main goal was essentially the question of relations between the Soviet state and the Western world after the failure of attempts to overthrow Soviet power through military intervention.
Western countries, primarily Great Britain, in search of overcoming post-war economic difficulties, tried to return Soviet Russia to the world market (so that, taking advantage of its temporary economic weakness, to widely exploit its resources), as well as Germany and its former allies in the First World War.

The Genoa Conference is the first wide international diplomatic meeting of Soviet Russia with the countries of the Western world on economic and financial matters. The conference was held in Genoa (Italy) from April 10 to May 19, 1922 with the participation of representatives of 29 states (including the RSFSR, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Japan).

The work of the delegation of the RSFSR was led by V. I. Lenin, who was appointed its chairman; deputy The chairman was G. V. Chicherin, who in Genoa, where Lenin did not go, enjoyed all the rights of the chairman.
The delegation of the RSFSR (it also included L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov, V. V. Borovsky, Ya. E. Rudzutak, A. A. Ioffe, X. G. Rakovsky, N. I. Narimanov , B. Mdivani, A. Bekzadyan, A. G. Shlyapnikov) represented at the Genoa Conference not only the Russian Federation, but also all other Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Belorussian, Bukhara, Georgian, Ukrainian, Khorezm), as well as the interests of the Far Eastern republics.

The United States, which refused to participate in the work of the Genoa Conference, was represented at it by an observer, the American Ambassador to Italy R. Child.

Among the delegates of Western states, the most active role at the Genoa Conference was played by D. Lloyd George, J. N. Curzon (Great Britain), K. Wirth, W. Rathenau (Germany), L. Facta (Italy), J. Barthou, K. Barrer (France).
The decision to convene the Genoa Conference is a search for measures "towards the economic recovery of Central and Eastern Europe."

The Soviet government, interested in normalizing economic and political relations with Western countries, agreed to take part in the work of the Genoa Conference on January 8, 1922.

At the conference, however, the leading role was played by representatives of those Western states who, instead of a business-like discussion of real ways of establishing economic ties with the Soviet state, tried to use diplomatic pressure to obtain economic and political concessions from the Soviet government, leading to the establishment of a different political and economic system in Russia; they hoped to force the Soviet state to recognize all the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, to return to foreign capitalists the enterprises nationalized by the Soviet government or to reimburse the cost of these enterprises, to eliminate the monopoly of foreign trade, etc.

The Soviet delegation, at the direction of Lenin, rejected these demands and, in turn, put forward counterclaims to compensate the Soviet state for losses caused by military intervention and blockade (if the pre-war and military debts of Russia were equal to 18.5 billion gold rubles, then the losses of the Soviet state as a result of the military interventions and blockades amounted to 39 billion gold rubles).

At the same time, wishing to find grounds for an agreement and the restoration of economic ties with Western states, the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference on April 20, 1922 declared that the Soviet government was ready to recognize pre-war debts and the succession right for the former owners to receive in concession or lease the property that previously belonged to them. subject to the de jure recognition of the Soviet state, the provision of financial assistance to it and the cancellation of war debts and interest on them.

At the first plenary session of the Genoa Conference on April 10, the Soviet delegation raised the question of a general reduction in armaments. However, both the issue of arms reduction and the settlement of mutual financial and economic claims were not equally resolved at the conference.
During the Genoa Conference, Soviet diplomacy, which used the contradictions in the imperialist camp (the camp of the Western powers), managed to break through the united front of the states that were trying to achieve the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet state, and conclude the 1922 Rappal Treaty with Germany.
Source: Soviet Historical Encyclopedia. In 16 volumes. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1973-1982. Volume 4. THE HAGUE - DVIN. 1963.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION MADE A STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE.

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENOA CONFERENCE April 10, 1922

The Russian delegation, which represents a government that always supports the cause of peace, welcomes with particular satisfaction the statements of previous speakers that peace is necessary first of all... It considers it necessary, first of all, to declare that it has come here in the interests of peace and the general restoration of the economic life of Europe, destroyed by the long war and the post-war five-year plan.

Remaining on the point of view of the principles of communism, the Russian delegation recognizes that in the current historical era that makes it possible parallel existence of the old and emerging new social order, economic cooperation between the states representing these two property systems is imperatively necessary for the general economic recovery ... The Russian delegation has come here not to propagate their own theoretical views, but for the sake of entering into business relations with governments and commercial and industrial circles of all countries on the basis of reciprocity, equality and full and unconditional recognition. (...)

