before the attack.

These, according to most historians, were the main and tactical reasons for the Mongol victories.

2 . The establishment of the Horde yoke, its aftermathtviya and influence on the fate of Russia

After the Batu invasion, the so-called Mongol-Tatar yoke was established over Russia - a complex of economic and political methods that ensured the dominance of the Golden Horde over that part of the territory of Russia that was under its control. A new term "Golden Horde" also appears, which refers to the state formed in 1242-1243. The Mongols who returned from western campaigns to the Lower Volga region, with the capital Saray (Saray-berke), the first khan of which was the same Batu.

The main among these methods were the collection of various tributes and duties - "ploughing", the trade duty "tamga", food for the Mongol ambassadors - "honor", etc. -s yrs. XIII century, and from 1257 on the orders of Khan Berke, the Mongols carried out a census (the first census in the history of the country) of the population of North-Eastern Russia ("recording in a number"), setting a fixed amount of fees. Only the clergy were exempted from paying the "exit" (before the adoption of Islam by the Horde at the beginning of the 14th century, pagan Mongols, like all pagans, were distinguished by religious tolerance).

Representatives of the Khan-Baskaki were sent to Russia to control the collection of tribute. The tribute was collected by tax-farmers - "besermens" (Central Asian merchants). By the end of the 13th-beginning of the 14th century, the Basque institution was abolished due to the active opposition of the population. Since that time, the Russian princes themselves began to collect the Horde tribute. In case of disobedience, punitive campaigns followed. As the domination of the Golden Horde strengthened, punitive expeditions were replaced by repressions against individual princes.

The Russian principalities that became dependent on the Horde lost their sovereignty. Their receipt of the princely table depended on the will of the khan, who gave them labels (letters for reigning). The measure that consolidated the dominance of the Golden Horde over Russia was the issuance of labels for the great reign of Vladimir.

The one who received such a label added the Vladimir principality to his possessions and became the most powerful among the Russian princes in order to maintain order, stop strife and ensure an uninterrupted flow of tribute. The Horde khans did not allow any significant strengthening of any of the princes and a long stay on the grand prince's throne. In addition, having taken away the label from the next Grand Duke, they gave it to the rival prince, which caused princely strife and a struggle for obtaining the Vladimir reign at the Khan's court.

A well-thought-out system of measures provided the Golden Horde with firm control over the Russian lands.

Political and cultural th consequences of the Mongol yoke . The consequences of the Mongol yoke for Russian culture and history were very difficult. The Mongols inflicted particular damage on the cities, which at that time in Europe grew rich and were freed from the power of the feudal lords.

In Russian cities, as noted earlier, stone construction ceased for a century, the size of the urban population, and especially the number of skilled artisans, decreased. A number of craft specialties disappeared, especially in jewelry: the production of cloisonne enamel, glass beads, granulation, niello, and filigree. The stronghold of urban democracy, the vecha, was destroyed, trade relations with Western Europe were disrupted, Russian trade turned its face to the east.

The development of agriculture slowed down. Uncertainty about the future and the increased demand for furs have contributed to an increase in the role of hunting to the detriment of agriculture. Serfdom, which was disappearing in Europe, was conserved. Slaves-serfs remained the main force in the households of princes and boyars until the beginning of the 16th century. The state of agriculture and forms of ownership was stagnant. In Western Europe, private property is playing an increasingly important role. It is protected by legislation and guaranteed by power. In Russia, state power-property is preserved and becomes traditional, limiting the sphere of development of private property. The term "state power-property" means that land is not, as a rule, an object of free sale and purchase, is not in someone's full private ownership, land ownership is inextricably linked with the implementation of state functions (military, administrative, legislative, judicial) and state power cannot be anyone's private affair.

The intermediate position of Ancient Russia between the West and the East is gradually being replaced by an orientation towards the East. Through the Mongols, Russians assimilate the values of the political culture of China and the Arab world. If the ruling elite of the West in the X-XIII centuries. As a result of the crusades, she got acquainted with the culture of the East as winners, then Russia, having a sad experience of defeat, experienced a strong influence of the East in the conditions of demoralization and crisis of traditional values.

In the Golden Horde, the Russian princes learned new, unknown in Russia, forms of political communication ("beat with a brow", i.e. forehead). The concept of absolute, despotic power, with which the Russians were only theoretically familiar, on the example of Byzantium, entered the political culture of Russia on the example of the power of the Horde Khan. The weakening of the cities made it possible for the princes themselves to claim the same power and a similar expression of the feelings of their subjects.

Under the influence of specifically Asian legal norms and methods of punishment, the Russians eroded the traditional, still tribal idea of the punishing power of society ("flow and plunder", "blood feud") and the limited princely right to punish people (preference for "vira", fines). The punishing force was not society, but the state in the form of an executioner. It was at this time that Russia learned "Chinese executions" - a whip ("commercial execution"), cutting off parts of the face (nose, ears), torture during interrogation and investigation. It was a completely new attitude to man in comparison with the tenth century, the time of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich.

Under the conditions of the yoke, the idea of the need for a balance of rights and duties disappeared. Duties in relation to the Mongols were performed regardless of whether it gave any rights. This was fundamentally at odds with the class morality of the West, assimilated by Kievan Rus, where duties were the result of certain rights granted to a person. In Russia, the value of power has become higher than the value of law (we are still seeing this!). Power subordinated to itself the concepts of law, property, honor, dignity.

At the same time, there is a restriction of women's rights, characteristic of the eastern patriarchal society. If the medieval cult of a woman flourished in the West, the knightly custom of worshiping a certain Beautiful Lady, then in Russia girls were locked in high chambers, protected from communication with men, married women had to dress in a certain way (it was imperative to wear a headscarf), they were limited in property rights, in everyday life.

Dependence on the Mongols, extensive trade and political ties with the Golden Horde and other eastern courts led to marriages of Russian princes with "Tatar princesses", the desire to imitate the customs of the khan's court. All this gave rise to the borrowing of oriental customs that spread from the top of society to the bottom.

Gradually, the Russian lands, not only politically, but to a certain extent and culturally, became part of the Great Steppe. At least the Europeans, who again became acquainted with the life of Russia in the 15th-17th centuries, had many reasons to call this land "Tataria". Due to the difference in the pace and direction of social development in the life of Russia and Western Europe, which had similar forms in the 10th-12th centuries, qualitative differences arose by the 14th-15th centuries.

The choice of the East as an object of interaction for Russia turned out to be quite stable. It manifested itself not only in adaptation to the eastern forms of the state, society, culture in the 13th-15th centuries, but also in the direction of the expansion of the centralized Russian state in the 16th-17th centuries. Even in the 18th century, when interaction between Russia and the West and Europe became the main thing, the Europeans noted Russia's tendency to give Eastern "answers" to the "questions" of the West, which was reflected in the strengthening of autocracy and serfdom as the foundations of the Europeanization of the country 3 1 .

3 . Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde)yoke on development, the fate of Russia

Arguments are common in science. In fact, without them, there would be no science. In historical science, disputes are often endless. Such is the discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development of Russia for more than two centuries. At one time in the 19th century, it was customary not to even notice this impact.

On the contrary, in historical science, as well as journalism of recent decades, it is believed that the yoke became a turning point in all spheres of public life, most of all in political life, since the movement towards a single state on the model of Western European countries was stopped, as well as in public consciousness, which formed, as a result of yoke, the soul of a Russian person, like the soul of a slave.

Supporters of the traditional point of view, and these are historians of pre-revolutionary Russia, historians of the Soviet period and many modern historians, writers and publicists, i.e. the actual large majority assess the impact of the yoke on the most diverse aspects of the life of Russia extremely negatively. There was a mass movement of the population, and with it the agricultural culture, to the west and northwest, to less convenient territories with a less favorable climate. The political and social role of cities has sharply decreased. The power of the princes over the population increased. There was also a certain reorientation of the policy of the Russian princes to the east. Today it is not fashionable, and often considered inappropriate, to quote the classics of Marxism, but, in my opinion, sometimes it is worth it. According to Karl Marx, "the Mongol yoke not only suppressed, but insulted and withered the very soul of the people who became its victim."

But there is another, directly opposite point of view on the problem under consideration. She considers the Mongol invasion not as a conquest, but as a "great cavalry raid" (only those cities that stood in the way of the troops were destroyed; the Mongols did not leave garrisons; they did not establish permanent power; with the end of the campaign, Batu went to the Volga).

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, a new cultural-historiosophical (historiosophy - philosophy of history) and geopolitical theory appeared in Russia - Eurasianism. Among many other provisions, a completely new, extremely unusual, and often shocking was the interpretation by the theorists of Eurasianism (G.V. Vernadsky, P.N. Savitsky, N.S. Trubetskoy) of ancient Russian history and the so-called "Tatar" period of Russian history. To understand the essence of their statements, you need to delve into the essence of the idea of Eurasianism.

The "Eurasian idea" is based on the principle of the unity of the "soil" (territory) and affirms the originality and self-sufficiency of the Slavic-Turkic civilization, which first developed within the framework of the Golden Horde, then the Russian Empire, and later the USSR. And today, the current leadership of Russia, experiencing enormous difficulties in governing the country, in which there are Orthodox and Muslims nearby, moreover, having their own state formations (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, and finally Chechnya (Ichkeria)) is objectively interested in spreading the idea of Eurasianism.

According to the theorists of Eurasianism, contrary to the tradition of Russian historical science to see in the Mongol yoke only "the oppression of the Russian people by the filthy Baskaks", the Eurasianists saw in this fact of Russian history a largely positive result.

"Without the "Tatars" there would be no Russia," wrote P.N. Savitsky in the work "Steppe and Settlement". In the 11th-first half of the 13th centuries, the cultural and political crushing of Kievan Rus could not lead to anything other than a foreign yoke. Great is the happiness of Russia that it went to the Tatars. The Tatars did not change the spiritual essence of Russia, but in their capacity as the creators of states, as a military-organizing force, which was different for them in this era, they undoubtedly influenced Russia.

Another Eurasian S.G. Pushkarev wrote: "Tatars not only did not show systematic aspirations to destroy the Russian faith and nationality, but on the contrary, showing complete religious tolerance, the Mongol khans issued labels to Russian metropolitans to protect the rights and advantages of the Russian church."

Developing this idea, S.G. Pushkarev contrasted the "Tatar neutral environment" with the Romano-Germanic "Drang nach Osten", as a result of which "the Baltic and Polabian Slavs disappeared from the face of the earth."

This advantage of the East over the West was appreciated by many Russian statesmen of that time. As a striking example of the "Old Russian Eurasian" G.V. Vernadsky brought Alexander Nevsky (by the way, canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church). In contrast to Daniil Galitsky, who connected himself with the West, Alexander Nevsky, "with much less historical data, achieved much more lasting political results. Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich singled out a culturally friendly force in the Mongols that could help him preserve and establish Russian identity from the Latin West" - this is how G.V. Vernadsky "Eastern" orientation of Alexander Nevsky and his bet on the Horde.

The thought of G.V. Vernadsky was deepened by another Eurasian historian, Boris Shiryaev. In one of his articles, he concludes "that the Mongol yoke called the Russian people out of the provincialism of the historical existence of small disparate tribal and urban principalities of the so-called appanage period onto the wide road of statehood." "In this intermediate era lies the genesis of Russian statehood," he stated.

The well-known emigrant historian and ethnographer of Kalmyk origin E.D. Khara-Davan believed that it was during these years that the foundations of Russian political culture were laid, that the Mongols gave the conquered Russian lands "the main elements of the future Moscow statehood: autocracy (khanate), centralism, serfdom." In addition, "under the influence of the Mongol rule, the Russian principalities and tribes were merged together, forming first the Muscovite kingdom, and later the Russian Empire."

The personification of the supreme power, traditional for Russia, also goes back to this era. consequence Horde Tatar yoke

Mongol rule made the Muscovite sovereign an absolute autocrat, and his subjects serfs. And if Genghis Khan and his successors ruled the name of the Eternal Blue Sky, then the Russian Tsar Autocrat ruled those subject to him as the Anointed of God. As a result, the Mongol conquest contributed to the transformation of urban and veche Russia into rural and princely Russia / from the author: from the modern point of view, all this looks sad, but ...\

Thus, according to the Eurasianists, "the Mongols gave Russia the ability to organize itself militarily, create a state-coercive center, achieve stability ... become a powerful" horde ".

According to the Eurasianists, the Russian religious consciousness received a significant "feed" from the East. So, E.D. Khara-Davan wrote that "Russian God-seeking"; "sectarianism", pilgrimage to holy places with readiness for sacrifice and torment for the sake of spiritual burning could only come from the East, because in the West religion does not affect the life and does not touch the hearts and souls of its followers, for they are completely and without a trace absorbed only by their own material culture."

But the Eurasianists saw the merit of the Mongols not only in strengthening the spirit. In their opinion, from the East, Russia also borrowed the features of the military prowess of the Mongol conquerors: "courage, endurance in overcoming obstacles in the war, love of discipline." All this "gave the Russians the opportunity to create the Great Russian Empire after the Mongol school."

Eurasians saw the further development of national history as follows.

The gradual decomposition and then the fall of the Golden Horde lead to the fact that its traditions are picked up by the strengthened Russian lands, and the empire of Genghis Khan is reborn in the new guise of the Muscovite kingdom. After the relatively easy conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia, the empire is practically restored to its former borders.

At the same time, the peaceful penetration of the Russian element into the eastern environment and the eastern into the Russian one takes place, thus cementing the integration processes. As B. Shiryaev noted: "The Russian state, without sacrificing its basic principle - Orthodox everyday religiosity, begins to apply the Genghis Khan's method of religious tolerance to those conquered by the Tatar khanates. This method connected both peoples."

Thus, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. considered by the Eurasians as the era of the best expression of the Eurasian statehood.

The Eurasian theory of the relationship between Russians and Mongols (Turks) caused a heated controversy among Russian émigré historians. Most of them, brought up on the classical works of the Russian historical school, did not accept this interpretation and, above all, the concept of the Mongol influence on Russian history. And there was no unity among the Eurasians. So, for example, a prominent Eurasian Ya.D. Sadovsky in his letter to P.N. Savitsky sharply criticized the book "The Legacy of Genghis Khan in the Russian Empire", published in 1925 for "praising the vile and vile slavery of the Tatars." Another prominent Eurasian theorist, M. Chess.

"What can we say about the opponents of Eurasianism in general." So P.N. Milyukov contrasted the arguments of the Eurasianists with his theses about "the absence of a Eurasian culture common to Russians and the Mongols" and "the absence of any significant relationship between the eastern steppe way of life and the settled Russian way of life." The "apotheosis of the Tatars" was seen in the Eurasian theory by the prominent liberal historian A.A. Kiesewetter. "Dmitry Donskoy and Sergius of Radonezh, from the point of view of an orthodox Eurasian, should be recognized as traitors to the national vocation of Russia," he ironically.

