National composition of Chechnya. The growing population of Chechnya is a sign of the end of the military crisis

The Chechen Republic is a tiny region in the southwestern part of Russia. In terms of its area, Chechnya occupies less than 0.1% of the country's territory. What is interesting about this region? What does it produce? How many cities are there within Chechnya? Our article will tell about all this.

Chechnya: area and geographical location

The republic is part of the North Caucasian Federal District. It is located within the Caucasian mountainous country. The total area of ​​Chechnya is 15.6 thousand square kilometers (76th place in the list of subjects of the Russian Federation). About 30% of its territory is occupied by mountain ranges and intermountain basins.

The capital of Chechnya is the city of Grozny. It is located in the geometric center of the republic. The head is Ramzan Akhmatovich Kadyrov (since 2007).

The climate of Chechnya is continental and very diverse. Differences in the amount of atmospheric precipitation are especially striking: in the north of the republic they fall no more than 300 mm, and in the south - about 1000 mm. There are quite a lot of lakes and rivers in Chechnya (the largest of them are Terek, Argun, Sunzha and Gekhi).

Despite its small area, Chechnya is distinguished by an extraordinary variety of topography and landscapes. In physical and geographical terms, the republic can be divided into four zones: flat (in the north), foothills (in the center), mountainous and high-mountainous (in the south).

The main resource of Chechnya

The main natural resource of the republic is oil. Together with neighboring Ingushetia, Chechnya is one of the oldest oil and gas regions in Russia. Most of the oil fields are historically concentrated in the vicinity of Grozny.

To date, industrial oil reserves in Chechnya amount to about 60 million tons. And for the most part, they are already exhausted. The total reserves of black gold within the republic are estimated by experts at 370 million tons. True, it is quite difficult to develop them due to the high depth of the horizons. Today, oil production in Chechnya is carried out only at 200 wells out of 1300.

In addition to oil, natural gas, gypsum, marl, limestone and sandstone are produced in the republic. There are also several valuable mineral springs here.

General features of the regional economy

Perhaps the main and most famous feature of the Chechen economy is its subsidization. On average, the republic receives up to 60 billion rubles in annual material assistance from the center. And according to this indicator, Chechnya is one of the three most subsidized regions of Russia.

Another anti-record: the Chechen Republic ranks fourth in the country in terms of unemployment (almost 17%). The most difficult situation is observed in villages, where there are only 2 to 10 workers per 100 inhabitants. Paradoxically, but the total income of the population of Chechnya is growing every year. The reasons for this growth are various social benefits, benefits, “shadow earnings”, as well as money from labor migrants earned in Moscow and other countries.

In terms of gross product, the Chechen economy ranks only 85th among the regions Russian Federation. As before, the structure of the economy of the republic is dominated by the oil and gas sector. In addition, the construction industry, chemical and food industries are developed here. Construction of a thermal power plant continues in Grozny.

The lion's share of agricultural products is provided by animal husbandry (in particular, sheep and poultry farming). Cereals, sugar beets, potatoes and vegetables are grown on the lands of Chechnya.

Population and cities of Chechnya

Demographically, Chechnya is a young and actively giving birth republic, and religiously, it is a deeply religious one. It boasts the highest natural population growth in the country. Today, 1.4 million people live in Chechnya. 65% of them are rural residents. Chechnya also has the lowest divorce rates in Russia.

The most numerous ethnic group of the republic is Chechens (95%), the dominant religion is Sunni Islam. By the way, according to research in 2012, Chechnya is among the twenty regions of the planet where the rights of Christians are most infringed (according to the Open Doors organization). There are two state languages ​​in the republic - Chechen and Russian.

There are few cities in Chechnya. There are only five of them: Grozny, Urus-Martan, Gudermes, Shali and Argun. The largest city in Chechnya is Grozny. Almost 300 thousand people live here. The oldest is Shali. This city was founded in the XIV century.

The city of Grozny is the capital of the republic

Grozny is the capital of Chechnya and the center of the administrative region of the same name. The city is located on the banks. Its chronology dates back to 1818, when a fortress was founded here. Russian soldiers erected it in just four months. Since at that time this area was a "hot spot" on the map of the North Caucasus, the fortress was nicknamed Grozny.

Modern Grozny is a fairly well-groomed city with several dozen industrial enterprises and a large number of new buildings. The main sights of Grozny are the grandiose mosque "Heart of Chechnya" and the no less impressive skyscraper complex "Grozny City". The latter is located in the very center of the city and includes five residential buildings, an office building and a five-star hotel.

The first attempts to determine the numerical composition of the Chechen people were made by Russian scientists, travelers and representatives of the military command at the end of the 18th - the first half of the 19th centuries. But the difficult political situation that emerged at that time in the Caucasus, and the then unfolding struggle of the mountaineers for their freedom and independence, made it impossible to carry out a full account of the local population. Documents of that time contain very valuable information about the composition of the population of individual mountaineer tribes, but they are so contradictory, and often so opportunistic, that it is almost impossible to even roughly estimate the number of the Chechen people from them. So, in an archival document dating back to the beginning of the 30s of the XIX century, the number of Chechens was determined at 110 - 120 thousand people, but it was indicated that "this calculation is very moderate, it should be assumed that the population in Chechnya is larger" ( one). In another document, compiled two years later, it is reported that there were 218 thousand Chechens together with the Ingush, and the number of the latter, as can be concluded from this source, did not exceed 16-17 thousand people. (2). And Alexander Rogov, who wrote already in the 20th century, believed that in 1847 Chechnya had at least 1.5 million inhabitants (3).

Of course, it is difficult to assume that during this period the Chechen population was so large. But the message of A. Rogov deserves attention, if we remember that in order to conquer the Caucasian highlanders, Russia was forced to send a third of its armed forces to the Caucasus at the final stage of the war, that is, more than 270 thousand soldiers and officers. An indirect argument (reinforcing the opinion of A. Rogov can also be the fact that on the eve of the First World War, only in Ottoman Empire 1.8 million lived, and according to other sources even 2,750,000, only Circassians (4). But it is known that the Chechens, in terms of the number of their population, not only were not inferior to the Circassians, but, on the contrary, surpassed them.

In general, speaking about the population of Chechens before their forcible annexation to Russia, it can be assumed that during the Caucasian war of extermination it decreased by at least three times. In any case, acad. A. Berger believed that during this war Chechnya was the area that lost the largest percentage of its population "(5), and A. Shakh-Gireev emphasized that only between 1847 and 1860 the population of Chechnya decreased by more than two times (6 ).

A systematic account of the population of Chechnya began in the second half of the 19th century, when the final pacification of the annexed country required the tsarist government to conduct its statistical and ethnographic study. Population calculations carried out in the 1960s and 1970s were still somewhat inaccurate, since they did not take into account part of the inhabitants of the high mountain regions of Chechnya. But already the materials of the first All-Russian population census of 1897 and the data of the current statistics of 1913 made it possible to solve, in general, the question of the number of Chechens, their settlement, the rate of natural increase and the ratio between the male and female population.

From 1861 to 1913, the growth of the Chechen population, despite the severe consequences of the Caucasian War and the national liberation uprisings of the 60-70s, as well as the emigration of a significant part of the highlanders outside the Caucasus, amounted to 105.5 thousand people, or 75.4 percent. So, according to estimates, in 1861 there were 140 thousand Chechens, in 1867 - 116 thousand, in 1875 - 139.2 thousand, in 1889 - 186,618 people, in 1897 - 226 .5 thousand (and according to other reports - 187,635 people), and, finally, in 1913 - 245.5 thousand people. (7).

The average annual rate of natural growth of the Chechen population was very much dependent on those social and political cataclysms that were so rich in the history of the Caucasus of that period. If the population growth of the Ingush throughout this era was, on the whole, stable, then the number of Chechens in some years not only did not increase, but, on the contrary, decreased. This was the case, for example, in the early 1960s, when they had to endure a number of major uprisings, brutally suppressed by punitive troops (8). The events of 1865 caused even more damage to the Chechens, when, according to Aslanbek Sheripov, something like natural selection occurred among them (9), and more than 23 thousand people. (10) was expelled to Turkey. Chechnya at that time lost the most healthy part of the population, which constitutes the gene pool of the nation.

The flight of the highlanders to foreign countries took place in subsequent years. But by the end of the 60s. in connection with the normalization of the political situation on the Terek and the emergence of conditions for the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war, it was reduced to a minimum. The local population stabilized and then began to gradually increase. In 1867-1875. population growth of Chechens was 18.0 percent and in 1875-1889. even 34.0 percent, despite the fact that during the national liberation uprising of 1877 they suffered heavy casualties. It is possible, however, that in the latter case it was achieved by taking into account the population of the deep regions of Chechnya, which were not included in the 1867 and 1875 censuses. It must also be borne in mind that some of the Chechens who had previously emigrated to Turkey managed to return to their homeland by that time. In any case, it is known that in the 60s - early 70s, at least 5900 Chechens managed to escape from Turkish captivity (11). Taking these factors into account, the indicated increase in the Chechen population may seem quite natural.

Relatively favorable for the reproduction of the population of Chechnya was the turn between the 19th and 20th centuries. During this period, the Chechens finally overcame the severe consequences of the events of the previous era and entered a period of intensive growth of their population. This process was positively influenced by a certain increase in the well-being of the people, caused by the development of the economy of Chechnya and its involvement in the system of Russian capitalism. In the early 90s. some of the Chechens moved to the countries of the Middle East (Syria and Jordan) (12). However, their population growth has been consistently high. And even the dramatic events of the beginning of the 20th century - the revolution of 1905 - 1907, the social upheavals of the post-revolutionary years, and in the conditions of Chechnya, in addition, the powerful national liberation and abrechen movement - did not interrupt the numerical growth of the population, although they led to its sharp increase. decrease.

The events of 1917-1920 had a negative impact on the further growth of the population of Chechnya. We do not have exact data on the losses of Chechens during the Civil War, but we can assume that they amounted to at least 30 thousand people. Nevertheless, the first All-Union population census, conducted in 1926, recorded a significant increase in the number of Chechens, amounting to 318.5 thousand people. (13) In comparison with the figures of 1913, their number increased by 29.9 percent. High rates of natural growth of the Chechen population continued until the end of the 1920s.

In the 30s demographic situation in Chechnya, as well as throughout the country, has deteriorated sharply. The mass repressions that swept through the country in the era of the authoritarian regime of I. Stalin had a heavy impact on Chechnya. The population census in 1939 determined the number of Chechens at 408.5 thousand people. (14) It must be assumed that it did not include people who were imprisoned and, in the words of L. Beria, should have turned into "camp dust." There is no doubt that their number was determined by many thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands of people. On the eve of the war, the number of Chechens, based on the traditional natural growth of their population in the 30s, was estimated at approximately 433 thousand people. (15)

The events of the 1940s and 1950s had tragic consequences for the peoples of Checheno-Ingushetia. The unjustified and unjustified repressions against the Chechens and Ingush, undertaken by the Stalinist leadership in the February days of 1944, put these peoples in front of a real threat of complete physical destruction. The number of the Chechen people in the first two years of exile, according to the most conservative estimates, decreased by 120 thousand people, the Ingush lost from 15 to 20 thousand people. (16). Many of them were destroyed during the days of eviction in their homeland. The tragedy of Khaibakh (17) and Tista (18), Galanchozh and Urus-Martan (19) will never be erased from the memory of the Chechen people. Great were the so-called indirect losses of the Chechens and Ingush as a result of a sharp decline in the birth rate with a simultaneous increase in mortality. In general, the direct and indirect losses of the Chechens ranged from 200 to 210 thousand people. (about 45 percent of their population), the Ingush lost up to 25 thousand people. (25 percent) (20). These data should also include tens of thousands of representatives of Checheno-Ingushetia, who were innocently convicted and destroyed in Stalin's dungeons. According to the population census of 1959, the number of Chechens (418.8 thousand people) increased by only 2.6 percent in comparison with the data of 1939 (21).

High population growth rates; marked the next stage in the history of Chechnya. The events of that time had a beneficial effect on him: the formation in 1957 of the second Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, the return of Chechens and Ingush from their places of exile and the improvement of their material well-being. During the 60s. in terms of the birth rate, the Chechens outstripped even the peoples of Central Asia (22). From 1959 to 1970 their number increased by 46.3 percent and amounted to 612.7 thousand people. (23).

However, by the end of the 1960s and, especially, in the 70s, the growth rate of the Chechen population began to decline. The Chechen family began to modernize and, in terms of the number of its members, approached the average Union indicators. But the slowdown in the rate of reproduction of their population was explained not only by this factor. Today, it is an indisputable fact that Checheno-Ingushetia occupied one of the first places in the territory former USSR on child mortality, as well as the fact that it never reached the imagined level of average life expectancy. It is a fait accompli that we have few old inals - guardians folk wisdom. But once Checheno-Ingushetia was famous for the longevity of its inhabitants.

According to the 1979 census, the number of Chechens was 756 thousand people. (24). Compared to the previous census, their population growth was 23.4 percent. In the next decade, the number of Chechens increased by 26.8 per cent and reached 958,309 in 1989 (25).

The latest studies on the issue of the settlement of the peoples of the Caucasus point to a larger territory occupied in antiquity and in the Middle Ages by Chechen tribes (26). During the long Russian-Caucasian war, when the tsarist government pursued a policy of capturing the most fertile lands of the highlanders and settling them with settlers from Central Russia, the territory of Chechen settlement was significantly reduced. In the second half of the 19th century, it was bounded in the east by the Aktash River, in the south by the Andean and Main Caucasian Ranges, in the west by the river. Fortanga and, finally, in the north - by the Sunzha and Terek rivers (27). Outside this territory, there were large groups of Chechens in the Terek-Sunzha interfluve (villages of Psedakh, Akki-Yurt, Chulga-Yurt, Stary Yurt, Nogai-Mirzi-Yurt, etc.) and in the northeastern regions of the Tiflis province (s.s. Omalo, Duisi, Jokolo, etc.). Already at that time, the tsarist government pursued a policy of settling the lands of Eastern Chechnya - Aukh - with people from Dagestan. In 1889, out of 15,637 residents of the Khasav-Yurt Plain, 9,861 or 63.1 percent were Aukh Chechens (28).