Meeting the needs of the world economy and the development of its productive forces, the Russian government is consciously and voluntarily ready to open its borders for international transit routes, to provide for cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile land, the richest forest, coal and ore concessions, especially in Siberia, as well as a number of other concessions. throughout the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. (...)

The Russian delegation intends to further work conference to propose a general reduction in armaments and support all proposals aimed at alleviating the burden of militarism, provided that the armies of all states are reduced and the rules of war are supplemented by a complete ban on its most barbaric forms, such as poisonous gases, air warfare and others, especially the use of means of destruction aimed at against the civilian population.

By not inviting Putin to the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, Polish and other European politicians made it clear that they did not recognize Russia's monopoly on symbolic role the historical successor of the USSR as the winner of fascism. But even in the real legal registration by Russia of the succession of the Soviet Union, everything is also not easy.
For example, a certain part of Soviet real estate in foreign registries is still listed in a country called "USSR", which has long since ceased to exist. And Russia, which considers itself the only legal successor of the USSR, still cannot re-register part of the Soviet real estate abroad. And here's why it happened.

Soviet trade pavilion in Canada (Montreal)

Moscow's position on this issue seems to be logical, and remains unchanged: it assumed and fully paid off all the debts of the USSR, which means that all foreign property of the USSR should belong to it and be registered on it. But not everything is so simple in this worst of worlds.
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Shortly before the official proclamation of the collapse of the USSR and the creation of new independent states, a meeting was held in Moscow to discuss the issues of the external debt of the USSR. The meeting was attended by representatives of the union republics (except for the Baltic countries and Uzbekistan) and 7 creditor countries. Its result was a memorandum dated 28.10.1991. on mutual understanding regarding the debts of foreign creditors of the USSR and its successors and a communiqué of November 24, 1991, in which the republics that were part of the USSR were designated as its successors, to which the external debt of the USSR and its assets abroad were transferred in different proportions.
In pursuance of the decision taken, the Agreement “On Succession in Respect of the State External Debt and Assets of the USSR” dated 04.12.1991 was concluded. and the Agreement “On the property of the former USSR abroad dated 30.12.1991.

Trade Representation of the USSR in Brazil (Brazilia)

According to the agreements concluded, Russia owed 61.34% of foreign Soviet assets and liabilities, Ukraine - 16.37%, Belarus - 4.13%, and so on. However, it was more profitable for Western creditors to have one debtor than twelve, and it was beneficial for Russia not to share Soviet foreign property with anyone, which it actually already owned, and to appear as the full and only legal successor of the USSR. Moreover, the value of foreign Soviet property could well exceed the amount of Soviet external debt.
And Moscow invited all former Soviet republics to sign agreements on the so-called "zero option" for the division of debts and assets, that is, to cede to Russia their shares of both one and the other. In the end, everyone agreed and recognized the exclusive right of Russia to foreign real estate and other foreign assets of the USSR, in exchange for paying off the Soviet external debt.
All except Ukraine - the Ukrainian parliament twice, in 1997 and 2009, refused to ratify the 1994 “zero option” agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and it never entered into force.

Embassy of the USSR in the USA (Washington)

As Russia expected, the vile West did not take advantage of its difficult situation at that time, agreeing on preferential terms to stretch payments on the Soviet debt for twenty years. And for safety, the Paris Club of creditors allowed to re-register property rights from the USSR to Russian Federation only after the full repayment of the Soviet debt.
And when oil prices went up, Russia was able to pay off the Soviet external debt ahead of schedule, eliminating in 2006 all the debts of the USSR to the Paris Club (creditor states), and in 2009 the debts of the USSR to the London Club (private creditors). At the same time, in 2006, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin announced that Moscow intended to immediately begin re-registration of all real estate former USSR abroad.
But that was not the case - in all countries of the world such registration is possible only after the settlement of all disputes with other applicants for real estate. And since Ukraine claimed some part of it, Russia led a real diplomatic and judicial struggle to formalize its ownership. At present, Russia cannot enter into full rights of the owner of foreign Soviet property in at least 35 countries of the world, where this process is blocked by Ukraine in court. According to the press organ of the government of the Russian Federation "Rossiyskaya Gazeta": In Russia, such incidents are even more reluctant to talk about, but they admit that they exist.».
And Russia was recognized as the full successor of the property of the USSR in 5 countries - Bulgaria, Hungary, Iceland, Finland and Sweden, where Russia managed to negotiate with Ukraine, ceding part of Soviet real estate to it.