One way or another, but despite a certain radicalism and subjectivism, Eurasianism is valuable in that it gives a new, in fact, interpretation of Russia's relations with both the West and the East. And this, in turn, enriched the theoretical basis of historical science.

The ideas of the Eurasianists in the second half of the twentieth century were developed by the famous scientist Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov and his other followers. That's how L.N. Gumilyov wrote on this issue:

"... Moreover, the purpose of this raid was not the conquest of Russia, but the war with the Polovtsy. Since the Polovtsy firmly held the line between the Don and the Volga, the Mongols used the well-known tactic of a long detour: they made a" cavalry raid "through the Ryazan, Vladimir principalities. And later the great Prince Vladimirsky (1252-1263) Alexander Nevsky concluded a mutually beneficial alliance with Batu: Alexander found an ally to resist German aggression, and Batu - to emerge victorious in the fight against the great Khan Guyuk (Alexander Nevsky provided Batu with an army consisting of Russians and Alans) .

The union existed as long as it was beneficial and necessary for both sides (L.N. Gumilyov). A. Golovatenko writes about the same: "... Russian princes themselves often turned to the Horde for help and did not even see anything shameful in using the Mongol-Tatar detachments in the fight against competitors. So ... Alexander Nevsky, with the support of the Horde cavalry, expelled his brother Andrei from the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (1252).Eight years later, Alexander again took advantage of the help of the Tatars, rendering them a reciprocal favor.The authoritative prince contributed to the census in Novgorod (similar censuses in all the Horde possessions served as the basis for taxation); the Horde also helped Alexander Nevsky to make his son (Dmitry Alexandrovich) a Novgorod prince.

Cooperation with the Mongols seemed to the princes of North-Eastern Russia as natural a means of achieving or consolidating power as allied relations with the Polovtsy-South Russian princes of the 12th century. "I think it is worth listening in this discussion to the calm and balanced opinion of the famous Soviet historian N. Ya .Eidelman:

"It is impossible, of course, to agree with the paradoxical opinion of L.N. Gumilyov (and other Eurasians!), As if the Mongol yoke was the best destiny for Russia, because, firstly, it saved it from the German yoke, and secondly, it could not be so painful affect the identity of the people, as would have happened under more cultured German invaders. I do not believe that such an erudite as Gumilyov does not know the facts with which it is easy to challenge him; carried away by his theory, he goes to extremes and does not notice, for example, that forces "dog-knights" were incomparably weaker than the Mongol ones; Alexander Nevsky stopped them with the army of one principality. Far from praising any foreign dominion in general, let me remind you that the Mongol yoke was terrible; that, first of all and most of all, it hit the ancient Russian cities, magnificent centers of crafts, culture ...

But it was the cities that were the carriers of the commercial principle, marketability, the future bourgeoisie - the example of Europe is obvious!

There is no need, we believe, to look for the positive aspects of such a yoke, first of all, because the result of the arrival of Batu is simple and terrible; the population, which has decreased several times; ruin, oppression, humiliation; the decline of both princely power and the germs of freedom.

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1

There are a number of rather highly politicized subjects in Russian historiography. So, in the field of early Russian history, this is the “Norman problem”. This also includes the question of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and yoke. The vast majority of Russian historians have considered and are considering them mainly from the point of view of political content, for example, the subordination of the institute of princely power to the Mongols, as well as the “fall” for the same reason of other ancient Russian power structures. Such a one-sided approach entails a certain modernization of the relationship between the ethno-state structures of the Middle Ages, the interpolation of interstate relations of the new and modern times on them, and ultimately, as we see it, a certain discrepancy in understanding the situation as a whole.

The origins of this kind of perception can already be seen in the reports of the chroniclers, who also added a strong emotional coloring. The latter, of course, is understandable, because the original records were made either by eyewitnesses who survived the tragedy of the invasion, or from their words.

In fact, in Russian historiography, the isolation of the problem of "Tatars and Rus" dates back to the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th century. Its understanding and interpretation must be associated with "the process of self-affirmation of the Russian mentality", "an expression of the intensive growth of national self-consciousness" and "an unprecedentedly high patriotic upsurge." These socio-psychological foundations for the formation of the Russian national culture of modern times directly influenced the formation of Russian national historiography, its initial "romantic" period. Hence the highly emotional and dramatic, even tragic perception of the events of ancient Russian history, especially such as the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke.

N.M. succumbed to the charm of Russian chronicles, tragically vividly depicting the Batu invasion and its consequences. Karamzin. His perception of the events of distant times is no less emotional than contemporaries or eyewitnesses of the events themselves. Russia is "a vast corpse after Batyev's invasion" - this is how he defines the immediate results of the Mongol campaigns. But the state of the country and the people under the yoke: it, “having exhausted the State, having swallowed up its civil well-being, humiliated humanity itself in our ancestors, and left deep, indelible marks for several hundred centuries, irrigated with the blood and tears of many generations.” The stamp of sentimentality is present even when N.M. Karamzin turns to sociological generalizations and conclusions. “The shadow of barbarism,” he writes, “clouding the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from us...”, “Russia, tormented by the Moghuls, strained its forces solely in order not to disappear: we had no time for enlightenment!” The Horde yoke as the reason for Russia's lagging behind the "European states" - this is the first main conclusion of N.M. Karamzin. The second conclusion of the historiographer relates to the internal development of Russia in the "Mongolian centuries". It does not correspond to what was said before, does not follow from it and, moreover, contradicts it, for, it turns out, the Mongols brought to Russia not only “blood and tears”, but also good: thanks to them, internecine strife was eliminated and “autocracy restored”, Moscow itself was "owed its greatness to the khans." "Karamzin was the first historian to single out the influence of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russia as a large independent problem of domestic science."

The views of N.M. Karamzin were widely used among contemporaries, which will be discussed below. For now, we are interested in their ideological origins. We have already pointed out one: it is the elevated socio-psychological and ideological atmosphere in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. But there was another.

When analyzing the literature used by N.M. Karamzin in the III and IV volumes of the "History of the Russian State", a fairly frequent mention of the work of the French Orientalist historian of the 18th century is striking. J. De Guignes "General history of the Huns, Turks, Mongols and other Western Tatars in antiquity and from Jesus Christ to the present", published in 4 volumes in 1756-1758. (volume 5 appeared in 1824). J. De Guignes defines the Mongols and their place in world history as follows: “The people who caused a great upheaval and who then formed an empire, the most extensive of all that we know, were not at all a civilized people, nor did they seek to spread the wisdom of their laws . This was a barbarian people who went to the most distant countries only to seize all the riches, enslave peoples, return them to a barbaric state and make their name awesome.

The work of J. De Guignes was the most significant and popular study of Mongolian history in Europe in the 18th century. As you can see, N.M. Karamzin, not alien to European enlightenment, fully accepted the latest Western European scientific developments in the ancient history of the East.

But Europe influenced the study of Russian history not only from the outside, but also from the inside. We have in mind the activity in the first decades of the 19th century. Russian Academy of Sciences. Historical science in the first quarter of the 19th century. was in the Academy in obvious decline. Scholars of German origin, who were part of the department of history, were mainly engaged in auxiliary historical disciplines (numismatics, genealogy, chronology), and their works on Russian history were published in German. Elected in 1817 by Academician Kh.D. Fren was also a numismatist, a specialist in Oriental (Juchid) coins. But he caught, so to speak, the spirit of the times. The fact is that “it was precisely in the first decades of the 19th century. in France, England, Germany, the first oriental scientific societies arise, special oriental journals begin to be published, etc.” H.D. Fren was able to look more broadly than his predecessors at the problems facing Russian historical science. He became the founder of the Russian school of Oriental studies, and his previous studies of Mongolian problems determined the top priorities of Russian Oriental studies. X. Fren was aware of all the oriental literature of his time and, as the largest historian of the Golden Horde, had firm views on the role of the Mongol conquest in the history of Russia,” noted A.Yu. Yakubovsky. In 1826, the Academy of Sciences announced a competition on the topic “What were the consequences of the domination of the Mongols in Russia and exactly what effect did it have on the political relations of the state, on the form of government and on its internal administration, as well as on the enlightenment and education of the people?” The task was followed by recommendations. “For a proper answer to this question, it is required that it be preceded by a complete description of the external relations and internal situation of Russia before the first invasion of it by the Mongols, and that it should subsequently be shown exactly what changes were made by the rule of the Mongols in the state of the people, and it would be desirable that, in addition to scattered testimonies contained in the Russian chronicles, a comparison of everything that can be gleaned from eastern and western sources regarding the then state of the Mongols and their treatment of the conquered peoples was placed.

Undoubtedly, a grandiose prospect opened up before the researchers. Actually, the very formulation of the problem and explanations to it remain relevant to this day almost without changes. Their scientific literacy is undeniable. But already in this initial task there was a certain predestination: the installation on the "domination" of the Mongols in Russia is determined in advance, although it was precisely the proof or refutation of this that should have become the main task of stimulated research.

This trend became more pronounced later on. The competition of 1826, as is known, did not lead to the desired result and was resumed at the suggestion of H.D. Frena in 1832. The Academy of Sciences again presented the work written by H.D. Fren "Program of the task", more extensive than in the first case. The introduction was also longer. “The dominion of the Mongol dynasty, known to us under the name of the Golden Horde, among the Mohammedans under the name of the Ulus of Jochi, or the Genghis Khanate of Deshtkipchak, and among the Mongols themselves under the name of Togmak, which was once for almost two and a half centuries the horror and scourge of Russia, which held it in bonds of unconditional enslavement and having waywardly disposed of the crown and life of its Princes, this dominion should have more or less influence on the fate, structure, decrees, education, customs and language of our fatherland. The history of this dynasty forms a necessary link in Russian history, and it goes without saying that the closest knowledge of the first not only serves to the most accurate understanding of the latter, in this memorable and ill-fated period, but also contributes a lot to clarifying our concepts of the influence that Mongol rule had on resolutions and folk life in Russia.

Comparing the "tasks" of 1826 and 1832, one can note a certain shift in emphasis. Firstly, much more space is now given to the need to study the actual history of the Golden Horde; secondly, only the previously outlined focus on the “dominion” of the Mongols in Russia is now developing into a whole concept. It is said (in the spirit of the “Norman problem”) about the “Mongolian dynasty”, which forms “an essential link in Russian history”. The "horror and scourge" of Russia - the Mongol khans - kept it "in the bonds of unconditional enslavement", and "wilfulness" disposed of the "crown and life" of the princes. In addition, attention is also drawn to the transition, so to speak, to the Karamzin style of presentation (which is worth the same "horror and scourge", etc.).

Thus, the foundation was laid for the future - not only in the 19th, but also in the 20th century. - research on the Russian-Horde problems. The views of N.M. Karamzin, set forth by him in the IV and V volumes of the "History of the Russian State", and the academic competitions of 1826 and 1832 gave a strong impetus to the study of the topic "Russia and the Mongols". Already in the 1920s and 1940s, many works appeared that directly or indirectly developed certain judgments of scientific authorities. In 1822, the first book on this topic was published. Bringing to the point of absurdity the thought of N.M. Karamzin about the slowdown in the course of the historical development of Russia due to the Mongol yoke, the author writes that the influence of the Mongols affected all levels of public life and contributed to the transformation of the Russians into the "Asiatic people". The same topic becomes relevant on the pages of the periodical press (moreover, the most popular magazines), asserting itself, therefore, as a socially significant one.

However, in a number of works of the same time, a different direction is seen than that of N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren. Thus, denying any benefit from the “Tatar domination”, M. Gastev further writes: “The autocracy itself, recognized by many as the fruit of their dominion, is not the fruit of their dominion, if even in the 15th century the princes divided their possessions. Rather, it can be called the fruit of the specific system, and most likely the fruit of the duration of civil life. Thus, M. Gastev was one of the first to question Karamzin's "concept of slowing down" the natural course of the social development of Russia, due to the intervention of the Mongols. Objections and one's own vision of the Mongol period in Russia can also be seen in the works of N.A. Polevoy and N.G. Ustryalova.

Considerations of a similar nature were put forward by S.M. Solovyov as the basis of his understanding of the time of the Russian Middle Ages. It is difficult to say how much the historiographical situation influenced him. Obviously, he proceeded primarily from his own concept of the historical development of Russia. “Since for us the subject of first importance was the change of the old order of things with a new one, the transition of tribal princely relations into state relations, on which the unity, power of Russia and the change in the internal order depended, and since we notice the beginning of a new order of things in the north before the Tatars, then Mongolian relations should be important to us insofar as they helped or hindered the establishment of this new order of things. We notice, - he continued, - that the influence of the Tatars was not the main and decisive one here. The Tatars remained to live far away, cared only about the collection of tribute, not interfering in any way with internal relations, leaving everything as it was, therefore, leaving those new relations that began in the north before them in complete freedom to operate. Even more clearly, his position as a scientist on the “Mongolian question” was formulated in the following words: “... a historian has no right to interrupt the natural thread of events from the second half of the 13th century - namely, the gradual transition of tribal princely relations into state ones - and insert the Tatar period, to bring to the fore the Tatars, Tatar relations, as a result of which the main phenomena, the main causes of these phenomena, must be closed. In his "History of Russia from Ancient Times" the great historian concretizes and details these general provisions.

With regard to S.M. Solovyov is attracted to the Russian-Mongolian theme by the balanced and conceptual approach. This was expressed accordingly in the absence of emotional assessments, which, as we have seen, the previous historiography was filled with, and in an attentive attitude to the development of precisely internal “original” (as his Slavophil contemporaries would say) processes. A look at the historical development of Mongolian Rus S.M. Solovyov, thus, was a new scientific concept of this period and became an alternative to the previously prevailing point of view of Karamzin-Fren. However, this line did not die either. This is due to the extremely successful development of Russian oriental studies. Moreover, Russia is becoming the only country where Mongolian studies are taking shape as an independent scientific discipline. In the middle - second half of the XIX century. it was represented by such names as N.Ya. Bichurin, V.V. Grigoriev, V.P. Vasiliev, I.N. Berezin, P.I. Kafarov, V.G. Tizenhausen.

V.G. Tizenhausen in 1884 noted that “the study of the Mongol-Tatar period since then (since academic competitions. - Yu.K.) has managed to move forward in many ways ... ". But at the same time, “the absence of a solid, possibly complete and critically processed history of the Golden Horde, or the Jochid ulus ... constitutes one of the most important and sensitive gaps in our everyday life, depriving us of the opportunity not only to get acquainted with the course of affairs and the entire structure of this vast and a kind of semi-steppe power that controlled the fate of Russia for more than 2 centuries, but also to correctly assess the degree of its influence on Russia, determining with certainty what exactly this Mongol-Tatar rule reflected in us and how much it actually slowed down the natural development of Russian people."