After the end of the Civil War 1918-1920. relatively favorable conditions arose for the return of Chechens to their original places of residence. Great importance at the same time, it was included in 1929 in the Chechen Autonomous Okrug of the city of Grozny and the Sunzha district (29). If in 1926 a little more than 500 Chechens and Ingush lived within the Sunzhensky District, including over 400 Chechens (30), then in 1939 there were already 3606 Chechens in the Sunzhensky District (31). The Chechen population also increased in the city of Grozny. At the same time, after 1920, the movement of Chechens to the east was limited, when the territory of Aukh, where by that time about 30 thousand Chechens already lived, became part of Dagestan (32).

The restoration of the national statehood of the Chechen and Ingush peoples in 1957 gave a new impetus to the development of the rich lands of the Chechen Plain and the Garman (Nogai) steppe by the Chechens. Only in the first two years after the restoration of the republic, 3654 Chechens (33) settled in the Naur, Shelkov and Kargaly regions, and in 1965 their number in these regions reached almost 13 thousand people. (34). Chechens also actively developed the territory of the Sunzha region and settled in the city of Grozny.

At present, the demographic situation in the republic is characterized by the fact that in six of its districts (Achkhoy-Martanovsky, Vedensky, Nadterechny, Nozhai-Yurtovsky, Urus-Martanovsky and Shali) Chechens make up from 94 to 99.5 percent of the population (35), in three districts - Grozny, Gudermes and Shatoy (including Itum-Kalinsky) - their share fluctuates between 76.7 and 87.2 percent (33). More than half of the population of the Naur region (59.4 percent) are also Chechens (37) (in 1970 their share in this region was 42.7 percent (38), and in 1979 - 51.6 percent (39). The Chechen population grew rapidly in the Shelkovsky region, in 1970 it was 19.4 percent (7540 people) (40), in 1979 - 27.8 percent (11176 people) (41), and in 1989 - already 37.5 percent (16,876 people) (42) According to the latest data, 18 thousand Chechens live in the region (43) (it is assumed, however, that their number has already exceeded 20 thousand people).

Over the past decades, the Chechen population has steadily increased in the Sunzha region and in the city of Grozny. In 1970, 9,452 Chechens lived in the Sunzha region (15.5 percent of the population of this region) (44), in 1979 - 11,240 (18.8 percent) (45), and in 1989 - 13,047 (21.4 percent) (46). According to other sources, there are about 17,000 Chechens in the Sunzha region. If in 1970 only 59,279 Chechens lived in Grozny and their share in the population of the city did not exceed 17.4 percent (47), then in 1989 they already amounted to 121,350 people. (48). In other words, almost every third inhabitant of the republic's capital was a Chechen.

Some of the Chechens lived within the Malgobek region. In 1989, in the city of Malgobek, the villages of Psedakh, Akki-Yurt, Vezhariy-Yurt and the village of Voznesenskaya, there were 5,789 Chechens (49).

According to the 1989 census, there were 223,808 Chechens outside Checheno-Ingushetia (50). Large groups of them were represented in the population of Dagestan (57,877 people, according to other sources, even 70 thousand people), Kazakhstan (49,506 people), Kalmykia (8,329 people), Georgia (about 8 thousand people). ), Kyrgyzstan (2873 people), Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (2845 people), North Ossetia (2646 people) (51). In some areas, Chechens made up a significant proportion of the population. So, in the Zavetinskiy district of the Rostov region, their share exceeded 40 percent.

Large groups of Chechens settled in the Stavropol Territory, Kalinin, Voronezh and some other regions of Russia. Naturally, they did not leave for these parts from a good life.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the numerical growth of Chechens outside their historical homeland in 1979-1989. was much higher than the natural increase of their total population. And this testified to the fact that in recent years, due to the lack of jobs and difficult living conditions, the outflow of the indigenous population from Checheno-Ingushetia continued.

Elmurzaev Yu,

Pages of the history of the Chechen people.

NOTES:

1. See: Volkova N. G. The ethnic composition of the population of the North Caucasus in the 19th century. AKD. M., 1973. S. 115-116.

2. Statement of the population of the Caucasus and the degree of their obedience to the tsarist government. June 1833 - In the book: Movement of the Highlanders of the North-Eastern Caucasus in 20-50s. XIX century. Makhachkala, 1959, pp. 124-125.

3. Journal "Revolution and Highlander", No. 6-7, 1932. P. 94.

4. Dzidzaria G. A. Makhadzhirstvo and problems of the history of Abkhazia in the 19th century. Sukhumi, 1982 p. 420; Gagatl A. M. Heroic epic. Narts of the Adyghe (Circassian) peoples. Maykop, 1987, p. 139.

5. Acad. A. P. Verger. The eviction of mountaineers from the Caucasus. Russian antiquity. Monthly historical publication. 1882. Thirteenth year, vol. XXXIII. From 4.

6. A. Shakh-Gireev. Chechnya must become literate. - "Revolution and Highlander", 1931, No. 8. S. 46

7. Volkova N. G. Decree. op. pp. 120-121; V. I. Kozlov. Nationalities of the USSR. M., 1975. S. 35.

8. S. A. Isaev. From the history of the class struggle in Chechnya in the 60-70s of the XIX century - Izvestiya CHINIIYAL, vol. IX, part four, no. 1, Grozny, 1976, pp. 153-158.

9. A. Sheripov. Speech at a meeting of the Terek Regional Council during the discussion of the issue of declaring the independence of the North Caucasus by mountain nationalists on April 24, 1918. Articles and speeches. Grozny, 1972, p. 55.

10. Acad. A. P. Berge. Decree. op. S. 16; S. A. Isaev. The treacherous policy of Turkey in organizing the eviction of mountaineers from the Caucasus, - Orga, No. 4, | 1988, p. 90.

11. Ch S. A. Isaev. Decree. op. S. 91.

12. N. P. Grishchenko. Class and anti-colonial struggle of the peasants of Checheno-Ingushetia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Grozny, 1971. P. 21-22.

13. V.I. Kozlov. Decree. op. S. 249.

16. Calculated by the author; See: Telegram from L. Beria to I. Stalin dated February 17, 1944 - Moscow News, October 14, 1990; Information from the department of special settlements of the NKVD of the USSR on the number of special settlers in October 1946. - Right there.

18. From the memoirs of a resident of the village. Roshni-Chu Ahmed Mudarov. - Archive of the author.

21. Kozlov V. I. Decree. op. S. 249.

22. Ibid. S. 181.

23. Ibid. S. 249.

24. USSR in numbers in 1979. M., 1980. S. 15.

25. The national composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Grozny Chechen-Ingush Republican Department of Statistics 1990 C 9.

26. I. A. Javakhishvilli. The main historical and ethnological problems of the history of Georgia, the Caucasus and the Middle East with ancient era. - VPI 1939, No. 4. S. 46; N. Ya. Marr. On the history of the movement of the Japhetic peoples from the south to the north of the Caucasus. IAN, 1916, No. 15, 1395-1396; From the history of relations between the Georgian and Chechen-Ingush peoples (from ancient times to the 15th century). Grozny, 1963, p. 16; Vagapov Ya.S. Vainakhs and Sarmatians. Grozny, 1990.

27. V. Potto. Caucasian war in separate essays, episodes, legends and biographies. T. 2. Ermolovskoe time. Third ed., S.-P, 1913 S. 61.

28. Volkova N. G. Decree. op. S. 122.

29. Essays on the history of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. T. 2. Grozny, 1972. S. 129.

30. All-Union population census of 1926. North Caucasian region M., 1928. S. 87.

31. TsGA CHIASSR, f. 767, unit ridge 9, l. 336.

33. See: S. N. Dzhuguryants. The implementation of the Leninist national policy in Checheno-Ingushetia based on the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU Grozny 1965. P. 36.

34. See: ibid.

35. The national composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. P. 10.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Number and composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Statistical collection. Grozny, 1972, p. 25.

39. 3. I. Khasbulatova. Interethnic marriages in Checheno-Ingushetia. - In the book: New and traditional in the culture and life of the peoples of Checheno-Ingushetia. Grozny, 1985, p. 36.

40. Number and composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. S. 25.

41. 3. I. Khasbulatova. Decree. op. S. 36.

42. The national composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. From 10

44. Number and composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. From 25

45. 3. I. Khasbulatova. Decree. op. S. 36.

46. ​​The national composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. From 10

47. Number and composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic C "20"

48. The national composition of the population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic C 10

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid. S. 9.

51. Data obtained from the Central (Republican) Statistical Office of the Chechen-Ingush Republic in 1990.

The Chechen Republic is part of the Russian Federation. Belongs to the North Caucasian Federal District (NCFD). The capital of the republic is the city of Grozny.

In the west, Chechnya borders on Ingushetia, in the northeast and east on Dagestan, on North Ossetia in the northwest, and in the south it crosses the border with Georgia.

Take with you:

Chechen Republic: briefly about the main

When the Second Chechen War began, the administration of the Chechen Republic was formed. Its leader was Akhmat Kadyrov, who defected to Russia. In 2003, the Chechen Republic adopted a new constitution, according to which it became part of the Russian Federation. Also, in 2003, presidential elections were held, in which Akhmat Kadyrov was elected. However, he was killed on May 9, 2004 in Grozny due to a terrorist attack.

The place of Akhmat Kadyrov in 2004 was taken by Alu Alkhanov. He retired after 3 years, in 2007. Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of Akhmat Kadyrov, became the new president of the Chechen Republic in 2007.

According to the State Committee of Russia, the population of Chechnya is 1,324,767 people. (2013). The most populated is the capital - the city of Grozny (250,803 people), the second place is occupied by the city of Urus-Martan (52,399 people).

Representatives of various nationalities live in the Chechen Republic: Chechens, Russians, Kumyks, Chamalals, Nogais, Ingush, Tatars and many others. etc. The official languages ​​of the republic are Chechen and Russian.

The republic contains a large number of beautiful places: rivers, lakes, waterfalls, high mountains etc.

• The main religion is Islam;
• State languages: Chechen and Russian;
• Now a little less than one and a half million people live in the republic;
• The bulk of the republic's population are Chechens;
• In Chechnya, penny coins do not "go" and prices in local outlets are always a multiple of one ruble;
• In Chechnya, cars are almost never stolen (but times are changing);
• Contrary to popular belief, no one is forcing Chechen women to wear headscarves;
• Almost all surnames in Chechnya are based on the name of an ancestor;
• This republic was the first territory where they adopted a ban on the operation of slot machines;
• According to local traditions, men are considered adults from the age of 15. That is, at this age they should already be responsible for all their actions;
• Chechens, like the Ingush, call themselves Vainakhs. Translated into Russian, the word "vai" means "one's own", and "nah" means "people". Thus, Vainakh means "one's own people" or "one's own people".

Photos of Chechnya

History of the Chechen Republic

People lived in the plains of Sunzha and Terek since time immemorial, but in the 13th century the ancestors of modern Chechens were forced to go to the highlands. The reason for this was the turmoil brought during the Tatar-Mongol invasion.

Thus, until the 16th century, the bulk of the Chechens lived in the mountains. Around the same period, in the society of representatives of the Vainakh ethnic group, a teip, or as it is also called, a tribal structure of society began to emerge, in which the territory of a person’s residence and his family ties were of great importance, which are very strong for this people to this day.

From the 16th century, the Chechens began to gradually move again to the flat terrain. And at the same time, one Shikh-Murza Okotsky began to establish ties with Moscow and sent his like-minded people to the Russian capital to discuss the entry of Chechnya into Russia.

Around the same time, the first Cossack settlers appeared here, initiating the formation of the so-called Terek Cossacks. In the 18th century, it ceased to be free, and the Cossacks officially became part of the Russian armed forces. The main task The Terek Cossacks were guarding the southern borders of Russia.

In the 18th century, Russian military campaigns on the territory of Chechnya became regular. The cause of the conflict was the constant complaints of the Cossacks about the raids of the indigenous population on their settlements, which did not contribute to the security of the borders.

In the 19th century, Emperor Alexander II issued a decree according to which Chechnya officially became part of the Russian Empire, along with other districts. This territory began to be called the Terek region.

After the Russian civil war 1917, on the territory of the republic was created Islamic State. Uzun Haji (Emir) became the head of the North Caucasian Emirate. However, soon the emirate lost its independence and became known as the Mountain ASSR, as it became part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

Then, with the advent of Soviet power, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Terek region was divided into the Ingush and Chechen districts. Then, in 1934 and 1936, it was renamed in turn into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Okrug and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

During the Great patriotic war, at the end of the winter of 1944, the entire population of Chechnya was deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The reason for these repressive measures was the unfair accusation of the Chechens and Ingush that they allegedly acted as accomplices of the fascist troops.

As a result, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was disbanded. Its territories were partly attached to other geographical entities, and partly included the Grozny region. Thus, the city of Grozny was preserved and became the administrative center of the newly formed region. In 1957, a decision was made to restore justice to the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the indigenous population returned to their native lands. However, the problem of the land issue still stands between some regions.

War in Chechnya

During the collapse of the USSR, various national movements became more active in Chechnya. The Executive Committee of the National Congress was created here, thus, two branches of power worked simultaneously in the republic. The national movement was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev. The major general set as his goal to achieve the withdrawal of Chechnya from the Soviet Union. The official head of the republic, Doku Zavgaev, did not give up his position, and as a result, this contradiction formed the basis of a long military conflict.

After perestroika in 1991, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a special situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In response to this, Dzhokhar Dudayev set about creating self-defense units. The first armed conflict between Russian and Chechen troops took place already in November 1991, when Dudayev's fighters blocked planes with Russian military on board at the Khankala airport. As a result of negotiations, Russian servicemen were withdrawn from Chechnya, leaving most of the military equipment and weapons there, which, as a result, passed to Dudayev's fighters.

The Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist and was divided into Chechnya and Ingushetia. In the last fall of 1992, hostilities and the displacement of the Ingush from the suburban area took place on the territory, and in the summer of 1992 it officially became part of the RSFSR as the Ingush Republic. In the same year, a council of Russian deputies recognized the existence of the Chechen Republic and amended the constitution accordingly.

Ichkeria

Despite the fact that the independence of Chechnya was not recognized by any state, the republic actually existed independently, having its own government, courts, flag, coat of arms, anthem, etc. In 1993, it received a new name and became known as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

The situation in Chechnya at that time was extremely tense. Business in the republic was mostly criminal, and often based on taking hostages, stealing oil or drug trafficking.

Rampant crime caused opposition movements to form in Chechnya that did not support the Dudayev regime. Thus, the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic arose here, whose members fought for the overthrow of Dudayev and enlisted the support of Russia.