Consulate General of the USSR in Turku (Finland)

Of course, it would be logical for Ukraine to first return to Russia the Ukrainian 16.37 percent in the Soviet debt that Russia paid (somewhere around $15 billion). But firstly, for Ukraine, this is an unbearable business, and secondly, no one knows how to get back and how much it is - 16.37% of Soviet foreign property.
There is no exact data on the state of Soviet foreign real estate and its value at the time of the collapse of the USSR, its market valuation is unknown, and, according to the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, only 3 percent of Soviet real estate located abroad is recorded in the register of Russian federal property. IN different sources figures vary from 2,700 real estate objects at a price of $ 2.7 billion (Krasavina L.N. “Russia's External Debt Lessons and Prospects”. Scientific Almanac Russia's External Debt and Problems of Its Settlement. M. 2002, p. 18.) to 30 thousand . real estate objects at a price of $500-525 billion (Makarevich LN "Tools for settling external debt". Scientific Almanac Russia's external debt and problems of its settlement. M. 2002).
But this is not all Soviet property abroad - foreign Soviet property ties were very confused, and there were a lot of other assets besides real estate: bank deposits, vehicles (aircraft, ships), securities, contributions to authorized capital, etc. And how much it cost and is worth, no one really knows.

Embassy of the USSR in Mauritania (Nouakchott)

To close the issue, Russia has repeatedly offered Ukraine foreign real estate on the basis of the principle “God bless you, I’m not good” - not in the key countries of the world, but somewhere in Africa or Latin America, where Ukraine has nothing to do (as, by the way, Russia). Foreign Soviet real estate there is dilapidated, and has long lost its market value, many objects are abandoned and no one maintains them.
Ukraine, of course, does not need this for nothing, which means that Russia can neither sell nor use the liquid part of Soviet real estate for commercial purposes (this is the so-called limited property right - the Russian Federation can own and use this real estate itself, but cannot dispose of it) . And this dispute has been dragging on for a quarter of a century, and will drag on for many more decades. Or forever, if the agreement never succeeds.

We want to clearly establish in the program that the proletarian state must necessarily be defended not only by the proletarians of this country, but also by the proletarians of all countries ... Then we must stipulate another tactical issue: the right to red intervention. This question is a touchstone for all communist parties. Everywhere there are cries of red militarism. We must establish in the program that every proletarian state has the right to red intervention. The Communist Manifesto says that the proletariat must conquer the whole world, but this cannot be done with the flick of a finger. Here you need bayonets and rifles. Yes, the spread of the Red Army is the spread of socialism, proletarian power, revolution. This is the basis for the right of red intervention under such special conditions that it only facilitates the implementation of socialism purely technically.

Document No. 2. From V.I. Lenin of the Soviet delegation in Genoa.

... Try to move Krasin's formula: "All countries recognize their public debts and undertake to compensate for damages and losses caused by the actions of their governments." If this fails, go for a break, while declaring with certainty that we are ready to recognize private debts, but not wanting to play hide and seek, we indicate that we consider them covered, like the entire amount of our obligations in general, by our counterclaims ...

Document No. 3. From the statement of the Soviet delegation at the first meeting of the Genoa Conference. April 10, 1922

The Russian delegation, which represents a government that has always supported the cause of peace, welcomes with particular satisfaction the statements of previous speakers that, first of all, peace is needed ... It considers it necessary, first of all, to declare that it has come here in the interests of peace and the general restoration of the economic life of Europe, which war and the post-war five-year plan. remaining on the point of view of the principles of communism, the Russian delegation recognizes that in the current historical era, which makes possible the parallel existence of the old and the emerging new social order, economic cooperation between the states representing these two property systems is imperatively necessary for the general economic recovery ... The Russian delegation came come here not to propagate their own theoretical views, but for the sake of entering into business relations with the governments and commercial and industrial circles of all countries on the basis of reciprocity, equality and full and unconditional recognition ... Meeting the needs of the world economy and the development of its productive forces, the Russian the government is consciously and voluntarily ready to open its borders to international transit routes, to provide for cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile land, the richest forest, coal and ore concessions, especially in Siberia, as well as a number of other concessions, especially in Siberia, as well as a number of other concessions throughout the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ... The Russian delegation intends during the future work of the conference to propose a general reduction in armaments and support all proposals aimed at alleviating the burden of militarism, with the condition of reducing the armies of all states and supplementing the rules of war with the complete prohibition of its most barbaric forms, such as poisonous gases, air warfare, and others, and in particular the use of means of destruction directed against the civilian population.