How to comment on the presented by V.G. Tiesenhausen the historiographical situation? Of course, firstly, despite the “advancement” of the problem, the awareness of the unsatisfactory scientific level of previous studies (primarily due to the unusedness of the entire known fund of sources), and, secondly, the author clearly has “old prejudices”, because “the ideological platform ” remains basically the same - at the level of Karamzin and Fren.

Actually, the Karamzinskaya line found the most prominent representative in the person of N.I. Kostomarov. Exploring the "Mongolian problem", he approaches it, as it was inherent in him, on a large scale - against the backdrop of the history of all Slavs. “Wherever the Slavs were left to their own devices, there they remained with their primitive qualities and did not develop any stable social system suitable for internal order and external protection. Only a strong conquest or the influence of foreign elements could lead them to this,” he wrote in one of his seminal works. These provisions even A.N. Nasonov called "fantastic theory". But, based on them, N.I. Kostomarov, inheriting N.M. Karamzin, explained the origin of autocratic power in Russia by the Tatar conquest. The legacy of N.M. Karamzin is felt in another passage: under the Mongols, “the sense of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; servility to the higher, despotism over the lower became the qualities of the Russian soul”, there was a “fall of the free spirit and the stupefaction of the people”. In general, for N.I. Kostomarov, with the conquest of the Mongols, "the great upheaval of Russian history began."

So, from the middle of the XIX century. The "Mongolian question" becomes one of the most important topics in Oriental and Russian medieval studies. In the second half of the century, two main ways of its study were formed. The first, going back to the traditions laid down by N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren, and presented by a number of prominent Mongol scholars of that time, proceeds from the significant, and at times decisive and all-encompassing role of the Mongols in medieval Russian history. The second is associated with the name, first of all, S.M. Solovyov, as well as his successors, among whom the names of V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov, and in the first third of the XX century. M.N. Pokrovsky and A.E. Presnyakov. For these scientists, the main thing remains the natural course of the inner life of medieval Russia, which was not subject, at least in a cardinal way, to changes. So S.F. Platonov considered the Mongol yoke only "an accident in our history"; therefore, he wrote, “we can consider the inner life of Russian society in the thirteenth century. not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke.

In a word, there was no unambiguity in the Mongolian question either in general or in specific subjects. This gave rise to one of the Orientalists of the early 20th century. to sum it up like this: "It is hardly possible to point to any other issue in Russian history that has been so little developed as the question of the Tatars."

2

Soviet historiography, thus, found the "Mongolian question" unresolved unambiguously, moreover, solved in a diametrically opposite way. For some time, the Mongolian period did not attract much attention of Soviet historians, and the works published in the late 1920s and early 1930s were mainly based on the widespread (and not yet debunked) theory of M.N. Pokrovsky. The situation began to change by the end of the 1930s, after the most important discussions on a number of problems in the history of Russia had passed, the class-harmful bourgeois concepts of Russian history were thrown off the “steamer of modernity”, and the Marxist doctrine was strengthened. After the approval of the concept of B.D. Grekov about the class feudal nature of ancient Russian society, the turn has come for the next - medieval - period in the history of Russia. It was then that the first Marxist works appeared, devoted to the period of the thirteenth and subsequent centuries. In 1937, a thematically special, but popular science work by B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky "Golden Horde", consisting of two parts: "Golden Horde" and "Golden Horde and Russia".

The book was destined to give an answer to the question - how should one understand, study and present the problem of "Russia and the Mongols" in Soviet historical science. In this regard, the authors followed the path that has already become traditional for Marxist historiography. They turned to the classics of Marxist thought, specifically to the statements of K. Marx, as well as I.V. Stalin. “We have the opportunity to make sure more than once,” writes B.D. Grekov, - how Marx regarded the influence of the Golden Horde authorities on the history of the Russian people. In his remarks, we do not see even a hint of the progressive nature of this phenomenon. On the contrary, Marx sharply emphasizes the deeply negative influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of Russia. Marx also quotes that the yoke “lasted from 1257 to 1462, i.e., more than 2 centuries; this yoke not only crushed, it insulted and withered the very soul of the people who became its victim. I.V. spoke even more clearly and definitely. Stalin (this was done in connection with the Austro-German invasion of Ukraine in 1918): "The imperialists of Austria and Germany ... carry on their bayonets a new, shameful yoke, which is no better than the old, Tatar one ...".

This approach and the assessment by the classics of Marxism-Leninism of medieval Russian-Mongolian relations had a direct impact on all subsequent Soviet historiography. But was there anything fundamentally new in the judgments of the ideologists and politicians of the 19th and 20th centuries? on the problem we are considering? Apparently not. Indeed, with the exception of the "Karamzin" thesis about some positive features of the development of Russian statehood, in general, in the perception of the "Mongolian question" by the classics, the provisions of Karamzin - Kostomarov are repeated. It also speaks of the negative impact of the yoke on the social and spiritual life of medieval Russia, and rather emotionally.

So, the already tested path was "offered" to Soviet historical science. However, unlike the previous historiographical period, there was no alternative to this path. The rigid framework of possible interpretations of Russian-Horde relations should not have allowed any radically different understanding of them.

However, returning to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, it should be said that they themselves are not inclined to exaggerate the influence of the Mongols on either the economic, political or cultural development of Russia. So, A.Yu. Yakubovsky, criticizing H.D. Fren for his interpretation of the impact of the Golden Horde period on the course of Russian history, writes the following: “For all the merits that Fren has to science, it cannot be overlooked that for his historical consciousness the question was not posed differently ... For Fren, the Golden Horde remains only "ill-fated period", and only from this side is of scientific interest. “No matter how heavy the power of the Golden Horde Mongol khans in feudal Russia,” the scientist continues, “now it is impossible to study the history of the Golden Horde only from the point of view of the extent to which it was a “horror and scourge” for the history of Russia.” However, B.D. Grekov writes: “In the process of the hard struggle of the Russian people against the oppression of the Golden Horde, the Muscovite state was created. It was not the Golden Horde that created it, but it was born against the will of the Tatar Khan, against the interests of his power.” These two theses about the struggle of the Russian people and about the creation of a unified Russian state against the will of the Mongols, in fact, contained a specific program for the upcoming scientific research.

Portion of criticism of "Mongolian views" M.N. Pokrovsky was also in the article by A.N. Nasonov “The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky” in the well-known collection “Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. True, the author used this "tribune" to a greater extent to present his own concept of Russian-Horde relations. This was also emphasized by A.N. Nasonov. “Turning to the criticism of the views of M.N. Pokrovsky,” he wrote, “let us note that our task will be not so much to evaluate the works of Pokrovsky in order to determine the place he occupies in our historiography, but to test his views on concrete historical material.”

A little later, the concept of A.N. Nasonov will be issued already in the form of the book "Mongols and Russia". The work of A.N. Nasonov will become a milestone for the Soviet historiography of the "Mongolian question".

Anticipating his own formulation of the question, he not only criticizes, but, based on the socio-political conditions of his time, explains the reasons for the "general assessment of the significance of the Tatar yoke in Russia" of his predecessors. “Apparently,” he believes, “in the pre-revolutionary situation, the idea of the active policy of the Russian princes in the Horde was more easily perceived than the idea of the active policy of the Tatars in Russia, even by those historians who attached great importance to the Tatar yoke. Modern historians XIX - early XX century. Russia was a state with the class of the Great Russian center dominating over other peoples of the East European Plain. To a certain extent, they unwittingly transferred the idea of contemporary Russia to the old days. They willingly discussed the results of the policy of the Russian princes in the Horde, but the question of the Tatars in Russia was not studied or touched upon in passing. In most cases, they were of the opinion that the passive behavior of the Mongols contributed to the process of the state unification of Russia.

His reasoning about the influence of social conditions on the formation of "pre-revolutionary" concepts of Russian-Horde relations can be fully applied to the ideological origin of his own concept. Firstly, despite the fact that “the problem of studying the history of the Tatar policy in Russia is posed” by him “for the first time”, “the formulation of such a problem follows from the indications of the “traditional policy of the Tatars”” given by K. Marx in the book “The Secret History of Diplomacy XVIII century." This is the first impetus for subsequent constructions. Secondly, the ideological essence of A.N. Nasonov is explained by the social conditions of the time, of which he was a contemporary. “We prove,” he says, “that the Mongols pursued an active policy and the main line of this policy was expressed not in the desire to create a single state from a politically fragmented society, but in the desire to prevent consolidation in every possible way, to support the mutual strife of individual political groups and principalities. Such a conclusion suggests that a single "Great Russian" state, as we see it in the 17th century, was formed in the process of fighting the Tatars, that is, in the 15th-16th centuries, partly in the second half of the 16th century, when the struggle was possible according to the state of the Golden Horde itself. Consequently, “the formation of a centralized state was, therefore, by no means as a result of the peaceful activities of the Mongols-conquerors, but as a result of the struggle against the Mongols, when the struggle became possible, when the Golden Horde began to weaken and decay, and a popular movement arose in the Russian Northeast for the unification of Russia and for the overthrow of the Tatar rule.

After analyzing a large number of Russian (mainly annals) and eastern (in translation) sources, A.N. Nasonov came to the following concrete conclusions: 1) the internal political life of Russia in the second half of the 13th - early 15th centuries. decisively depended on the state of affairs in the Horde; the changes that took place in the Horde certainly entailed a new situation in Russia; 2) the Mongol khans constantly manipulated the Russian princes; 3) popular uprisings took place against the Mongols, but they were suppressed.

Book by A.N. Nasonova became the first monograph in Russian historiography entirely devoted to the topic "Russia and the Mongols", and most of her conclusions became the basis for the subsequent development of the problem. Moreover, it can be said that it still remains in this “role”: many (if not most) of its provisions are accepted as axioms in modern historiography. Therefore, thanks to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky and the monograph by A.N. Nasonov, first of all, "Soviet historiography of the 30s - early 40s developed ... a unified scientifically based view of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion as a terrible disaster for the Russian people, which for a long time delayed the economic, political and cultural development of Russia" ; this was also due to the fact that for many decades a regime of “systematic terror” was established in Russia, wrote A.A. Zimin, fully accepting the scheme of A.N. Nasonov. Thus, as A.A. Zimin, "the study of the struggle of the Russian people against the Tatar-Mongolian enslavers is one of the important tasks of Soviet historical science."

An example of solving this problem is the fundamental work of L.V. Tcherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State. In the chapters on the socio-political history of medieval Russia, its history is closely intertwined with the Horde theme. Peru L.V. Cherepnin also wrote an article about the initial period (XIII century) of Mongol dependence in Russia.

“Having suppressed the courageous and stubborn resistance of the peoples, the Mongol-Tatar invaders established their dominance over the Russian land, which had a detrimental effect on its future destinies.” In general, the researcher formulates the question of this “perniciousness” as follows: “the Mongol invasion of Russia is not a single fact, but a continuous long process that led the country to exhaustion, causing it to lag behind a number of other European countries that developed in more favorable conditions.” Already in the XIII century. the "Russian" policy of the Mongol khans is revealed, "aimed at inciting inter-princely strife, strife, internal wars." Although the Horde did not break (“could not break”) the “political order” that existed in Russia, it sought to put them “at its service, using in its own interests the Russian princes, who seemed to them reliable, exterminating the unreliable and all the time pushing the princes against each other to prevent anyone from gaining strength and to keep everyone in fear.

However, “the Horde khans acted not only in intimidation. They tried to rely on certain social forces; gifts, benefits, privileges to attract a part of the princes, boyars, clergy. This, according to L.V. Cherepnin, played a certain role: “some representatives of the ruling class went over to the service of the conquerors, helping to strengthen their dominion. But not everyone did so. And among the feudal elite - princes, boyars, clerics - there were enough people who resisted the foreign yoke. But they did not determine the "mode" of the fight against the enemy. “The active force in the fight against the Mongol-Tatar oppression was the masses. Throughout the thirteenth century there was a people's liberation movement, anti-Tatar uprisings broke out, ”representing, however, not“ organized armed resistance ”(which will happen only by the end of the 14th century), but“ separate spontaneous disparate performances ”.

This is how an authoritative researcher of the 13th century sees it. How much has changed in the XIV century.? The events of the century in relation to Russian-Mongolian relations are presented (and rightly so!) by L.V. Cherepnin is ambiguous. Before us is a detailed picture of that complex and dramatic era.

However, the first decades of the XIV century. not much different from the last 13th century. The scientist writes: “In the first quarter of the XIV century. the Tatar-Mongolian yoke weighed heavily on Russia. Fighting for political primacy in Russia, individual Russian princes did not oppose the Golden Horde, but acted as executors of the Khan's will. As soon as they stopped doing this, the Horde dealt with them. The struggle against the Horde was waged by the people themselves in the form of spontaneous uprisings, which arose mainly in the cities. The princes had not yet tried to lead the liberation movement of the townspeople. For this, they did not yet have the proper material prerequisites and forces. But the support of the cities to a large extent determined the success of certain princes in the political struggle with each other.

The same processes remained dominant during the time of Ivan Kalita. So, the uprising in Tver in 1327 was raised "by the people themselves, contrary to the instructions of the prince of Tver ...". In general, “under Kalita, the Russian feudal lords not only made no attempt to overthrow the Tatar-Mongol yoke (the time had not yet come for this), but this prince brutally suppressed those spontaneous popular movements that undermined the foundations of the Horde’s rule over Russia.”

Some changes are observed in the following decades. In the 1940s and 1950s, while still recognizing the supreme power and regularly paying the “exit”, the princes achieved “non-interference of the Horde Khan in the internal affairs of their possessions”. Thanks to this, these years become a time of "a certain strengthening of the independence of a number of Russian lands." This, as well as the internal struggle in the Golden Horde itself, lead to the fact that in the 60-70s of the XIV century. there is a "gradual weakening of the power of the Golden Horde over Russia." However, since the turn of the 60-70s of the XIV century. in connection with the intensified Tatar raids, “the resistance of the Russian people to the Horde invaders also intensified”, and the “Nizhny Novgorod Principality” becomes the “center of the national liberation struggle”. Ultimately, this "rise" led to "a decisive battle" on the Kulikovo field. Assessing the reign of Dmitry Donskoy L.V. Cherepnin writes about "a significant intensification of the foreign policy of Russia": if earlier the Russian princes ensured the security of their possessions by paying tribute to the khans, then "now they are already organizing a military rebuff to the Horde force." Dmitry Donskoy "tried to achieve" silence "for Russia, not only with the people's ruble, but also with the sword." Having “elevated” this prince in this way, L.V. Cherepnin hurries to make a reservation right there: “However, before Dm. Donskoy raised this sword, the Russian people have already risen to fight the Tatar yoke. And yet, "Prince Dmitry more consistently than his predecessors supported an alliance with the townspeople", which was due to the growth of their importance, primarily in socio-economic development. Dmitry Donskoy "objectively", thus, contributed to the rise of the people's liberation movement.