Two large military companies followed. The first Chechen war, which began with the storming of Grozny, lasted from 1994 to 1995. Dzhokhar Dudayev died in 1995 from an air missile strike.

The second Chechen war began in 1999. Active hostilities in Chechnya ended in the early spring of 2000. Further, the military conflict was of a partisan nature. Now the Chechen Republic is officially part of the Russian Federation.

Authorities of Chechnya

The head of the Chechen Republic is Ramzan Kadyrov. He has held this position since 2007, after the official voluntary resignation of Alu Alkhanov.

And the first president of the Chechen Republic was Akhmad Kadyrov, the father of Ramzan Kadyrov. Under him, in 2003, a constitution was adopted, according to which the republic became part of the Russian Federation. Akhmat Kadyrov died in 2004. He became one of the victims of the terrorist attack in Grozny.

Parliament of Chechnya:

• Council of the Republic - 21 people, according to the number of regions of the republic;
• People's Assembly - 40 deputies - 20 from party lists and 20 from single-mandate constituencies.

Since April 11, 2007, Odes Baysultanov has been appointed Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic.

Geography of the Chechen Republic

Geographically, Chechnya is located in the North Caucasus near the rivers Sunzha and Terek. To the north of the republic, steppe and semi-desert terrain prevails, from the south - mountain ranges (Caucasus Mountains), and in the middle - forest-steppe. The local climate can be classified as continental.

On the territory of the republic, in addition to the Terek and Sunzha, there are 17 more rivers, 15 lakes, and five waterfalls. There are also many mountain ranges, five of which are over four thousand meters.

Conventionally, the republic can be divided into several main zones:

• Foothill. This land, partially covered with forest, has been famous for its fertility since ancient times. Due to the rather mild climate, fruit-bearing southern plants and trees have long taken root here. The value of this site was also given by the fact that many trees grow here, which are used for the construction of houses and other structures;
• Mountain. People call this area "black mountains". There are mostly mountain ranges here, “decorated” with beautiful waterfalls and gullies. It is noteworthy that a large area rocks here it is covered with chernozem, thanks to which not only many ordinary trees grow in the forests, but also fruit-bearing species: plum, pear, dogwood, apple tree, etc. The huge number of herbs growing in local forests is also striking, among which there are many medicinal ones;
• Alpine. Here the picture is different. The harsh climate and cold have caused the appearance of eternal snows and glaciers on the tops of the ridges. In the northern part of Chechnya, where the mountains are a little lower, one can see valleys covered with black soil. During the warm season, they are usually used as pastures;
• Plain. There are two main plains in the Chechen Republic, one is located on the left bank of the Terek, and the second is between the Black Mountains, Termsky, Grozny, and Sunzhensky mountain ranges.

The republic can be proud not only of its incredible beauty of mountain landscapes and generous fertile soil, but also of the presence of various natural resources on its territory. Chechnya has three dozen oil and gas fields. Gypsum, mineral paints, sandstone, limestone, etc. are also mined here. There are also famous healing mineral springs.

Rivers

The rivers on the territory of Chechnya are scattered. In total there are 20 main rivers, these are: Terek, Argun, Gekhi, Sunzha, Sharoargun, Aksai, Baas, Khulhulau, Martan, Yamansu, Shalazha, Gums, Yaryk-su, Roshnya, Fortanga, Michik, Netkhoi, Shalazha, Chemulga, Assa.

There are 14 lakes, the largest and deepest of them is Lake Kezenoyam, located in the North Caucasus and is mountainous (belongs to the Vedeno region).

• Lakes of the Achkhoy-Martan region: Galain-Am, Gekhi-Am.
• Lakes of the Shelkovsky region: Big, Salty, Cherkasy.
• Lakes of the Shatoi region: Urgyukhkhoy-am, Bezik-Ome.
• Lakes of the Naursky district: Kapustino, Mayorskoye, Generalskoye and Chechenskoye. One lake belongs to the Sharoysky district - Amga, as well as to the Itum-Kalinsky - Chentii-am.

There are only five waterfalls, these are: Argun, Genikh, Sharo-Argun, Khulhuloi and Aksai waterfalls.

The highest peaks of the mountains were called “Peaks of four thousand meters”, to match their height: Maistismta (4082 m), Donosmta (4174 m), Komito (4262 m), Diklosmta (4285 m), Tebulosmta (4493 m).

Fauna of Chechnya

Due to the fact that several different climatic territories are located on the territory of the republic, its vegetation and animal world striking in its diversity. The climate here, depending on the area, can be continental, arid or highland. In one area, the average winter temperature can be only "-3" degrees, and in another from "-12" to "-15" degrees. Precipitation in the republic also falls unevenly.

Considering that on the territory of Chechnya, there are different natural zones, ranging from steppes and deserts to forests, forest-steppes and glaciers in the mountains, here you can meet a wide variety of fauna.

In total, more than 400 species of animals live on the territory of the republic. Of these, about 200 are "Red Book", which is why the authorities of the republic pay great attention to the fight against poachers who exterminate rare species of animals.

Bears, lynxes and forest cats live in mountains and gorges. Foxes, roe deer, chamois, weasels, badgers, red deer and saiga are found in local forests.

The latter animal, outwardly very reminiscent of a ram with long legs, and prefers to live on dry flat steppes. But in the mountains of this Caucasian beast it is almost impossible to meet. Also, here you can often see a wild jackal, which is a cross between a fox and a wolf. The jackal is omnivorous, and in the absence of meat or fish, it is ready to eat, for example, fruits or wild berries.

The flora of the republic is also very rich. And if camel thorn and wormwood mainly grow on arid soils, then the black earth delights us with high yields of wheat, corn and various horticultural crops. And in the mountain meadows grows many medicinal herbs, and here locals often establish apiaries to collect amazingly fragrant, tasty and pure honey.

Flag of Chechnya

The State Flag of Chechnya is a rectangular panel of three straight stripes: green top - 65 cm, middle white - 10 cm and red bottom - 35 cm. The entire flag is framed with gold fringe along the contour. The ratio of width to length is 2:3.

Coat of arms of Chechnya

Coat of arms of the Chechen Republic

The State Emblem of Chechnya was approved on June 22, 2004. The coat of arms is made in a round shape of a two-dimensional plane. It has four colors: yellow, white, red and blue.

In the central part of the Emblem there is a Symbol of Unity and Eternity in the form of a national Chechen ornament, which is painted red. IN blue color the mountains, the oil rig and the historical tower of the Vainakhs are painted.

On a blue background, yellow ears of wheat are depicted, framing the inner circle. They symbolize the wealth of the people of Chechnya.

The outer circle has an image of a red pattern of ornaments in the national style of the Chechens on a yellow background.

The wolf is a symbol of Chechnya and Chechens?

There is a fictional story that has nothing to do with Chechnya:

According to an old legend, in ancient times, the Almighty commanded people and animals to keep the commandments and give each other only good. At first, everyone tried to keep the commandments, but over time they began to give vent to emotions and began to cause pain and death to their neighbors. People killed each other, stole and gave vent to anger. So did the animals. On the whole earth, only one she-wolf kept all the commandments and tried to live, treating all her neighbors as brothers.

Meanwhile, the Almighty sent angels to earth to keep people and animals from sin, but the inhabitants of the earth did not accept God's messengers and continued to do lawlessness.

And the Almighty became angry and brought down his anger on the earth in the form of terrible hurricanes, during which centuries-old trees were uprooted and the seas were seething! And while the strongest gusts of icy wind destroyed everything and everything, sand fell from the sky, which, getting into people's throats, did not allow them to breathe.

And then all the sinners rushed into the loose, trying to escape, and only one she-wolf was ready to humbly accept her fate. She stood and did not move, and her wolf cubs and people were hiding behind her. And all the wrath of the Almighty fell on the she-wolf, and the wind blew on her so hard that she tore off pieces of meat and skin from her body, but she stood, and did not even think of running ...

And then the Almighty appreciated her courage and said that there was still one worthy creature left in the world. And after that, the bad weather that turned the earth into hell stopped instantly. People came out from behind the she-wolf, and immediately killed her, so as not to leave alive the witness of their fear, shame and humiliation.

Take with you:

So, the Chechen Republic (Chechnya) is one of the Subjects of the Russian Federation and is part of the North Caucasian District. In total, its territory occupies over 15.5 square kilometers. She is famous for her beautiful views: mountain ranges, waterfalls and lakes. The Chechen land is also rich in productive soils, valuable tree species, as well as minerals: oil, gas, etc.

The local population has been living in the Chechen plains and mountains since the 13th century. In the 19th century most of these lands became part of Russia.

Demography, population losses and migration flows in the zone of armed conflict in the Chechen Republic

The very idea and possibility of elections is based on the fact that the opinion, the vote of each person can be taken into account and correlated with the opinions of other members of the community - that is, on the assumption of their calculus. If the whole is not defined, its components lose their meaning. The rulers, by no means elected, also sought to take into account their subjects, however, for other purposes - one can recall both the English "Book of the Last Judgment" and the biblical "Book of Numbers".

Turning to estimates of the number, migration and losses of the population in the zone of armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, one involuntarily recalls the name of another Old Testament text - "The Book of Paralipopemnon", the Book of the Lost, Lost...

Mistakes in voter lists are a serious thing. Quite recently, in December, the absence of a third of voters from the lists became one of the reasons for the overthrow of the ruling regime in Georgia. But it is there, beyond the mountains. And on our side of the Greater Caucasus Range, in Chechnya, almost one and a half excess of the number of voters over the theoretically possible one is in the order of things.
Someone will call it an anomaly, a deviation from the norm. However, gentlemen, three-dimensional images have such a property: break the hologram into parts, and in each piece you will see not a fragment of the original image, not a part, but the whole. Only in miniature. In the Chechen "presidential elections" on October 5, 2003, the outlines of the March 14 Russian elections can be seen.

Perhaps that is why the article "The Book of Numbers. The Book of Losses. The Book of the Last Judgment. Demography, population losses and migration flows in the zone of armed conflict in the Chechen Republic" will be of interest not only to those who are interested in our last "Caucasian war".

The article will be included in the book "The Political Process Through the Looking-Glass", which is being prepared for publication by the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Human Rights Center "Memorial".

The results of three votes in 2003 in Chechnya - in the referendum on March 26, in the presidential elections on October 5 and the Duma elections on December 7 - were summed up based on the results of the October 2002 census. Then it was officially announced that the population of the Chechen Republic is 1 million 88 thousand people.

Three years earlier, at the beginning of the "second Chechen war", the federal center estimated the population of the Chechen Republic at 350,000 people, of which 300,000 were Chechens. So, in November 1999, Igor Shabdurasulov (then deputy head of the presidential administration) said: “Today, more than 750 thousand Chechens live outside the republic, in Russia. In the republic itself, according to various estimates, from 150 to 200 thousand remained, and those , whom we call "forced migrants", is also about 100-150 thousand."

How to combine these two numbers? What - in three years the population of Chechnya has tripled? It turns out that not only all the refugees of the "second Chechen war" returned to the republic, but also the entire diaspora that had previously formed. The assumption is, to put it mildly, bold.

To understand this solitaire, you need to try to answer a few questions.

First, what was the population of the republic in different time How many people lived on the territory of the republic?
Secondly, what was the migration outside of Chechnya, how many refugees were outside Chechnya at different times?
Thirdly, what is the scale of the deaths of the inhabitants of Chechnya during the armed conflicts of recent years?

And then the resulting numbers should somehow be coordinated with each other ...

The previous census in Checheno-Ingushetia, as well as throughout the USSR, took place in 1989. The population of the CHIASSR amounted to 1275.5 thousand people in cash and 1270.4 thousand - permanent. There is no separate information about the population living on the territory of modern Chechnya and Ingushetia, it can be estimated in 1989 as a little over 1.1 million and 170 thousand people, respectively.

The national composition of the resident population of the CHIASSR was as follows: out of 1270.4 thousand - 734.5 thousand Chechens, 163.8 thousand Ingush, 293.8 thousand Russians, 14.8 thousand Armenians, 12.6 thousand Ukrainians. There is no exact information about the national composition of the population of the territory of Chechnya itself for 1989, a possible estimate: out of 1084 thousand - about 715 thousand Chechens, 25 thousand Ingush, 269 thousand Russians; thus, the upper estimate of the Vainakh population at that time was 755-760 thousand people.

According to censuses, the number of Vainakhs in the USSR increased by 27% in 1979-89, which corresponds to an annual increase of 2.42%. It is possible to proceed from these data when assessing the maximum possible number of the Vainakh and, in particular, the Chechen component of the population of Checheno-Ingushetia. Compared with recent years Soviet power, in the 1990s, socio-economic conditions were unlikely to contribute to an increase in the birth rate and a decrease in mortality from natural causes. Note that these estimates are the maximum, according to more cautious forecasts, the increase in the 1990s could be 15%, at best - 20%. Nevertheless, extrapolating the census data for the period of the second Chechen war, we find that the number of Chechens could exceed one million in 2002.

Table 1. The maximum number of the Chechen population of Chechnya and Ingushetia during the "second Chechen war" (* - extrapolation of the period 1979-1989)

To understand how these estimates, these predictions, differ from reality (even if it is reflected in official documents), it is enough to refer to the current demographic statistics of the 1990s. These data also cast doubt on the correctness of the above statements of officials. The Russian Statistical Yearbook gives the following dynamics of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia:

Table 2. Current population of Chechnya and Ingushetia (in thousands of people, as of January 1 of each year)

	Chechnya	Ingushetia

Table 3. Distribution of the resident population of the Chechen Republic by sex and main age groups as of January 1, 1998

This gender and age structure of the population of Chechnya looks plausible. The shortage of the male population - 70,000 people - is by no means explained by military losses (see below), but by the departure of men to work in other regions of Russia.

We also note that, according to the table, the number of voters in the Chechen Republic on the eve of the second war could not exceed 526,720 people.

The main factor that has changed the demography of Chechnya in recent years has been migration outside the republic.

The Russian mass media mostly talked about the exodus of the "Russian-speaking" (more precisely, non-Vainakh) population - this is true, but by no means the whole truth.

Number Eastern Slavs(Russians and Ukrainians) in Checheno-Ingushetia was rapidly declining back in the 70-80s - according to the census, from 379.6 thousand in 1970 to 306.4 thousand in 1989. Then, of course, this was not connected with the "criminal regime of Dudayev and Maskhadov."