Document No. 4. Resolution of the Allied delegations at the Genoa Conference outlining the conditions imposed on Russia. April 15, 1922

1. The allied creditor states represented at Genoa cannot assume any obligations in relation to the claims made by the Soviet government. 2. In view, however, of Russia's difficult economic situation, the creditor states are inclined to reduce Russia's military debt to them in percentage terms, the size of which must be determined subsequently. The nations represented in Genoa are inclined to take into account not only the question of deferring the payment of current interest, but also of deferring the payment of a part of the interest that has expired or is in arrears. 3. Nevertheless, it must finally be established that no exceptions can be made to the Soviet government regarding: a) Debts and financial obligations assumed in respect of citizens of other nationalities; b) regarding the rights of these citizens to the restoration of their property rights or to compensation for the damage and losses incurred.

Document No. 5. From the agreement between the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and Germany. April 16, 1922

Article I. ... a) The RSFSR and the German State mutually renounce compensation for military expenses, as well as compensation for military losses ... Similarly, both Parties renounce compensation for non-military losses caused to citizens of one Party through so-called exceptional military laws and violent measures government agencies the other Party. C) Russia and Germany mutually refuse to reimburse their expenses for prisoners of war ... Article II. Germany renounces claims arising from the fact that up to now the laws and measures of the RSFSR have been applied to German citizens and their private rights, as well as to the rights of the German State and Lands in relation to Russia, as well as claims arising in general from the measures of the RSFSR or its bodies in relation to German citizens or their private rights, provided that the government of the RSFSR will not satisfy similar claims of other states. Article III. Diplomatic and consular relations between the RSFSR and the German State are immediately resumed... Article IV. Both Governments further agree that for the general legal status of citizens of one Party in the territory of the other and for the general regulation of mutual trade and economic relations, the principle of the greatest should apply. 1919

Civil war ignited throughout Europe; the victory of communism in Germany is absolutely inevitable; in a year in Europe they will forget about the struggle for communism, because all of Europe will be communist; then the struggle for communism will begin in America, perhaps in Asia and on other continents.

Document No. 6. From the annual report of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the VIII Congress of Soviets for 1919-1920. December 22-29, 1920

The term that had elapsed since the last Congress of Soviets was the year of the triumph of the so-called "peaceful offensive" of Soviet Russia. Our policy of constant, systematic coming forward with peace proposals and constant attempts to make peace with all our adversaries, however, was dubbed by the latter as a peaceful offensive. This policy of unceasing and systematic efforts in favor of peace has borne fruit... At present, peace treaties have been concluded with all our neighbors, except for Poland.... And besides Romania... In January of this year, first the Supreme Economic Council, and then the Supreme Union Council, that is, England. France and Italy officially announced the resumption of commercial relations with Soviet Russia, but not directly with the Soviet Government, but with the cooperatives. At the present time, however, the British Government is proposing to us a draft trade agreement which already completely eliminates the co-operatives from any participation in it... At the present time even France, the most consistent of our opponents.... She recommended that Poland conclude peace with us... The successful military defense of the Soviet Republic was facilitated by the widespread military collapse, and the governments were encouraged to engage in trade relations with it by the growing economic collapse, which made Russia's absence in peaceful, economic circulation even more acutely... Increasing fatigue and need for peace The broad masses of the people exerted strong pressure on the governments of the states directly fighting us, forcing them to succumb to our peaceful policy... The military and economic disintegration of the bourgeois world is accompanied by diplomatic disintegration. The victorious powers ... are powerless to force even small states to submit to their will.

Questions and tasks:

1. Based on doc. No. 1, I draw the following conclusions about the export of the revolution from Russia: 1 ..., 2 ... etc.