In the studies of L.V. Cherepnin devoted to the period of Horde dependence, a number of thoughts are clearly visible that develop the views of his predecessors. The first is princely-khan relations, mainly dependent on the khan's will and, in general, on the events taking place in the Horde. The second is an emphasis in relation to the Mongols of a deep class abyss between the princes (and other feudal lords) and the people. At the same time, certain successes in the inter-princely struggle depended on the latter, mainly on the townspeople. Of course, specific situations in one way or another changed the alignment of the noted parties, but always, according to L.V. Cherepnin, their original opposition was preserved: the prince - the khans, the feudal lords - the people (townspeople) and, of course, Russia - the Horde. At the same time, it is necessary to note a certain research flexibility, which allows the scientist in his conceptual scheme of events to take into account data that, at first glance, contradict the main trend of research (which, however, remains unchanged).

This distinguishes the works of L.V. Cherepnin from the somewhat straightforward conclusions of other domestic historians, whose works were contemporary with them or were published in subsequent years. So, I.U. Budovnits wrote the following very emotionally: “... In the most terrible decades of the Tatar yoke, which came after the bloody pogrom of Batu, the preaching of servitude, servility and groveling before the carriers of foreign oppression emanating from the clergy and the ruling feudal class, the people managed to oppose their fighting ideology based on intransigence towards the invaders, on contempt for death, on the readiness to sacrifice one's life in order to free the country from the foreign yoke.

Having considered the historiographical situation in the “Mongolian question” that had developed by the mid-1960s, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a "special study" specifically about the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia. These were the chapters of thematically and chronologically more general of his work.

The main goal of V.V. Kargalov is to maximize the "field" of the problem within the 13th century: chronologically, territorially, and finally, socially. As for the first task, “the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia are considered not as the result of only Batu’s campaign, but as a consequence of a whole series of Tatar invasions that lasted several decades (starting with the Batu pogrom).” In general, it seems that it is true and justified: the Mongol detachments still repeatedly appear in Russia. But V.V. Kargalov is a priori interested in only one aspect: "This formulation of the question makes it possible to more fully imagine the devastating consequences of the Mongol-Tatar conquest."

Expanding the "territorial field", V.V. Kargalov also contributes. If “the question of the consequences of the invasion for the Russian city,” he believes, “is well developed by Soviet historians,” then “the situation is somewhat worse with the study of the consequences of the invasion for the rural areas of feudal Russia. Having studied the written and archaeological data, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that both the cities and the "productive forces of the Russian feudal village" were "dealt a terrible blow" by the Mongol invasion.

How did the population of the Russian lands react to these disasters: the nobility and the people? V.V. Kargalov continues the practice of their "bifurcation", outlined in previous works. The “policy of agreement” of the Tatars with the “local feudal lords”, “cooperation of the Tatar feudal lords”, their “alliance” among themselves, at best, “a certain compromise” - such is the picture of Russian-Mongolian relations in the second half of the 13th century. at the level of "feudalism" of two ethnic groups.

But unlike his predecessors, V.V. Kargalov proposes to consider this “compromising policy” of the Russian princes not locally (both in relation to individual princes and other “feudal lords” of certain Russian lands), but extends such conclusions to “Russian spiritual and secular feudal lords” as a whole. “The Russian feudal lords,” he concludes, “quickly came to an agreement with the Horde khans and, recognizing the supreme power of the khan, retained their “tables” and power over the oppressed classes.”

The attitude towards the Horde people was different. “The policy of cooperation with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors, which was pursued by a significant part of the Russian feudal lords, was opposed by the masses with an irreconcilable attitude towards the rapists. Despite the terrible consequences of the "Batu pogrom" and the policy of their own feudal lords, who conspired with the Horde khans, the Russian people continued to fight against the foreign yoke.

This alignment of social forces has led to at least two consequences. The first was that "anti-Tatar and anti-feudal motives were closely intertwined in the speeches of the lower classes." The second is that it is precisely “the struggle of the Russian people against the foreign yoke ... North-Eastern Russia owes its special position in relation to the Horde Khan. Not the "wise policy" of the Russian princes, but the struggle of the masses against the Mongol conquerors led to the elimination of "bessermenstvo" and "Basqueism", to the expulsion of numerous "tsarist ambassadors" from Russian cities, to the fact that Russia did not turn into a simple "ulus" of Golden Hordes. Under the oppressive foreign yoke, the Russian people managed to preserve the conditions for their independent national development. This is one main conclusion of the work of V.V. Kargalov. Another sums up the invasion. “The study of the history of Russia after the Mongol-Tatar invasion inevitably leads to the conclusion about the negative, deeply regressive influence of foreign conquest on the economic, political and cultural development of the country. The consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were felt for several centuries. It was this that was the main reason for Russia's lagging behind the developed European countries, the elimination of which required the titanic efforts of the industrious and talented Russian people.

The work of V.V. Kargalov is a new milestone in the development of the national historiography of the "Mongolian question". She very clearly pointed out the main plots of Russian-Horde relations in the 13th century. and their perspective. Between Russia and the Horde there was an armed tough confrontation, between the princes (and other "feudal lords") and the people - irreconcilable class contradictions. At the same time, another aspect of the problem is the preservation of a certain (within the framework of feudal development) political independence of the Russian lands.

We see the development of this kind of research trends in the monograph by V.L. Egorova. Its main task is to study the historical geography of the Golden Horde in the XIII-XIV centuries. - is closely linked, in particular, with the military-political relations of Russia and the Horde. Along with the confirmation of a number of provisions already established in Russian historiography, for example, about “the undivided power of the Mongols and the absence of active resistance from the Russian princes” in the period before 1312 or that the period of 1359-1380. "characterized by a steady increase in the military and economic power of the Russian lands", the author puts some questions in a new way or emphasizes well-known ones more.

First, we see a clear division of "the main stages of the Mongolian policy in Russia." Secondly, it seems important to us the assertion that this policy "was not connected with the seizure and exclusion of new land territories." The Russian lands, therefore, according to the reasonable opinion of the researcher, were not included in the actual territory of the Golden Horde. And in the same connection is the concept of "buffer zones" introduced by him into scientific circulation, "limiting the Russian borders from the south." Finally, thirdly, emphasizing that the main goal of the Horde's policy "was to obtain the greatest possible tribute", and the Russian lands were "in the position of semi-dependent territories subject to tribute." At the same time, this status not only did not interfere, but, on the contrary, stimulated the military dictate of the Mongol khans over Russia. Therefore, "throughout the entire existence of the Golden Horde, the Russian principalities were forcibly drawn into the orbit of the political and economic interests of the Mongols."

The results of the consideration in the latest domestic historiography of the "Mongolian question" were summed up in the article by A.L. Khoroshkevich and A.I. Pliguzov, anticipating the book of J. Fennel about Russia 1200-1304. “The question of the impact of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russian society is one of the most difficult in the history of Russia. The extreme lack of sources makes it difficult to answer it, so the appearance of such works becomes quite possible, in which any impact of the invasion on the development of Russia is denied. Most historians, however, are of the opinion that the foreign yoke delayed the economic, social and political development of Russia, the completion of the formation of feudalism, reviving the archaic forms of exploitation.

Along with this conclusion, which, however, does not contain any innovations, the authors propose the formulation of some relevant problems that they consider to be relevant. Without a doubt, they are such and are both for solving private and general issues of Russian-Horde relations. But at the same time, we note that the “Mongolian question” as a whole is far from being resolved in principle. By no means do not seem frivolous and unscientific concepts, which before, having criticized, it was possible, simply speaking, to brush aside, citing their scientific inconsistency. In our historiography in such an unenviable role for a long time was the concept of L.N. Gumilyov.

The relationship between Russia and the Mongols is considered by L.N. Gumilyov against a broad background of foreign policy, largely based on the ethnic and confessional relations of that time. The invasion of Batu's troops for the scientist is not some kind of turning point in the history of Russia. It was a "Mongol raid", or "a big raid, and not a planned conquest, for which the entire Mongol Empire would not have had enough people"; it "in terms of the scale of the destruction produced is comparable to the internecine war, common for that turbulent time." “The Grand Duchy of Vladimir, which let the Tatar army through its lands, retained its military potential,” and “the destruction caused by the war” is “exaggerated.”

Subsequently, "in Great Russia they agreed that the Russian land became the land of "Kanovi and Batyev", that is, they recognized the suzerainty of the Mongol Khan." This situation suited both the Mongols and the Russians, since "it was justified by the foreign political situation." What was "suzerainty" for Russia? “... The Mongols, neither in Russia, nor in Poland, nor in Hungary, did not leave garrisons, did not impose a constant tax on the population, did not conclude unequal treaties with the princes. Therefore, the expression "a conquered but not conquered country" is completely wrong. The conquest did not take place, because it was not planned”; "Russia was neither subjugated nor conquered by the Mongols", and "Russian land became part of the Dzhuchiev ulus, without losing autonomy ...". “This system of Russian-Tatar relations that existed before 1312 should be called a symbiosis. And then everything changed ... ". The changes occurred as a result of the adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde, which L.N. Gumilyov calls "the victory of the neighboring Muslim super-ethnos, which in 1312 took possession of the Volga and Black Sea regions." “Great Russia, in order not to perish, was forced to become a military camp, and the former symbiosis with the Tatars turned into a military alliance with the Horde, which lasted more than half a century - from Uzbek to Mamai.” Its political essence was that the Russian princes “demanded and received military assistance against the West (Lithuania and the Germans) for the tribute they paid. - Yu.K.) and had a strong barrier that protected them from impending strikes from the East.

The subsequent confluence of circumstances (internal and external) has already made it possible to lay the "foundation of the future greatness of Russia."

The concept of "Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe" L.N. Gumilyov in many ways goes back to the idea of "Eurasianism" and its specific historical development, primarily in the works of G.V. Vernadsky. (L.N. Gumilyov, as is well known, called himself “the last Eurasian”.) “Eurasianism” now, unlike in the past decades, is actively present in Russian social and scientific thought. He is "opposed" by the concept of Russian-Mongolian relations, formed by our historical science in the late 30s - 60s-70s. How significant are the differences between these concepts? If you pay attention to the details, then, of course, there will be a lot of inconsistencies and disagreements. And if you look more broadly and voluminously?

Both concepts recognize, to one degree or another, the dependence of Russia on the Mongols, which is obvious. But the "Eurasian" view presupposes the status of the Russian lands as a "Russian ulus", i.e. their entry into the main territory of the Golden Horde. However, no "stagnation" in the internal life of Russia came from this. Moreover, she was enriched by many acquisitions in various spheres of social, political, cultural and even ethnic life.

Most domestic historians believed and still believe that Russia, as a territory and society, did not become the territory of the "Juchi ulus". As noted by V.L. Egorov, between the "indigenous" lands of North-Eastern Russia and the Golden Horde, there were so-called "buffer zones", in fact delimiting the Russian and Mongolian areas. But at the same time, this did not alleviate the situation of Russia. Russia found itself under the heavy Horde "yoke", which lasted almost two and a half centuries. The "yoke" threw the country, which was in line with the all-European development, for several centuries, causing its backwardness and specificity in the future. These are the positions of the currently opposing historiographic parties in the "Mongolian question".

It seems to us that, despite the external antagonism, there are no insurmountable obstacles between them. But for this it is necessary to somewhat soften their provisions regarding the internal state and development of Russia "under the yoke". There is no doubt that assessments of relations as “friendly” or “benevolent” did not correspond to reality. There was a confrontation between two ethno-social systems (although, perhaps, they were close in their basis), and the confrontation was tough. On the other hand, we believe that the view of Russian-Horde relations as a "total" subordination of Russia to the Horde, expressed in the form of constant "terror" in relation to the population and the prince, is at least somewhat exaggerated.

This is not about defending the Mongol-Tatar policy in Russia, we are not striving for any kind of apologetics for the Mongol-Tatars. (It seems that the history of any ethnic group does not need protection and patronage, because in the history of all peoples there is positive and negative, "black" and "white", if the question can be put that way at all.) We are talking about creating the most complete picture of Russian - Horde relations, complete and balanced, without ideological and other distortions in one direction or another. We are also talking about an attempt to explain some (all, apparently, fail) elements of relations (their origins, causes), which do not always fit into the rationalistic schemes that are familiar to us. Religious ideas, norms of customary law, everyday life, rituals - all this (along with "classical" economic and political relations, of course) must be taken into account when studying Russian-Horde relations.

Not only economic, social and political systems came into contact, not only the nomadic and sedentary worlds, but also worldview systems: ideological and mental. Without taking into account the latter, our perception of the events and phenomena of that time becomes impoverished and becomes inadequate to medieval realities.

Raids, assaults, violence clearly simplify Russian-Horde relations, as they generally simplify the internal development of Russia itself, in many respects reducing it only to the imposed influence of the Mongol-Tatar orders.

The essays proposed below are intended to show the common and the different, what connected or separated the two large social systems of the Eurasian Middle Ages. Ultimately, an attempt to move from the interpretation of Russian-Horde relations as a continuous struggle to an interpretation that involves multilateral and multi-level interaction.

Notes

. Grekov B.D., Yakubovsky A.Yu. 1) The Golden Horde (Essay on the history of the Ulus Ju-chi during the period of formation and flourishing in the XIII-XIV centuries). L., 1937. S. 3-10, 193-202; 2) The Golden Horde and its fall. M.; L., 1950. S. 5-12; Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky // Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. Part 2. M.; L., 1940; Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols in Russia // Essays on the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1953. S. 31-95; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. Saransk, 1960. S. 3-18; Cherepnin L.V. Formation of the Russian centralized state in the XIV-XV centuries. Essays on the socio-economic and political history of Russia. M., 1960 (Chapter 1. Historiography of the issue of the formation of the Russian centralized state); Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors in the development of feudal Russia: Feudal Russia and nomads. M., 1967. S. 218-255; Fedorov-Davydov G.A. Social structure of the Golden Horde. M., 1973. S. 18-25; Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography on the impact of the Tatar-Mongol invasion on Russian culture // Problems of the history of the USSR. Issue. V. M., 1976. S. 129-148; Grekov I.B. Place of the Battle of Kulikovo in the political life of Eastern Europe at the end of the 14th century. // Battle of Kulikovo. M., 1980. S. 113-118; Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies and the Study of the History of the Golden Horde // Battle of Kulikovo in the history and culture of our Motherland. M., 1983. S. 70-77; Arslanova A.A. From the history of the study of the Golden Horde according to Persian sources of the 13th - first half of the 15th centuries. in Russian historiography // Problems of socio-economic development of the village of the Middle Volga region during the period of feudalism. Kazan, 1986, pp. 11-130; Tolochko P.P. Ancient Russia. Essays on socio-political history. Kyiv, 1987. S. 165-167; Gorsky A.A. Russian lands in the XIII-XV centuries. Ways of political development. M., 1996. S. 56-57, 107-108; Chukaeea V.A. Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. 1243-1350 Dnepropetrovsk, 1998. S. 4-19.