In addition, a similar outcome was observed in other national formations of the Caucasus. This was explained by many factors. First, the relative overpopulation and scarcity of land. Secondly, tense relations between national groups - even in the era of "friendship of peoples." Thirdly, the greater cohesion of the peoples of the Caucasus compared to the Russians - even when it came to the Cossacks.

In Chechnya, these processes were much deeper and tougher than in neighboring republics - the reason for this is the large hidden unemployment, and the greater stability of traditional social institutions among the Vainakhs, where everyone was under the protection of the community - which made the object of pressure, including criminal, representatives of non-Vainakh ethnic groups.

The weakening of power structures in general and law enforcement agencies in particular in 1991-1994 accelerated the outflow of Russian-speaking residents from Chechnya, but even during the first Chechen war, Grozny remained a half-Russian city. In 1996-1999, the practical collapse of statehood and even the merging of power in Chechnya with openly criminal structures, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the central government's disregard for the situation with human rights in the region, led to the exodus of most of the non-Vainakh population from the republic.

Finally, the second Chechen war, which began in 1999, practically completed the ethnic cleansing of the republic - everyone fled from hostilities, almost exclusively Chechens returned. Even the Grozny Ingush did not really want to return and settled in Ingushetia.

In the interval between the wars, Chechens also fled from Chechnya. During this period, up to one and a half thousand local residents, primarily Chechens, were kidnapped for the purpose of obtaining a ransom - as we see, traditional public institutions were already disintegrating. But what was the size of that wave of refugees? In the autumn of 1999, Vladimir Putin, then the chairman of the Russian government, spoke about the diaspora: “We are ready for political cooperation with those citizens of Chechnya who have left the territory of the Chechen Republic in recent years, and, let me remind you, there are 220,000 Russians and 550,000 Chechens" - from the context it is obvious that it was only about pre-war emigration.

If one can agree with the estimate of the number of Slavs who left, then the origin of the last figure is inexplicable. Of the 978,426 forced migrants who were registered with the FMS as of January 1, 1999, there were 10,995 Chechens. In 1998, 2,026 Chechens were registered in this capacity. In total, there were 147,232 forced migrants from Chechnya, a year earlier there were 13,007. The departure of Chechens from the territory of Chechnya to other regions of Russia was hindered in the second half of the 1990s by the fact that both the authorities and sometimes the local population considered them as "foreigners", and very hostile ones at that.

The assessments made public by Putin, being adopted by lower-ranking officials, put them in an uncomfortable position. When in the autumn of 1999 the number of refugees who left the republic peaked at 350,000, Vladimir Kalamanov, at that time the head of the Federal Migration Service, said: "The whole of Chechnya has withdrawn, registered and is migrating!" And this was putting it mildly: if we take seriously the official estimate of the population of Chechnya at the beginning of the conflict at 300,000, the federal troops at that moment overcame the resistance of several tens of thousands of blockaded people ... with a "minus" sign!

The only conclusion that saves us from this absurdity is that official statements and figures were determined by considerations of momentary political gain and were connected with reality very indirectly. Real information about the population of the Chechen Republic, and consequently about the scale of a possible subsequent exodus of refugees from there, could complicate the planning of a military operation or even call it into question.

Apparently, no one in power structures was embarrassed by the fact that as a result, many times more people turned out to be bombed in the zone of armed conflict, that the wave of refugees far exceeded all forecasts. Moreover, the statements of officials were not corrected, they still contradicted not only reality and common sense, but also each other. Before political expediency, not only reality receded, but also what stood behind the numbers - human lives.

Are there any real, based not only on estimates and extrapolations, data on the population of Chechnya at the beginning of the "second Chechen war"? In the sources there were references to "Maskhadov's census" - earlier the author considered them apocryphal, but in 2003 he changed his mind.

The population census in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was carried out for several months, from August to October 1998.

The template for the census forms was the standard form used in the 1989 All-Union Census; this form has been changed only in details.

During these three months, the census takers carried out door-to-door rounds - perhaps not everywhere equally carefully, but they came to some respondents' homes three times, and only on the third time they were caught and questioned.

There was no subsequent input of information from the sheets into the computer, all the more so - there was no analysis of the information. The processing of the census results was reduced to counting the census sheets. But even with the involvement of all employees of all departments of the Department of Demographic Statistics, this simple operation dragged on until February 1999. In total, about 800 thousand inhabitants were counted in Chechnya. Note that similar values ​​were also given in the Russian Statistical Yearbook.

If on the eve and at the very beginning of the second Chechen war, information about the number of residents of the Chechen Republic received "political significance" - in the statements of officials their number decreased from 800 to 300 thousand - then in the following months and years the question of the number of forced migrants who left from the conflict zone. The information published by Vladimir Kalamanov - up to 350,000 refugees - corresponded to reality, but was extremely inconvenient for the federal authorities.

Officials from the very beginning of the armed conflict not only disputed the figures, but above all denied or replaced the reasons for such a mass exodus, the main of which was and remains the very nature of the way the "siloviki" in Chechnya acted. This operation was called "counter-terrorist" - such a definition implies the highest selectivity of actions. The purpose of such an operation is, first of all, to save people, and then to capture or destroy the terrorists. In fact, the main instruments for the military component of the Chechen campaign were massive indiscriminate bombardments and shelling, for the "police" component - massive indiscriminate detentions. The operation was not "counter-terrorist" from the very beginning: there was no file of terrorists to be detained, no list of targets to attack. "Precise strikes", "humanitarian corridors", "security zones" existed only in official propaganda.

In the autumn of 1999, people fled Chechnya from "pinpoint strikes" - that is, from massive indiscriminate bombing and shelling. But the roads declared "humanitarian corridors" would be more appropriate to call "corridors of death": the number of people who died in settlements and when leaving them was comparable. On the whole, however, this survival strategy paid off.

Migration statistics have been and remain incompatible with the official position that the situation in Chechnya will return to normal soon. From the very beginning, the military and propagandists claimed that everything was in order there, and militants were chasing people to create "the illusion of a humanitarian catastrophe." The ideal here is that there are no refugees (or rather, no television picture of forced migrant camps), which means there is no problem. There was such a temptation from the very beginning: on September 25, 1999, General Shamanov by telephone forbade the departments of internal affairs to let migrants from the Chechen Republic through the administrative borders. All subjects of the federation did this - except for Ingushetia, headed by President Ruslan Aushev. Thus, most of the forced migrants from Chechnya ended up in Ingushetia, at some point the actual population of the republic almost doubled compared to the permanent one. Within half a year, the number of forced migrants of this last wave decreased here to about 150 thousand people. It remained at this level until the second half of 2002, when active attempts were made to "voluntarily-forced" their return to Chechnya. But even a year and a half later, half of them remain in Ingushetia. As of the end of 2003, Russian officials speak of 4,200 or 4,500 forced migrants in tent camps (towns). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates the population of the camps at 7,000 people, in addition to whom another 24,000 live in temporary settlements in adapted premises and 36,000 live in the private sector, totaling 67,000 internally displaced persons.

From the very beginning of the armed conflict, the federal authorities disputed these figures. Information from international humanitarian organizations was constantly called into question by Russian officials, but after registration of internally displaced persons by the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the summer of 2002, these doubts disappeared. Joint work in Ingushetia of state structures and humanitarian organizations, mutual transparency, mutual control and cross-checking of information have done their job.

The reduction in the number of Chechen refugees in Ingushetia was by no means only due to the return to Chechnya - those who could, went to other regions of the Russian Federation or even beyond its borders.

Officials cited various reasons why all attempts to bring migrants back to places permanent residence do not give a result. The main reason is the lack of security on the territory of Chechnya.

In December 1999, refugees began to return (sometimes forcibly) to the territory of Chechnya, to the so-called "security zones". This led to new casualties: in Shali on January 9, in the villages of Zakan-Yurt, Shaami-Yurt and Katyr-Yurt in early February 2000, hundreds of civilians who returned there were killed by bombing and shelling. Of course, these "safety zones" were not agreed with the opposing side, and the federal forces themselves did not limit their actions to these zones: both of them acted as if in a desert, not burdening themselves with caring for the lives of local residents. After the end of active hostilities in the spring of 2000, "cleansing operations" began in populated areas. not reaching main goal- to identify the participants in the armed resistance, "cleansing" took the form of mass indiscriminate violence. Looting, torture and beatings, "disappearances" and murders of people engendered in the inhabitants of Chechnya hatred for the Russian security forces and the state as a whole, multiplied the ranks of resistance and did not at all engender in the refugees a desire to return home. At the end of 2002, the number of “cleansing operations” decreased, but people still disappear during “targeted events”, night visits by “unidentified armed persons in camouflage uniforms and masks who arrived in armored vehicles”.

Under these conditions, calls for the "voluntary return" of forced migrants from Ingushetia are hypocritical and criminal - but they have been continuing since the end of 1999 - why? The movement of internally displaced persons to Chechnya, albeit a formal one, means switching flows of humanitarian aid, financial flows, "live" money there with the prospect of their uncontrolled spending. So there was a "social order" for the quick return of migrants from Ingushetia to Chechnya, not only from the federal center, not only from the military, but also from the administration of Akhmad Kadyrov.

For almost three years - from autumn 1999 to autumn 2002 - the number of forced migrants from Chechnya who were in Ingushetia was disputed by representatives of the federal and Chechen authorities loyal to Moscow. Unable to create conditions for the return of refugees, or even bring them back by force, the authorities tried to deny their existence.

In the first months of the second Chechen war, up to 350,000 of the approximately 800,000 inhabitants fled outside the administrative borders of the Chechen Republic. What about the rest?

Most of them joined the process of internal migration: first from the northern and eastern regions, then from Grozny and from the mountains. The battle zones tried to leave everyone who could. Numerous families left one or two people to protect property from marauders. At the same time, internal migration, as a rule, was local, to adjacent villages or districts: people hoped to quickly return to their homes, and to otherwise left the republic.

After the end of hostilities, the structure of settlement on the territory of Chechnya as a whole changed little compared to the pre-war period. Two significant anomalies can be singled out: a significant, at times, reduction in the population of Grozny and an accelerated depopulation of mountainous regions. According to the Federal Migration Service, in 2001 up to a third of the republic's population - 200,000 people - remained internal migrants.

The war made Chechnya de facto ethnically homogeneous. The Nevainakh population left it almost completely. But the Ingush - and those who could not return to the Prigorodny district in 1957 and settled in Grozny, and those who fled to Grozny in 1992 - basically left.

How many people died in the two Chechen wars?

One of the main historical sources for the period of the reign of Ivan the Terrible - the "Oprichny Synod" - was compiled when the sovereign was once again about to die. To atone for sins, to commemorate the slain, it was necessary to make a list of them. The crowned murderer, however, was so zealous that the compilers of the Synod had to end the list with the words: "The rest, Lord, you yourself weigh ..."

The Russian state is in the same situation today, since it did not make any real attempts to take into account the losses of the civilian population either during the 1994-1996 war or after 1999. There are no lists of names of the dead - even incomplete ones - and an intelligible polemic with any given figures - up to hundreds of thousands - turns out to be impossible for the Russian authorities.

So, on September 17, 2002, Salambek Maigov told reporters that eighty thousand civilians of the republic died in the "second Chechen war" - for some reason, with reference to Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Center "Memorial", although neither one nor the other about anything this has never been reported. The next day, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Observance of Human and Citizen Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, reacted - he, in turn, noted that this estimate was overstated, and in general, "all the figures that human rights organizations are currently reporting organizations, are subjective, evaluative data that have nothing to do with the real situation.

What has to do with reality?

During the first Chechen war, only one attempt was made to estimate the number of residents of Grozny who died there during the fighting from December 1994 to March 1995. Members of the Observatory Mission of Human Rights Organizations (better known as "Sergey Kovalev's group") operating on the basis of the Human Rights Center "Memorial" interviewed more than a thousand refugees from Grozny about cases of death of relatives (direct and cousins) and acquaintances during the fighting that they knew for certain. When processing the data, the structure of families was also taken into account - the average total number of relatives of different degrees of kinship, and the breadth of the circle of acquaintances, a correction was made for double counting, etc. On the whole, the methodology used in this case by Eduard Gelman, an employee of the Kurchatov Institute, in 1995 is typical for estimating the number of deaths in local conflicts. Based on the collected information, it was concluded that 25-29 thousand civilians died in Grozny.

Even during that war, in January 1996, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Rubanov, in an interview with Interfax, said that there were no official figures, there were only data from human rights activists: 25-30 thousand dead civilians. In the spring of 1997, during the preparation of the Russian-Chechen agreement, when the issue of a possible amount of compensation to Chechnya for the damage caused and for human losses was being discussed, Boris Brui, head of the Department of Demographic Statistics of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, asked Memorial about the number of dead citizens. Previously, he was addressed, as a last resort, to the International Committee of the Red Cross, from where he was sent to us. As a result, based on the same data, the State Statistics Committee concluded that 30-40 thousand died - "Memorial", realizing all the possible inaccuracy of such estimates, used the wording "less than 50 thousand."

Similarly, the only definitive estimate of the number of civilian deaths during the active hostilities of the second Chechen war was made by human rights activists from Human Rights Watch using a similar methodology. After collecting and analyzing detailed data on 1,300 deaths in the first nine months of the conflict, they concluded that their sample covered between 1/8 and 1/5 of the total number of victims. Thus, in total, from 6.5 to 10.4 thousand civilians died in those months.

An estimate of the number of residents of the Chechen Republic who died in the subsequent years of the armed conflict is possible on the basis of the Chronicle of Violence, which Memorial has been keeping since July 2000. The number of people whose deaths are reported in the Chronicle varies in different periods - from 489 in the second half of 2000 to 559 in the whole of 2002, not counting militants and Chechen policemen. The results of this monitoring are obviously incomplete. We record perhaps a quarter of such cases, in any case, no more than half - as a comparison with the official statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic for 2002 shows. Extrapolation of the data of the "Chronicles" allows us to conclude that after the end of active hostilities, from 5.3 to 10.7 thousand civilians died.

In addition, during the "second Chechen war" about three thousand people disappeared after being detained by federal security forces. The bodies of some of the disappeared have since been found and identified, but the vast majority of the rest are also unlikely to be alive.

Thus, the total number of civilians who died during the entire second Chechen war, including the "disappeared", is from 14.8 to 24.1 thousand, given the accuracy of the estimates - "from 15 to 24 thousand." A conservative estimate, excluding those reported missing, is "10,000 to 20,000".

Where did the other - significantly larger - estimates of the number of deaths come from?

Back in the first Chechen war, they talked about 80, 100, 120 thousand killed. These figures are the product of political games, and they are connected with reality very indirectly.