2. Doc. No. 3 contradicts doc. No. 1, because ...

3. Based on doc. Nos. 2 and 4, I can single out the following reasons for the failure of the talks between Russia and Western countries in Genoa: 1…, 2… etc. …

4. On the basis of Doc No. 5, I conclude that the treaty with Germany was beneficial (not beneficial) for Russia, because …

5. Having studied the dock. No. 5, I was convinced of the correct (wrong) opinion when answering the question. No. 4, because ...

6. Based on the above and doc. No. 6, I can draw the following conclusions about successes and failures foreign policy Russia in the 1920s: 1…, 2… etc. …

This week, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a law on a moratorium on the payment of the country's foreign debts. This law allows Kiev to freeze payments at any time due to the difficult economic situation in the country. However, a demonstrative refusal to pay, as history shows, does any country more harm than good, even with all the adjustments for circumstances. A classic example of this is the decision of Soviet Russia not to return imperial debts. The win turned out to be extremely doubtful and had an extremely negative impact on the history of the country in the medium term.

In early 1918, the Bolsheviks who seized power in St. Petersburg and Moscow found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, the ideological position demanded both "peace without annexations and indemnities" and non-recognition of debts to the capitalist system, and the financial and economic situation in the revolutionary country was difficult. On the other hand, spoiling relations with the Entente without strengthening its position within the country was fraught with danger. As a result, the Bolshevik government nevertheless decided to take a risk, and on February 3, a decree was issued annulling all internal and external public debt. The latter included almost 18.5 billion rubles in gold, of which more than half were recruited during the First World War.

Photo: Mary Evans Picture Library / Global Look

The reaction of the Entente was predictable. Especially considering that a month later the Bolsheviks signed a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary. All economic relations with Soviet Russia were interrupted, and the allies relied on the whites. Assistance was limited, but serious problems arose for the Soviet government. The result was a severe and destructive civil war for the country and mass famine.

I forgive everyone

Russia found itself in a blockade, from which it was necessary to somehow get out. Moreover, the former allies realized that communist regime established for a long time and, therefore, you should look for points of contact with it. The greatest efforts in this direction were made by Great Britain under the leadership of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, which had already managed to conclude a trade agreement with Moscow. In the end, all participants in the war agreed for the first time to meet at a conference in Genoa, to which Russian representatives were supposed to arrive.

The conference opened on April 10, 1922. The Soviet delegation in Genoa was headed by the People's Commissar for foreign affairs Georgy Chicherin, that is, the representation was as serious as possible. But the conversation was tough. Immediately after the conversation turned to the return of debts, the Soviet side put forward counter-demands: compensation in the amount of 39 billion rubles for the damage caused during civil war damage. In addition, the Soviet representatives refused to return the foreign property nationalized during the revolution.

The tactics of the Soviet side was to negotiate with different countries separately. For example, Great Britain and Italy, which did not lose much in Russia, were ready to cooperate. But there were also France and Belgium, categorically dissatisfied with the too soft treatment of the Bolsheviks. The uncompromising stance of French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré also played a role in the unwillingness of the participants to negotiate for real. Great Britain, the strongest player in Europe at that time, was ready to give in to France in exchange for its concessions on Germany, which at that time was a higher priority diplomacy target for the ex-Entente.

In addition, the goals of the Soviet side were rather ambiguous. The instructions of the Soviet party organs ordered Chicherin's delegation "in fact, behind the scenes of the negotiations, it is possible to more quarrel the bourgeois states ... while pursuing real interests, that is, creating the possibility of individual agreements with individual states even after the breakdown of the Genoa Conference." With such an attitude, one should not be surprised that a normal dialogue did not work out.

As a result, the negotiations ended in nothing. It was proposed to continue the conversation a few months later in The Hague, but it was not possible to work out any common position there either. Instead, Soviet diplomats went to Rapallo, where they were able to settle all disputes with Germany. Moscow repeated its rejection of German reparations, but at the same time asserted the property of Germany and its citizens confiscated during and after the war. Thus, it was Berlin that became the main partner of the USSR for the next ten years.

Although it was much better than nothing, the success of the young Soviet state on the basis of financial and economic diplomacy was modest. Weimar Germany, with its prohibitive hyperinflation, was as impoverished as Russia, and it would be strange to expect help from her to restore the economy. And in 1933, the Nazis came to power, and Soviet Union was in isolation.