Cm.: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 140-143; Kargalov V.V. Foreign Policy Factors... S. 253-255.

Cm.: Rudakov V.N. Perception of the Mongol-Tatars in the annalistic stories about the invasion of Batu // Hermeneutics of Old Russian Literature. Sat. 10. M., 2000, etc. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the later editorial processing of the “scribes” ( Prokhorov G.M. 1) Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle // VID. L., 1972; 2) The story of the Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle // TODRL. T. 28. 1974).

. Stennik Yu.V. On the Origins of Slavophilism in Russian Literature of the 18th Century // Slavophilism and Modernity. SPb., 1994. S. 17, 19, 20; Poznansky V.V. Essay on the formation of Russian national culture: The first half of the 19th century. M., 1975. S. 8 and others.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. V. M., 1992. S. 205.

There. T. II-III. M., 1991. S. 462.

There. T. V. C. 201, 202, 208. See also: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 130-132.

There. S. 132.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. II-III. S. 751; T. IV. M., 1992. S. 423.

Cit. on: Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia in the West (XIII - mid-XX centuries). M., 1988. S. 40.

There. - Another prominent French Orientalist of the early 19th century became his successor. D "Osson, who published in 1824 in 4 volumes "The History of the Mongols from Genghis Khan to Timur Bek." M.I. Golman believes that he "managed to recreate a broad picture of the Mongol conquests and, most importantly, correctly assess them devastating consequences for the peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe "; as de Guigne's work for the 18th century, the work of D" Osson was "the most significant in Western European historiography on the history of Mongolia in the 19th century. and has not lost its scientific significance in the 20th century. (Ibid., pp. 42-43). A look at the Mongols of the 13th century. as conquerors who caused enormous destruction in the countries they conquered, was accepted by bourgeois science when this science was on the rise "( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 33). Compare: "After D" Osson, historians, so to speak, vulgarized a negative attitude towards the Mongols and Genghisides "( Kozmin N.N. Preface // D "Osson K. History of the Mongols. T. 1. Genghis Khan. Irkutsk, 1937. C.XXVII-XXVIII).

History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. T. 2. 1803-1917. M.; L., 1964. S. 189.

About H.D. Frenet see: Saveliev P. On the life and scientific works of Fren. SPb., 1855.

. Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia ... S. 143, approx. 57. - D.Yu. Arapov ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde. S. 70). See also: Gumilyov L.N. Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe. M., 1989. S. 602-604; Kozhinov V.V. Mysterious pages of the history of the XX century. M., 1995. S. 229, 231-232.

. Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 39.

Collection of acts of the solemn meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which was on the occasion of its 100th anniversary of its existence on December 29, 1826. St. Petersburg, 1827. S. 52-53. - About the prehistory of setting the task and the results of the competition, see: Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. SPb., 1884. T. 1. S. V-VI; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. pp. 3-6.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. S. 555-563.

There. S. 555.

There. pp. 556-557.

. "The views of H. Fren were then dominant in historical science" ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 39). - It is hardly appropriate to say that in the "Program" compiled by H.D. Fren, "the problem of classes and the class struggle was not taken into account, no priority was given to the study of the socio-economic foundations of the Golden Horde state" ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies ... S. 72).

. Richter A. Something about the influence of the Mongols and Tatars on Russia. SPb., 1822. See also: Naumov P. On the relationship of Russian princes to the Mongol and Tatar khans from 1224 to 1480. St. Petersburg, 1823; Bernhof A. Russia under the yoke of the Tatars. Riga, 1830; Kartamyshev A. On the significance of the Mongolian period in Russian history. Odessa, 1847.

. A.R. Research on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1825, June; Prandunas G. The reasons for the fall of Russia under the yoke of the Tatars and the gradual restoration of autocracy in it // Bulletin of Europe. 1827. Ch. 155. No. 14; [N. W.] On the state of Russia before the invasion of the Mongols (excerpt) // Son of the Fatherland. 1831. V. 22. No. 33-34; [M.P.] Reasoning about the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state to Peter the Great, essay by M. Gastev. M., 1832 // Telescope. 1832. No. 12; Fisher A. Speech delivered at the solemn meeting of St. Petersburg University by Ordinary Professor of Philosophy A. Fisher, September 20, 1834 // ZhMNP. 1835.4.5. No. 1.

. Gastev M. Reasoning about the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state. M., 1832. S. 131.

. Polevoy N.A. History of the Russian people. SPb., 1833. T. 4. S. 9; T. 5. S. 22-23 and others; Ustryalov N.G. Russian history. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1855. S. 185, 187-193.

Although it is possible to assume that his view was “a reaction to the exaggeration of the role of the Tatar yoke in Russian history” (Russian history in essays and articles / Edited by M.V. Dovnar-Zapolsky. T. I. B. m., 6. g. S. 589).

. Soloviev S.M. Op. in 18 books. Book. I. History of Russia since ancient times. T. 1-2.M., 1988. S. 53.

There. S. 54.

The concept of the "Mongolian question" S.M. Solovyov was not accepted by Soviet historical science and was sharply criticized. So, N.S. Borisov wrote that in his works “the significance of the Tatar invasion is extremely underestimated, even the very term “Mongolian period” is discarded. In his multi-volume "History of Russia" Batu's invasion occupies only four pages, and about the same - a description of the customs of the Tatars "( Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 135).

. Kononov A.N. Some questions of studying the history of domestic oriental studies. M., 1960. S. 3; Golman M.I. The study of the history of Mongolia ... S. 54. - On the subsequent development of Mongolian studies in Russia, see p. 108-118.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. S. IX.

There. S. V. Cf.: “The merits of that generation of Orientalists to which Berezin belongs are determined not so much by the fulfillment as by the setting of scientific tasks, and in this regard, a scientist who understood that “Russian Orientalists have the duty of explaining” the Mongolian period of Russian history, and not only in word, but also in deed, he who has proved the consciousness of this duty ... has the full right to the gratitude of posterity ”( Bartold V.V. Op. T. IX. M., 1977. S. 756).

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia // Kostomarov N.I. Sobr. op. Historical monographs and researches. Book. 5. T. XII-XIV. SPb., 1905. S. 5.

. Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky. S. 61.

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia. S. 47.

There. S. 43.

. Platonov S.F. Op. in 2 vols. T. 1. St. Petersburg, 1993. S. 135-139. - A brief description of other points of view of Russian historiography of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. see: Russian history in essays and articles. pp. 589-590. - Reassessment of the "Mongolian heritage" at the end of the 19th century. took place in Western historiography. “In bourgeois historical science, at that time, a revision of views on the past began, including the question of the role of the Mongol conquest. More and more voices began to be heard that previous historians had incorrectly assessed the role of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest in the history of mankind, that it was high time to reassess the previous views in this area, that the Mongols were not at all such destroyers as they thought before, and that, on the contrary, , they brought a lot of positive things into the life of the conquered peoples and countries. This change of progressive views in the field of evaluating the Mongol conquests with reactionary ones captured even the most serious representatives of bourgeois historiography of the late 19th and 20th centuries, ”described from the standpoint of the early 50s of the 20th century. a revolution in the views on the "Mongolian problem" A.Yu. Yakubovsky ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 64. See also: Golman M.I. The study of the history of Mongolia ... S. 44, 52).

Federal Agency for Education of the Russian Federation

State Municipal Institution of Professional Higher Education

Vladimir State University

Department of History and Museology

Fulfilled

Student gr. ISG-106

Surnichenko K.A.

checked

Assoc. Pogorelaya S.V.

The Mongol-Tatra invasion, the essence of the Horde yoke and its influence on the fate of Russia

Vladimir 2006

Plan.

1. Formation of the Mongol Empire. Etymology of the concept of "Tatars" ... .1

2. Battle on the Kalka. Russia after the Battle of the Kalka…………………………3

3. The invasion of Batu in Russia. Reasons for the success of the Mongols. Consequences of Batu’s invasion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

4. Establishment of the Horde yoke, its consequences and influence on the fate of Russia………………………………………………………………………......12

5. Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development, the fate of Russia. ……………………………………………. …….15

6. List of used literature……………………………………….21

7. List of used literature (footnotes)…….…………………...32

I.Formation of the Mongol Empire. Etymology of the concept "Tatars".

Mongolian tribes have long roamed the expanses of Central Asia. In the steppe regions, they were engaged in cattle breeding, and in the north, in the taiga regions, they also hunted. In the 12th century, the territory occupied by them stretched from Baikal, the upper reaches of the Yenisei and the Irtysh in the north to the Gobi Desert in the south. From the end of the 12th century, the Mongol tribes roaming here were undergoing a process of disintegration of tribal relations and the beginning of feudalization. From the environment of ordinary community members-cattle breeders, tribal nobility-noyons (princes), who owned large pastures and herds, began to stand out. To capture them from the communities of pastoralists, the noyons started their squads of nukers (warriors) led by bagaturs (heroes). From the very beginning, the state of the Mongols turned out to be militarized. Nomadic pastoralism led to the depletion of pastures, the depletion of pastures led to a struggle for new pastures. Hence, the seizure of the lands of neighboring tribes, rapid movement over vast distances.

In the second half of the 12th century, a struggle for leadership began between the Mongol tribes. During the bloody civil strife at the end of the 12th century, or rather in 1190, the khan of a tribe that roamed in the basin of the Onon and Korulen rivers (the mountainous outskirts of the Gobi steppe) won. At birth in 1154, he was named Temujin (according to other sources, Temujin). He had to endure many vicissitudes of fate and difficult trials. Temuchin was 13 years old when his father Esukai-bagatur died. The tributaries of the father, and it was 30-40 thousand families, refused to pay tribute to the minor heir, and began to attack his nomad camps. Temujin suffered setbacks in wars, treason, resentment, more than once fell into the hands of enemies. He is a boy for three years

spent in slavery and with a wooden block around his neck, doing the hardest work in the forge of a hostile tribe. He managed to kill the watchman with his own chain and escape from captivity 1 .

Before becoming a great khan, Temuchin had to wage a fierce struggle against his opponents for over 20 years, and neither his native people nor his neighbors knew mercy from him. Temuchin was already over 50 when he emerged victorious from a deadly fight for sole power. In 1206, at the khural-congress of all the Mongol princes, on the banks of the Onon, he proclaimed himself their supreme ruler, Genghis Khan (great khan, "sent from heaven").

Genghis Khan created a first-class army for his time. His entire army was divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. Ten thousand warriors made up a tumen (in Russian sources "darkness") - a kind of independent army. The high combat effectiveness of the Mongolian army was recognized by such a military authority as Napoleon. In particular, he noted: “... it is vain to think that the Mongol invasion was a senseless invasion of the Asian horde. It was a deeply thought-out offensive by an army in which the military organization was much higher than in the troops of its opponent.

The Mongols fought on undersized, with a shaggy mane, fast and very hardy horses. Before entering the main mass into a foreign land, they sent forward detachments with the aim of destroying as many people as possible and, having sowed panic, put them to flight. Then followed the main army, destroying everything in its path. Detachments of warriors of the conquered peoples marched in the center, and the Mongols suddenly and swiftly attacked from the flanks.

But the main distinguishing feature of the army of Genghis Khan, which significantly increased its combat effectiveness, was, along with a clear organization, iron military discipline. Circular, collective responsibility for

cowardice, failure to comply with an order, even for inexperience or for some other reason did not help a neighbor - death.

Genghis Khan put forward brave, determined and capable people in the first place in his army, regardless of their tribal and social origin, such as Subedei-Bagatur, Jebe-Noyon, Tohuchar-Noyon and others.

A well-established intelligence service also continuously worked for the Mongols' army. On the eve of the invasion of foreign lands, the military leaders had information about the military-political and economic potential of the enemy - they were delivered by merchants, ambassadors and numerous prisoners.

In other words, the army of Genghis Khan in all respects surpassed its contemporary armies and in vain N.M. Karamzin writes: “... the ancient Russians, for many centuries, fighting either with foreigners or with foreigners, were not inferior both in courage and in the art people to any of the then European peoples” 3 . They did not yield to the European peoples, but they could not resist the Asian onslaught, and there were absolutely no chances. In 1211-1212. collapsed under the onslaught of the hordes of the Mongols

China is a single powerful state, so it is hardly worth referring to the feudal fragmentation of Russia.

In the summer of 1219, Genghis Khan began the conquest of Central Asia. In two years, an advanced civilization was turned into pastures. After that, Genghis Khan withdrew the main forces to Mongolia, and two tumens Jebe-Noyon and Subedei-Bagatur devastated Iran and Transcaucasia, and in the spring of 1223 struck at the Crimea, plundering Sudak.

Very confused in Russian history is the question of who nevertheless attacked Russia: the Mongols, Tatars or Mongol-Tatars? And what does modern Tatars (Kazan Tatars) have to do with those Central Asian Tatars. And where did this concept come from?

VO Klyuchevsky in his course of Russian history used mainly the concept of "Tatars" 4 . A. Nechvolodov equally uses the concepts of "Mongols" and "Tatars" 5 . To one degree or another, pages and lines are devoted to this problem in almost all serious publications that examine the history of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan and their relationship with Russia in the 13th-15th centuries. S.F. wrote about this. Platonov in "The Complete Course of Lectures on Russian History", "Kristall", St. Petersburg, 1997, using the concept of "Tatars", etc. In modern historiography, an important role is played by the double magazine "Motherland" (No. 3-4 for 1997), dedicated to both the Mongol invasion and the problem of the relationship between the Forest and the Steppe in the 9th-16th centuries. Modern answers to the above questions are approximately as follows.