In the winter of 1996, shortly after Rubanov's confession mentioned above, several politicians at once - from Lebed to Novodvorskaya - declared: since the state speaks of 25-30 thousand dead, it means that in fact there are three times more of them - 80-100 thousand.

Another assessment is related to misinterpretation. Lechi Saligov, who worked in the pro-Russian Chechen administration during the first war, claimed that more than 120,000 people died in the Grozny region alone in 1995 - a house-to-house inspection conducted at that time revealed such a difference with pre-war figures. Saligov interpreted this difference as the death toll, although a more natural explanation is migration.

While civilian deaths were generally exaggerated in politicians' statements, the military and official propaganda underestimated or denied them altogether. So, in August 2001, General Valery Manilov stated that no more than a thousand civilians were killed in the second war. A year later, in August 2002, the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic Kostyuchenko spoke about the same thousand dead. Even then, this estimate was easily refuted not even by estimates and extrapolations, but by taking into account directly registered cases of death.

At the same time, the military and propagandists regularly announced successes in the destruction of militants, whose number on an accrual basis is already many tens of thousands. These figures, apparently, were not taken from the ceiling, they were obtained as a result of the work of the bureaucratic machine, but they have nothing to do with reality.

Estimates of the number of dead civilians, made public by representatives of law enforcement agencies, are also political in nature and are very weakly related to reality. However, the numbers of "destroyed militants" called by the military, which are overestimated by at least an order of magnitude, correlate with the losses of the civilian population.

Thus, the total number of civilians killed in the two wars in the Chechen Republic may reach 70,000 people. Although the accuracy of our estimates is not high, there is no alternative to them - the state did not and still does not count the citizens who died in the course of the "counter-terrorist operation" or "restoring constitutional order."

How many people lived in the Chechen Republic during the second war?

At different times, completely different assessments could be received on this question - and in the same place.

In August 2002 in Grozny, in the Government House, the OSCE Assistance Group was informed that about 600,000 people live in the Chechen Republic. This figure was very similar to the truth - out of about 800 thousand people of the pre-war population, about 150 thousand were forced migrants in neighboring republics, and a smaller but significant part scattered throughout the rest of Russia and beyond.

However, a month later, in September 2002, during Lord Judd's trip to Chechnya, in the same Government House he was informed about the allegedly successful return of refugees there, as a result of which the population of the republic reached 900 thousand people. This figure obviously exceeded not only the real, but also theoretically possible values ​​- but, apparently, it should have indicated the return to their homes of all forced migrants who fled from the "second Chechen war" that began three years ago. And since people have returned, it means that the situation in the republic is stable and safe - otherwise people will not go!

This is what the federal authorities soon tried to demonstrate again by conducting a census in Chechnya.

On October 14, 2002, the head of the government of the Chechen Republic, Stanislav Ilyasov, announced that a population census had been successfully conducted in Chechnya and the population of the republic was one million eighty-eight thousand people. According to Ilyasov, the result exceeded all expectations - the census sheets, which were brought in the republic, 825 thousand, quickly ran out, and more had to be brought. That is, taking into account the inevitable damage to the ballots, the authorities expected to receive a total population of no more than 800 thousand. For this, indeed, it would be enough to return to Chechnya all the migrants of the last three years. But in order to get a census result of 1088 thousand people, it would be necessary to return to the Chechen Republic ALL who fled from there in the 90s - not only Chechens and Ingush, but also Russians, Armenians and representatives of other non-Vainakh peoples. Or it would be necessary to recognize a significant increase in population, despite two wars and a collapse in the socio-economic sphere.

A normal person is unlikely to believe in such a "demographic miracle".

However, there is a plausible explanation for this miracle. During the census in the Chechen Republic, there were at least three significant factors that could significantly distort its results.

First, up to a third of the population of the republic were internal migrants. Although earlier it was repeatedly announced that the census documents were anonymous and would not be used for any other purposes, few people in Chechnya believed this. It was difficult to dissuade people that, according to the results of the census, local administrations would not excommunicate "unregistered" people from humanitarian assistance and from the promised future compensation for destroyed housing. In the same way, it was impossible to guarantee that the power structures and special services would not check those detained during the "cleansing operations" with the received lists, separating "civilians" from "alien militants." Thus, if a person lived in a village, but often visited the city, restoring his destroyed house, he had every reason to "correspond" both in the city and in the village - not so much out of an illusory expectation of benefits, but out of a very real fear for his security.

Secondly, it has been repeatedly stated at different levels that the census will help determine "how many schools and hospitals to build", and in relation to the Chechen Republic, both the amount of funding necessary for the restoration of the socio-economic sphere, and the amount of transfers for the payment of various benefits, etc. With the virtual absence of control and the impossibility of re-checking, the temptation for administrations at all levels was too great here, and it was a sin not to apply the experience gained during the "elections" of 1995, 1996, 2000 in using the "administrative resource".

Thirdly, and most importantly, representatives of various federal structures have repeatedly stated that the situation in Chechnya is stable and safe, that internally displaced persons have returned there or are about to return, and the upcoming census cannot fail to confirm this.

Thus, during the census, the local authorities could hope for the favor of the federal authorities, and the residents of Chechnya - for the "inattention" of local administrations to the excess of relatives enumerated from their words - in any case, this version is more plausible than the announced results of the census.

The unified will of the federal authorities, local authorities and ordinary residents of the Chechen Republic created a "demographic miracle". And we reaffirmed the internationally accepted practice of a moratorium on holding censuses and elections in zones of armed conflict and in a state of emergency.

How many people actually lived in Chechnya at that time? In the winter of 2002, the Danish Refugee Council conducted a house-to-house visit in Chechnya to determine the need for humanitarian assistance; they counted about 600,000 residents. It was precisely this number that the officials gave in August to the OSCE representatives, on whose opinion nothing depended - in contrast to Lord Judd, on the basis of whose report the PACE was to adopt another resolution. Black magic was exposed already in November 2002, a month after the census, when the Danish Refugee Council conducted another house-to-house round in Chechnya, as a result of which the population of Chechnya was about 700,000 people. It should be noted that the heads of rural administrations, who were interested in delivering humanitarian aid, could only contribute to an overestimation of this result.

The difference between this real value and the results of the census - under 400 thousand "dead souls" - became the "electoral reserve" for the referendum and the 2003 elections.

During the "elections" held by the federal authorities in Chechnya on December 14-17, 1995, when they voted for State Duma deputies and the "Head of the Chechen Republic" Doka Zavgaev, on June 14-16 and July 2-3, 1996, when they voted for the President of Russia and "Deputies of the People's Assembly", a high turnout was noted - from 60% to 74% of the total number of voters - 503 thousand. This is official data, the OSCE mission then stated that the elections do not meet the principles of free and fair expression of the will of citizens, or the mission staff left Chechnya for voting days. According to independent observers, most settlements people just didn't go to the polls. But the CEC recognized the elections as valid, although, we repeat, in the context of the armed conflict and the de facto current state of emergency, it is impossible to hold elections categorically.

On January 27, 1997, elections of the President and Parliament of Ichkeria were held. The number of voters - 447,000 - was specified during the door-to-door round. A. Maskhadov won with 65% of the votes. The observation was carried out by 72 OSCE representatives. But when the second round of parliamentary elections took place on February 15, 1997, voter turnout slightly exceeded 25%. It should be noted that in this case Chechnya did not go for registration, although, obviously, the lack of a quorum in the future was a serious problem.

In September 1999, the "second Chechen war" began, and in December of the same year, elections to the State Duma were not held in Chechnya. It was probably the cleanest election in a decade...

On March 26, 2000, elections of the President of Russia were held. On February 22, a month before the vote, Sergei Danilenko, a CEC member in charge of the Chechen direction, in an interview with Ekho Moskvy said that the number of inhabitants in the territory of the Chechen Republic is about 400 thousand people, of which 200-250 thousand voters. However, a month later, the chairman of the Chechen electoral committee, Abdul-Kerim Arsakhanov, announced a different number - 460,000 voters, despite the fact that elections will be held only in 12 districts of Chechnya at 336 polling stations. On March 26, the electoral committee reported that more than 70% of voters had voted in Chechnya, and 97% (!) in Grozny.

On August 20, 2000, when elections were held in Chechnya for a State Duma deputy in the 31st constituency, the CEC announced the total number of voters - 495,000. If the former proportions between the size of the electorate and the population were preserved, the latter could amount to 885 thousand - that is, it should have grown during the war.

At the next vote, the reserve of "dead souls" created during the census was already used. On March 23, 2003, a referendum was held, in which, according to the CEC, 89% of the 540,000 voters, whose number was determined according to the census, took part. 95.37% voted "yes".

Next came the presidential elections, on the eve of which the author had the opportunity to check his calculations "on a regional scale." On September 5, 2003, three values ​​were named in the administration of the Shali region: 104 thousand - the population of the region; 43 thousand - the number of voters according to the lists; 33 thousand - underage, receiving child benefits. Subtracting the second and third from the first, we get 28 thousand people who are neither adults nor minors. To a perplexed question, the author received an answer: these are those who were once registered, and the census was carried out according to documents or from the words of relatives. That is, in this one area taken separately, the authorities recognized the existence of 27 percent of "dead souls."

Although the candidate of the federal center was guaranteed victory in the upcoming elections without manipulating these numbers, those who have been playing with numbers all these years have become hostages of the game. It was in 1997 that they could honestly admit a 25 percent turnout, but now to refuse "540 thousand voters" and exorbitant attendance at polling stations meant to take on the burden of truth and responsibility.

P.S. But the reality has surpassed the wildest expectations. According to the chairman of the Central Election Commission Veshnyakov, at the December voting on elections in State Duma 11 percent more people voted in Chechnya than there were voters in the republic.

As for the results of the census, they are not even used State Committee according to statistics - according to his data, in 2003, 813 thousand people lived in Chechnya.

1 - For a more detailed analysis, see: Vladimir Grivenko. About the population of Chechnya in July 1999 (by the beginning of the new Caucasian conflict) on the Memorial website.
2 - The border between the republics has not yet been demarcated and delimited. Extrapolation of data published by the State Statistics Committee in subsequent years, gives for 1989 the resident population of the regions of Chechnya at about 1084 thousand, and the regions of Ingushetia - 186 thousand people. But the Goskomstat included not only the Nazranovsky, Malgobeksky and Dzheyrakhsky districts, but also the entire Sunzhensky district as Ingushetia. In fact, a significant part of the latter - in particular, two large settlements, Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya, with 8 and 6.9 thousand inhabitants in 1989, respectively - belonged to Chechnya.
3 - In addition to the Vainakhs, in 1989 several tens of thousands of representatives of other Muslim peoples lived in Chechnya - 23 thousand Kumyks, Nogais and Avars, the vast majority were rural residents, and 5.1 thousand Tatars, mostly city dwellers.
4 - Estimates of the population of Ingushetia are a separate issue. Perhaps, no other region of Russia has seen such migration in recent years. During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of 1992, tens of thousands of Ingush were expelled from the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia - the Ingush authorities say about 70 thousand, the Ossetian - about 17 thousand. In 1994-1996, during the "first Chechen war", the number of forced migrants from Chechnya in Ingushetia was up to 150 thousand - there is no exact data, since from April 1995 to August 1996 no registration of refugees was kept (for more details, see below ). Many Ingush families who failed to return to the Prigorodny district in 1957 and then settled in Grozny remained after that in Ingushetia for permanent residence. As for forced migrants, as of January 1, 1999, according to the Federal Migration Service, 34,983 people were registered in Ingushetia.
Further, in 1989, 41 thousand Ingush lived in the USSR outside of Checheno-Ingushetia and North Ossetia, some of them returned to their homeland. On the other hand, in the 1990s, migration from the republic, which remained one of the poorest regions of the federation, to other regions was very significant. However, in this entire table, it is the second column that causes the least doubt.
5 - In itself, such accuracy is unrealistic - it would be nice if these figures corresponded to reality with an accuracy of up to 10 thousand.
6 - In the 1990s, this process accelerated both in the autonomous republics, which became simply republics, and in the autonomous okrugs, which raised their status and became republics, "Russian-speaking" personnel were replaced by "national" ones in leadership and simply paid positions. At the same time, nowhere, except in Chechnya, did the national movements even think of separating from Russia - it was about the struggle of the elites for control over resources, but with an indispensable appeal to the federal center as an arbiter.
7 - After the return of the Chechens from exile in 1957, it turned out that industrial jobs were filled. It was impossible to return to half of the territory - it was difficult to restore mountain villages that had been uninhabited for thirteen years, and the authorities did not want resistance to resume in the mountains. Two districts north of the Terek, Naursky and Shelkovskaya, were cut to Chechnya - first of all, the highlanders were settled there, but this solved the problem only partially. High hidden unemployment was partly compensated by subsistence farming and seasonal work, coven work, work in the "northers" and labor emigration. In the 70-80s, not only Slavs, but also Vainakhs left Checheno-Ingushetia - the net emigration of the latter in 1979-89, according to censuses, reached 50 thousand. Over the years, the number of Chechens who permanently lived in the Stavropol Territory increased 3.4 times, in the Astrakhan Region - 5.5 times, in the Rostov Region - 6.8 times, in the Volgograd Region - 13.7 times, in Tyumen region - 33.7 times. In total, the number of Chechens permanently residing in these five regions increased sixfold - from 9.3 to 55.8 thousand. On the other hand, the opportunity to "cobble" was sharply reduced in the mid-1980s as a result of the economic collapse in the USSR and, as a result, a reduction in appropriations for rural construction.
8 - At the same time, there was no mass exodus, only the fixation of this reality has changed: human rights activists simply managed to get the department to register these migrants who had previously left.
9 - Russian propagandists claimed that Maskhadov specially classified the data of the census, since they testified to a catastrophic decline in the population of Chechnya - a copy of the story of the Soviet census of 1937, which was recognized as "wrecking". However, even the very possibility of holding such a complex event in the conditions of the collapse of statehood raised doubts. The author even allowed to call "Maskhadov's census" in Ichkeria the "Library of Ivan the Terrible" - there was no such thing, as it turned out, he was wrong.
10 - Having questioned both the people involved in the census and many residents of the Chechen Republic - whether the census takers applied to them.
11 - He got problems with refugees for all of Russia, and if Aushev had acted as prescribed, he would not have had problems either with refugees or with the generals. But then the number of civilians killed in Chechnya would have been many times, if not an order of magnitude higher. Not complicity in war crimes is a worthy choice for a general and for a president.
12 - The Danish Refugee Council, one of the leading humanitarian organizations working in Ingushetia and Chechnya, regularly conducts door-to-door visits to compile lists for humanitarian assistance. However, their data for Ingushetia, where reconciliation is carried out for each family, is much more accurate than for Chechnya - there you have to use the information provided by the heads of rural administrations.
13 - In Ingushetia, dozens of heads of local administrations were removed from their posts for abuse of "refugee" money in two years - in Chechnya, nothing like this was heard, since there was effective control in Ingushetia. For comparison: at the beginning of the war in Ingushetia, according to the estimate, 700 rubles were spent on the arrangement of one refugee in the camp (tent, flooring, bed, stove, communications), in Chechnya - 3,700 rubles.
14 - So, in Grozny during the storming of the city by federal troops in December 1999 - January 2000, no more than 40 thousand people remained.
15 - About 60 thousand were in Ingushetia and intended to stay there, it was supposed to allocate land to them in the Sunzha region.
16 - NTVRU message dated September 17, 2002 11:42:20 am.
17 - NTVRU message dated September 18, 2002 08:15:00.
18 - Although the second Chechen war was much more brutal than the first, the number of deaths in the first months was 3-4 times less. There is no contradiction here: fear is sometimes saving. Back in 1996, the inhabitants of Chechnya took off from their seats already under the threat of death. In the autumn of 1999, people fled Chechnya from massive indiscriminate bombing and shelling, and this was also dangerous. The roads declared "humanitarian corridors" would be more appropriate to call "corridors of death": the number of deaths in settlements and when leaving them was comparable. On the whole, however, this survival strategy paid off.
19 - In Intushetia - 137 thousand, and 10 thousand in Dagestan
20 - In Ingushetia, according to the preliminary results of the census, there were 468 thousand people, of which thousands are temporarily displaced persons from Chechnya living in temporary accommodation centers. Other migrants - not living in the camps, or who fled in 1992 from the Prigorodny district - were not singled out as a separate category. It should be noted that in this way the permanent population of the republic - and, apparently, the future budget financing of this subsidized region - was "increased" one and a half times. We also note that the migrants allegedly resettled in Chechnya were in fact enumerated in Ingushetia. 256 thousand women and 212 thousand men lived in the republic, the asymmetry is caused by high unemployment and the departure of men to work.
21 - In the very methodology of the 2002 census, there was some ambiguity: only the permanent population was subject to registration, the actual population was not recorded. Thus, quite "legitimate" postscripts became possible. True, the criterion (qualification) of "constancy" was determined - residence in a given place for a year. But, as we see, this ambiguity was used to their advantage both in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