Over time, political relations with the former Entente settled to a certain extent, the countries of the West recognized the USSR one by one during the 1920s. However, the issue of refusing to repay loans hung like a sword of Damocles over economic ties. The biggest problem was the inability to refinance and enter Western, primarily American financial markets, although Soviet structures from time to time issued bonds on the British and American exchanges and even lent for export. However, all these were not the amounts that could be expected with a more favorable attitude of the creditor states.

For example, in 1933 the USSR raised the issue of a loan to the United States in the amount of a billion dollars. This amount was about one-fifth of the total cost of the industrialization plans. The Americans hesitated and said no. Unsuccessful were attempts to lend in other countries.

If the USSR had initially had a good credit history, then the probability of receiving these and even larger amounts would have been much greater. The possibility of borrowing money abroad in conditions of such an expensive pleasure as industrialization would be of exceptional help to the Soviet government. With access to the world credit market, the state would act more confidently and probably would not try to use such a controversial method of confiscating goods from the population as collectivization. The latter, carried out in a hurry and extremely unprofessionally, dealt a severe blow to Soviet agriculture (for example, the number of cattle could not be restored for several decades).

Image: RIA Novosti

If everyone should, then no one should

But perhaps there was no other way out for Soviet Russia than to refuse debts? Indeed, the amount of liabilities at first glance looked unbearable, exceeding the entire GDP of the country. In Soviet historiography, this default was justified, among other things, by the fact that the state was freed from a heavy burden and could start from scratch.

However, the reality is much more complex. First, in fact, not all debts (as it turned out) had to be repaid. Most of them in the case of Russia belonged to the military taken already during the First World War. And if we look at international experience, we see that practically none of the debtors paid not only the full amount of these obligations, but even half of them.

After the war, the United States turned out to be the world's largest creditor, which drove even the British Empire into debt. In total, the Americans financed the Entente countries (excluding Russia) for 10.5 billion dollars (more than 200 billion dollars in current prices). By the beginning of the 1920s, it became clear that the ruined economies of European countries would not be able to pull such amounts. In 1922, Congress created a commission to deal with the settlement of this debt.

After negotiations with the allies, a new payment program was approved. The Europeans agreed to a colossal restructuring. All debts had to be repaid over 62 years, while the total amount due was only $22 billion. That is, the yield did not exceed 1 percent per annum, which is simply ridiculous even in our time of ultra-low rates. In fact, this meant writing off 51 percent of the debt.

In fact, even this amount could not be recovered. For some time, the debtors paid relatively regularly, although negotiations on concessions were ongoing. But then came the crisis of 1929 and the Great Depression, again brought down the European economy. US President Herbert Hoover imposed a moratorium on all cross-national payments because of the general panic and capital flight. When the moratorium expired European countries, referring to various circumstances, en masse denied America further payments. By 1934, all the states of Europe, with the exception of Finland, declared a default against the United States. Thus the story of "exorbitant war debts" ended.

The difference between the behavior of Soviet Russia and the Entente countries, however, is obvious. If the former showed demonstrative stubbornness and disrespect for accepted norms, which seriously complicated relations with foreign states, then the Europeans acted more cunningly. Until the last moment, agreeing with the need to pay, they knocked out various concessions and indulgences from creditors. At the same time, lenders objectively understood that they would not be able to get everything one way or another, so they were ready to meet halfway. Ultimately, European debtors, speaking as a united front, were able to achieve a complete cancellation of the debt burden.

Resolution of the Allied delegations at the Genoa Conference

with a statement of the conditions presented to Russia

April 15, 1922

(Ignoring the political declaration of the Soviet delegation of April 10, 1922, the Western countries also rejected its economic proposals, formulating harsh conditions for the return of the debt to Russia and the property of foreign citizens)

1. The allied creditor states represented at Genoa cannot assume any obligations in relation to the claims made by the Soviet government.

2. In view, however, of Russia's difficult economic situation, the creditor states are inclined to reduce Russia's war debt towards them in percentage terms, the size of which is to be determined subsequently. The nations represented in Genoa are inclined to take into account not only the question of deferring the payment of current interest, but also of deferring the payment of a part of the interest that has expired or is in arrears.

3. Nevertheless, it must finally be established that no exceptions can be made to the Soviet government regarding:

a) debts and financial obligations assumed in relation to citizens of other nationalities;

b) regarding the rights of these citizens to the restoration of their property rights or to compensation for damages and losses incurred.

Klyuchnikov Yu.V., Sabanin A.V. International politics of modern times. M.. 1929. part III. S. 158.