All Mongols neighboring peoples, including Russian, were also called Tatars. The concept of "Tatars" is ambiguous in terms of semantic expression. The ethnonym "ta-ta" or "ta-tan" dates back to the 5th century and means the name of the largest Mongolian tribe that lived in the northeastern part of Mongolia, as well as in Manchuria. In the 12th century, under the name "dada" a tribal association was known in the steppes of Eastern and North-Eastern Mongolia and Transbaikalia. Then the name "Tatars", as well as the name "Mongols" spread to the multilingual Mongolian, Turkic, Manchu peoples of the Mongol Empire of the 13th-15th centuries, although the Tatars themselves almost completely exterminated Genghis Khan during the struggle for power 6 . “Tatars” entered the Russian language from the Chinese language, for which all Mongolian tribes were “Tatars”, i.e. "barbarians". Actually, they called the Tatars "white Tatars", while the Mongolian tribes to the north of them were "black Tatars", which was pejorative, emphasizing their savagery. The Chinese referred to Genghis Khan as a "black Tatar".

At the beginning of the 13th century, in retaliation for the poisoning of his father, Genghis Khan ordered the destruction of the Tatars. Tatars as a military and political force ceased to exist. However, the Chinese continued to call the Mongol tribes Tatars, although the Mongols did not call themselves Tatars. Thus, the army of Batu Khan consisted of Mongol warriors 7 and modern Tatars have nothing to do with the Central Asian Tatars 8 .

The term “Mongol-Tatars”, common in historical literature, is a combination of the self-name of the people with the term that this people was designated by neighbors 9 .

II. Battle on Kalka. Russia after the Battle of the Kalka.

In the spring of 1223, a 30,000-strong detachment of the Mongols, led by Jebe and Subedei, marched along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea and invaded Transcaucasia. Having defeated the Armenian-Georgian army and devastated Georgia and Azerbaijan, the invaders broke through the Derbent passage to the North Caucasus and clashed with the Alans (ancestors of the Ossetians) and the Polovtsians. Acting by cunning, they first defeated the Alans, and then began to push the Polovtsy.

The latter, led by Khan Kotyan, asked for help from the Russian princes with whom they were related (the Galician prince Mstislav Udaloy was married to the daughter of Khan Kotyan). On the initiative of Mstislav Mstislavovich Udaly, at the congress of South Russian princes in Kyiv, it was decided to come to the aid of the Polovtsy 10 .

A large Russian army led by the three strongest princes of southern Russia: Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev, Mstislav Svyatoslavovich of Chernigov and Mstislav Mstislavovich of Galicia marched into the steppe. In the lower reaches of the Dnieper, it joined the Polovtsian army. This was the last joint major military action on the eve of Batu's invasion.

The Kyiv prince Mstislav Romanovich, having fortified himself with his army on a hill, did not take part in the battle. Regiments of Russian soldiers and Polovtsians, having crossed the Kalka, struck at the advanced Mongol detachments, which retreated. The Russian and Polovtsian regiments were carried away by the persecution. The main forces of the Mongols, who approached, took the pursuing Russian and Polovtsian warriors in pincers and destroyed them.

Then the Mongols laid siege to the hill, where the prince of Kyiv fortified. On the third day of the siege, Mstislav Romanovich believed the promise of the enemy to honorably release the Russians in the event of voluntary surrender and laid down his arms. The Russian princes and warriors did not know that the murder of ambassadors among the Mongols was the greatest crime, and no oaths counted against this evil! And the Russians killed the Mongol ambassadors on the eve of the battle on Kalka and the Mongol revenge was terrible. And Prince Mstislav Romanovich and all his soldiers were brutally killed. A tenth of the troops returned to Russia from the Azov steppes. In honor of their victory, the Mongols held a "feast on the bones." The captured princes were crushed with boards on which the victors sat and feasted. A Russian chronicler wrote after the Battle of the Kalka:

“It is for our sins that God has invested

bewilderment in us, and perished without number

many people. And there was a cry and a sigh,

and in all cities and volosts.

we don’t know about these evil Tatars,

where did they come from

and where have gone again God knows…” 11

Russian lands after the defeat at the Kalka were still embraced by inter-princely strife. Relative calm was preserved only on Vladimir land, where Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich managed to maintain peaceful relations with the southern Russian princes.

However, Novgorod remained a bone of contention, from where Yuri's brother Yaroslav was expelled in the same sad 1223. Then in 1224, Yuri Vladimirsky appeared at the head of a large army and forced the Novgorodians to accept their brother-in-law, Mikhail Vsevolodovich Chernigov, for the reign. Soon a stubborn struggle for the reign of Novgorod began between Yaroslav and Mikhail of Chernigov, which culminated in the victory of Yaroslav in 1229. Then Daniil Galitsky joined this struggle, who was eager not to capture Novgorod, but to unite under his command all of Southern and South-Western Russia. The Russian princes and people fought furiously among themselves, forgetting or not attaching importance to the wise words of the chronicler. “... We don’t know about these evil Tatars where they came from and where God knows again.” Well, the Russians didn’t have intelligence at that time, and even Kalka didn’t teach us anything!

Meanwhile, Mongolian history was developing not in our favor!

Returning to their steppes, the Mongols made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Volga Bulgaria. Reconnaissance in force showed that aggressive campaigns against Russia and its neighbors can only be carried out by organizing a general Mongolian campaign and not just anywhere, but against the countries of Europe. In addition, Genghis Khan died in 1227, and the Mongol Empire was divided into regions (uluses), ruled by his sons and grandsons. The grandson of Genghis Khan Baty (1227-1255), who inherited from his grandfather all the lands in the "West", "where the foot of the Mongol horse sets foot." Subedey, who knew the theater of future military operations well, became his chief military adviser.

In 1235, at the kurultai - the congress of the Mongol princes in the capital of Mongolia, Karakorum, a decision was made on a general Mongol campaign to the West. In 1236 they captured the Volga Bulgaria, and in 1237 they subjugated the nomadic peoples of the steppe. In the autumn of 1237, the main Mongol forces, having crossed the Volga, concentrated on the Voronezh River, aiming at the Russian lands. Starting a difficult story about the terrible Russian defeats with the highest spirit of the Russian people, their courage, stamina and heroism, the question is natural: “What are the reasons for the success of the Mongols?”. We will try to answer it in more detail, but for now, the mournful pages of Russian history ...

III. The invasion of Batu in Russia. The reasons for the success of the Mongols. Consequences of Batu's invasion.

The first principality to undergo ruthless ruin was the Ryazan land. In the winter of 1237, the hordes of Batu invaded its borders, ruining and destroying everything in their path. The Princes of Vladimir and Chernigov refused to help Ryazan. The Mongols laid siege to Ryazan and sent envoys who demanded obedience and one-tenth "of everything." Karamzin also points out other details: “Yuri Ryazansky, left by the Grand Duke, sent his son Theodore, with gifts to Batu, who, having learned about the beauty of Feodorova’s wife Eupraxia, wanted to see her, but this young prince answered him that Christians do not show their wives wicked pagans. Batu ordered to kill him; and the unfortunate Eupraxia, having learned about the death of her beloved husband, together with her baby, John, threw herself from the high tower to the ground and lost her life. The bottom line is that Batu began to demand from the Ryazan princes and nobles "daughters and sisters to his bed" 13.

Everything was followed by the courageous answer of the Ryazantsev: "If all of us are not there, then everything will be yours." On the sixth day of the siege, December 21, 1237, the city was taken, the princely family and the surviving inhabitants were killed. In the old place, Ryazan was no longer revived (modern Ryazan is a new city located 60 km from the old Ryazan, it used to be called Pereyaslavl Ryazansky).

In the grateful people's memory, the story of the heroic deed of the Ryazan hero Yevpaty Kolovrat, who entered into an unequal battle with the invaders and earned the respect of Batu himself for his valor and courage, has been preserved 14 .

Having devastated the Ryazan land in January 1238, the Mongol invaders defeated the Grand Duke's guard regiment of the Vladimir-Suzdal land near Kolomna, led by the son of the Grand Duke Vsevolod Yuryevich. Actually it was all the Vladimir army. This defeat predetermined the fate of North-Eastern Russia. During the battle for Kolomna, the last son of Genghis Khan Kulkan was killed. Genghisides, as usual, did not take direct part in the battle. Therefore, the death of Kulkan near Kolomna suggests that the Russians; probably managed to inflict a strong blow on the Mongolian rear in some place.

Then moving along the frozen rivers (Oka and others), the Mongols captured Moscow, where for 5 days all its population put up strong resistance under the leadership of the governor Philip Nyanka. Moscow was completely burned, and all its inhabitants were killed.

On February 4, 1238, Batu laid siege to Vladimir. Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich left Vladimir in advance to organize a rebuff to uninvited guests in the northern forests on the Sit River. He took with him two nephews, and left the Grand Duchess and two sons in the city.

The Mongols prepared for the assault on Vladimir according to all the rules of military science, which they had learned back in China. At the walls of the city, they built siege towers in order to be on the same level with the besieged and at the right time to throw "crossings" over the walls, they installed "vices" - wall-beating and throwing machines. At night, a "tyn" was erected around the city - an external fortification to protect against attacks by the besieged and in order to cut off all their escape routes.

Before the assault on the city at the Golden Gate, in front of the besieged Vladimirites, the Mongols killed the younger prince Vladimir Yuryevich, who had recently defended Moscow. Mstislav Yurievich soon died on the defensive line. The last son of the Grand Duke, Vsevolod, who fought with the horde in Kolomna, during the assault on Vladimir, decided to enter into negotiations with Batu. With a small retinue and large gifts, he left the besieged city, but the khan did not want to talk with the prince and "like a ferocious beast, do not spare his youth, he ordered to be slaughtered in front of him" 15.

After that, the horde rushed to the last assault. The Grand Duchess, Bishop Mitrofan, other princely wives, boyars and some of the common people, the last defenders of Vladimir, took refuge in the Assumption Cathedral. On February 7, 1238, the invaders broke into the city through gaps in the fortress wall and set it on fire. Many people died from fire and suffocation, not excluding those who took refuge in the cathedral. The most valuable monuments of literature, art and architecture perished in the fire and ruins.

After the capture and devastation of Vladimir, the horde spread throughout the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, ruining and burning cities, villages and villages. During February, 14 cities were plundered in the interfluve of the Klyazma and the Volga: Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Galich, Dmitrov, Tver, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, Yuryev and others.

On March 4, 1238, beyond the Volga on the City River, a battle took place between the main forces of North-Eastern Russia, led by the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich, and the Mongol invaders. 49-year-old Yuri Vsevolodovich was a brave fighter and a fairly experienced military leader. Behind him were victories over the Germans, Lithuanians, Mordovians, Kama Bulgarians and those Russian princes who claimed his grand princely throne. However, in the organization and preparation of Russian troops for the battle on the City River, he made a number of serious miscalculations: he showed carelessness in the defense of his military camp, did not pay due attention to intelligence, allowed his governors to disperse the army over several villages and did not establish reliable communication between scattered detachments. And when a large Mongol formation under the command of Barendey quite unexpectedly appeared in the Russian camp, the result of the battle was obvious. The chronicles and excavations of archaeologists in the City testify that the Russians were defeated in parts, fled, and the horde whipped people like grass. Yuri Vsevolodovich himself also died in this unequal battle. The circumstances of his death remain unknown. Only the following testimony about the Prince of Novgorod, a contemporary of that sad event, has come down to us: “God knows how he died, others say a lot about him” 16.

Since that time, the Mongol yoke began in Russia: Russia became obliged to pay tribute to the Mongols, and the princes were to receive the title of Grand Duke from the hands of the Khan 17 . The very term "yoke" in the sense of oppression was first used in 1275 by Metropolitan Cyril 18.

The Mongol hordes moved to the north-west of Russia. Everywhere they met stubborn resistance from the Russians. For two weeks, for example, the suburb of Novgorod, Torzhok, was defended. However, the approach of spring thaw and significant human losses forced the Mongols, not reaching Veliky Novgorod about 100 miles, from the stone Ignach Cross to turn south, into the Polovtsian steppes. The retreat was in the nature of a "raid". Divided into separate detachments, the invaders "combed" the Russian cities from north to south. Smolensk managed to fight back. Kursk was destroyed, like other centers. The small city of Kozelsk, which held out for seven (!) weeks, put up the greatest resistance to the Mongols. The town stood on a steep, washed by two rivers - Zhizdra and Druchusnaya. In addition to these natural barriers, it was reliably covered by wooden fortress walls with towers and a moat about 25 meters deep. Before the arrival of the horde, the Kozeltsy managed to freeze a layer of ice on the floor wall and the entrance gate, which greatly complicated the assault on the city for the enemy. The inhabitants of the town wrote a heroic page in Russian history with their blood. Yes, it is not for nothing that the Mongols called it the "evil city". The Mongols stormed Ryazan for six days, Moscow for five days, Vladimir for a little longer, Torzhok for fourteen days, and little Kozelsk fell on the 50th day, probably only because the Mongols - for the umpteenth time! - used their favorite trick - after another unsuccessful assault, they simulated a stampede. The besieged Kozeltsy, in order to complete their victory, made a general sortie, but were surrounded by superior enemy forces and all were killed. The Horde, finally, broke into the city and drowned in the blood of the inhabitants who remained there, including the 4-year-old prince Kozelsk 19 .

Having devastated North-Eastern Russia, Batu Khan and Subedei-Bagatur took their troops to the Don steppes for rest. Here the horde spent the entire summer of 1238. In the fall, Batu's detachments repeated raids on Ryazan and other Russian cities and towns that had so far survived from devastation. Murom, Gorokhovets, Yaropolch (modern Vyazniki), Nizhny Novgorod were defeated.

And in 1239, the hordes of Batu invaded the borders of Southern Russia. They took and burned Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and other settlements.

On September 5, 1240, the troops of Batu, Subedei and Barendei crossed the Dnieper and surrounded Kyiv from all sides. At that time, Kyiv was compared with Tsargrad (Constantinople) in terms of wealth and population. The population of the city was approaching 50 thousand people. Shortly before the arrival of the horde, the Galician prince Daniel Romanovich took possession of the throne of Kiev. When she appeared, he went west to protect his ancestral possessions, and entrusted the defense of Kyiv to the thousand Dmitry.

The city was defended by artisans, suburban peasants, merchants. There were few professional soldiers. Therefore, the defense of Kyiv, as well as Kozelsk, can rightly be considered popular.

Kyiv was well fortified. The thickness of its earthen ramparts reached 20 meters at the base. The walls were oak, with earth filling. Stone defensive towers with gate openings stood in the walls. Along the ramparts stretched a moat filled with water 18 meters wide.

Subedei, of course, was well aware of the difficulties of the impending assault. Therefore, he first sent his ambassadors to Kyiv demanding his immediate and complete surrender. But the people of Kiev did not negotiate and killed the ambassadors, and we know what this meant for the Mongols. Then the systematic siege of the most ancient city in Russia began.