The All-Russian census of 2002, unfortunately, took into account only the permanent population, depriving demographers of the opportunity to control the repeated counting arising from the double counting of the same people - by location and by place of permanent residence. The result was a huge exaggeration of the population in the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia. Apparently, the residents themselves turned out to be interested in it, counting on receiving compensation for the loss of property and various benefits and therefore classifying themselves as several places of permanent residence at once (a refugee camp, their native village, the city of Grozny, where it became possible to take an apartment, to Moscow or Krasnodar, where some relatives have already moved and others are about to move). Local authorities, whose budget and prestige are directly dependent on the number of citizens under their care, most likely also took an active part in distorting the census results. Memorial activist A. Cherkasov reports one of the estimates of the census error. According to him, in the Shali district, with a population of 104 thousand people, "dead souls" accounted for 27%.

The statisticians who processed the census did not take the necessary measures to eliminate errors and published results that largely contradicted common sense.

In order to be convinced of this, it is enough to compare the numbers of the same generations of residents of Chechnya and Ingushetia according to the 1989 and 2002 censuses. To this end, the 2002 census data has been regrouped so that data from the same generations can be compared. Compare, for example, those who were aged 0-4 years at the time of the 1989 census (it took place in January) and those who were 14-18 years old in October 2002, when the next census was conducted, because they are the same the same generation born in 1984-1988. The comparison would be more accurate if the latest census data were for January 2003, but the inaccuracy resulting from the difference of 3 months cannot significantly affect the result.

The comparison shows that on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia, the number of generations born in 1959-1988 between the censuses of 1989-2002 either increased or remained virtually unchanged (Table 1), although it should have significantly decreased both due to natural mortality during 14 years, and because of the almost total flight of the Russian-speaking population and the departure of a certain number of Chechens to other regions of the country and abroad.

Table 1. Number of generations born in 1914-1988 on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia according to two censuses, people

Years of birth of generations	Men			Women			Both sexes
	1989	2002	2002 to 1989	1989	2002	2002 to 1989	1989	2002	2002 to 1989
1984-1988	75265	92661	1,23	72482	88806	1,23	147747	181467	1,23
1979-1983	68087	81861	1,20	66484	79434	1,19	134571	161295	1,20
1974-1978	63353	60912	0,96	62324	71220	1,14	125677	132132	1,05
1969-1973	58490	54416	0,93	58099	61317	1,06	116589	115733	0,99
1964-1968	50743	50091	0,99	54982	60239	1,10	105725	110330	1,04
1959-1963	52504	51272	0,98	58907	59354	1,01	111411	110626	0,99
1954-1958	48029	39073	0,81	54100	44520	0,82	102129	83593	0,82
1949-1953	38952	25775	0,66	43267	27248	0,63	82219	53023	0,64
1944-1948	21256	10070	0,47	23865	12353	0,52	45121	22423	0,50
1939-1943	20507	13904	0,68	25468	20058	0,79	45975	33962	0,74
1934-1938	28865	13629	0,47	36404	18787	0,52	65269	32416	0,50
1929-1933	24074	10913	0,45	29927	14119	0,47	54001	25032	0,46
1924-1928	20315	3997	0,20	28936	6299	0,22	49251	10296	0,21
1919-1923	9602	1965	0,20	18025	3940	0,22	27627	5905	0,21
1914-1918	6882	2033	0,30	14258	4656	0,33	21140	6689	0,32
Total	586924	512572	0,87	647528	572350	0,88	1234452	1084922	0,88

Figure 1. The number of male and female generations born in 1914-1988 on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia according to two censuses, people

Let's try to estimate the census error based on the statistical materials at our disposal. Here and below, we will use, without special reservations, the 1989 census data on the population by sex and age, on sex and age mortality in 1988-1989, and on the national composition by sex and age of the population of Chechen-Ingushetia in 1989 according to 5% sample, kindly provided by E. Andreev, as well as data published in the official publication of the 2002 census materials. An estimate of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia by nationality in 1989 is taken from the encyclopedia The Peoples of Russia.

The error of the 2002 census can be estimated by comparing its results with the hypothetical population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 2002, calculated on the basis of the 1989 census data, taking into account the impact of mortality and migration in the intercensal period.

It is therefore necessary to make some assumptions about this influence, that is, to estimate the true levels of mortality and migration.

What were the losses from increased mortality?

If we assume that mortality has not changed throughout the period, then the calculation hypothetical size age groups of men and women in 2002 can be performed by the standard method of shifting the generations recorded in the 1989 census by 14 years, using the table of mortality of the population of Chechen-Ingushetia 1988-1989. Such a calculation was made by us, but we cannot limit ourselves to it, since it does not take into account many real conditions that were in force throughout the intercensal period.

Obviously, the hypothesis of constant mortality is unreasonably optimistic. After all, mortality was growing even in Russia as a whole. Moreover, it increased in Chechnya, where there are even fewer grounds for using the 1988-1989 mortality tables without reservations than for Russia.

First, the 1989 Chechen-Ingushetian mortality tables used include 25% of Russians and Russian-speaking urban residents with lower mortality rates. The flight from the republic of these people increased the level of age-specific mortality.

Secondly, it was assumed in the calculation that the age and sex composition of the Chechens and Ingush who left and entered Chechnya and Ingushetia is the same and corresponds to the structure of the population of Chechen-Ingushetia in 1989. However, it is highly probable that emigration carried away the younger part of the population from their homeland, and its relative aging led to an increase in mortality, which is not taken into account in the calculation.

Thirdly, the population suffered large direct losses from the hostilities, from which all the inhabitants of the republic suffered, although unevenly: they most affected the number of men aged 18-50.

Fourthly, the destruction of the social and economic life of the country has led to increased mortality in all age groups, especially among the elderly.

We will try to estimate the additional losses of the population of Chechnya associated with the military and the circumstances accompanying them, and then use this estimate to clarify the estimated population of this republic.

There are a large number of highly exaggerated estimates of the increased loss of the Chechen population from hostilities. They talk about 40 thousand dead during the bombing of Grozny in 1995, about 75, 100, 250 thousand killed. The last figure belongs to the representative of the government of Ichkeria in the West, Akhmed Zakaev, he reports it in a film shown in April 2005 on American television, thereby illustrating the losses of the Chechen people after the explosions of Moscow houses, committed, according to him, by the FSB. There are more serious expert opinions, but without indications of the calculation method, they remain just assumptions.

The only attempt at a reasonable estimate of losses was a survey of refugees conducted by Sergei Kovalev's group in 1995. On its basis, a conclusion was drawn about the death of 25-29 thousand civilians in Grozny. In proportion to the population, this is about 3 times more than the losses of the inhabitants of Berlin during its assault in 1945, although in terms of population density, the amount of ammunition used, the number of armies fighting and their losses, Grozny is many times inferior to Berlin. (According to historians, during the battles for Berlin, about 84 thousand civilians were killed - 3% of the civilian population remaining in the city, in addition, 20 thousand died of heart attacks and 6 thousand committed suicide).

The result of the Kovalev group was accepted by many public and even Russian government organizations. Meanwhile, the reliability of this estimate is low, since the most important parameters of the sample (sex, age, nationality of the victims, places, dates and causes of their death) are unknown. Without this information, the results of the calculation are not at all reliable. The methodology used in the calculation is rightly criticized by Vladimir Grivenko:

“We do not know exactly 1) how many of their direct and cousin relatives lived in Grozny - 500 or, say, 5000, and members of one Chechen family often have several hundred direct and cousin relatives; 2) how reliable was the information about the fate of all these relatives that was at the disposal of the respondents; 3) how truthful were the answers of the respondents?

An important fact to be taken into account when considering this and other similar estimates is the ratio between the number of killed and wounded. As you know, in addition to those killed in the course of hostilities, the wounded and the disabled inevitably appear. In the Second World War, the ratio of three wounded to one killed was quite stable, and every third wounded Red Army soldier was demobilized due to disability. In the Chechen war, the proportion of the wounded should not be less, since in the fight against militants the Russian army often resorts to bombing and artillery shelling on squares. It is known that during the shelling of the market in Grozny in 1999, one hundred civilians were killed and several hundred were injured. It is also reported that during the bombardment of Shali with cluster bombs, 55 people were killed and 186 wounded. During the assault on Grozny in January-April 1995, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces, 1,426 Russian soldiers were killed and 4,630 were wounded. The losses of the airborne troops amounted to 244 people killed and 909 wounded, the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 60 killed and 294 wounded, etc.

Based on these ratios, with 25-29 thousand killed in Grozny, almost all the surviving citizens should have been injured, and several tens of thousands of people should have become disabled. However, there is no information about the wounded and disabled on the streets of Grozny. Silent and population statistics. According to the 2002 census, the proportion of people receiving a disability pension in Chechnya is 2.3% of all persons with a single source of income. In the neighboring republics it is higher: in Ingushetia 3.3%, in North Ossetia 3.4%, in Dagestan 4%. There are no differences in men, women, working age, pensioners, in the countryside or in the city. It could be assumed that the population is simply not allowed to receive their pensions. However, it is not. The 2002 census shows that the state distributes pensions and allowances to Chechens in an unusually generous manner. The lack of data on war invalids suggests that their number is small and is probably hidden by the census error. It follows from this that both the number of wounded and the associated number of those killed during shelling and bombardment was not as large as the authors of some estimates suggest.

Military casualties of the male population

A natural method for estimating military - predominantly male - casualties would be to use the change in the ratio of men to women. The increase in the number of women per 1,000 men in the active age groups shows the decline in men during the course of hostilities. In this way, at one time B.Ts. Urlanis estimated the military losses of Germany. Also, after the 1959 census, it was not difficult to estimate the military losses of the USSR. During local conflicts, men who are afraid of the authorities usually try to avoid participation in the census. For example, in 1920, the Don census missed a third of the men who hid in the forests and mountains. Some researchers viewed this shortage as a population loss. However, at the 1926 census, the missing men "revealed".

The situation in Chechnya is the opposite and in some respects unique. In the 2002 census, the ratio of men to women in many age groups turned out to be better in Chechnya than in Ingushetia and Dagestan, and even better than it was in Checheno-Ingushetia in 1989. The male-dominated paradox can be explained by three factors.

Firstly, a certain predominance of men at young ages is generally traditional for residents of the North Caucasus and Central Asia. In the 1989 census, it was masked by the presence of a large Russian population with a different sex ratio. The flight of Russians from the republic was supposed to slightly increase the proportion of men.

Secondly, part of the Chechen women passed the census in Ingushetia, while their husbands passed the census in Chechnya.

Thirdly, the losses of men are masked in the 2002 census by the size of the Russian army, which was censused in the republic.

For the above reasons, the method of female preponderance turned out to be of little use for assessing the dead Chechens.

It is possible, however, to calculate the loss of men by the increased proportion of widows. Compare the percentage of widows among women different ages in Chechnya and Ingushetia with corresponding data for Dagestan, which is close to Chechnya in terms of demographic parameters, matrimonial and family traditions (Table 2). The excess proportion of widows in Chechnya and Ingushetia can naturally be seen as a consequence of the death of their husbands. Accordingly, male losses are calculated as the product of the excess proportion of widows by the number of women of a given age. It is also natural to assume that all losses relate to the male population of Chechnya, since it is obvious that the increased number of widows in Ingushetia is associated with the presence of Chechen refugees there.

Theoretically, the number of widows in 2002 could be less than the number of widows during the intercensal period due to the remarriage of some of the widowed. However, we do not make an appropriate amendment, since remarriages in Chechnya are not very common. Due to early marriage and the early appearance of the first child, most widows already have children and therefore represent an unattractive lot.

Table 2. Estimated losses of the married male population, based on the proportion of widows

Age	Share of widows, %					Number of women according to the 2002 census		Loss of the male population
	Dage- mill	Ingu- shetia	Chechnya	Ingu- shetia	Chechnya	Ingu- shetia	Chechnya	According to the number of widows in Ingu- sheti	By the number of widows in Chechnya	Total
16-17	0,04	0,06	0,17	0,02	0,13	10942	24996	2	32	34
18-19	0,05	0,26	0,48	0,21	0,43	10586	22695	22	98	120
20-24	0,4	1,1	1,9	0,7	1,5	24473	51961	171	779	950
25-29	1,4	2,9	4,4	1,5	3	20013	43207	300	1296	1596
30-34	2,9	5,4	7,2	2,5	4,3	19147	41170	479	1770	2249
35-39	4,3	8	8,8	3,7	4,5	17462	39777	646	1790	2436
40-44	6,8	11,4	11,6	4,6	4,8	16407	40947	755	1965	2720
45-49	10,3	14,6	15,6	4,3	5,3	11630	31890	500	1690	2190
50-54	17	22	23,6	5	6,6	7595	20653	380	1365	1745
55-59	24,3	29,4	32,9	5,1	8,6	4109	8244	210	709	919
60-64	35	38,5	42,8	3,5	7,8	6070	13988	212	1091	1303
65-69	44,5	49,2	51,8	4,7	7,3	4963	13824	233	1009	1242
70 +	69,1	68	72,3	-	3,2	7127	21302	-	682	682
Total						160524	374654	3910	14276	18186

Thus, the increased loss of married men in the population of Chechnya is, according to our calculation, 18,186 people. But some of the widows did not live to see the census due to natural mortality. The number of such cases - 1269 - is obtained by calculating how many women should have died, based on the mortality table of 1988-1989, in seven and a half years from the beginning of the first Chechen war so that the number of survivors is 18186. Accordingly, the number of male losses will also increase by 1269 people and amount to 19455 people. At the same time, due to the attribution of all losses to the first war, their total size is somewhat overestimated. But, on the other hand, the calculation does not take into account the increased loss of widows in war conditions.

The calculation makes it possible to judge the losses of married men, but unmarried men also died. If we accept that the chances of the death of a married and unmarried man of the same age are approximately equal, then we obtain a general estimate of male losses, presented in Table. 3. Estimates of the losses of married men from Table 1 are transferred to it. 2 adjusted for widow mortality. The total increased loss of men is 31189 people.

Table 3. Calculation of the losses of men in Chechnya and Ingushetia

Age in 2002	Number of married	The loss of the married	Share of losses, %	Number of unmarried	The loss of the unmarried	Total losses
18-19	1786	165	9,2*	38959	2961	3126
20-24	13360	1016	7,6	40000**	3040	4056
25-29	23736	1707	7,2	31176	2245	3952
30-34	32907	2406	7,3	18509	1351	3757
35-39	38153	2606	6,8	9938	676	3282
40-44	45075	2910	6,5	6197	403	3313
45-49	35693	2342	6,6	3380	223	2565
50-54	23743	1865	7,9	2032	161	2026
55-59	9225	983	10,7	845	90	1073
60-64	12433	1394	11,2	1807	202	1596
65-69	12097	1329	11,0	1532	169	1498
70+	14638	732	5,0	4260	213	945
Total	262846	19455	7,4	158635	11734	31189

* Due to the small number of married men and the low accuracy of the coefficient for calculating 18-19-year-olds, the coefficient of the next group of 20-24 years old was adopted. The loss of the 16-17 year old generation is included in the 18-19 year old age group.
** 24.6 thousand Russian soldiers who passed the census in Chechnya were deducted from the population of the generation aged 20-24.

Losses of the female and child population

Any war leads primarily to the loss of men's lives. However, the female population in wartime also suffers increased losses. Some part of women die together with their husbands, in this case, the statistics of widows and widowers does not allow us to estimate the excess mortality of men or women. But the probability of simultaneous death is not too great, husbands and wives were often in different places, not all of the dead were victims of bombing and shelling, and during bombing and shelling, direct hits did not happen often. Losses of women leading to male widowhood were probably more frequent, and can be estimated in the same way that male losses were estimated above: by the increased proportion of men who became widowers (Table 4). The table shows that in the age groups of 25-54 the number of widowers in Chechnya and Ingushetia is two to three times higher than the number of widowers in Dagestan. This is quite a significant difference. The small discrepancy in ages under 20 is explained by the small number of married men in these groups and, therefore, by the low reliability of the ratios obtained. In the age groups over 54 years of age, increased mortality plays a large role, and therefore relatively small military losses become invisible against the background of a high loss from disease. Interestingly, the values ​​of the coefficients in Ingushetia in Table. 4 above the corresponding coefficients in Chechnya. This is probably due to the fact that the number of men in Chechnya is more exaggerated than in Ingushetia.

Table 4. Estimated losses of the married female population, based on the proportion of widowers

Age	Share of widowers, %			Deviation from the level of Dagestan, percentage points		Number of men according to the 2002 census		Loss of the female population
	Dage- mill	Ingu- shetia	Chechnya	Ingushetia	Chechnya	Ingushetia	Chechnya	According to the number of widowers in Ingu- sheti	By the number of widowers in Chechnya	Total
16-17	0,01	0,04	0,07	0,03	0,06	9962	22564	3	13	16
18-19	0,01	0,05	0,05	0,04	0,04	9905	30497	4	12	16
20-24	0,1	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,1	20990	56871	42	57	99
25-29	0,3	0,7	0,6	0,4	0,3	17062	37850	68	114	182
30-34	0,5	1,2	1,2	0,7	0,7	15832	35584	111	249	360
35-39	0,7	1,7	1,4	1	0,7	14093	33998	141	238	379
40-44	0,9	2,3	1,9	1,4	1	14215	37057	199	371	570
45-49	1,3	2,6	2,2	1,3	0,9	10227	28846	133	260	393
50-54	2,3	3,4	3,3	1,1	1	6727	19048	74	190	264
55-59	3,6	3,6	4,9	-	1,3	3283	6787	-	88	88
60-64	6 3	6	7,6	-	1,3	4171	9733	-	127	127
65-69	9,5	7,7	10,1	-	0,6	3698	9931	-	60	60
70 +	21,7	15,5	21,5	-	-	5007	13501	-	-	-
Total						135172	342267	775	1779	2554

Losses are calculated as the product of the excess percentage of widowers and the number of men of a given age. As in the case of widows (Table 2), we calculate the number of widowers who died in the period 1995-2002, provided that 2554 widowers survived before the census. It will be 270 people. Widowed men are more likely to remarry than widowed women, so an adjustment should be made. It is calculated from the difference in the shares of married men between neighboring age cohorts. For example, at the age of 24-25, 20% of Chechen men were married, and at the age of 25-29, the number of married men was 50%. This means that the group of 182 widowers of Chechnya and Ingushetia aged 25-29 was 30% larger 5 years ago and its number was 260 people. Having thus calculated the number of each cohort, we obtain a change in the birth rate for the five-year period of 361 people. With this approach, two assumptions were made. First, remarriages are considered as likely as regular marriages in this age group. Secondly, it is assumed that the loss of men occurred in two stages - in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 - and middle period possible widowhood is equal to five years.

Since the losses of women from combat operations occurred mainly as a result of bombing and artillery shelling, we will introduce an amendment for the joint death of a husband and wife in the amount of 10% (255 people). The total loss of married women from hostilities will thus amount to 3440 people.

With the same age-specific mortality rates as those of married women, unmarried women would lose 1,100 lives. The total losses of the female population, therefore, are estimated at 4540 people.

Children under 14 suffered noticeably less than the adult population, they were rescued in the first place. An assessment of child losses can be the increased decline in married women aged 16-29, who at the beginning of the war in Chechnya were themselves children aged 9-21. As can be seen from Table. 4, the increased loss of these women varies from 0.03% to 0.4%. Since the number of married women and their loss at the age of 16-19 is not very reliable, we take the average value of the increased loss of women aged 20-29 to calculate the loss of children. It will be equal to 0.21%. Consequently, out of 292 thousand children under 14 years old (the justification for this figure is given in the last section of the article), about 615 died during the fighting.

Total losses

The calculated military losses of the population of Chechnya are presented in Table. five.

Table 5. Calculated military losses of the population of Chechnya

This estimate includes military casualties (they include those who died in battle, victims of bombing and shelling, the disappearance of men as a result of roundups during document checks and arrests, victims of massacres by militants), as well as some of the increased mortality of the population from deteriorating living conditions. The fact is that the estimate of the increased loss was calculated by us as an excess of the number of widows and widowers over the level of Dagestan, and if the military losses in Dagestan were very small, then the increased mortality due to the deterioration of medical and social conditions after the collapse of the USSR affected this republic, as well as and all other regions of Russia. We have taken into account only the share of increased mortality due to medical reasons, by which Chechnya and Ingushetia exceed Dagestan. You can try to separate in tables 3 and 4 military and medical losses.

Since the "normal" mortality of men under 40 years of age is relatively low, the increased loss from disease will also not be significant for them, and it can be assumed that the loss of men in this group is mainly associated with combat operations. This is confirmed by the ratio of men and women. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, there are 117-120 women per 100 men aged 30-39, 10% more than in neighboring Dagestan. (At younger ages, the picture is distorted by the participation of Russian soldiers in the census). At the age of 40-49, the difference between Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia decreases to 2-3%, at the age of 50-59 it disappears. Obviously, at the age of over 40 years, losses from diseases begin to noticeably affect the mortality of the population, and at the age of over 55 years, they can prevail. Therefore, all the losses of 18-44-year-olds are attributed to the military. For 45-54 year olds, 70% are included in combat losses. For generations aged 55-69, medical and combat losses are divided in half, and over the age of 70, all losses are considered to be caused by diseases. Thus, the losses of 26,808 men are associated with military operations, and 4,381 are associated with increased mortality from diseases. Women account for 3,990 people in combat operations, and 550 people for medical losses. The increased loss of children is associated with military operations.

These estimates are derived mainly from an analysis of the number of widows and widowers. But there is every reason to believe that the number of widows and widowers according to the results of the census is exaggerated to the same extent as the number of women and men in the corresponding ages. Since almost all military losses fall within the age range of 17-63 years, the census exaggeration of the number of widows and widowers can be taken at a rate of 30% (justification for this figure is given below). In this case, the losses from hostilities will not be 36.3 thousand people, but about 25 thousand. Probably, most of the women died not in combat clashes, but during the bombing and rocket attacks on settlements. It can be assumed that about the same number of men died in a similar way. This also includes the loss of children. Thus, the loss of civilians will be about 8.5 thousand people, and the loss of militants 16.5 thousand. The latter figure also includes the losses of Chechens who fought on the side of the federal forces. The losses of volunteers and mercenaries fighting on the side of the Chechen separatists are not taken into account in the calculation.

Along with military losses, the population of Chechnya suffered human losses from the destruction of the social and economic life of the country, the disappearance of medicines, doctors, habitual work, normal living conditions, necessary food and other similar reasons. The main reason for the increased decline was the expulsion of the Russian-speaking population, which made up the majority of the townspeople, that is, teachers, doctors, engineers, workers, administrative workers, and so on. With the disappearance of this population came the destruction of social and economic life. The true extent of these losses is difficult to estimate, but they certainly exceed the loss from the fighting. An approximate estimate can be obtained by comparing the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia, calculated according to the mortality tables - 794 thousand people over 14 years old (Tables 6 and 7) with the population according to the census, reduced by a census error of 32% - 738 thousand people. The difference of 56,000 is made up of 25,000 who died during the hostilities and 31,000 who died prematurely (about 17,000 men and 14,000 women). The increased loss from diseases of children under 14 is taken as 50% of the natural mortality of a generation. During the period under review, this will amount to about 9 thousand people. And all the losses from the deterioration of living conditions will be equal to 40 thousand (about 4% of the population).

Table 6. Total population losses in Chechnya and Ingushetia

	fighting	Military civilian casualties	Losses from deteriorating living conditions	Migration balance
Chechens and Ingush	16500	8000	38000	65000
Including:
men	16500	3645	16000
women		3740	13000
children		615	9000
Russian-speaking population		250	800	325000
Other national groups		250	1200	30000
Total	16500	8500	40000	420000

Military civilian casualties and medical casualties are distributed roughly in proportion to the size of the respective national groups.

Combat losses include both the militants themselves and the losses of Chechens who fought on the side of the federal troops, militiamen and administrative workers killed by terrorists, and repressed opponents of the Dudayev-Maskhadov regime. According to press reports, the number of this group is approximately 1000-1500 people. Combat losses also include persons arrested during the cleansing operations and missing. Judging by the card index compiled in recent years by the Memorial, their number reaches 2-3 thousand people. Combat losses do not include foreign mercenaries and volunteers who died in combat in Chechnya, approximately 500-1000 people.

The losses of the Russian-speaking population refer only to the Russians who remained in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The loss of hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled from Chechnya, as it were, emigrated with them. The Russian-speaking population of Chechnya was not an active party in the outbreak of the conflict. Grozny during the storming of 1994-1995 was two hundred times enlarged Nord-Ost, in which Chechen separatists and Russian statesmen sorted things out over the heads of the helpless Russian population.

If we talk about the losses of the Russian population in the Chechen conflict, then they include 12-15 thousand soldiers of the Russian army and 7-10 thousand civilians killed during military operations, during terrorist actions, during hostage-taking. So the military losses of the Russian and Chechen "sides" are approximately the same.

How many people left Chechnya?

In addition to the losses of the population of Chechnya from increased mortality, it is necessary to take into account the losses associated with migration. These losses can be estimated using information on the number of Chechens and Ingush within the borders of Russia and on the ethnic composition of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1989 and 2002.

Let us consider separately several categories of the population of Chechnya.

Chechens and Ingush

The number of these two peoples within the borders of Russia, excluding the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia, between 1989 and 2002 increased by 66 thousand people - from 216 to 282 thousand. Of course, the declining birth rate trends common among the urban population of Russia had an effect on these predominantly urban residents, but also, apparently, they continued to maintain, to a certain extent, national traditions of high birth rates. They maintained a positive natural increase, which amounted to about 35 thousand people (15%). Another source of replenishment of the Chechen and Ingush population of Russia was their immigration from Kazakhstan - judging by the census conducted in Kazakhstan in 1999, about 35 thousand Chechens and Ingush left from there. Some of them moved to Chechnya, while others settled in other regions of Russia. Approximately 45 thousand Ingush fled to Ingushetia from Ossetia during the intercensal period. Several tens of thousands of Chechens left Russia for Western and Eastern countries. As a result, the migration of Chechens and Ingush tentatively consisted of the arrival of 60,000 people in Chechnya and Ingushetia and the departure of 125,000 people from there. The negative balance of migration is 65,000 people, of which 45,000 are aged 14 and over.