The Russian medieval chronicler described it as follows: “... Tsar Batu came to the city of Kiev with many soldiers and surrounded the city ... and it was impossible for anyone to leave the city or enter the city. And it was impossible to hear each other in the city from the creak of carts, the roar of camels, from the sounds of trumpets ... from the neighing of horse herds and from the screams and screams of countless people ... they fought, and there were many dead ... the Tatars broke through the city walls and entered the city, and the townspeople rushed to meet them. And one could see and hear the terrible crack of spears and the sound of shields; the arrows darkened the light, so that the sky behind the arrows was not visible, but there was darkness from the many arrows of the Tatars, and the dead lay everywhere, and everywhere blood flowed like water ... and the townspeople were defeated, and the Tatars climbed the walls, but from great fatigue sat down on city walls. And the night came. The townspeople that night created another city, near the Church of the Holy Mother of God. The next morning, the Tatars came to them, and there was an evil slaughter. And people began to faint, and ran with their belongings into the church vaults, and the church walls fell down from the weight, and the Tatars took the city of Kyiv in the month of December on the 6th day ... "20

In the works of the pre-revolutionary years, such a fact is cited 21 that the Mongols seized the courageous organizer of the defense of Kyiv, Dimitra, and brought him to Batu.

“This formidable conqueror, having no idea about the virtues of philanthropy, knew how to appreciate extraordinary courage and with an air of proud pleasure said to the Russian governor: “I give you life!” Demetrius accepted the gift, because he could still be useful for the fatherland and was left under Batu.

Thus ended the heroic defense of Kyiv, which lasted 93 days. The invaders looted the church of St. Sophia, all other monasteries, and the surviving Kievans killed everyone to the last, regardless of age.

In the next 1241, the Galicia-Volyn principality was defeated. On the territory of Russia, the Mongol yoke was established, which existed for 240 years (1240-1480) 22 . This is the point of view of historians of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.

In the spring of 1241, the horde rushed to the West to conquer all the "evening countries" and extend its power to the whole of Europe, right down to the last sea, as Genghis Khan bequeathed.

Western Europe, like Russia, was going through a period of feudal fragmentation at that time. Torn apart by internal strife and rivalry between small and large rulers, she could not unite in order to stop the invasion of the steppes with common efforts. Alone at that time, not a single European state was able to withstand the military onslaught of the horde, especially its fast and hardy cavalry, which played a decisive role in hostilities. Therefore, despite the courageous resistance of the European peoples, in 1241 the hordes of Batu and Subedei invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Moldavia, and in 1242 they reached Croatia and Dalmatia-Balkan countries. This is a critical moment for Western Europe. However, at the end of 1242, Batu turned his troops to the east. What's the matter? The Mongols had to reckon with incessant resistance in the rear of their troops. At the same time, they suffered a number of, albeit small, but failures in the Czech Republic and Hungary. But most importantly, their army was exhausted by battles with the Russians. And from the distant Karakorum, the capital of Mongolia, came the news of the death of the great khan. On the subsequent division of the empire, Batu must be himself. It was a very convenient excuse to stop the difficult campaign.

About the world-historical significance of the struggle of Russia with the Horde conquerors, A.S. Pushkin wrote:

“Russia was assigned a high destiny ... its boundless plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion on the very edge of Europe; the barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their east. The emerging enlightenment was saved by a torn and dying Russia…” 23 .

Reasons for the success of the Mongols.

The question of why the nomads, who were significantly inferior to the conquered peoples of Asia and Europe in economic and cultural terms, subjugated them to their power for almost three centuries, has always been in the center of attention, both of domestic and foreign historians. No textbook, study guide; historical monograph, to some extent considering the problems of the formation of the Mongol empire and its conquests, which would not reflect this problem. Presenting it in such a way that if Russia were united, it would show the Mongols is not a historically justified idea, although it is clear that the level of resistance would be an order of magnitude higher. But the example of a united China, as mentioned earlier, destroys this scheme, although it is present in the historical literature. More reasonable can be considered the quantity and quality of military force on each side and other military factors. In other words, the Mongols outnumbered their opponents in military power. As already noted, the Steppe militarily was always superior to the Forest in ancient times. After this short introduction to the "problem", let's list the factors of the victory of the steppes, cited in the historical literature.

The feudal fragmentation of Russia, Europe and the weak interstate relations of the countries of Asia and Europe, which did not allow, by combining their forces, to repulse the conquerors.

Numerical superiority of the conquerors. There were many disputes among historians about how much Batu brought to Russia. N.M. Karamzin indicated the number of 300 thousand soldiers 24 . However, a serious analysis does not allow even close approach to this figure. Each Mongol horseman (and they were all horsemen) had at least 2, and most likely 3 horses. Where in the forest of Russia to feed 1 million horses in winter? Not a single chronicle even raises this topic. Therefore, modern historians call the figure a maximum of 150 thousand Moghuls who came to Russia, more cautious ones stop at the figure of 120-130 thousand. And the whole of Russia, even if united, could put up 50 thousand, although there are figures up to 100 thousand 25 . So in reality, the Russians could put up 10-15 thousand soldiers for battle. Here the following circumstance should be taken into account. The strike force of the Russian squads, the princely ratis, were in no way inferior to the Mughals, but the bulk of the Russian squads were militia warriors, not professional warriors, but ordinary people who took up arms, not like professional Mongols. The tactics of the warring parties also differed. The Russians were forced to stick to defensive tactics designed to exhaust the enemy. Why? The fact is that in a direct military clash in the field, the Mongolian cavalry had clear advantages. Therefore, the Russians tried to sit out behind the fortress walls of their cities. However, wooden fortresses could not withstand the onslaught of the Mongol troops. In addition, the conquerors used the tactics of continuous assault, successfully used siege weapons and equipment perfect for their time, borrowed from the peoples of China, Central Asia and the Caucasus they conquered.

In addition, in Russia, stocks of food and fodder for livestock were prepared for the winter. Thus, the conquerors were already provided with fodder for their cavalry before the attack.

These, according to most historians, were the main and tactical reasons for the Mongol victories.

Consequences of Batu's invasion.

The results of the Mongol conquest for the Russian lands were extremely difficult. In terms of the scale of destruction and the victims suffered as a result of the invasion, they could not be compared with the damage caused by the raids of nomads and princely civil strife. First of all, the invasion caused huge damage to all the lands at the same time. According to archaeologists, out of 74 cities that existed in Russia in the pre-Mongolian period, 49 were completely destroyed by the hordes of Batu. At the same time, a third of them were depopulated forever and were no longer restored, and 15 former cities became villages. Only Veliky Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Polotsk and the Turov-Pinsk principality did not suffer, primarily due to the fact that the Mongol hordes bypassed them. The population of Russian lands also sharply decreased. Most of the townspeople either died in battles, or were taken away by the conquerors to "full" (slavery). Handicraft production was particularly affected. After the invasion in Russia, some handicraft industries and specialties disappeared, stone construction stopped, the secrets of making glassware, cloisonne enamel, multicolored ceramics, etc. were lost. .. Only after half a century in Russia, the service class begins to be restored, and, accordingly, the structure of the patrimonial and only nascent landlord economy is re-created.

However, the main consequence of the Mongol invasion of Russia and the establishment of Horde dominion from the middle of the 13th century was a sharp increase in the isolation of Russian lands, the disappearance of the old political and legal system and the organization of the power structure that was once characteristic of the Old Russian state. For Russia of the 9th-13th centuries, located between Europe and Asia, it was extremely important in which direction it would turn - to the East or to the West. Kievan Rus managed to maintain a neutral position between them, it was open to both the West and the East.

But the new political situation of the 13th century, the invasion of the Mongols and the crusade of the European Catholic knights, which called into question the continued existence of Russia, its Orthodox culture, forced the political elite of Russia to make a definite choice. The fate of the country for many centuries, including modern times, depended on this choice.

The collapse of the political unity of Ancient Russia also marked the beginning of the disappearance of the ancient Russian people, which became the progenitor of the three existing East Slavic peoples. Since the 14th century, the Russian (Great Russian) nationality has been formed in the northeast and northwest of Russia; on the lands that became part of Lithuania and Poland - Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalities 27.

IV. The establishment of the Horde yoke, its consequences and influence on the fate of Russia.

After the Batu invasion over Russia, the so-called Mongol-Tatar yoke was established - a complex of economic and political methods that ensured the dominance of the Golden Horde 28 over that part of the territory of Russia that was under its control. A new term "Golden Horde" also appears, which refers to the state formed in 1242-1243. Mongols who returned from western campaigns to the Lower Volga region, with the capital Saray (Saray-berke), the first khan of which was the same Batu 29 .

The main among these methods were the levying of various tributes and duties - "plough", the trade duty "tamga", food for the Mongol ambassadors - "honor", etc. The most difficult of them was the Horde "exit" - a tribute in silver, which began to be collected back in 40s XIII century, and from 1257 on the orders of Khan Berke, the Mongols carried out a census (the first census in the history of the country) of the population of North-Eastern Russia (“recording in a number”), setting fixed fees. Only the clergy were exempted from paying the “exit” (before the adoption of Islam by the Horde at the beginning of the 14th century, pagan Mongols, like all pagans, were religiously tolerant).

Representatives of the Khan-Baskaki were sent to Russia to control the collection of tribute. Tribute was collected by tax-farmers - "besermens" (Central Asian merchants). By the end of the 13th-beginning of the 14th century, the Basque institution was abolished due to the active opposition of the population. Since that time, the Russian princes themselves began to collect the Horde tribute. In case of disobedience, punitive campaigns followed. As the domination of the Golden Horde strengthened, punitive expeditions were replaced by repressions against individual princes.

A well-thought-out system of measures provided the Golden Horde with firm control over the Russian lands.

Political and cultural consequences of the Mongol yoke.

The consequences of the Mongol yoke for Russian culture and history were very difficult. The Mongols inflicted particular damage on the cities, which at that time in Europe grew rich and were freed from the power of the feudal lords.

In the Golden Horde, the Russian princes learned new forms of political communication, unknown in Russia (“beat with a brow”, i.e. forehead). The concept of absolute, despotic power, with which the Russians were only theoretically familiar, on the example of Byzantium, entered the political culture of Russia on the example of the power of the Horde Khan. The weakening of the cities made it possible for the princes themselves to claim the same power and a similar expression of the feelings of their subjects.

Under the influence of specifically Asian legal norms and methods of punishment, the Russians eroded the traditional, still tribal idea of the punishing power of society (“flow and plunder”, “blood feud”) and the limited princely right to punish people (preference for “vira”, fines). The punishing force was not society, but the state in the form of an executioner. It was at this time that Russia learned "Chinese executions" - a whip ("commercial execution"), cutting off parts of the face (nose, ears), torture during interrogation and investigation. It was a completely new attitude to man in comparison with the tenth century, the time of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich.

At the same time, the Russian people acutely felt the injustice of everything that was happening. Aggression from the East and the West forced the foreigners to be blamed for everything "non-Christians". Under the conditions of the Horde yoke and the hostile attitude of the Catholic West, Russians developed national narrow-mindedness, a feeling of only being a true Christian, Orthodox people. The church remained the only nationwide public institution. Therefore, the unity of the nation was based on the awareness of belonging to a single faith, the idea of the Russian people being chosen by God. Subsequently, this will manifest itself in the theory of "Moscow-the third Rome."

The choice of the East as an object of interaction for Russia turned out to be quite stable. It manifested itself not only in adaptation to the eastern forms of the state, society, culture in the 13th-15th centuries, but also in the direction of the expansion of the centralized Russian state in the 16th-17th centuries. Even in the 18th century, when the interaction between Russia and the West, Europe became the main thing, the Europeans noted Russia's tendency to give Eastern "answers" to the "questions" of the West, which affected the strengthening of autocracy and serfdom as the basis for the Europeanization of the country 31 .

V. Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development, the fate of Russia.

Arguments are common in science. In fact, without them, there would be no science. In historical science, disputes are often endless. Such is the discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development of Russia for more than two centuries. At one time, in the 19th century, it was customary not to even notice this impact.

On the contrary, in historical science, as well as journalism of recent decades, it is believed that the yoke became a turning point in all spheres of public life, most of all in political life, since the movement towards a single state was stopped on the model of Western European countries, as well as in public consciousness, which formed, as a result of yoke, the soul of a Russian person, like the soul of a slave 32 .

Actually, in my work I adhere to the traditional point of view. But there is another, directly opposite point of view on the problem under consideration. She considers the Mongol invasion not as a conquest, but as a “great cavalry raid” (only those cities that stood in the way of the troops were destroyed; the Mongols did not leave garrisons; they did not establish permanent power; with the end of the campaign, Batu went to the Volga).

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, a new cultural-historiosophical (historiosophy-philosophy of history) and geopolitical theory-Eurasianism appeared in Russia. Among many other provisions, a completely new, extremely unusual, and often shocking was the interpretation by the theorists of Eurasianism (G.V. Vernadsky, P.N. Savitsky, N.S. Trubetskoy) of ancient Russian history and the so-called "Tatar" period of Russian history. To understand the essence of their statements, you need to delve into the essence of the idea of Eurasianism.

The “Eurasian idea” is based on the principle of the unity of the “soil” (territory) and affirms the originality and self-sufficiency of the Slavic-Turkic civilization, which first developed within the framework of the Golden Horde, then the Russian Empire, and later the USSR. And today, the current leadership of Russia, experiencing enormous difficulties in governing the country, in which there are Orthodox and Muslims nearby, moreover, having their own state formations (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, and finally Chechnya (Ichkeria)) is objectively interested in spreading the idea of Eurasianism.

According to the theorists of Eurasianism, contrary to the tradition of Russian historical science to see in the Mongol yoke only “the oppression of the Russian people by the filthy Baskaks”, the Eurasianists saw in this fact of Russian history a largely positive outcome.

“Without the “Tatars” there would be no Russia,” wrote P.N. Savitsky in his work “The Steppe and Settlement.” could. Great is the happiness of Russia that it went to the Tatars ... The Tatars did not change the spiritual essence of Russia, but in their excellent capacity as the creators of states, as a military-organizing force, they undoubtedly influenced Russia in this era.

Another Eurasianist, S.G. Pushkarev, wrote: “Tatars not only did not show systematic aspirations to destroy the Russian faith and nationality, but on the contrary, showing complete religious tolerance, the Mongol khans issued labels to Russian metropolitans to protect the rights and advantages of the Russian church” 34 .

Developing this idea of his, S.G. Pushkarev contrasted the “Tatar neutral environment” with the Romano-Germanic “Drang nach Osten”, as a result of which “the Baltic and Polabian Slavs disappeared from the face of the earth” 35 .