Another curious fact indirectly speaks of the significant scale of emigration from Chechnya - an unusual sex ratio in childhood. As has long been established, the ratio of boys and girls among newborns is almost constant: 1050 to 1000. Naturally, among all peoples throughout Russia, the 2002 census found a predominance of boys in the age groups of 0-14 years. Russians have 1044 boys per 1000 girls, Tatars have 1053, Ossetians have 1065, Avars have 1037, Dargins have 1047, and so on.

The only exceptions are Chechens and Ingush in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Chechens in Chechnya in this age group have 960 boys per thousand girls, in Ingushetia the corresponding figure is 948. In rural areas of Chechnya, the ratio is 991 per 1000, in the city 934 per 1000. The same picture is observed among the Ingush.

What is the reason for this amazing phenomenon? It is unlikely that families with little boys were less likely to be included in the census than those with little girls. If double counting was the cause of the census error, then the probability of the sex ratio in the additional data should have been the same as in the original data. In those cases where new faces were invented, the probability of the appearance of an imaginary son was obviously higher than the chances of the appearance of a fictitious daughter. Therefore, we have to assume that it is not a census error. Apparently, families with boys emigrated in a larger proportion than families with girls.

Naturally, the emigration of the city dwellers of Chechnya was higher than that of the rural inhabitants, and among the Chechens who found themselves in Ingushetia, that is, who had already begun to move, it was higher than among the Chechens who remained at home. The ratio of boys and girls under the age of 15 in the Chechen diaspora in Russia is 1132, which is noticeably higher than the natural norm. The same proportion is observed among the Ingush outside the borders of their republic - 1133. Obviously, several thousand Chechen and Ingush families (several tens of thousands of people) left their homeland, fearing for the fate of their sons.

Russian-speaking population

This category includes Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Armenians and Jews. In 1989, there were 326.5 thousand of them in Chechnya and Ingushetia. According to the 2002 census, only 48 thousand of them remained - 278.5 thousand less.

But even these 48 thousand, apparently, included the soldiers of the Russian army called up for service, who, according to the instructions, were to be enumerated at the place of deployment of the units. Their assessment can be obtained by comparing the number of generations of Russian men and women in Chechnya according to the 2002 census. At the pre-conscription age of 15-17 there were 237 men and 265 women. At the age of 18-19 there were 9354 men and 157 women. Among 20-24-year-olds, the corresponding figures are 11812 and 745, and among 25-29-year-olds - 2671 and 772, 30-34-year-olds 1682 and 761, -year-olds - 950 and 911, 45-49-year-olds - 538 and 753. The excess of the number of men over the number of women at the age of 18-39 is 23687 people, and the only explanation for this fact is the participation of the military in the census. In addition, 962 people gives a similar calculation for Ingushetia. Consequently, half of the Russian-speaking population (24.6 thousand people) in Chechnya and Ingushetia were Russian soldiers. According to the census, most of them were unmarried and had secondary specialized or general education.

Without soldiers and children under 14 years old (about 4 thousand people), we get the number of Russian-speaking population in Chechnya and Ingushetia equal to 19 thousand, that is, about 308 thousand people less than according to the previous census. About 26 thousand were natural deaths - according to the calculation, which is discussed below. Everything else should be attributed to migration to other regions of Russia.

In addition to the two most numerous groups of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia named above, three more quantitatively not so significant groups should be considered. This Caucasians and Tatars- Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Ossetians and Tatars - people who left the country not without exception, but by 50-75%; peoples of Dagestan(Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Laks, Nogais); others, which include Turks, Arabs, Bashkirs, Kurds, peoples of the Volga region (except Tatars) and other small national groups.

When calculating the number of emigrants in these three groups, we assume that about 15% of their number in 1989 was natural and increased mortality, and the number in 2002 is reduced by the census error (32%). Since we are estimating the emigration of persons recorded in the 1989 census, we subtract the number of children under 14 years of age (28%) from the number of these peoples in 2002.

The result of the assessments is given in table. 7.

Table 7. Migration of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia, thousand people

National groups	Census population		Migration balance
	1989	2002	Population over 14	All population
1. Chechens and Ingush	898,3	1491 (950*)	45	65
2. Russian-speaking population	326,5	48,0	280	325
3. Inhabitants of the Caucasus and Tatars	9,1	3,5	6	8
4. Peoples of Dagestan	25,9	17,9	13	18
5. Other nations	10,3	10,6	3	4
Total	1270,1	1571 (1030*)	347	420

How wrong was the census?

The above calculations and considerations make it possible to estimate the error in the census of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in two versions.

First This option allows comparison of the census results with the calculation performed by the age shift method using the Chechen-Ingush mortality tables for 1988-1989. The calculation also takes into account emigration, the size of which is estimated in Table. 7. Emigration is timed to three dates: 1993 - 55 thousand men and 66 thousand women (Russian speakers), 1998 - 52 thousand men and 62 thousand women (mainly Russian speakers), 2002 - 47 thousand men and 65 thousand women (Russians, Chechens and other national groups). According to the State Statistics Committee, the balance of migration in 1989-1991 was 40 thousand, in 1992-1994 - 147 thousand people. Including those over 14 years old, there were, apparently, 130-140 thousand. Among the registered refugees and migrants, Russians made up 82%, and Russian speakers - 90%).

The age structure of emigrants is taken in accordance with the age and sex structure of Russians and Chechens in 1989, known from a 5% sample.

Second the variant takes into account the above estimates of losses from increased mortality.

The calculation results for both options are presented in Table. 8 and 9.

Table 8. Estimated error of the 2002 census by age groups of men in Chechnya and Ingushetia

Years of birth	Age		Number, thousand people				Error, %
	1989	2002	1989	2002
			Re- writing	Re- writing	Payment
					Var. one	Var. 2	Var. one	Var. 2
1984-1988	0-4	14-18	75265	92661	56459	53743	39	42
1979-1983	5-9	19-23	68087	81861	50757	46661	38	43
1974-1978	10-14	24-28	63353	60912	46003	40811	24	33
1969-1973	15-19	29-33		54416	42755	38635	21	29
1964-1968	20-24	34-38	50743	50091	35042	31557	30	37
1959-1963	25-29	39-43	52504	51272	37558	34352	27	33
1954-1958	30-34	44-48	48029	39073	33494	30868	14	21
1949-1953	35-39	49-53	38952	25775	26243	27322	-6	-6
1944-1948	40-44	54-58	21256	10070	8462	6948	16	31
1939-1943	45-49	59-63	20507	13904	6442	5005	54	64
1934-1938	50-54	64-68	28865	13629	12778	12811	6	6
1929-1933	55-59	69-73	24074	10913	8079	8076	26	26
1924-1928	60-64	74-78	20315	3997	7628	3997	-	-
1919-1923	65-69	79-83	9602	1965	1483	1631	17	17
1914-1918	70-74	84+	6882	2033	1205	1220	40	40
1909-1913	75-79		6578
1904-1908	80-84		3487
1903 and earlier	85+		3206
1984-1943	0-49	14-63	497186	480 035	343214	312023	29	35
Total			600195	512572	374387	338298	27	34

88806 53619 54172 39 39 1979-1983 5-9 19-23 66484 79434 49288 49249 38 38 1974-1978 10-14 24-28 62324 71220 46528 45581 35 36 1969-1973 15-19 29-33 58099 61317 42217 41696 31 32 1964-1968 20-24 34-38 54982 60239 38524 37951 36 37 1959-1963 25-29 39-43 58907 59354 43256 42735 27 28 1954-1958 30-34 44-48 54100 44520 41996 40958 6 8 1949-1953 35-39 49-53 43267 27248 31250 27248 - - 1944-1948 40-44 54-58 23865 12353 9393 9388 24 24 1939-1943 45-49 59-63 25468 20058 10230 10230 49 49 1934-1938 50-54 64-68 36404 18787 19041 18787 1929-1933 55-59 69-73 29927 14119 13849 14119 1924-1928 60-64 74-78 28936 6299 13262 6299 1919-1923 65-69 79-83 18025 3940 4437 3940 1914-1918 70-74 84+ 14258 4656 2297 4656 1909-1913 75-79 13220 1904-1908 80-84 7819 1903 and earlier 85+ 8289 1984-1943 0-49 14-63 519 978 524 549 366300 361939 30 31 Total 676856 572350 419184 417816 27 27

As can be seen from Table. 8 and 9, the estimate of the census error is especially large for adolescents who reached the age of 14-18 in 2002 (0-4 years in 1989). The higher values ​​of the census error are apparently explained by the fact that children, not actively participating in social life, could easily be included in the census sheets several times (together with each of the parents in the case of their separate residence or location, together with grandparents and etc.).

We also note a significant deviation of the census data from the calculated data for men aged 19-23. This is apparently caused by the inclusion of Russian soldiers in this group.

In generations aged 24–43, although this deviation is smaller, it is also quite large (28–37%) and differs little between men and women. In older cohorts (44-53 years old) the error noticeably decreases, and then in 54-63-year-olds it returns to the level of younger generations and even exceeds it. It is hard to believe that middle-aged people did not participate in the distortion of the census, in contrast to younger and older citizens. On the contrary, it can be definitely stated that the census error for the elderly is about the same as for neighboring generations. The method used did not detect census errors, most likely due to the increased migration activity of these age groups. People of this age are still quite energetic and able-bodied, usually already have a family with several children, the responsibility for the future of which pushes them to leave. If we do not take into account the higher level of emigration of these generations in the calculation, we overestimate their estimated number and thus underestimate the census error.

The high value of the coefficient in the age group of 59-63 years, which is especially striking in men, is most likely due to the rounding of age to 60 years, which for men makes it possible to receive a pension. Perhaps the date of deportation to Kazakhstan plays some role, perhaps some expected benefits depend on being among the deported. In any case, exaggerating or rounding off one's age tends to overestimate the census error in one cohort and to depopulate and artificially underestimate the census error in neighboring cohorts.

Small values ​​of the error in ages over 64 also indicate not its absence in the census results, but the unaccounted for factors that did not allow it to be detected. In this case, this is an increased mortality from diseases, which is higher the older the given age group, which was not taken into account in our calculation. But since the number of older people is small, they do not have a very noticeable effect on average distortion of the census.

For men, in whom increased mortality from deteriorating living conditions was partially taken into account, the average error for 14-63-year-olds was 35%, and for all ages - 34%. For women, whose medical losses were practically not taken into account, the corresponding figures are 31% and 27%. Obviously, with a more complete account of mortality from diseases, the average estimate of the error will rise to 32-35%. For caution, we take the smaller of these numbers. In this case, the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia aged 14 and over will not be 1085 thousand, as recorded by the census, but 32% less - 738 thousand.

The census error in estimating the number of children under 14, judging by the age groups 0-4 years old (Tables 8 and 9), is 38-42%. As already noted, babies are more likely to double count, since it was them who were rescued primarily from threatening danger by being sent to Ingushetia or other regions of the country. This increased the likelihood that they would be counted twice in the census. Therefore, we will accept for children born between censuses, the value of a possible error of 40%. It should be noted that both the error resulting from double counting and the increased export of children outside the republics are included here. Thus, the number of children in Chechnya and Ingushetia aged 0-14 years, counted by the 2002 census in the amount of 486 thousand people, we estimate at 292 thousand. Of the total population (1030 thousand), this is 28%, which is slightly less than it was in 1989 (32%).

The national composition of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia according to the 2002 census, taking into account the proposed amendments, can be tentatively presented as follows: 950 thousand Vainakhs (including approximately 700 thousand Chechens and 250 thousand Ingush), 23 thousand Russian-speaking residents (not counting 24.6 thousand Russian soldiers ) and 32 thousand representatives of other nationalities.

The population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 2002 turned out to be 240 thousand less than it was in this territory in 1989, but at the same time the number of Chechens and Ingush increased by 52 thousand (about 6%). Large population losses between censuses occurred only in one place - in the city of Grozny. The number of its inhabitants decreased from 400 thousand in 1989 to 211 thousand in 2002, and taking into account the census error - up to 140-150 thousand people.

Taking the ratio of the population of the two republics to be the same as in the official results of the 2002 census, we find that with a total population of just over 1 million, 330,000 people live in Ingushetia and 675,000 live in Chechnya. This is less than the estimate used by the Chechen administration (815,000) and the Danish Refugee Council's estimate (700,000).

According to the latest census, the period between 1989 and 2002 was a time of extraordinary demographic prosperity for the Chechens and Ingush. In fact, this is of course not the case.

In the 20th century, the number of Chechens and Ingush in the Russian Empire and in the USSR increased rapidly. According to censuses, it was in thousands of people: in 1897 - 272, in 1926 - 393, in 1939 - 500, in 1959 - 525, in 1970 - 770, in 1979 - 942, in 1989 - 1114. Despite the high infant mortality , world war, deportation to Kazakhstan and the resulting temporary reduction in the population, the number of Chechens and Ingush for 1926-1959 increased by 33.6%, much stronger than that of many peoples of the USSR (for example, among the Kazakhs over the same period it fell by 9% , among the Kalmyks - by 20%, among the Abkhazians, although it increased, but only by 15%). This growth has a completely rational explanation, it indicates that the Chechens and Ingush in the twentieth century were captured by the demographic revolution. But miracles do not happen, the peak of the accelerated growth in the number of both peoples, most likely, has already been passed. In order to reach the population indicated by the 2002 census (in all of Russia, according to the census, it was 1,773 thousand people), the growth in the number of Chechens and Ingush would have to accelerate sharply. This is unlikely. According to our estimates, the number of Chechens and Ingush in Russia in 2002 amounted to 1232 thousand people (within the borders of the former USSR about 1300 thousand). Such dynamics is more plausible, it fits into the long-term trends that existed throughout the entire 20th century (Fig. 2).

Anatoly Kulikov, Sergey Lembik. Chechen knot. Chronicle of the armed conflict. 1994-1996 M. 2000, p. 113; N.N. Novichkov, V.Ya. Snegovsky, A.G. Sokolov, V.Yu. Shvarev. Russian armed forces in the Chechen conflict: analysis, results, conclusions. Paris-Moscow 1995, pp. 125-126.

Preliminary results of the loss assessment were posted on the Memorial-Caucasus website in December 2004.

Chechnya in the flames of separatism. Saratov, 1998: 176-177.