This advantage of the East over the West was appreciated by many Russian statesmen of that time. G.V. Vernadsky cited Alexander Nevsky as a striking example of an “Old Russian Eurasian” (who, by the way, was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church). In contrast to Daniil Galitsky, who connected himself with the West, Alexander Nevsky, “with much less historical data, achieved much more lasting political results. Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich singled out a culturally friendly force in the Mongols that could help him preserve and establish Russian identity from the Latin West” 36 - this is how G.V. Vernadsky assessed the “Eastern” orientation of Alexander Nevsky and his stake on the Horde.

The thought of G.V. Vernadsky was deepened by another Eurasian historian, Boris Shiryaev. In one of his articles, he comes to the conclusion that “the Mongol yoke called the Russian people out of the provincialism of the historical existence of small disparate tribal and urban principalities of the so-called appanage period onto the wide road of statehood.” "In this intermediate epoch lies the genesis of Russian statehood," 37 he stated.

The well-known emigrant historian and ethnographer of Kalmyk origin E.D. Khara-Davan believed that it was during these years that the foundations of Russian political culture were laid, that the Mongols gave the conquered Russian lands “the main elements of the future Moscow statehood: autocracy (khanat), centralism, serfdom” 38. In addition, "under the influence of the Mongol domination, the Russian principalities and tribes were merged together, forming first the Muscovite kingdom, and later the Russian Empire" 39 .

The personification of the supreme power, traditional for Russia, also goes back to this era.

Thus, in the opinion of the Eurasianists, “the Mongols gave Russia the ability to organize itself militarily, create a state-coercive center, achieve stability ... become a powerful “horde” 40 .

In addition, during the period of the 13th-15th centuries, the Eurasian authors noted in Russia, due to the introduction of the Turkic element into the Russian (Slavic) culture, a definitely new ethnotype was formed, which laid the foundations of the psychology of the Russian person 41 . So, Prince N.S. Trubetskoy believed that “the Turk loves symmetry. Clarity and stable balance; but he loves that all this be already given, and not given, that it determines by inertia his thoughts, actions and way of thinking” 42 .

Such a psyche imparts to the nation "cultural stability and strength, establishes cultural and historical continuity and creates conditions for the economy of national forces, favorable to any construction" 43 . Having flowed into the Slavic element during the Mongol yoke, these Turkic features of the Russian folk psyche determined both the strength of the Muscovite state (“not well-tailored, but tightly sewn”), and then “everyday confessionism, that impregnation of culture and life with religion, which were the result of the special properties of the Old Russian piety." True, according to the Eurasian theorist, the reverse side of these traits was "excessive sluggishness and inactivity of theoretical thinking."

According to the Eurasianists, the Russian religious consciousness received significant “feeding” from the East. So, E.D. Khara-Davan wrote that “Russian God-seeking”; “sectarianism”, pilgrimage to holy places with readiness for sacrifice and torment for the sake of spiritual burning could only come from the East, because in the West religion does not affect the life and does not touch the hearts and souls of its followers, for they are completely and without a trace absorbed only by their own material culture” 44 .

Eurasians saw the further development of national history as follows.

At the same time, the peaceful penetration of the Russian element into the eastern environment and the eastern into the Russian one takes place, thus cementing the integration processes. As B. Shiryaev noted: “The Russian state, without sacrificing its basic principle - Orthodox everyday religiosity, begins to apply the Genghis Khan method of religious tolerance, which it tested on itself, to the conquered Tatar khanates. This technique connected both peoples” 46 .

Thus, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. considered by the Eurasians as the era of the best expression of the Eurasian statehood.

The Eurasian theory of the relationship between Russians and Mongols (Turks) caused a heated controversy among Russian émigré historians. Most of them, brought up on the classical works of the Russian historical school, did not accept this interpretation and, above all, the concept of the Mongol influence on Russian history. And there was no unity among the Eurasians. Thus, for example, the prominent Eurasianist Ya.D. Another prominent Eurasian theorist, M. Chess.

"What can we say about the opponents of Eurasianism in general." So P.N. Milyukov countered the arguments of the Eurasianists with his theses about “the absence of a Eurasian culture common to Russians with the Mongols” and “the absence of any significant relationship between the eastern steppe life and the settled Russian” 48 . The prominent liberal historian A.A. Kizevetter saw the “Apotheosis of Tatarism” in the Eurasian theory. "Dmitry Donskoy and Sergius of Radonezh, from the point of view of an orthodox Eurasian, should be recognized as traitors to Russia's national vocation," 49 he sneered.

The ideas of the Eurasianists in the second half of the twentieth century were developed by the famous scientist Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov and his other followers. Here is how L.N. Gumilyov wrote on this issue:

“... Moreover, the purpose of this raid was not the conquest of Russia, but the war with the Polovtsians. Since the Polovtsians firmly held the line between the Don and the Volga, the Mongols used the well-known tactic of a long-range detour: they made a "cavalry raid" through the Ryazan and Vladimir principalities. And later, the Grand Duke of Vladimir (1252-1263) Alexander Nevsky concluded a mutually beneficial alliance with Batu: Alexander found an ally to resist German aggression, and Batu to emerge victorious in the fight against the great Khan Guyuk (Alexander Nevsky provided Batu with an army consisting of Russian and Alans).

The union existed as long as it was beneficial and necessary for both sides (LN Gumilyov) 50 . A. Golovatenko also writes about this: “... Russian princes themselves often turned to the Horde for help and did not even see anything shameful in using the Mongol-Tatar detachments in the fight against competitors. So ... Alexander Nevsky, with the support of the Horde cavalry, expelled his brother Andrei from the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (1252). Eight years later, Alexander again took advantage of the help of the Tatars, rendering them a reciprocal favor. The authoritative prince contributed to the census in Novgorod (similar censuses in all the Horde possessions served as the basis for taxation); the Horde also helped Alexander Nevsky to make his son (Dmitry Alexandrovich) a Novgorod prince.

Cooperation with the Mongols seemed to the princes of North-Eastern Russia as natural a means of achieving or consolidating power as allied relations with the Polovtsy-South Russian princes of the 12th century” 51 . It seems that it is worth listening in this discussion to the calm and balanced opinion of the famous Soviet historian N.Ya. Eidelman:

“It is impossible, of course, to agree with the paradoxical opinion of L.N. affect the identity of the people, as would have happened under the more cultured German invaders. I do not believe that such an erudite as Gumilyov does not know the facts with which it is easy to challenge him; fascinated by his theory, he goes to extremes and does not notice, for example, that the forces of the “dog-knights” were incomparably weaker than the Mongol ones; Alexander Nevsky stopped them with the army of one principality. Far from praising any foreign dominion at all, let me remind you that the Mongol yoke was terrible; that, first of all and most of all, it hit the ancient Russian cities, the magnificent centers of crafts and culture ...

But it was the cities that were the carriers of the commercial beginning, marketability, future bourgeoisness - an example of Europe is evident!

There is no need, we believe, to look for the positive aspects of such a yoke in comparison with the abstract, non-existent and impracticable then German yoke. First of all, because the result of Batu's arrival is simple and terrible; the population, which has decreased several times; ruin, oppression, humiliation; the decline of both princely power and the germs of freedom ...

List of used literature.

1.N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State". Kaluga, "Golden Alley" vols. 3,4.1993

2. Klyuchevsky V.O. Collected works v.2. Moscow "Thought". 1988.

3. Nechvolodov "The Legend of the Russian Land", a reprint edition of the Ural branch of the All-Union Cultural Center "Russian Encyclopedia", book 2.1991.

4. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Polunov A.Yu., Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. "The basis of the course of the history of Russia" Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov, and the Faculty of History. Moscow, Prostor. 2002

5. Pushkin A.S. Complete Works v.3. Moscow, 1958.

6.Sandulov Yu.A. etc. “History of Russia. People and power. St. Petersburg, Lan. 1997.

7. Zuev M.N. History of Russia since ancient times. Moscow, "Drofa". 1999.

8. Gumilyov L.N. From Russia to Russia. Essays on ethnic history. Moscow, "Economic Russia". 1992.

9. Ionov I.N. "Russian civilization" 9-10th centuries. Moscow, "Enlightenment".

10. "History of Russia 9-10 centuries." under the editorship of M.M. Shumilov, Ryabikin S.P., 5th edition corrected and supplemented. St. Petersburg, "Niva". 1997.

11. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial issues." Moscow, "School-press".

12. Zaikin I.A., Pochkaev I.N., “Russian History”. Moscow, "Thought". 1992.

13. Valkova V.G., Valkova O.A., “Rulers of Russia”. Moscow, Rolf, Iris-press. 1999.

14. Savitsky P.N. "Steppe and Settlement". Moscow-Berlin, 1925

15. Khara-Davan E. "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy." Elista, 1991

16. Eidelman N. Ya. "Revolution from above" in Russia. "Book", 1989

17. Vernadsky G.V. "Two Labors of St. Alexander Nevsky. Eurasian time book, book 4. Berlin, 1925

18. Shiryaev B. “A supranational state on the territory of Eurasia”, “Eurasian Chronicle”, issue 7. Paris, 1927.

19. Pushkarev S.G. "Russia and Europe in their historical past", "Eurasian Chronicle", book 2. Prague, 1925

20. Magazine "Motherland" No. 3-4 1997

21. Quote by Gessen S.I. "Eurasianism". Modern records v.23, 1925.

List of used literature, (footnotes).

1. I.A. Zaichkin, I.N. Pochkaev “Russian History”, Moscow, “Thought”, 1992; p.104.

2. Quote according to Jan V. “Selected Works”, v.1, Moscow, 1979; p.436.

3. Karamzin N.M. "History of the Russian State" v.4, Kaluga, "Golden Alley" 1993; p.419.

4. Klyuchevsky V.O. "Collected Works" vol. 2, Moscow, "Thought" 1988; pp.20,21,41,45 etc.

5. Nechvolodov A. "The Legend of the Russian Land", a reprint edition of the Ural branch of the All-Union Cultural Center "Russian Encyclopedia", 1991; pp. 262-269 and others.

6. I.A. Zaichkin, I.N. Pochkaev “Russian History”, Moscow, “Thought”, 1992; p.103.

7. "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." edited by M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikin, 5th edition, corrected and supplemented, St. Petersburg, Neva, 1997; p.34.

8. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 for 1997, article by Mirkasim Usmanov, Doctor of Historical Sciences. Kazan University "Neighbors called them Tatars" pp. 40-44.

9. Zuev M.N. "History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the twentieth century", Moscow, "Drofa" 1999; page 48.

10. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State" v.3, Kaluga, "Golden Rainbow"; pp. 380-381.

11. Magazine "Motherland" No. 3-4 for 1997; p.39.

12.N.M. Karamzin, ibid., p.397.

13. Ibid., p. 410.

14. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 for 1997, article by A. Amelkin "When; Evpatiy Kolovrat was “born” pp. 48-52.

15. I.A. Zaichkin, I.N. Pochkaev “Russian History”, Moscow, “Thought”, 1992; p.115.

16. Ibid., p. 116.

17. Valkova V.G., Valkova O.A. "Rulers of Russia", Moscow, "Rolf, Iris press" 1999; page 69.

18. "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." edited by M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikin, 5th edition, corrected and supplemented, St. Petersburg, Neva, 1997; page 35.

19. I.A. Zaichkin, I.N. Pochkaev “Russian History”, Moscow, “Thought”, 1992; p.119.

20. Ibid., p. 121 and A. Nechvolodov “The Legend of the Russian Land”, reprint edition of the Ural branch of the Russian Encyclopedia, 1991; p.299.

21. N.M. Karamzin “History of the Russian State”, Kaluga, “Golden Alley” v.4, p.417 and A. Nechvolodov “The Legend of the Russian Land”, reprint edition of the Ural branch of the “Russian Encyclopedia” 1991, book 2 ; p.300.

22. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Polunov A.Yu., Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. Moscow State University M.V. Lomonosov Faculty of History, Moscow, Prostor, 2002; p.70.

23. Pushkin A.S. "Complete Works" v.6, Moscow, 1958; p.306.

24. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State", Kaluga, "Golden Alley" 1993, v.3; p.396.

25. For example, Sandulov Yu.A. etc. “History of Russia. People and Power”, St. Petersburg, “Lan”, 1997; p.171.

26. Ionov I.N. "Russian civilization of the 9th-beginning of the 20th century", Moscow, "Prosveshchenie" 1994; page 77.

27. Zuev M.N., ibid.; p.53.

28. Zuev M.N., ibid.; p.53.

29. “History of Russia in the 9th-20th centuries”, edited by M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikin, 5th edition, corrected and supplemented, St. page 35.

30. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial issues", Moscow, "Shkola-Press" 1994; p.32.

31. Ionov I.N., ibid., pp. 82-84.

32. Sandulov Yu.A. etc. “History of Russia. People and Power”, St. Petersburg, “Lan”, 1997; 173.

33. Quote on the "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." under the editorship of M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikin, 5th edition, corrected and supplemented, St. Petersburg, "Neva", 1997; p.36.

34. Pushkarev S.G. "Russia and Europe in their historical past", "Eurasian Chronicle", book 2, Prague, 1925; page 12.

35. Ibid., p. 12.

36. Vernadsky G.V. "Two Feats of St. Alexander Nevsky", "Eurasian Contemporary", book 4, Berlin 1925; pp. 325-327.

37. Shiryaev B. “National state on the territory of Eurasia”, “Eurasian Chronicle”, issue 7, Paris, 1927; page 7.

38. Khara-Davan E. "Genghis Khan as a commander and his heritage", Elista, 1991; p.182.

39. Ibid., p. 181.

40. Ibid., p. 202.

41. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4, 1997, A. Shatilov "Peresvet and Chelubey-brothers forever"; p.101.

42. Quote by Gessen S.I. "Eurasianism", "Modern Notes" v.23, 1925; p.502.

45.See Khara-Davan E., specified composition; p.195.

46. Ibid; pp. 199-200.

47. Magazine "Motherland" No. 3-4, 1997; page 55.

48. Ibid; page 56.

49. Ibid; page 59.

50. Gumilyov L.N. From Russia to Russia. Essays on Ethnic History”, Moscow, “Ekopros”, 1992, part 2 “In Alliance with the Horde”, ch. 1i2; pp. 90-136.

51. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial issues", edition 2, supplemented, Moscow, "Shkola-Press" 1994; pp. 39-40.

52. Eidelman N. Ya. "Revolution from above" in Russia, "Book" 1989; pp.32-33.

Mongols and Russ discuss the consequences of Mongol rule. Examination: Russia and the Golden Horde in the XIII-XV centuries

The consequences of the invasion and the establishment of the Horde yoke

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